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The Syrian Jihad, al-Qaida, and Salafi-Jihadism: An Interview with Muzamjir al-Sham

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In early June, the much-awaited interview with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani was released by Frontline.[1] American journalist Martin Smith asked al-Jolani a number of questions ranging from the jihadi leader’s personal trajectory and relationship with al-Qaida and the Islamic State to the subsequent transformation of HTS from a group invested in global jihadism to one focused on local struggle in Syria and Idlib in particular. The interview revealed what HTS is seemingly becoming more and more every day: a third model of jihadism that is departing from Salafi-Jihadi ideology and in opposition to both al-Qaida and the Islamic State.

In light of the Frontline interview, the authors decided to interview a prominent jihadi source who actively monitors the ongoing conflict between HTS and Hurras al-Din (HaD), the new Syrian al-Qaida affiliate in Syria, and the state of al-Qaida and the Salafi-Jihadi movement globally. The source, who goes by the name Muzamjir al-Sham, is known for revealing, via his Twitter account, detailed information about the inner workings of the various jihadi groups in Syria. While his identity remains unknown, his Twitter page describes him as “a shami voice from within the jihadi current.” According to Aaron Zelin, he is believed to have once belonged to Ahrar al-Sham, a Syrian Islamist militant group.

The interview, which was conducted remotely between 11 and 18 June 2021, covered a number of topics, ranging from whether the jihadi groups opposed to HTS can form a united front (Q1) and whether al-Jolani will tolerate foreign jihadis in his territory (Q4) to the possibility of a reconciliation between al-Qaida and HTS (Q6) and the current state of HaD (Q7). Muzamjir al-Sham further discussed the state of the al-Qaida leadership and its control of its affiliates (Q10-12), as well as Ayman al-Zawahiri’s oath of allegiance, or bay‘a, to the Taliban (Q8-9). Finally, he touched on the differences between al-Qaida and the Islamic State (Q13-14) and the capabilities of these groups to conduct international terrorist operations (Q16-17).

Perhaps the most remarkable detail to emerge from the interview is the assertion that the leader of the Taliban, Hibatullah Akhundzadeh, refused to accept al-Zawahiri’s bay‘a, meaning that the leader of al-Qaida’s pledge of allegiance to the Taliban was rejected. While the source did not substantiate his claim (and has not responded to further queries regarding the matter), it is a potentially significant revelation if proven true. As of now, no other jihadi source has corroborated the assertion, and the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaida is widely seen as strong and enduring. Muzamjir al-Sham appears to disagree, arguing that there will be little al-Qaida activity in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

It is also interesting to note that, according to this source, al-Qaida made the unofficial decision to dissolve HaD and to operate in smaller cells in Syria, thereby avoiding a fratricidal confrontation with HTS. This would seem to confirm the weakened state of al-Qaida in Syria as reported by the United Nations Security Council sanctions monitoring team for al-Qaida and the Islamic State.[2] The source indicates that this decision came from Sayf al-‘Adl, the Egyptian al-Qaida leader in Iran who appears to manage and communicate with al-Qaida central and the al-Qaida affiliates. Given al-Zawahiri’s rumored ill-health, al-‘Adl’s current role is significant as it could undermine the idea of a power vacuum in the event of a leadership transition.

The source was skeptical of the rumors that al-Zawahiri had died, suggesting rather that he could be merely ill. On 10 September 2021, an 852-page book by al-Zawahiri was published by al-Qaida central, and the introduction is dated 21 April 2021. Presumably, therefore, the al-Qaida leader is alive—or least he was until that date—though the text does not reveal anything about his health. The rumors about his death or serious illness could be exploited in an instrumental way by the organization to create confusion around its real condition, allowing al-Qaida to continue to work under the radar.

Jihadi organizations remain a threat not to be underestimated. Al-Qaida’s strategy of keeping a low profile has facilitated its reorganization, allowing it to build ties with other jihadi groups, tribes, clans, and minorities. The Islamic State was too quickly declared defeated; it was also forming new alliances and planning new strategies. In Muzamjir al-Sham’s words, “fighting and struggle are a lung with which Salafi-Jihadism breathes, as it thrives in such circumstances.” Cutting off the air will require specifically tailored policies for each local condition.

 

Q1: After the separation of the Islamic State from al-Qaida, and the subsequent separation of al-Jolani from al-Qaida, al-Qaida’s position in Syria has become very precarious. HaD found itself fighting alone on multiple fronts, squeezed between the Asad regime, the international coalition, and al-Jolani’s HTS. HTS has imprisoned several members of the al-Qaida shura council and several HaD leaders, transforming Idlib into a new Guantanamo. In your opinion, what are the chances that al-Qaida and HaD will be able to form a united front with the other Salafi-Jihadi factions of Idlib, such as Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Tawhid, Ahrar al-Sham, Jundullah, and al-Ghuraba, against HTS?

There will be no united front between al-Qaida and the rest of the Salafi-Jihadi factions in Syria for several reasons.

First, some of these factions have been won over by al-Jolani by his providing some support to them, and thus he neutralized them from the conflict with al-Qaida. Ansar al-Tawhid is an example.

Second, there are some Salafi-Jihadi factions that do not agree with al-Qaida in terms of ideology and consider it deviant. This is the case with Jundullah, which is close in ideology to ISIS.

Third, entering into a front or union with al-Qaida means entering into a comprehensive war with HTS, and this is something the results of which these factions are currently not able to bear.

I expect the formation of something that looks like an alliance, not a merger or a single front. I mean an alliance that looks like a joint operations room, similar to the previously formed Wa-Harrid  al-Mu’minin room[3] that HTS was able to dismantle.

This is a step [the formation of an alliance or united front] that cannot take place right now for several other reasons. The position of al-Qaida and the factions that could ally with it is very weak because of arrests and security operations against them and because of a lack of funding.

However, I believe that the regime’s assault on Idlib will strengthen the position of al-Qaida and the factions that could ally with it, as these factions thrive in chaos.

Q2: Is Ahrar al-Sham still close to al-Qaida and HaD?

Al-Zawahiri sent a letter to Ahrar al-Sham calling for the unification of all factions in Syria. But the factions fell into heresy or deviation.

They are no longer close to al-Qaida, especially after the murder of its first leaders.

Q3: Going back in time to the early quarrel between al-Qaida and ISIS, the Khurasan cell [i.e., a group of senior al-Qaida members who travelled from Iran to Syria in 2013 involved in the reconciliation process between al-Qaida and ISIS] and many of its prominent members from Iran were very critical of the way al-Jolani ran the al-Qaida branch in Syria. It seems that al-Jolani may have facilitated or helped in the killing of a number of members of the Khurasan cell in Aleppo and Idlib, before separating from al-Qaida in 2016. Given the high rank of the members of the Khurasan cell, one would think that it would have been very difficult to betray them without consequences. Does anyone suspect al-Jolani?

The Khurasan cell was not satisfied with al-Jolani’s management of al-Qaida in Syria. Al-Jolani is in origin a son of the Iraqi school [of jihadism], and al-Qaida did not know him or anything about him. Neither did al-Qaida know anything about al-Baghdadi’s policy and management of the [Islamic] State group. Its relationship to the Iraq branch was only superficial. Thus when al-Qaida got the opportunity to get to know al-Jolani and the Iraqi school closely, it did not like any of it. What they were being told was one thing, and what they saw was something else.

Al-Jolani is unknown to the leadership of al-Qaida, unlike the Khurasan cell or members of al-Qaida’s shura council who came to Syria, and unlike Abu al-Hammam [al-Suri], the current leader of HaD, who was a leader in the al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. So all of them are known to al-Qaida, while al-Jolani was completely unknown and his bay‘a to al-Qaida occurred suddenly and without complete coordination.

As for how they [the Khurasan cell’s members] were killed, some were killed in coalition strikes, while others were killed by improvised explosive devices. Others were deliberately pushed into battles with the [Asad] regime and were killed.

Even those who were killed in the coalition strikes, I think that they were betrayed from within by HTS, because some of the leaders were liquidated while walking on the road without using any machinery or electronic device. Some of them, such as Abu Firas [al-Suri], were targeted minutes after meeting with al-Jolani and his leaders.

Q4: According to some sources, HTS specifically targeted foreign fighter groups in Idlib, most notably Omar Omsen of al-Ghuraba [Omar Diaby, the leader of the French foreign fighters]. What is the current status of Salafi-Jihadi groups made up of foreigners in Idlib? Do you think they will have to leave Syria and move to other theaters?

Yes, al-Jolani is pushing them to leave Syria by putting great pressure on them: arresting and kidnapping them, preventing them from fighting, and preventing them from working to earn money.

Al-Jolani is pushing them to leave for two reasons: (1) foreign agreements with some countries; (2) the presence of these emigrants hinders his project in Idlib, and therefore it is necessary to get rid of them.

Indeed, the condition of the [foreign] jihadi groups is very bad. They are completely surrounded and prevented from working or raising funds, and they are being arrested, pursued, and severely restricted. They have become just scattered cells.

Q5: Moving away from the Syrian theater, many analysts and researchers claim that there is no longer an al-Qaida group in Iraq. Is this true? Is Ansar al-Islam[4] still operating in Kurdish areas? Are they still connected to al-Qaida? Are there any brigades or battalions linked to al-Qaida in Iraq?

There are no groups connected to Iraq except for ISIS and Ansar al-Islam. Ansar al-Islam is a very old group with popular support and roots in the areas of Kurdistan, so it is difficult to completely eradicate. However, most of its members are now working in Syria, being in contact with their cells in Iraqi Kurdistan. In Syria they are operating in the western areas of Idlib.

Q6: It is quite clear that reconciliation between al-Qaida and HTS is currently impossible, at least as long as al-Jolani remains HTS’s leader. Do you think that al-Qaida’s opposition to HTS is limited to al-Jolani and his entourage (such as controversial members like Abu Ahmad Hadd, Abu Muhjen al-Hasakawi, Abu Hafs Binnish), or does it also extend to the model of the Salvation Government? If al-Jolani weren’t the leader of HTS, do you think that HaD and other Salafi-Jihadi factions in Idlib would be ready to hold peace talks, similar to what is happening in Afghanistan with the Taliban or what has been proposed by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) in Mali in the past? Will HaD be willing to join the Salvation Government or a similar authority?

No, this is almost impossible. I mean the possibility of reconciliation between HTS and al-Qaida in the event of al-Jolani’s death. This is for a simple reason: when al-Jolani defected from al-Qaida, the entire current that adopted his position left with him. Meanwhile, the other group opposed to al-Jolani’s line and his orientation formed al-Qaida with its new name, Hurras al-Din.

The issue, then, is not about people only; it is about difference in ideology, thought, and methodology. Even if al-Jolani were killed, all the leaders of HTS today are people who have completely severed their ties with al-Qaida.

As for the HaD’s willingness to join a government or authority, this is also entirely out of the question. HaD does have permission from al-Zawahiri to merge with [other] factions, but only after consulting with and obtaining permission from the al-Qaida leadership. However, al-Qaida does not want to repeat the al-Jolani scenario.

Q7: And do you think that HaD will be able to resist in such a hostile environment? Or will it be disbanded?

HaD has already been dissolved, though it was an unofficial decision. It now takes the form of small cells only.

Al-Qaida’s policy was to avoid confrontation with al-Jolani, directing many of its members to remain within the ranks of HTS—a kind of flexibility for absorbing al-Jolani’s attacks.

Q8: And do you think that HaD could eventually migrate from Syria to other areas, such as Afghanistan? What is HaD’s view on what is happening there?

Both HTS and HaD glorify what the Taliban are doing in Afghanistan, and they sing the praises of their victories. HTS thinks that they are the Syrian Taliban, while HaD thinks that the Taliban are the same Taliban of yesterday that embraced al-Qaida.

However, the emir of the Taliban recently rejected the bay‘a of al-Qaida. Therefore, there will not be significant al-Qaida activity in the areas of the Taliban. It is completely unlikely that fighters will leave the base in Syria for Afghanistan, with the possible exception of the fighters of the Turkistan Islamic Party [TIP, a Uyghur jihadi group].

Q9: What do you mean that the Taliban rejected al-Zawahiri’sbay‘a? Did Akhundzada explicitly say he rejected al-Zawahiri’s bay‘a? We only know that Suhail Shaheen recently said that there is no allegiance between al-Qaida and the Taliban[5]. Can you explain to us what you mean?

The emir of the Taliban rejected al-Zawahiri’s bay‘a to him.

Q10: I see. Back to HaD. Is al-Qaida central controlling these new cells? Because many researchers and analysts claim that al-Qaida does not have control over its affiliates, and therefore that they operate independently from the central leadership. Do you agree?

Yes, that is correct. Al-Qaida now operates in a decentralized manner. Al-Qaida central is disconnected from the branches and does not interfere much in their policies or operations. Thus most of the branches operate without referring to al-Qaida central.

As for the Syrian branch, it is still linked to al-Qaida central through Sayf al-‘Adl, who is in Iran and is the supervisor of the Syrian branch. However, the contact with him is weak as well.

Q11: During the last several months, several intelligence services and researchers have reported that al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri could be seriously ill or even dead. There are also rumors that his possible successors could be Sayf al-‘Adl and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi. What is your opinion?

Recently, al-Zawahiri appeared in an audio recording after the news reports speaking of his death. Al-Qaida also released a statement regarding the recent events in Gaza.[6] Therefore, I don’t think he has died. It is possible he is just ill.

Regarding his possible successor, there is a document by some al-Qaida leaders from a number of branches entrusting the leadership to a number of persons. I have it, though I cannot remember where it is right now. Perhaps I can find it for you.

In light of the killing of Abu al-Khayr [al-Masri] and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Sayf al-‘Adl is certainly the most likely successor. However, some branches do not support this.

Q12: And apart from Sayf al-‘Adl, is there any other senior member of the Hittin Shura[7] who is still connected with Syria?

Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri[8] is still based in Syria.

Q13: For many years, both official and unofficial Islamic State propaganda accused al-Qaida of having a too populist, sort of wait-and-see strategy, of not applying the Sharia, and of betraying the Salafi-Jihadi ideology. What is your opinion on this?

Indeed, al-Qaida does not agree with ISIS on many matters. Al-Qaida is more populist because of the ideological revisions that took place among the al-Qaida leaders—I mean here the Egyptian leaders. And al-Qaida was influenced by the ideas of Abu Yahya [al-Libi] and Atiyatullah [al-Libi].[9]

Therefore al-Qaida appears to be more realist as it takes into account some aspects of society. However, the difference between them is not huge as regards the issue of applying the Sharia. Jabhat al-Nusra was also close to ISIS when it came to implementing the Sharia in the liberated areas, where it established the role of the judiciary and carried out some of the canonical punishments. But it did not follow ISIS’s policy of giving media coverage to them.

Q14: You say that the difference between al-Qaida and ISIS on the matter of Sharia rulings is not that huge. However, the Islamic State has repeatedly published magazines and videos in which they declare al-Qaida and its leader to be apostates for their operational choices, such as their alliance with the Taliban. What do you think?

ISIS’s relationship with al-Qaida has passed through three stages:

[First,] a stage in which there was a kind of agreement. This was the stage that preceded the establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra and the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. Al-Qaida continued to recognize the [Islamic] State of Iraq as its branch in Iraq, and ISIS continued to regard al-Qaida with a kind of appreciation, despite the reports that reached al-Qaida concerning violations and abuses committed by the [Islamic] State of Iraq.

As for the second stage, this is the stage of discord. It began with al-Jolani’s announcement of his bay‘a to al-Qaida and opposition to al-Baghdadi, and al-Qaida’s judgment in support of al-Jolani. Here ISIS began to view al-Qaida as a competitor, given that it had encouraged al-Jolani to defect from the [Islamic] State, and accusations began to be hurled between the two sides.

The third stage began after the killing of Abu Khalid al-Suri, the leader in Ahrar al-Sham who was the person appointed by al-Qaida central as arbiter between al-Baghdadi and al-Jolani. This stage came after the fighting between ISIS and the rest of the Syrian factions, including Jabhat al-Nusra, and here the dispute reached the point of accusing ISIS of being on the path of the Kharijites, while ISIS accused al-Qaida in Syria of showing loyalty to apostates and allying with them, and thus of having apostatized as well. Then all of al-Qaida was accused of apostasy.

As for the Taliban, they have been apostate for ISIS for a long time, even before the dispute with al-Qaida … But these matters were not leaked to the media.

Q15: Today, many Salafi-Jihadi groups, including al-Qaida, are still engaged on several fronts, fighting a number of different actors. However, in some areas, some groups appear to be inclined towards abandoning the armed struggle and concluding peace agreements with the governments they are fighting. Do you think such a strategic choice could be a valuable option for Salafi-Jihadi groups, or do you think that there can be no peace deal between them and their opponents?

There are several interrelated factors regarding this issue.

First, fighting and struggle are a lung with which Salafi-Jihadism breathes, as it thrives in such circumstances.

Second, there are many elements that used to be part of jihadi factions that made [reconciliation] agreements.

Third, it seems that after years of conflict Salafi-Jihadism has lost much of its momentum and strength, especially with the disintegration of Ahrar al-Sham, the decline of ISIS, and the cutting of ties between Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaida.

Fourth, there is no doubt that ending a conflict in an unjust manner and without equitable solutions will generate a backlash among many factions and elements that do not belong to Salafi-Jihadi groups. Thus, the slogans raised by Salafi-Jihadism to the effect that it is necessary to continue the struggle will appear as truthful slogans and will attract more elements to them from beyond Salafi-Jihadism. Thus Asad’s success in regaining control of the country and resolving the conflict in his favor, or imposing unfair solutions, will strengthen the Salafi-Jihadi narrative and position.

Q16: Do you think that al-Qaida and ISIS are still capable of waging a global armed struggle against the far enemy? Or will they decide to exclusively concentrate their attacks on the near enemy?

I believe that ISIS is still capable of launching external attacks despite its weak state at the present time. ISIS has gone through similar stages previously and it was eventually able to reassemble its ranks and restore its activity, and this is what it is doing now in Syria, Iraq, and Africa.

As for al-Qaida, external operations are limited to the Yemen branch only, and to a lesser extent to the North African branch. As for the Syrian branch, it is forbidden from launching any external attacks, and it is in a very weak state now.

Q17: So, you say that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and maybe al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) are still capable of conducting external attacks, as they are allowed to do so. But as you may be aware, many scholars and politicians claim that al-Qaida no longer has the strength to carry out attacks in the West. What is your opinion? Does al-Qaida still have the capability to attack the West?

I think that al-Qaida is still capable of launching small attacks in Europe, such as stabbings or tramplings. As for major operations, I do not think that it is capable of that at the present time.

[1] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/abu-mohammad-al-jolani/.

[2] https://undocs.org/S/2021/68.

[3] The operations room referred to by the interviewee is the “Rouse the Believers Operations Room,” a coalition of Salafist-Jihadi groups that rose up in northwest Syria during the Syrian civil war. The coalition included Hurras al-Din, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Ansar al-Islam, and Ansar al-Tawhid. On 12 June 2020, the member groups of the “Rouse the Believers Operations Room” (excluding Ansar al-Tawhid), along with two other Salafi-Jihadi groups (the al-Muqatileen al-Ansar Brigade and the al-Jihad Coordination Group) led by former HTS commanders, reorganized into a new operations room called “So Be Steadfast,” which was quickly routed by HTS.

[4] Ansar al-Islam is a historic Salafi-Jihadi group originally based in Iraqi Kurdistan. In 2014, it shifted its operations to Syria. In February 2015, it announced the creation of a branch in the north-western Syrian province of Idlib that has been mainly active in the northern area of Latakia. It cooperates with HaD in their fight against the Syrian regime and Russian troops.

[5] See Nihad Jariri’s interview with Suhail Shaheen https://mobile.twitter.com/NihadJariri/status/1391155623534989314

[6] The video referenced here is from 12 March 2021, “The Wound of the Rohingya is the Wound of the Islamic Nation”; see https://jihadology.net/2021/03/12/new-video-message-from-al-qaidahs-dr-ayman-al-%e1%ba%93awahiri-the-wound-of-the-rohingya-is-the-wound-of-the-islamic-nation/.

[7] The core leadership of al-Qaida.

[8] Abu ‘Abd al-Karim al-Masri is a veteran member of al-Qaida and a senior leader of HaD. In 2018, al-Masri, was a member of HaD’s shura council, the group’s senior decision-making body, and served as a mediator between it and Jabhat al-Nusra.

[9] Abu Yahya al-Libi was a prominent al-Qaida leader who rose to become al-Qaida’s second in command. He was killed in a drone strike in 2012 in Mir Ali, Pakistan. Atiyatullah al-Libi was a senior member of al-Qaida who worked as general manager for the organization. He was killed in a drone strike in 2011 in North Waziristan, Pakistan.

Jihadi Schadenfreude Over al-Nahdah in Tunisia

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On July 25, President Qays Sa‘id of Tunisia dismissed Prime Minister Hisham al-Mishishi and suspended the activities of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People by invoking emergency powers under Article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution. The rationale was an out-of-control Covid crisis, continuing economic problems, and political dysfunction within the al-Nahdah-led parliament. Some analysts in the West have called Sa‘id’s maneuver an autogolpe, while many Tunisians locally, according to polling data, have backed Sa‘id’s move. It would not be a crisis, however, if the jihadi talking heads did not weigh in.

It is important to note that jihadi activity in Tunisia has been on a decline in recent years due to counterterrorism and military efforts locally against al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), as well as the waning fortunes of foreign fighting endeavors in Iraq, Libya, and Syria as IS lost territory. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the issue given the large-scale mobilization seen in Tunisia over the past decade, and since any form of instability is seen as an opportunity by the jihadi movement. Plus, what initially might appear as rhetoric, as was the case with jihadis speaking on the 2011 Tunisia uprising and having no part in it, could lead to a re-energized mobilization, in the same way that Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) was able to take advantage of new conditions following the overthrow of former president Bin ‘Ali.

How Jihadis Have Framed the Crisis

Much of the messaging from jihadi thinkers surrounding the latest political events in Tunisia boils down to gloating over the embarrassment that al-Nahdah has suffered as a consequence of the freezing of parliament. In their telling, this is another example of democracy failing Islamist parties and further evidence that fighting jihad and instituting sharia are the only way to push back against local deep states and perceived anti-Islamic authoritarian forces. The Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-affiliated cleric Shaykh ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi also views what happened through the prism of a conspiracy from outside forces, in this seeing similarities with what happened in Egypt with ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood: “[Sa‘id] is leading a coup with the support of France, Sisi, and [the Crown Prince of the UAE] Ibn Zayed… if the lunatic is able to he will do as Sisi of Egypt.”

Meanwhile, the Syrian-based Tansiqiyyat al-Jihad’s Abu al-‘Abd Ashida, seeking to undermine democracy as a legitimate form of governance, rhetorically and cynically states and then asks the following: “Bloody red democracy. Coup in Tunisia. Coup in Egypt. Coup of [Libyan strongman Khalifah] Haftar. So this is considered democracy?” Abu Mahmud al-Filastini, a London-based ideologue and acolyte of Abu Qatada al-Filastini, argues that “no change will come without an effective force that loosens the joints of the deep state and undermines its pillars. The path of democracy cannot lead to the rule of sharia and the building of an Islamic state.” His mentor, Abu Qatada, gets to the point and bluntly states: “Jihad is a necessity. Almost all Muslims commenting today, from all walks of life, in their comments on what happened in Tunisia agree that jihad has become a necessity… They have no other choice.”

Alluding to what has become of al-Nahdah, the leader of Jaysh al-Ummah in Gaza, Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi, quotes a saying of the second caliph ʿUmar Ibn al-Khattab: “We are a people whom God has honored with Islam, so whenever we seek honor through anything else, God will humiliate us.” Adding onto the critiques of al-Nahdah is the London-based ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who addresses the party saying, “You will not find anyone crying for you … this is the reward of those who raise the slogan ‘separating da‘wa from politics’ and the slogan ‘freedom before Islam, and before applying the teachings and laws of Islam.’ You have neither achieved freedom nor supported the religion!” Al-Tartusi goes on to call al-Nahdah out for having tried to build relations with France while the latter is, in his view, domestically attacking Islam. Therefore, “[al-Nahdah] paid the price of this stance of vacillation and dilution … and this is the fate of every movement or group that follows this false and vacillating approach of theirs!”

As for the Tunisian ideologue in HTS who goes by the name al-Idrisi, his approach is more localized since he is originally from Tunisia: “The Tunisian revolution is paying the price of not purging the country of the remnants of the former regime, from the security [services], the army, influential businessmen, and the media. The parties are paying the price of living in an illusion and wishful thinking.” Of course, since al-Idrisi is with HTS and based in Syria now, he heavily criticizes on a regional level al-Nahdah’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in failing the revolution: “Peoples’ relying on the Brotherhood in leading the Arab Spring revolutions is like relying on a mirage.” This leads to a key point in buttressing his own position on leaving Tunisia, which is that the best model today is that of HTS in Syria and the Taliban in Afghanistan. “The success of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Taliban,” he says, “calls for the umma’s reconsideration of the moderate jihadist movements that have proven their political and military sophistication in managing conflict, establishing existence, and seizing freedom from the clutches of evildoers.”

Beyond specific ideologues, the pro-AQ news agency Thabat and the official IS newsletter al-Naba’ also commented on the events in Tunisia. The Thabat article was penned by an Abu al-Bara’ al-Libi, who portrays the recent experience of al-Nahdah as part of a long history of Muslim Brotherhood organizations being used and betrayed by local regimes they had engaged with. He points in particular to what happened to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt under Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and more recently in the coup of ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi. Sudan and Turkey are mentioned as cases too. Whereas Brotherhood organizations, including al-Nahdah, do not not heed the lessons of the past, he claims, the jihadis are never fooled since they have “a firm and unchanging stance regarding every tyrant (taghut) who substitutes God’s law and accepts democracy.”

Tracking with the rest of the aforementioned critiques, IS’s editorial in al-Naba’ directly attacks al-Nahdah’s embrace of democracy:

And among those who have most opposed God and His Messenger in this time are the seekers, advocates, and followers of democracy, who have believed in it and taken it as a path and course, and thus have contravened the Sunna and the precepts. God has imposed on them humiliation, destitution, and becoming lost, and that has become appended to them in all of their circumstances like a collar around their necks. This is the very thing that has happened today to the apostate Ikhwan in Tunisia after they contravened the path of the believers, followed democracy, sought help in it, glorified it, and made it a judge among them and a guide for them to the path of Hellfire. The result resembled what happened to them before, when the one they were content with as a taghut for themselves turned on them.

The IS editorial also uses the downfall of al-Nahdah as an opportunity to win points with AQ and its supporters, since in the past Abu Qatada al-Filistini, whom IS sees as a pro-AQ ideologue, had commended Qays Sa‘id when he won the 2019 Tunisian presidential election. Recalling the former praise of “some of the theoreticians of al-Qaeda” for Sa‘id, the editorial notes: “Indeed the stance of the dimwits of al-Qaeda regarding the Tunisian taghut is no less than the stance of the apostate Ikhwan in its naivete.” It is possible that Abu Qatada and others favored Sa‘id because of the latter’s traditional views on the death penalty, criminalization of homosexuality, and opposing equal inheritance between men and women.

Will These Words Amount to Anything?

It is hard to believe that Sa‘id would follow the mistakes that were made in the aftermath of the revolution as it relates to the jihadi movement. There have been too many hard-fought lessons learned by the state. It will not repeat the mistake of doing a prisoner amnesty like the transitional government did in February 2011 or having a light touch policy vis-à-vis AST as al-Nahdah did following its coming to power in the October 2011 Constituent Assembly election. That said, it would not be surprising if either AQ or IS attempted to prod the capabilities of the Tunisian state if these groups foresee some opening for themselves in the medium term. If Sa‘id goes full authoritarian, however, it is likely that dynamics will play out as they did under former Tunisian dictator Bin ‘Ali: suppression of local mobilization, with much of Tunisian jihadi activity occurring outside its borders in Europe or the latest foreign fighter destination—potentially Afghanistan again in light of the Taliban’s methodical takeover of Afghan territory.

Hamas and the Jihadis

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The Palestinian terrorist group Hamas has long been a source of controversy in the world of Sunni jihadism. Especially since it participated in and won the elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006, going on to form a unity government with Fatah, the dominant faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the following year, the group has generally been shunned by jihadis. Hamas’s roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, its embrace of the “polytheistic” religion of democracy, its perceived failure to rule by Islamic law in Gaza, its unholy alliance with Shiite Iran—all of this has made it unpalatable, if not anathema, to the adherents of Jihadi Salafism (al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya). The question that divides jihadis is exactly what level of condemnation is called for. Is the right approach to pronounce takfir (excommunication) on Hamas, or on certain elements of it? Is Hamas to be supported when it faces off against the Jewish state? Are its war dead to be considered martyrs?

The recent hostilities between Hamas and Israel have brought the controversy over Hamas back to the fore, shedding new light on the jihadi movement’s ideological fault lines. The first division is that between al-Qaida and the Islamic State, and as one would expect it is the Islamic State that takes the harder line against Hamas. There is another fault line, however, that runs between two ideological camps on the pro-al-Qaida side of the jihadi movement. It is here, as will be seen, where the most intense debate has taken place. One of the camps has not shied away from criticizing al-Qaida itself.

Al-Qaida vs. the Islamic State

Shortly after the conflict between Israel and Hamas began on May 10, when Hamas fired more than 150 rockets into Israel and Israel responded with airstrikes, most jihadi groups, including the various branches of al-Qaida, issued statements of solidarity with the Palestinians. The statements also decried the perceived Israeli aggression on the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, where clashes had been taking place between worshippers and Israeli security forces since May 7. Al-Qaida central, through its al-Sahab media outlet, issued three such statements between mid-May and early June.

The first statement appeared on May 11 in the form of an issue of al-Qaida’s occasional newsletter, al-Nafir. Titled “Al-Aqsa in the Care of the Descendants of al-Bara’ ibn Malik,” it appears to have been written before the air war began as its focus is the Palestinian demonstrations around the al-Aqsa mosque. Al-Qaida here likens the fearlessness of the demonstrators to that of the Prophet’s companion al-Bara’ ibn Malik, who was launched into a walled area of thousands of apostates in the so-called “wars of apostasy” in early Islam. The issue also quoted at length from a March 2002 speech by Osama bin Ladin in which he inveighs against normalization with the Jewish state and encourages Muslims to kill Americans and Jews by any means possible.

Several days later, on May 17, came a more controversial statement from al-Qaida’s “general leadership,” titled “Statement of Love, Honor, and Support for Our People in Palestine.” The purpose of the statement was to salute the “mujahidin” in Gaza and their launching of “jihadi missiles toward the Zionists.” The statement never mentions Hamas, but it does mourn the death of one of its military commanders. Toward the end, the al-Qaida leadership offers its condolences (or congratulations) to the Palestinians on “your pious martyrs, foremost among them the heroic leader Basim ‘Isa Abu ‘Imad.” Basim ‘Isa, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza on May 12, was a top military commander of the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s armed wing. As noted by the analyst Wassim Nasr on Twitter, the praise for Basim ‘Isa here was in keeping with a preexisting al-Qaida policy to distinguish between the political and military wings of Hamas. That policy was elucidated over a decade ago by the al-Qaida commander Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (d. 2010) after he made the mistake of saying in an interview that “we and Hamas share the same thinking and the same methodology.” Following criticism of his remark, Abu al-Yazid issued a clarification acknowledging that he had misspoken and explaining that the approach of the al-Qaida leadership is to distinguish between Hamas as a political organization, which had committed terrible methodological errors such as embracing democracy, and the righteous mujahideen fighting under Hamas’s banner (i.e., the al-Qassam Brigades, or at least some of them).

The third al-Qaida statement appeared on June 2, two weeks after a ceasefire was reached between the warring parties on May 21. Once again taking the form of an issue of al-Qaida’s al-Nafir newsletter, the statement hailed Hamas’s “sword of Jerusalem” campaign as a great victory that should be seized on “to revive the duty of jihad” in the youth of the Muslim umma. The model of initiating battles to defend mosques under siege from unbelievers and apostates was one to be followed across the Islamic world. The statement went on to praise “the mujahidin in Gaza” and in particular “their heroic leader Muhammad al-Dayf,” the supreme military commander of the al-Qassam Brigades. The singling out of al-Dayf further exemplified the al-Qaida leadership’s fondness for Hamas’s military wing to the exclusion of its political wing.

Taken together, the three statements show al-Qaida posturing as the ally of the al-Qassam Brigades and trying to portray the hostilities with the Jewish state as part of al-Qaida’s larger war with the Americans, the Zionists, and the “client” Arab regimes. Nowhere in these statements is there any hint of criticism of Hamas as a political organization, unless that is to be read in the omission of Hamas’s name. In the past al-Qaida has issued harsh condemnations of the Hamas political leadership, but here no such thing is to be found.

The Islamic State could not have responded more differently to the war between Hamas and Israel. After more than a week of silence on the matter, the official line came in the editorial of the May 20 issue of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter, al-Naba’. Titled “The Road to Jerusalem,” the editorial condemned Hamas (never mentioned by name) as a proxy of Shiite Iran and as part of its axis of “resistance.” Hamas’s warfare was not to be considered jihad as it served the interests of the Iranians and their plot for regional domination. “The difference between jihad and resistance is as the difference between truth and falsehood,” the editorial read. “Whoso allies with those who curse the Prophet’s wives [i.e., the Shia] will never liberate Jerusalem … and whoso differentiates between the Rejectionists [i.e., the Shia] and the Jews will never liberate Jerusalem … Indeed, we consider the mujahid who lies in wait for the Rejectionists in Iraq to be closer to Jerusalem than those who show loyalty to the Rejectionists and burnish their image.” The editorial went on to claim that all of the Islamic State’s battles “east and west are in fact steps in the direction of Jerusalem, Mecca, al-Andalus, Baghdad, Damascus, and all other captured Muslim lands.” In other words, it is the Islamic State, and not Hamas, that holds the promise of liberating Jerusalem.

Perhaps the most notable line in the editorial was a remark toward the end rejecting the idea of Palestinian exceptionalism. “The soldiers of the caliphate,” it stated, “have not exaggerated the issue of Palestine and have not made it an exception among the issues of the Muslims … They have not differentiated between the blood of their Muslim brethren in Palestine and the blood of their brethren in other lands.” This is a remarkable statement, and one that illustrates a stark difference between the Islamic State and al-Qaida regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike al-Qaida, the Islamic State is not interested in posing as the ally of whatever Sunni Muslim group is waging war against the Jewish state. For the Islamic State, any group that deviates from its methodology (manhaj) is simply not worthy of honor and support.

On June 21, the Islamic State’s official spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, delivered an audio address that echoed much of the sentiment of the editorial. Al-Qurashi ridiculed the idea that Hamas could ever bring victory to Palestine and urged the Palestinians not to be deceived by the rockets launched by Hamas “in service of their Iranian masters.” Hamas was hypocritical for condemning the Gulf states’ normalization with Israel when it had normalized relations with “Zoroastrian, Safavid Iran.” As in the editorial, the idea here is that it is folly to differentiate between the Jews and the Shia.

Al-Maqdisi vs. Abu Qatada

Among jihadis opposed to the Islamic State and generally aligned with al-Qaida, a divide has emerged in recent years between two competing ideological camps—namely, those who side with the more hardline ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and those who ally with the relatively more moderate Abu Qatada al-Filastini. Both men, who are Palestinian-Jordanians, have active social media presences and devoted followings. Much of their disagreement has revolved around the issue of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, which al-Maqdisi has condemned and Abu Qatada praised. The matter of Hamas has proven equally controversial.

The war of words over Hamas, which played out on the messaging app Telegram, began on May 13 when al-Maqdisi responded to a comment by the jihadi scholar Na’il ibn Ghazi Musran, who is aligned with Abu Qatada. Musran had written that Gaza was “the standard of distinction between faith and unbelief, and the line separating monotheism (tawhid) in its entirety from apostasy in its entirety.” The author was referring to the different reactions in the Arab world to the Gaza conflict, his point being that those unsupportive of the Palestinian belligerents were in “the camp of apostasy” and those supportive were in “the camp of truth.” In his response, al-Maqdisi ridiculed the idea that “Gaza is the standard,” as the ongoing battle was not one between tawhid and unbelief. He cited what he saw as the outright apostasy of some Palestinian youth and their adherence to pagan nationalism. Addressing the people of Palestine, he wrote: “Do not expect victory from God so long as you are silent about the reviling and cursing of God around you.”

Later that day, Abu Qatada authored a brief response in which he objected to such casual dismissal of unspecified Palestinian youth as apostates. “It is incumbent upon us,” he wrote, “to treat the Muslim youth, even if they are people of sin, as belonging to us. We should understand them as belonging to us and being of us, for the call to expel them from the umma means making them the soldiers of Satan, and making them against us and against Islam. This is a profound error.” Abu Qatada did not believe that Hamas’s efforts would achieve “complete victory and the elimination of the Jewish state,” but nonetheless “these winds of faith in Palestine,” he said, referring to Hamas’s military operations, keep “the spirit of jihad” alive and renew faith in “the necessity of waging jihad against the unbelievers and the apostates.” And likewise, “they teach us to keep in check our quarrels with the Muslim sinner, the Muslim innovator, and the Muslim who errs.”

If Abu Qatada’s view was that the Gaza conflict ought to teach jihadis to be more tolerant and openminded, al-Maqdisi’s view was the opposite. In a post published on May 14, al-Maqdisi accused a certain unnamed shaykh (ba‘d al-shuyukh) of “exploiting these events to spread error and confusion.” “What is necessary,” he retorted, “is that these occasions and battles and wars be exploited to teach people their tawhid and their true religion, not to dilute it, change it, and distort it with false conceptions.” The problem with “making Gaza and Palestine the measure of unbelief and faith,” he reiterated, was that it overlooked the transgressions of the those purporting to wage jihad. “It is impossible for victory to come,” he declared, “from the exaltation of the Rejectionists of Iran and its affiliated parties that attack the honor of the Prophet’s wives, pronounce takfir on the Companions, and kill the Sunnis in Iraq and al-Sham.” In a subsequent post published the next day, al-Maqdisi clarified that while he supports the military efforts of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad against the Jews, he nonetheless does not consider them “jihad in the path of God”; for the path of these groups is not “tawhid and dissociation from all forms of polytheism and idolatry,” but rather “exalting and burnishing of the image of Rejectionist Iran.”

Al-Maqdisi vs. al-Qaida (and Abu Qatada)

The war of words between al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada went on hiatus for about two weeks. It resumed on June 1 when al-Maqdisi authored a post condemning al-Qaida’s statement mourning the death of the Hamas military commander Basim ‘Isa. In the post, titled “Questions Posed to the Brothers at al-Sahab,” al-Maqdisi presented his criticism in the form of questionings attributed to others. “Many mujahid brothers, shaykhs, and preachers were displeased,” he wrote, “by the al-Sahab statement’s exaltation of the al-Qassam leader who was killed in the recent war in Gaza, and they wondered astonishedly: ‘Are our brothers not aware of the deviation of Hamas and its leadership from the path of tawhid in favor of the path of democracy, and their alignment with Hizb al-Lat [i.e., Hizbullah] and Bashar [al-Asad] and Iran?’” Al-Maqdisi continued in this way, referring to the “surprises, shocks, and perturbations” that have succeeded one after the other since the mourning of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi by some of the al-Qaida leadership. “Has the methodology (manhaj) changed?” he asked. “Or have the ranks of al-Qaida been penetrated by those who pay no heed to the purity of the manhaj? … It is presumed that al-Qaida continues to condemn the advocates of democratic Islamism and to dissociate from their manhaj, so how can it mourn their dead when they died on behalf of democracy? And how can it exalt their military leaders who in turn exalt Iran and Bashar and choose the path of democracy?” Al-Maqdisi was putting it out there that a lot of supporters of al-Qaida, himself included, were aghast at such praise for Hamas, even if the praise was restricted to Hamas’s military wing.

The following day, Abu Qatada responded to al-Maqdisi with a brief post implicitly rebuking him for suggesting that Hamas’s war dead were not martyrs (al-Maqdisi had pondered how al-Qaida could “mourn their dead when they died on behalf of democracy?”). Hamas was far from perfect, Abu Qatada explained, yet it nonetheless deserved praise for having “returned the Islamic identity” to the Palestinian cause that had been dominated by leftist and secularist parties. For this reason, he said, and because the secularist alternative is far worse, the critics of Hamas have generally been restrained in their criticism. The right way to deal with them, he declared, was to seek their improvement (ta‘dil) and not their destruction (tadmir). “Their dead are martyrs and their legal status is Islam,” he concluded. “Patience concerning their errors, together with the proffering of advice, is the right-guided sunni way.”

Al-Maqdisi’s response, which appeared the next day, was to insist that “whoso is killed in the path of democracy, and in support of a group that refrains from implementing the Sharia and chooses democracy, is not a martyr; rather he is a corpse (fatis), bother some though it will.” In the same post, al-Maqdisi launched into a comparison of Hamas and the Islamic State, both of which, as he explains, have killed their opponents and exposed their civilian populations to bombardment. Though al-Maqdisi has long been a critic of the Islamic State, here he suggests that the caliphate is superior to Hamas in that it has implemented the Sharia as opposed to democracy and does not show loyalty to idolatrous tyrants (tawaghit). Why then, he asks, addressing Abu Qatada (though not by name), is it your view that we must approach the Islamic State as something to be destroyed (tadmir) but Hamas as something to be improved (ta‘dil)? Al-Maqdisi’s point here was not that the Islamic State is improvable while Hamas is not. His point, rather, was that if the Islamic State is irredeemable then Hamas is doubly so, since Hamas is worse than the Islamic State in certain ways.

This time Abu Qatada did not respond. Al-Maqdisi would follow up to reaffirm that “whoso dies in the path of democracy is a corpse, not a martyr,” and later he would author a long post quoting some of Abu Qatada’s older works that were highly critical of Hamas and its ilk. The most recent post by Abu Qatada regarding Hamas was actually a statement condemning the group for allying with Iran and its Shiite proxies, and particularly the Houthis whom a Hamas representative had recently honored with a medal. Yet even here it was clear that Abu Qatada considered Hamas a Muslim group; the criticism was harsh but still intended as constructive.

Whither al-Maqdisi and al-Qaida?

As noted above, the jihadi reactions to last month’s Israel-Hamas war point to two fault lines in the Sunni jihadi movement: one between the Islamic State and al-Qaida, and one in the pro-al-Qaida side of the movement between the followers of al-Maqdisi and the followers of Abu Qatada. Al-Qaida, as I have written before, almost certainly would like to hold on to both ideological camps, but increasingly it is alienating al-Maqdisi and his followers. The change in approach appears to be by design. With the Islamic State representing the more extreme and intolerant version of Jihadi Salafism, al-Qaida is intent on presenting itself as the movement’s more moderate face. To that end, it has taken a softer line on mainstream Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and played down the emphasis on ideological exclusivism promoted by al-Maqdisi and his camp.

Al-Qaida has long wavered between a more pan-Islamist and a more Salafi (i.e., doctrinally exclusivist) tendency, and today the pan-Islamist tendency has the edge. Al-Maqdisi has taken note of this development, hence his questioning whether al-Qaida has “changed its methodology.” For the supporters of the Islamic State, the answer to this question is obvious and al-Maqdisi knows it. As one Islamic State supporter recently wrote, addressing al-Maqdisi, “Yes, it has changed, and you have ceased to have any value to them and they no longer pay any heed to what you say. Soon they may issue a statement in which, implicitly or explicitly, they dissociate from you and your extremism.” The writer was probably overstating the divergence between al-Maqdisi and al-Qaida; neither is eager for a divorce. But if al-Maqdisi continues to express outrage at what he see as the accumulating deviations of al-Qaida, then a breakup of sorts may well be inevitable.

Is Ayman al-Zawahiri Dead?

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In November 2020, reports emerged on social media and in the Pakistani press that al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri had recently died of natural causes, possibly in Afghanistan. Born in 1951, the Egyptian jihadi veteran has been at the helm of al-Qaida since Osama bin Ladin’s death in the raid on Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011. During this time he has been highly visible as the face of the organization, delivering numerous audio and video addresses and offering written guidance to its members and branches. While there have been periods when he was incommunicado and his fate uncertain, never before have rumors of his demise swirled with such intensity. The release last week of a new video featuring al-Zawahiri has only reinforced those rumors, raising questions about the future of al-Qaida’s leadership and its future as an organization.

The Wound of the Rohingya

The new video, released on March 12, 2021 and titled “The Rohingya Are the Wound of the Entire Umma,” is peculiar in several respects. First, though it is advertised as a video address by al-Zawahiri, he is not in fact the main speaker. That role is played by an unidentified narrator, who introduces the subject (the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar and the world’s failure to do something about it) and provides the vast majority of the commentary. Al-Zawahiri’s voice can be heard (he does not actually appear in the video) on just six occasions, in snippets ranging from eleven seconds to a minute and a half. In total, he speaks for just three minutes and forty-five seconds in the nearly 22-minute video. While news coverages clippings take up a lot of this time, and that is normal in these sorts of videos, it is not normal for al-Zawahiri to play second fiddle to another speaker.

Al-Zawahiri, it seems, did at some point record an address on the subject of the Rohingya genocide. But the impression given by the video is that this was recorded so long ago that it needed trimming and repackaging in order not to seem dated and timeworn. In one of the six snippets, al-Zawahiri speaks of “the democratic government of Myanmar,” indicating that his recorded words are not recent. The narrator, by contrast, refers to “the military coup in Myanmar,” showing that at least he is up to date on current affairs. Al-Zawahiri’s words are indeed so general that they could have been recorded as long ago as 2017. Nothing in his three minutes and forty-five seconds offers anything remotely approaching proof of life.

In his last video, al-Zawahiri also did not refer to recent events. Released on September 11, 2020, this was a most unusual video for al-Qaida to put out on the anniversary of 9/11. Billed as the first installment of a series titled “Deal of the Century or Centuries of Campaigns?” its general subject is the Trump administration’s policies regarding Israel. At the beginning of the video, al-Zawahiri describes some of the Trump administration’s recent moves, such as relocating the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, as part of “the long-running struggle between the Muslims and the Crusaders.” Yet the bulk of his address takes the form of an extended refutation of an al-Jazeera documentary from July 2019 that asserted links between al-Qaida and Bahraini intelligence. Al-Zawahiri made no reference to anything more recent than that.

Another peculiarity of the Rohingya video, as pointed out by Wassim Nasr, is the omission of the phrase “may God preserve him” from its usual place after al-Zawahiri’s name, both in the announcement for the video and in the video itself. In jihadi media products, the words “may God preserve him” usually follow the name of a speaker/author who is alive, whereas the words “may God have mercy on him” usually follow the name of a speaker/author who is dead. The absence of either of these expressions here is striking, particularly in the context of rumors of al-Zawahiri’s death. The phraseology was also missing from al-Zawahiri’s “Deal of the Century” video. By contrast, “may God preserve him” followed al-Zawahiri’s name is his video from May 2020, as it did in nearly all of his videos from 2019. While occasionally al-Qaida has neglected to include the phrase in videos of al-Zawahiri in the past, to do so twice in a row under the current circumstances is to give the impression that he very well could be dead.

Video from March 12, 2021

Video from September 11, 2020

Video from May 19, 2020

Video from December 27, 2019

Jihadi reactions

Following the release of the video, supporters of the Islamic State trolled supporters of al-Qaida on Telegram, sometimes using the hashtag @where_is_al-Zawahiri (#أين_الظواهري). Sawt al-Zarqawi, a prominent commentator, urged those in the Islamic State camp to use the hashtag and to give the “apostate” al-Qaida lovers hell in retaliation for how they responded to the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019. “Flog them and gloat over them,” he wrote, “as those accursed ones did before when they rejoiced and exulted in the martyrdom of Shaykh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, may God accept him … today the shoe is on the other foot.”

Another prominent supporter of the Islamic State, known as Baha’, called the video a failed attempt “to prove that al-Zawahiri is alive.” While the video was presented as being a new address by al-Zawahiri, he wrote, it obviously was not, and “even the supporters of al-Qaida recognized this time that it is an old production.” More discouraging for them still, he continued, was the absence of the phrase “may God preserve him,” an omission that “invites speculation.” In another post, Baha’ wrote that the video, rather than reassuring al-Qaida supporters about their emir’s status, instead had the effect of “fueling speculation about al-Zawahiri’s fate and the fate of al-Qaida in its entirety.”

Baha’s own take is that al-Zawahiri is long dead and that al-Qaida, for whatever reason, is trying to cover it up: “All of this muddling … confirms that which is already established, which is that al-Zawahiri died a long time ago. Foolish al-Qaida’s current efforts are akin to trying to cover up the sun with a sieve.” But al-Qaida may not be ready, he added, to announce the death of its leader. Alluding to the two-year period from 2014 to 2015 when al-Qaida urged its members to give bay‘a, or allegiance, to Taliban leader Mullah Omar as their supreme authority even though he had been dead since 2013, Baha’ quipped that “giving bay‘a to the dead is a registered al-Qaida trademark.”

The online supporters of al-Qaida, as Baha’ correctly noted, made no effort to convince themselves that al-Zawahiri’s video was new and that it furnished proof of life. To the contrary, some of them began to entertain the possibility that al-Zawahiri had died. In a post released the day after the video, Jallad al-Murji’a, one of the more outspoken pro-al-Qaida commentators on Telegram, praised al-Zawahiri as one of the giants of the jihadi movement while minimizing the significance of his possible death. Jihad is not about any particular leader or organization, he reminded his readers, and all of us, including al-Zawahiri, will one day die. “There will come a day when [al-Zawahiri] dies,” Jallad al-Murji’a wrote, “whether that is today or tomorrow, for death will afflict all of us.” In that event, al-Qaida “may pass through stages of weakness,” but in one form or another it will endure. This is because al-Qaida “is more than just an armed group; rather, it is an idea and methodology and creed that will not expire with the death of its adherents.” None of this, he said, was to affirm or deny the rumors of al-Zawahiri’s death, only to remind everyone that his death will eventually come and that the jihad will continue.

A similar sentiment was expressed by another pro-al-Qaida personality, Warith al-Qassam, who in a post informed al-Qaida’s unbelieving adversaries that the organization does not  fight on behalf of any particular individual. “If for the sake of argument we accept your claims that the jihad will end with the death of our shaykh,” he wrote, “then the jihad would have ended more than fifteen years ago with the death of the Imam Abu ‘Abdallah [i.e., Osama bin Ladin].”

These kinds of statements  do not constitute acknowledgment of al-Zawahiri’s death, but they do show that al-Qaida supporters are beginning at least to take seriously the idea that their leader has passed.

The Problem of succession

The possibility of al-Zawahiri’s death raises the question of who will succeed him. The process of choosing a successor could be a difficult one.

Several years ago, al-Qaida put in place a succession plan providing for an orderly transition, but it may be of little help today. The plan was detailed in a set of documents leaked by the Syrian-based jihadi al-Zubayr al-Ghazzi in the course of the dispute between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the group of al-Qaida loyalists in Syria. The documents, from 2014, are the handwritten statements of six high-ranking members of al-Qaida pledging to honor the succession plan. The line of succession to al-Zawahiri is described as follows: First, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, then Abu Muhammad al-Masri, then Sayf al-‘Adl, then Nasir al-Wuhayshi, and then another person to be chosen by al-Qaida’s shura council. Out of the four men named here, three are now dead: Nasir al-Wuhayshi was killed in a drone strike in Yemen in 2015, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was killed by the same means in Syria in 2017, and Abu Muhammad al-Masri was gunned down in Iran (most likely by Israeli agents) in 2020. That leaves Sayf al-‘Adl as the only surviving candidate, but his elevation could be complicated by the fact that he is living in Iran.

The six documents detailing the succession plan clearly state that for a candidate to be given bay‘a as emir he must be present in Khurasan (i.e., the Afghanistan-Pakistan region) or in one of al-Qaida’s branches. That would seem to rule out anyone living in Iran, including al-‘Adl, who is forbidden from leaving the country in accordance with the terms of a 2015 prisoner exchange deal. However, the deal with Iran was reached after these succession documents were written, leaving open the possibility that the restriction on his candidacy no longer applies. While the prisoner exchange deal forbade al-‘Adl from leaving Iran, it also enabled him to live a more normal life and to operate more freely. Thus he may feel perfectly comfortable claiming the mantle of al-Qaida’s global leadership. Even so, it would be problematic for ‘Adl to assume the emirship while still living in Iran, a country routinely described by al-Zawahiri as an enemy state and seen as such by the vast majority of al-Qaida’s supporters. Such a situation would almost certainly alienate al-Qaida’s support base of hardline Jihadi Salafis and possibly some of its commanders. So if al-‘Adl were indeed to succeed al-Zawahiri, he would be wise to do so discreetly—and to try to leave Iran for another safe location as soon as possible.

If al-‘Adl is disqualified, however, on the basis of his location, then perhaps the decision on a successor would fall to al-Qaida’s shura council. In that case the picture becomes more obscure. One possible candidate in this scenario is ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, al-Zawahiri’s Moroccan-born son-in-law who is in charge of al-Qaida’s main media platform, al-Sahab. But he too, according to the U.S. State Department, is based in Iran. Incidentally, al-Maghrebi is the author of one of the six pledges outlining the 2014 succession plan. Two of the other authors of these pledges, Abu Ziyad al-‘Iraqi and Abu Dujana al-Basha, are no longer alive. Perhaps one of the other three authors (Abu Hammam al-Sa‘idi, Salih ibn Sa‘id al-Ghamidi, and Abu ‘Amr al-Masri) is a possible candidate, but there seems to be no publicly available information about who or where they are.

Another complicating factor in the succession process is the Taliban’s ongoing negotations with the Afghan government and its hopes for a complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, as is well known, has long enjoyed a close relationship with the Taliban and even presents itself as ultimately subservient to the Taliban leader. Yet in seeking to get the United States to agree to a military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban has sought to minimize the relationship with al-Qaida, going so far as to deny that any al-Qaida members are present in Afghanistan. That is of course false (in summer 2020 CENTCOM commander Kenneth McKenzie located al-Zawahiri in eastern Afghanistan, and in fall of last year Afghan special forces eliminated al-Qaida’s media chief in Ghazni Province), but the Taliban’s interest in making it seem that al-Qaida is of little significance could have an effect on succession.

The Taliban appears to have asked the al-Qaida central leadership to keep a low profile while it negotiates a U.S. exit. Hardly any al-Qaida videos have been released since the signing of the Doha accord in February 2020. So if al-Zawahiri were to have died, and especially if he died while living in Afghanistan, the Taliban might request that al-Qaida not announce it—and thus delay announcing a successor. That delay could grow into a long one, as the Biden administration may never agree to a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Three distinct possibilities

While al-Zawahiri’s death is not confirmed, all signs seem to be pointing in that direction. Even al-Qaida itself, by leaving out the words “may God preserve him” from its latest video, seems to be signaling that he could be dead. The first and most likely possibility, then, is that al-Zawahiri has died but that al-Qaida does not yet wish to confirm it, either because it is playing for time as it manages a succession or because the Taliban has asked it not to, or both—or perhaps for some other reason.

Yet if this is the case, the question remains why al-Qaida would put out the Rohingya video in the first place. What possible benefit is there in fueling speculation that al-Zawahiri is dead? Is the purpose to send a message to al-Qaida’s global membership that a transition may be underway? Perhaps that is so, but another explanation is also possible.

The second possibility is that al- Zawahiri is not dead but that al-Qaida wants us to think that he might be. In other words, al-Qaida is deliberately fostering ambiguity for some strategic purpose, perhaps because al-Qaida (in cooperation with the Taliban) wants to broadcast to the United States and the international community that al-Qaida is weak and fragile—and thus not worth sticking around in Afghanistan for. That, however, may be a bit too conspiratorial to countenance. As the saying goes, never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity or incompetence.

That leads to the third possibility, which is that the al-Qaida leaders responsible for the group’s media production simply do not know if al-Zawahiri is dead or not. They have heard the rumors of his death but are just as in the dark as the rest of us. If this were true, it would account for the withholding of “may God preserve him” or “may God have mercy on him” from after al-Zawahiri’s name, but it would not account for the decision to release the video in the first place.

Whatever the case may be, al-Qaida’s supporters cannot be feeling very good about their organization right now. What is going on at the top of al-Qaida is not entirely clear, but it appears to be a symptom of a deeper dysfunction and existential crisis afflicting the group. Several of al-Qaida’s local affiliates are doing quite well today, but as a centralized organization al-Qaida has the look of a group in disarray. Over the past decade it has lost control of its affiliates in Iraq and Syria. It has lost numerous leaders in decapitation strikes or assassinations, and those who have survived appear powerless and constrained. Sayf al-‘Adl, the presumptive successor to al-Zawahiri, lives in a country that al-Qaida claims to be at war with. Other al-Qaida leaders live under the authority of a group, the Taliban, that seems interested in reigning it in (at least temporarily). Meanwhile, al-Qaida’s principal stated objective remains attacking the United States, though it has not succeeded in doing so on a large scale since 9/11. And while it is generally thought of as a Jihadi Salafi group, al-Qaida occasionally makes overtures to the Muslim Brotherhood, as it did in this most recent video. In short, there is a lot of dissonance here. Whether al-Zawahiri is dead or alive, al-Qaida has a lot of problems it needs to sort out. Any successor might find the challenge insurmountable.

Reading Kadyrov in al-Sham: ‘Adnan Hadid on Chechnya, Syria, and al-Qaida’s Strategic Failure

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In his recent article for Jihadica, Aaron Zelin proposed the emergence of a tripolar jihadi world consisting of al-Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State (IS), and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). While the first two poles are competing for the legitimacy and leadership of global jihadism, HTS has already departed the global arena and focused its efforts on running its proto-state in Idlib, Syria. Disputes between the three poles are intractable due to the ideological intransigence of IS and, to a lesser degree, of AQ, in addition to the political pragmatism of HTS, which has been conceived by the other poles as a deviation from the “right” path.

Understandably, a group like AQ, which perceives itself as the pioneer of jihadi Salafism, believes in its right to represent and lead the movement as was its role before the emergence of IS and HTS. This belief can be seen in the writings of AQ-aligned writers such as ‘Adnan Hadid, who periodically pens essays commenting on and analyzing global political events, assessing the status of jihadism, and theorizing a lucid political vision for jihadi groups to follow.

“‘Adnan Hadid” is almost certainly a nom de guerre, the two parts of his name appearing to be a tribute to ‘Adnan ‘Uqla and Marwan Hadid, two figures associated with the Fighting Vanguard of the armed branch of the Syrian Brotherhood.[1] Marwan Hadid was the group’s founder in the mid-1970s and among the first Islamist figures to espouse jihadi thinking and to fight against the Ba’ath regime in Syria.[2] ‘Adnan ‘Uqla was the leader of the Fighting Vanguard until his capture in 1982. Although ‘Adnan Hadid’s works have tackled global issues such as the 9/11 attacks and the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand in March 2019, and regional issues such as the Libyan conflict, his main focus has been on the Syrian conflict, or al-jihad al-Shami (“the jihad of the Levant”) as it is known by jihadis, which could suggest that he is a Syrian national.

The present article provides a thematic analysis of Hadid’s essay titled “Between Chechnya and al-Sham … Lessons and Examples: A Brief Political Study of the Chechen Experience and the Future of al-Sham,” which was published on the AQ-affiliated website Bayan in July 2020. The 102-page essay forms an extensive reflection on the failures of both the Chechen jihad experience of the 1990s and 2000s and the Syrian jihad that began in 2011. It is divided into an introduction and six “axes,” or chapters. The first four consist of historical explorations and political analyses of the pre-Chechen-wars phase, the first and second Chechen wars (1994-1996, 1999-2009), and the period between them. Chapter Five compares the rise of current Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov to that of HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. The final chapter, titled “Back to al-Sham,” is dedicated to highlighting the “strategic mistakes” of Osama bin Laden and Aymen al-Zawahiri in the arena of Iraq and Syria.

The Chosen Trauma

Hadid begins his essay by assessing the state of the jihadi movement as it has developed since the 9/11 attacks. The salient feature of most jihadi battlefields nowadays, he says, is the repetition of errors and the failure to learn from them. “The [same] historical, structural, and organizational errors,” he writes, “are being repeated from battlefield to battlefield, producing the same putrid secretions whose bitterness the umma has tasted over and over again for years.” By bringing up events that led to the defeat of jihadi groups before and during the Chechen wars, and identifying similar errors in al-jihad al-Shami, Hadid constructs what has been called by Jan Hjärpe, a scholar of Islamic Studies, “the chosen trauma.”[3] This is “a catastrophe in the past, a historical disaster … that has the function of signifying ‘group belonging’ and to create a pattern of behaviour” intended, among other things, to prevent the reemergence of the “trauma.” In addition to othering those who do not belong to the group, the “trauma” has the effect of uniting the group’s members in the effort to prevent whatever might lead to its reoccurrence.

For Hadid, nothing is more traumatic than the “recurring defeats of Muslims” living in Russian zones of influence over the last three centuries, and particularly the defeat of the Chechen jihad fighters during the 1990s and 2000s. The aim of his essay is to examine the critical failures that led to defeat in the Chechen wars—failures that would reoccur in al-jihad al-Shami—in hopes of not repeating them in the future. Hadid’s presentation of the history of the Chechen wars is largely based on several books including Sebastian Smith’s Allah’s Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus, Steven Lee Myers’s The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin, and Lilia Shevtsova’s Putin’s Russia, reflecting a considerable knowledge of the history of Chechnya and the Caucasus.

Reoccurences

Three years after the announcement of its independence from Russia in 1991, the new Chechen state, known as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, witnessed the first Chechen war, during which the Russian army seized control of the country’s major cities. To avoid the scourge of war, Hadid writes, some villages around the capital cooperated with the Russian army in an act of “betrayal.” Others, such as the village of Samashki, handed over their weapons and asked the Chechen fighters to leave in return for assurances of villagers’ safety from the Russian forces. Nevertheless, as Hadid relates, safety was far from assured, as the Russian troops committed atrocities such as the “Samashki massacre” in April 1995, during which more than 100 unarmed women, children, and elderly were killed after the withdrawal of the Chechen fighters.[4]

“The reoccurrence of that scene in al-Sham today” is astounding, writes Hadid, referring implicitly to the Russian-brokered agreements of “reconciliation” and “de-escalation zones” that were signed between the Syrian regime and the Islamist armed opposition throughout the conflict. (The “reconciliation” agreements have helped the Syrian regime to recapture opposition-held territories without fighting, in return for false assurances regarding the future status of the opposition fighters; the “de-escalation zones” have spared the regime having to fight multi-front battles.)[5]

Another parallel that Hadid draws between the experiences of Syria and Chechnya is the “the structural defect” in the strategy dealing with “the current of betrayal,” meaning those who betrayed the Islamic cause. In the case of Chechnya the chief traitor is understood to be Ahmad Kadyrov, a former military commander and religious scholar who would be co-opted by Russia and become president of Chechnya. Although the Chechen militants managed to assassinate Kadyrov in 2004, they lacked a “well-laid plan to deal with” his betrayal project, which had dire consequences for the future of Muslims. Hadid reserves greater vitriol, however, for the jihadi movement in al-Sham, whose negligence in dealing with the “intelligence-backed factions”—referring to HTS and other opposition groups that have cooperated with Turkey and other foreign states during the conflict—and poor planning and inexperienced practices have “cost the umma the elite of its leaders.” These are the AQ-affiliated Hurras al-Din seniors, who have been killed in drone strikes over the last two years by the U.S.-led international coalition.

Not all of Hadid’s ruminations on the past are critical, however. At one point he advises his readers to “think outside the box,” citing the example of the Chechen military commander Shamil Basayev, who in June 1995 attacked the southern Russian city of Budyonnovsk with just hundreds of fighters, leading to the capture of more than a thousand civilians and the killing of many others. The operation forced the Russians to initiate peace negotiations after an immediate ceasefire. Basayev’s strategy, which Hadid calls the “Caucasusization” of the struggle, aimed at transforming the Chechen conflict into a regional one that stretched across a huge swath of Russia and the former Soviet states in order to fatigue Moscow and embarrass it internationally. Citing Smith’s and Lee Myers’s books, Hadid provides other examples of Basayev’s military operations abroad, like the famous attack on the Moscow theater in October 2002, the Nazran raid in 2004 in the Republic of Ingushetia, and the Beslan School Siege in 2004, all of which resulted in a high Russian death toll despite the limited number of Chechen fighters involved.

Jihadi Sufism

In considering the failures in Chechnya and Syria, Hadid also turns a critical eye to the role played by Turkey in both cases. In contrast with the dominant jihadi Salafi narrative, which laments the demise of the Ottoman Empire and glorifies its past role as the guardian of Islam, Hadid lambasts the Ottoman sultans for neither defending their Muslim brethren nor supporting their resistance to the Russian Empire’s military expansion in the northern Caucasus during the 18th and the 19th centuries. How similar today is to yesterday, remarks Hadid, claiming that Turkey has abandoned “the Muslims to be slaughtered by the Nusayris” in al-Sham and conspired with the Russians in containing the jihadi movement there.[6]

In the past, according to Hadid, Islam in the northern Caucasus was “preserved” by what he calls “jihadi Sufism” (al-sufiyya al-jihadiyya), a term possibly coined by him and referring to those Sufis who adopted violence as a means of resistance to colonialism in the 18th and the 19th centuries. Hadid seems to anticipate the astonishment of his readers at seeing this term, noting that “we have become used to hearing only the term ‘jihadi Salafism’ (al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya).” In principle, jihadi Salafis consider the Sufi tradition to be heterodox on account of its embrace of bid‘a, or innovation, such as visiting the shrines of religious figures and revering saints. Sufis, according to jihadi Salafis, worship these shrines and figures and associate them with Allah, which renders these practices al-shirk al-akbar, or “greater polytheism.” Excommunicating Sufis and legitimizing jihad against them, however, have been contested by groups and figures within the sphere of jihadi Salafism.

Its “innovations” notwithstanding, Hadid praises jihadi Sufism for combating the British in the Sudan, the Italians in Libya, and the French in Algeria, in addition to safeguarding Islam in the northern Caucusus. His remarks echo those of other pro-AQ ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Musab al-Suri, who, while acknowledging their shortcomings, have also praised jihadi Sufis and given them credit for protecting Islam throughout modern history.[7] IS, on the other hand, does not overlook the perceived flaws of Sufism, and so excommunicates its adherents. Tragically, its Wilayat Sinai militants carried out a gruesome attack on the Sufi mosque of al-Rawda in November 2017, claiming the lives of 305 people.[8] During the same month, IS published a video featuring one of its leaders claiming that IS had warned the Sufis in Sinai against practising their polytheism (shirk), “but to no avail.” Therefore, “their blood is to be shed.”

The Kadyrov of al-Sham

The assassination of former president Ahmad Kadyrov in 2004 did not harm the political forrtunes of his son Ramzan, who came to power in 2007, ushering in a new phase in Chechen history characterized by close ties between the younger Kadyrov and Russian president Vladimir Putin. In return for “submitting to Putin,” tightening control over the security situation in Chechnya, and executing national and international tasks assigned to him by the Kremlin, Ramzan Kadyrov was rewarded with fortune, power, and influence.

Hadid accuses Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the leader of HTS, of playing the role of Kadyrov (both father and son) in Syria, except in al-Jolani’s case he is kowtowing to Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as opposed to Putin. Describing al-Jolani as “Jolanov,” Hadid attacks him for dismantling the unity of the largest jihadi group (Jabhat al-Nusra) in al-Sham, facilitating or at least remaining silent regarding the targeting of jihadi leaders opposed to his policies, reducing the ideology of the jihadi group to one of narrow nationalism, embracing international agreements after much blood has been shed to oppose them, and establishing a department for issuing fatwas (dar ifta’) to provide religious cover for his policies. Hadid also condemns “Jolanov” for interfering with the spread of the jihadi movement outside his zone of influence by preventing Hurras al-Din senior Abu Julaybib al-Urduni, who was killed in December 2018, from moving to Daraa and establishing a jihadi group in southern Syria.[9]

According to Hadid, al-Jolani, much like the Kadyrovs with Putin, has been rewarded for his cooperation with the “rulers of Anatolia.” In return for his cooperation, Turkey has thrown open the border crossings to Idlib and left them unsupervised, allowing al-Jolani to take his “cut” of the foreign aid coming into the province and thereby enriching himself and his cronies. In the future, he says, al-Jolani hopes to be rewarded further by being appointed the unrivaled leader of this small part of Syria.

Strengthening or in Disarray?

Since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, assessing AQ ’s strength has become a contentious debate among analysts and scholars of jihadi Salafism. While some believe that AQ is “much stronger” today than it was in 2001, others argue that the group is in “disarray.” In some sense AQ may be rightly seen as stronger today than it was on 9/11, given that it now has a network of affiliates from South Asia to North Africa. However, the group’s leadership structure appears to be in crisis, as Hadid’s essay attests. The final chapter in particular, which accuses both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri of committing “strategic mistakes” in their approach to Iraq and Syria, suggests that the AQ leadership has lost the aura of its heyday.

As Hadid writes, following the death in 2010 of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the former leader of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), bin Laden should not have accepted the appointment of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the group’s emir for a one-year term pending further vetting as he did. Likewise, al-Zawahiri should have followed up on bin Laden’s decision, and he should not have accepted al-Jolani’s bay‘a, or pledge of allegiance, following the dispute between JN and ISI in 2013. Both leaders are criticized for failing “to fortify the solid core of the jihadi movement against rebellion and betrayal,” such fortification being “an essential building block for strategic success.”

Yet according to Hadid, bin Laden was a leader of far greater influence and ability than al-Zawahiri, and his death in 2011 was a key factor behind the “treachery” that would take place in Iraq and Syria. The loss of such a charismatic and powerful figure as bin Laden, one capable of remotely containing disagreements between the leadership and the group’s affiliates, “deprived the group of an important weapon in combatting any deviation that might afflict some commanders.” Without doing so explicitly, Hadid accuses al-Zawahiri of demonstrating feeble and ineffective leadership.

Indeed, the fact that al-Zawahiri’s directives were defied by both al-Baghdadi, when he refused to reverse the merger between JN and ISI and operate only in Iraq in 2013, and al-Jolani, when he announced the breaking of ties with AQ in 2016 against the wishes of al-Zawahiri, speaks volumes about AQ central’s level of influence over its subordinates. Under al-Zawahiri, as is seen in Hadid’s essay, AQ has lost much of the respect and influence it possessed during bin Laden’s life. As Marwan Shehade recently put it, “Who listens to al-Zawahiri today! He is not competent enough to lead an organization the size of AQ.”

One could conclude that Hadid is thinking much the same thing. Certainly, his essay supports the view that AQ, rather than strengthening, is indeed in a state of disarray. That this view is being articulated by a jihadi writer who supports AQ, and published on an AQ-affiliated platform, is all the more remarkable.

 

[1] For more about the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in ’70s and ’80s, and the controversy over Marwan Hadid’s connections with the Fighting Vanguard, see Ahmad Mansour’s interview with Adnan Sa’ed al-Din, the fourth muraqib, or leader, of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Shahid Ala al-‘Aser, September 9, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIusQVhw4cI.

[2] Dara Conduit argues that Marwan’s Hadid’s ideas regarding waging war against the Assad regime in 1970s led to the formation of the “The Fighting Vanguard.” See Dara Conduit, The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 34.

[3] Jan Hjärpe, “What Will Be Chosen From the Islamic basket?,” European Review, volume 5, issue 3, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-review/article/abs/what-will-be-chosen-from-the-islamic-basket/03AC9398D26B22B1ADC10FBD19097B2F.

[4] For more about the “Samashki massacre” see Michael Specter, “Russians’ Killing of 100 Civilians in a Chechen Town Stirs Outrage,” New York Times, May 1995. https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/08/world/russians-killing-of-100-civilians-in-a-chechen-town-stirs-outrage.html.

[5] For a detailed account of the reconciliation process between the Syrian regime and the armed opposition, see Jusoor Study Center, The Reconciliation System in Syria: Societal Peace or War Strategy, October 2018. https://jusoor.co/details/نظام%20المصالحات%20في%20سورية%20سلام%20مجتمعي%20أم%20استراتيجية%20حرب؟/448/ar.

[6] “Nusayris” is a pejorative term commonly used by Salafis and jihadis to describe Alawites.

[7] See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s introduction in Abu Anas al-Shami’s Sufism, p. 3 http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_4313.html. Abu Musab al-Suri, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, p. 1019.

[8] H.A. Hellyer, “The Dangerous Myths About Sufi Muslims,” November 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/airbrushing-sufi-muslims-out-of-modern-islam/546794/.

[9] This confirms Charles lister’s account in his article discussing the implication of HTS’s breaking of ties with AQ. Charles Lister, “How al-Qa`ida Lost Control of its Syrian Affiliate: The Inside Story,” CTC Sentinel, February 2018, https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaida-lost-control-syrian-affiliate-inside-story/.

The Islamic State 2020: The Year in Review

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2020 was not supposed to be a good year for the Islamic State. In March 2019, US President Trump declared victory over the group after its defeat in Baghouz, Syria, and in October it lost its caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and spokesman, Abu al-Hasan al-Muhajir. Yet, here on the last day of the year, we can conclude that the Islamic State is far from defeated and that 2020 was in fact quite a positive year for the group.

It is hard to say whether the Islamic State is better off now than it was a year ago. That is not really the purpose of this article. While the group continues to be under pressure in the Levant and to face strong pressure in places like Libya, Yemen, Somalia and the Philippines, 2020 has been the year the Islamic State truly cemented its presence in Sub-Saharan Africa.

One measure of the group’s global operational strength is the overview of military operations and attendant casualties published every week in its al-Naba newsletter. While this data is purely quantitative and produced by the group itself, it nevertheless represents a good indicator of the development of its operations over the year.

From a first look at the numbers of killed/wounded and attacks across the Islamic State’s various provinces, two things stand out. One is the high operational level in Iraq and in West Africa, the latter covering all of Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso (i.e., the Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP). Iraq continues to be the province with the highest number of attacks executed by the Islamic State, but in 2020 it was closely followed by West Africa. This lends credence to the argument that the Islamic State’s center of gravity is tilting towards Sub-Saharan Africa. What also stands out is the low operational level in places like Libya, Somalia, Yemen and Khorasan (Afghanistan).

That the Islamic State is highly active in Sub-Saharan Africa is nothing new. In 2018-19, ISWAP executed a high number of attacks in Nigeria. Nonetheless, developments in 2020 imply that Africa is now arguably the most important region for the Islamic State on a global level. This is also reflected in the group’s al-Naba newsletter, where 39% of the frontpages in 2020 were dedicated to events in Nigeria, 10% to the Sahel, 6% to Mozambique and finally 2% to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the latter two countries constituting the Islamic State Central Africa Province, ISCAP).

In fact, the Islamic State’s activity level in Sub-Saharan Africa has been pretty constant through 2020, especially in West Africa, while the frequency in DRC and Mozambique is slightly more sporadic.

While Iraq remains the most active battlefront for the Islamic State in terms of attack frequency, the caliphate’s soldiers in Iraq are not the deadliest. The casualty per attack ratio is in fact much higher in Khorasan, West Africa and Central Africa, closely followed by the Islamic State’s East Asia Province (ISEAP).

The graphics below illustrate how attack patterns vary from one province to another. In Khorasan there is low attack frequency but attacks are highly deadly. In the Levant it is quite the opposite. West Africa is characterised by both a high number of attacks and a high casualty ratio, while Central Africa is somewhere in between.

Despite declarations that the Islamic State has finally been defeated, the data shows something else. The Islamic State is very much alive and has managed the tricky transition from one caliph to another, and the change of its center of gravity, remarkably well.

Based on the data, we can conclude that:

  • The Islamic is NOT defeated but remains highly active—in Africa in particular but also in the Levant (especially in Iraq)
  • 2020 cemented Sub-Saharan Africa as the group’s most important area of operations
  • Yemen, Sinai and Somalia are seeing little activity
  • ISWAP, ISCAP and Khorasan are the most deadly provinces on a casualty per attack ratio

Al-Qaeda’s Leaders Are Dying, But a Greater Challenge Looms

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A string of top-level al-Qaeda leaders have been killed this year in U.S. counterterrorism operations extending from Afghanistan to Iran and Syria. The frequency of the strikes, together with the seniority of those lost, has dealt a crippling blow to the old guard responsible for founding al-Qaeda back in the 1980s. After nearly 20 years of relentless counterterrorism pressure following the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda’s central leadership has grown older, more distant and disconnected, and, it seems, increasingly vulnerable.

Most prominently, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (better known as Abu Mohammed al-Masri), was reportedly killed in August by a team of elite Israeli assassins acting on U.S. intelligence in the Iranian capital of Tehran. The targeting of al-Masri, the most likely successor to overall leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, was one of the most significant operational successes against al-Qaeda since Osama Bin Laden’s death in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011. That it took place in Iran, where he had been present since 2003 (first in prison and strict house arrest, then from 2015 living freely in Iranian territory), was additionally significant, given the widespread assumption that senior al-Qaeda figures in Iran were virtually invulnerable to foreign threats. Beyond the U.S.-Israeli operation, al-Qaeda has also recently lost its media chief, Hossam Abdul Raouf, in Afghanistan, and Khaled al-Aruri (Abu al-Qassam al-Urduni) and Sari Shihab (Abu Khallad al-Mohandis) in Syria, among many others.

How and why now?

This flurry of losses raises the question of how and why now. First of all, the U.S. appears to have developed extremely potent lines of human and signals intelligence in northwestern Syria, given the frequency with which drone strikes run jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) have taken out prominent al-Qaeda operatives there, including Aruri and Shihab. Effective intelligence in Idlib is nothing new for the U.S., having been used effectively to neutralize the so-called Khorasan Group between 2014 and 2015, and additional high-level targets like Rifai Taha in April 2016 and then al-Qaeda deputy leader Abu al-Khayr al-Masri in February 2017. Intriguingly, Taha’s death in a drone strike may in fact have been a case of accidental—or coincidental—targeting, as he was killed after unexpectedly swapping vehicles and driving a car belonging to the presumed target, Ahmed Salameh Mabrouk (Abu Faraj al-Masri).

Beyond extraordinary intelligence penetration, it also appears feasible that some if not all of this year’s high-level U.S. strikes against al-Qaeda were linked. Notwithstanding the likelihood of linkages in the spate of strikes in Syria, the killing of al-Qaeda media chief Hossam Abdul Raouf in Afghanistan in October could be a central puzzle piece. Public and leaked al-Qaeda communications, and even more so a very public spat between al-Qaeda’s former affiliate in Syria and al-Qaeda loyalists in 2017, revealed the centrality of al-Qaeda’s media network to facilitating transnational communications between affiliates and the central leadership. It is highly likely that Abdul Raouf and his associates maintained open and regular channels to key al-Qaeda operatives worldwide. According to a well-placed intelligence source, Abdul Raouf’s deputy was captured and a large quantity of documents and data seized—which could easily reveal a plethora of intelligence leads for future strikes.

This disruption of the media network could explain rumors that have been swirling in al-Qaeda circles in recent weeks that Zawahiri is dead—rumors based in large part on claims that al-Qaeda’s present-day Syrian affiliate, Tanzim Hurras al-Din, has lost contact with him for roughly two months, after having enjoyed steady contact with him for at least two years. For now, no evidence exists to substantiate rumors of Zawahiri’s death. What appears more likely is that his already poor health has put him temporarily out of action, or that the deaths of Abu Mohammed al-Masri and Hossam Abdul Raouf have forced him into lockdown. If al-Qaeda’s most prized channels of communication—both human couriers and a variety of innovative online methods—were compromised, as one would assume they would be following such high-level losses, one would expect surviving leaders to go dark for some time. It is also possible, given his apparent basing in eastern Afghanistan, that Zawahiri has been forced to go off-grid by the Taliban amid intensifying scrutiny over the U.S.-Taliban agreement and the intra-Afghan peace talks. Though constraining him in this way would unquestionably throw a spanner into the Taliban-al-Qaeda relationship, it would be a strategically smart move by the Taliban—and one that gives the  impression of a Zawahiri crisis.

Succession crisis

Assuming Zawahiri is still alive, he is now faced with an existential succession crisis. For years, al-Qaeda maintained a three-man council of deputies, but two of those—Abu Mohammed al-Masri and Abu al-Khayr al-Masri—are now dead. Only one survives: Mohammed Salah ad Din Zeidan (Sayf al-Adel), who remains based in Iran, more or less living freely but prohibited from leaving Iranian territory. Were Zawahiri gone, it is virtually impossible to imagine any Iran-based leader, even one with the veteran clout of Sayf al-Adel, being capable of exerting any meaningful influence over widely dispersed affiliates deeply distrustful of Iran and its possible influence over leaders still assumed to be in some form of captivity. In the process of breaking ties with al-Qaeda, the senior leaders of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) claimed to be highly suspicious of any instructions coming from Iran-based leaders, and on these grounds they ultimately refused to abide by them. Were that dynamic to go global, al-Qaeda could swiftly fall apart.

Worse still for al-Qaeda, Iran is highly unlikely to remove its travel restrictions on Sayf al-Adel—his presence on Iranian soil equates to strategically significant leverage, not just on al-Qaeda itself, but also potentially on the U.S. If the incoming Biden administration seeks to resume some form of negotiations with Iran, as is assumed, the fate of the highest-known leader after Zawahiri would represent a valuable card on the table.

For the sake of al-Qaeda’s future, Zawahiri needs to foster a new generation of leaders capable of assuming the mantle of leadership, but for now it is unclear who they might be—or where.

The principal base of operations for the central leadership has long been South Asia, and any shift away from there appears unlikely in the near future. In this context, deciphering the dynamic between al-Qaeda core and the Taliban, and determining the extent to which the U.S. will retain effective intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities in Afghanistan amid troop drawdowns, have become more crucial than ever. Given al-Qaeda’s bay’a to Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, it is virtually impossible to envision the relationship turning hostile, as the Trump administration has done its best to suggest it could. But if ties become more convoluted, and if the Taliban’s factionalism becomes more pronounced on this and similar issues, the prospect of shifting—or even distributing—the core leadership abroad may rise.

Decentralization and localization

Thanks in large part to sustained U.S. counterterrorism successes against al-Qaeda leaders over the past nearly two decades, al-Qaeda has proceeded—willingly or unwillingly—down a steady path of decentralization. Whereas the al-Qaeda responsible for 9/11 was a rigidly structured and tightly controlled organization, the al-Qaeda of today could more accurately be described as a loosely networked movement, comprising likeminded but regionally distinct groups, each pursuing increasingly local agendas. While Zawahiri and the Shura that he represents clearly still exert a powerful aura and form a focal point for the cause, the actual practical value that they represent in terms of controlling and directing appears to be minimal at best.

Bin Laden presided over the start of this decentralization, but his charisma and “star status” ensured a degree of authority when it came to asserting strategic control over affiliate activities. The spread of Internet access and the rapidity of developments and information dissemination; the explosion of instability that followed the “Arab Spring”; continued U.S. counterterrorism pressure; and Zawahiri’s deathly boring character have all contributed to an exponential progression in al-Qaeda’s decentralization.

Nowhere have the consequences of this been more clear than in Syria, where the dilemmas and challenges presented by an extraordinarily complex and highly fluid operating environment saw al-Qaeda’s once most powerful affiliate defect. It took a year for that defection to take full form, and attempts by Zawahiri in Af-Pak and both Sayf al-Adel and Abu Mohammed al-Masri in Iran to stop it revealed the extent to which distance and communications delays had crippled prospects of central control. Most importantly, these leaders of the old guard were deemed insufficiently familiar with the every-day operational realities in Syria, such that their views meant little to the decisionmakers on the ground.

But evidence of al-Qaeda’s likely irreversible decentralization has been evident everywhere, with affiliates dedicating themselves to locally-focused agendas that run almost entirely against the grain of Zawahiri’s strategic commands. Though HTS’s “pragmatic” approach to the jihad continues to draw a great deal of criticism within al-Qaeda circles, the fact that al-Qaeda affiliates are treading paths once trodden by HTS’s predecessor Jabhat al-Nusra is inescapable. From forming alliances with irreligious bodies; mediating local communal conflicts; espousing non-violent tactics for political gain; seeking to engage nation-state governments; and establishing long-term semi-legitimate business investments, these affiliates are not at all being guided by the likes of Zawahiri.

The current trajectory of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a former Malian diplomat known as “the strategist,” is especially emblematic of this trend. Its guiding ideology differs little from that of al-Qaeda’s, but the methods used to expand its influence have evolved dramatically when compared to the earlier days of Ansar al-Din-al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb cooperation. In parts of the Sahel, particularly in northern Mali, JNIM has arguably molded itself into a more accepted, more credible actor, trusted by non-ideological community groups to mediate conflict more than the central government. In a similar vein, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), in embracing tribal alliances and focusing on hostilities with the Houthis and ISIS, has been accused of not just failing to act on its hostility towards Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates but even negotiating mutually suitable arrangements with them.

Of course, al-Qaeda’s decentralization has also resulted in individual affiliates turning to more extreme agendas, as when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) chose a more extreme path than Bin Laden desired. Similarly, al-Shabab in Somalia has been critiqued internally in the past for its excessive brutality. Yet similar examples do not appear to exist today. Rather, the trend appears to be focused on growing sustainable local and/or regional roots, socio-politically out-competing rivals, and slowly and methodically transforming society to fit Salafi-jihadist ideals in hopes of one day collectively forming an Islamic state.

The coming challenge

Therefore, while we should all be celebrating the string of recent counterterrorism successes against al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, we should be doing so while simultaneously shifting our attention to the challenge of tomorrow: deeply rooted, locally-oriented jihadist groups pursuing more sustainable agendas. While this localism trend may well reduce the prospect of 9/11-style plotting—at least temporarily—it is not a sign of counterterrorism success. Rather, it is a sign of terrorism’s adaptation, and the embrace of strategies that promise equally significant instability but require far more complex and long-term countermeasures, for which we are frankly ill equipped. Worryingly, ISIS appears to be learning this lesson too.

The challenge on the horizon has little of anything to do with combating extremist ideologies, and much more to do with tackling the problems of ungoverned spaces, failed and corrupt governance, economic strife, underdevelopment, and long-standing hyper-local conflicts – all of which provide fuel for jihadists displaying more flexibility and political intelligence than ever before. To put our hands up and declare victory would be to miss the coming challenge altogether.

A Brief Note on the Spike in Intra-Sahelian Conflict in Light of al-Naba

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In last week’s al-Naba, a weekly newsletter the Islamic State issues every Thursday, two interesting articles focused on the newest local manifestation of intra-Jihadi conflict. The Sahel was long seen as “the exception”, but in the summer of 2019 tensions finally started to emerge between the local Islamic State affiliate known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), a subgroup of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin (JNIM), the local al-Qaida franchise (and a sub-group of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb). During the fall of 2019 skirmishes were reported, but the conflict really got going in early 2020. For a great timeline see Nsaibia and Weiss’ piece in the CTC Sentinel from July. Here, the authors report that between July 2019 and July 2020 the two groups clashed 46 times.

The first article of interest in al-Naba issue 260 is an interview with ISGS amir Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi. Caleb Weiss already dealt with the interview more broadly, but what is of interest here is al-Sahrawi’s comments on the conflict with JNIM. Al-Sahrawi mentions how the conflict initially erupted because JNIM fighters started to defect and pledge allegiance to ISGS. That much we already knew. He explains how JNIM reacted aggressively, arresting and killing several fighters leaving the group. One of them was al-Miqdad al-Ansari, a local leader of the contingent of JNIM fighters from Nampala that pledged allegiance to ISGS. Al-Sahrawi also aims his pen against Amadou Kouffa, the amir of the Macina Liberation Front, a constituent group of JNIM. Kouffa, he claims, ordered the defecting JNIM fighters to hand over all their weapons and leave Nampala within ten days or face persecution. It is interesting how a similar issue of weapons ownership also dominated the early tensions between Hay’at Tahriral-Sham and Hurras al-Deen in Syria. Finally, al-Sahrawi turns his attention to the issue of JNIM’s rapprochement with the Malian government. Their arrogance and delusion, he says, is “pushing them to follow a path similar to that of the apostate Taliban”.

The second—and arguably the more revealing—article is a military report covering the previous three months of skirmishes. According to the report, the two groups clashed 26 times during that period, leaving 76 al-Qaida fighters dead. Approximately 30 al-Qaida fighters were killed in just one attack in Mali’s N’Tillit area (see map above). The attack took place on October 21, when ISGS fighters allegedly ambushed a camp of about 600 JNIM fighters southeast of N’Tillit close to the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger. As is standard for the Islamic State’s military reports, while enemy casualties are described in detail, there is no mention of any killed ISGS fighters. Yet if these numbers are anywhere near the truth, they imply that clashes between the two groups have surged dramatically over the last three months.

Jihadi Reactions to the U.S.-Taliban Deal and Afghan Peace Talks

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On September 12, 2020, the Taliban and the Afghan government began negotiations in Qatar over the political future of Afghanistan. In accordance with the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan,” signed by the United States and the Taliban on February 29, the negotiations are expected to produce “a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire” between the warring Afghan parties, as well as an “agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan.” In return for the Taliban’s participation in the negotiations and its guarantee that “Afghan soil will not be used against the security of the United States and its allies,” the United States agreed to withdraw all its forces from Afghanistan within fourteen months of the original agreement.

In the world of Sunni jihadism, the U.S.-Taliban deal and the associated peace talks have elicited a range of reactions, from celebration to condemnation. This divergence of views reflects the fractured state of the jihadi movement—or its “tri-polar” character—split as it is between the three poles of the Islamic State, al-Qaida, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria. The cautiously optimistic views of certain jihadi scholars add another layer of complexity to the picture.

The Islamic State

The Islamic State, it will be recalled, considers the Taliban to be a movement that has abandoned Islam and taken up the cause of Afghan nationalism. Its media routinely portray the Taliban as a nationalist and polytheist group, one that is theologically flawed, tolerant of the Shia, and in bed with Pakistani intelligence. The Islamic State’s “Khorasan Province” has also fought with the Taliban on numerous occasions. It thus comes as no surprise that the Islamic State has represented the recent deal and negotiations as further evidence of the Taliban’s apostasy.

An early response came in the form of an editorial in the Islamic State’s al-Naba’ newsletter in mid-March in which the Taliban were condemned for taking the “Crusaders” (i.e., the Americans) as their “new allies.” Unlike the Taliban, the Islamic State, the editorial boasted, would not cease to attack the Americans in Afghanistan, citing a recent Islamic State attack on the Bagram Air Base. This was a message to the Crusaders, the editorial continued, that the Islamic State’s war on them would continue despite the peace agreement with the “apostate” Taliban, who would also continue to be targeted.

In a speech two months later, in May 2020, the Islamic State’s official spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, commented further on the U.S.-Taliban agreement, alleging a conspiracy between the two sides to destroy the Islamic State in Afghanistan. “The agreement regarding the withdrawal of the American military from Afghanistan,” he said, “is a cover for the standing alliance between the apostate Taliban militia and the Crusaders for fighting the Islamic State, and a basis for establishing a national government that brings together the apostates of the Taliban with the polytheist Rejectionists [i.e., Shia] and other apostate and unbelieving sects.” In al-Qurashi’s view, the deal was to be understood in light of the purported preexisting alliance between the United States and the Taliban to root out the “caliphate” in Afghanistan. What the Taliban sought was a “national government” in which it could share. The Islamic State, however, would stand in the way of all this, intent on fighting “the Crusaders and the apostates” until true Islamic rule is established throughout the land.

Al-Qaida

Al-Qaida has portrayed the agreement in an entirely different light. On March 12, the “general leadership” of the group released a statement hailing the U.S.-Taliban deal as a “great historical victory” for the Taliban, focusing on the agreed-to withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The Taliban, the statement argued, by remaining steadfast and true to their faith, have defeated and brought low an enemy of far greater size and strength. Theirs is thus a lesson to be heeded by all jihadis fighting oppression and occupation.

Noticeably absent from this statement, however, was any mention of the Taliban’s pledge regarding al-Qaida or the coming negotiations with the Afghan government. Al-Qaida proceeded as if none of that mattered. As it had in the past, it described the Taliban in terms of the future caliphate, as “the nucleus of the Islamic state that will rule by God’s pure law.”

Since 2014, al-Qaida has repeatedly portrayed the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—the Taliban’s official name—as the seat of the anticipated caliphate and the Taliban leader as the caliph-in-waiting. In July 2014, for instance, it released a newsletter renewing the bay‘a (i.e., pledge of allegiance) to Mullah Omar, affirming “that al-Qaeda and its branches in all locales are soldiers in his army acting under his victorious banner.” A few months later, when al-Qaida in the Islamic Subcontinent was announced, its leader emphasized that he had given bay‘a to both al-Zawahiri and Mullah Omar. The next year, when it was discovered that Mullah Omar had actually been dead since 2013, al-Zawahiri released an audio message giving bay‘a to his successor, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur. The exercise was repeated for the next Taliban leader, Haybat Allah Akhundzadah, after Mullah Akhtar was killed in an airstrike in mid-2016. In both of these statements, al-Zawahiri indicated that everyone who gives bay‘a to the leader of al-Qaida has in effect given bay‘a to the leader of the Taliban, and that the latter bay‘a is to be understood as al-bay‘a al-‘uzma, or “the supreme bay‘a,” meaning the kind of bay‘a that one gives to a caliph. In 2017, when the subsidiary group of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam al-Muslimin, was proclaimed, its leader articulated three bay‘as—one to the leader of AQIM, one to al-Zawahiri, and one to Akhundzadah. In his speeches, al-Zawahiri has continued to emphasize the theme of al-Qaida’s bay‘a to Akhundzadah. The issue even played a role in the debate between al-Qaida and HTS, the former al-Qaida affiliate in Syria, over the latter’s decision to leave al-Qaida. In a speech in November 2017, al-Zawahiri condemned HTS’s move, saying: “O brothers. By God’s grace and favor you belong to a greater union than the union you have. You are in the Qa‘idat al-Jihad group that is pledged in bay‘a to the Islamic Emirate in an expansive jihadi confederation.” The argument did not persuade, however. In a response, HTS’s representative rejected the idea that the Syrian group had ever owed loyalty to the Taliban.

As all of this shows, the relationship with the Taliban is of central importance to al-Qaida. In its self-presentation, al-Qaida is little more than a global military unit in service to Akhundzadah, whom it sees as its quasi-caliph. It would thus be a pretty big blow to al-Qaida, in material and propaganda terms, if the Taliban were to cut all ties with the group. That is not what the text of the U.S.-Taliban agreement requires, though it comes fairly close. The agreement states that the Taliban “will prevent any group or individual in Afghanistan from threatening the security of the United States and its allies, and will prevent them from recruiting, training, and fundraising and will not host them in accordance with the commitments in this agreement.” Threatening the United States and its allies is the raison d’être of al-Qaida, and the Taliban is supposed to be its supreme “host.” If the Taliban were to honor this pledge—and it has repeatedly said that it will—it would be embarrassing for al-Qaida.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

On September 13, the head of HTS’s Sharia committee, Abu ‘Abdallah al-Shami (aka ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Atun), issued a statement congratulating the Taliban on the start of negotiations with the Afghan government. “This great victory that the Muslims in Afghanistan have achieved,” the statement read, “brings us joy as it brings joy to every free and passionate Muslim.” The key to the Taliban’s success, according to al-Shami, in addition to its extraordinary perseverance in resisting the American occupiers, was its ability to translate military success into political gains, and to do so by maintaining a united front. The implication of al-Shami’s words was that the Taliban’s approach was a model for HTS. Recently, the more hardline jihadi factions in Syria have criticized HTS for seeking a monopoly on violence in the territory it controls. Such an approach, al-Shami seems to be saying, is vindicated by the experience of the Taliban.

Other voices within HTS made similar comments, some of them more explicit in presenting the Taliban as a model for HTS to follow. On September 14, another HTS Sharia official, Muzhir al-Ways, commented that “the Taliban’s example” was “inspiring for all,” the Taliban being “a model in jihad and a model in political activity, a model in methodology and approach and respect for religious knowledge and jurisprudence.” While “every theater has its particularities,” he added, and no one example ought to be emulated in its entirety, the case of the Taliban offered lessons worthy of consideration.

Supporters of al-Qaida were quick to respond that HTS and the Taliban were in fact nothing alike. “The matter of likening the Taliban to [HTS] is entirely invalid,” wrote Jallad al-Murji’a on Telegram. In another post he supported his claim by citing the example of HTS’s cooperation with “the secular Turkish army … which was a participant in the war on the Muslims in Afghanistan under the banner of America and the Crusader NATO alliance.” Another al-Qaida supporter would point out that HTS, in its cooperation with Turkey and Russia, has fallen victim to “the game of international politics.” This was quite contrary to the successful experience of the Taliban. “Do not be deceived,” he wrote, “by what you have done, and don’t take pride in your victories, from which we have seen only destruction and devastation.” “How great is the difference,” wrote another, “between humbling oneself before the unbelievers and humbling the unbelievers.”

In response to these sorts of comments, HTS supporter al-Ifriqi al-Muhajir took issue with this characterization of the Taliban’s policy as one of uncompromising jihadism. There were elements of the Taliban’s policy, he said, that these voices failed to appreciate. The Taliban were not even forthright about their relationship with al-Qaida. He quoted an excerpt from a letter by the al-Qaida ideologue ‘Atiyyat Allah al-Libi (d. 2011), who wrote as follows about the nature of the Taliban’s dealings with al-Qaida: “Of course, the Taliban’s policy is to avoid being seen with us or revealing any cooperation or agreement between us and them. That is for the purpose of averting international and regional pressure and out of consideration for regional dynamics. We defer to them in this regard.”

Scholarly reactions

The senior scholars of the jihadi movement, including the Palestinian-Jordanians Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al-Filastini, have expressed both praise and concern for the Taliban’s recent doings. While deeply divided over the issue of HTS—Abu Qatada is generally supportive, al-Maqdisi fiercely opposed—the two men’s views on this subject are not so far apart.

Back in February, Abu Qatada heaped praise on the Taliban for signing the agreement with the United States. In a statement on Telegram, he wrote that “the Afghan situation” is “an important example” and one that “deserves to be studied.” While rejecting the idea that every jihadi group should follow the Taliban’s path “step by step,” he highlighted several admirable aspects of the Taliban’s approach. These included the Taliban’s commitment to “staying the course” on the battlefield, its strong connection to the society in which it operates, and its status as a scholarly movement, that is, as a “movement of scholars.” On September 13, Abu Qatada continued in this vein in another statement, praising the Taliban’s success in securing the release of thousands of prisoners. “This is a jihadi victory the like of which has not been seen in our modern history,” he wrote.

Yet with regard to the negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, he was much less enthusiastic. “The Taliban’s agreeing to sit down with the [Afghan] government is an American victory,” he wrote in the September 13 commentary. “This has to be acknowledged.” For Abu Qatada, this was a potentially troubling development, for any concession to the Afghan government from this point forward would strip the Taliban of its status as “a legitimate emirate for Afghanistan.” The worst possible outcome, in his view, would be for the Taliban to enter into a power-sharing arrangement. He held this possibility to be remote, however, hoping that the negotiations would continue only as a “tactic” for achieving the American withdrawal.

Al-Maqdisi was similarly boastful about the Taliban’s initial agreement with the United States. In late February, he wrote that it was only the Taliban’s unrelenting “will to fight” that had forced the United States to negotiate with them, and that this was a “clear lesson” for jihadis. It showed that “the solution is not in democracy and ballot boxes! Rather it is in jihad and ammunition boxes.”

The next day, on March 1, al-Maqdisi published an “open letter to the Taliban,” sounding a more critical and cautionary note. In the letter he objected to the open-ended nature of the Taliban’s agreement with the United States, including the clause regarding al-Qaida, arguing that a non-aggression pact with unbelievers should be for no more than ten years in keeping with prophetic practice. This was, in his view, no more than “a jurisprudential transgression.” It was certainly the Taliban’s right to restrict al-Qaida, he said, particularly as Mullah Omar had never given his blessing to the 9/11 attacks. But should the “peace agreement” with the United States lead to the abrogation of jihad, this would speak to a deeper, more theological problem with the Taliban. Al-Maqdisi further faulted the Taliban for giving thanks to Qatar, Pakistan, and China, among other countries, in a statement issued by its leader upon the signing of the agreement. Such expressions of gratitude to states whose rulers are at war with Islam, he wrote, leave one to wonder about possible changes in the Taliban’s methodology.

Particularly troubling, in his view, was the clause in the agreement stating that the United States and the Taliban “seek positive relations with each other and expect that the relations between the United States and the new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government … will be positive.” Perhaps all of this, he speculated, is nothing more than “maneuvers and political steps to achieve important interests.” But like Abu Qatada, he was concerned about what would come once the Taliban and “the client Afghan government” actually sat down to negotiate. More recently, after the negotiations got under way in September, al-Maqdisi reiterated his concerns. “What worries me,” he wrote on Telegram on September 12, “is not the sitting down [at the negotiating table] in itself, but rather the results of the sitting down!” He would wait to pass judgment, however, until the results were clear and documented.

Another jihadi scholar, the London-based Egyptian Hani al-Siba‘i, who is close ideologically to al-Maqdisi, has been somewhat more upbeat in responding to the Taliban’s recent moves. He also has contributed a somewhat different take on the Taliban’s pledge regarding al-Qaida. In a sermon delivered in March, al-Siba‘i pointed out that the Taliban, to its credit, “did not dissociate from [al-Qaida] and did not hand them over [to the Americans].” The Taliban’s commitment in the agreement was in reality nothing new, since the Taliban were already forbidding al-Qaida from launching attacks on the United States from Afghan soil.

In a more recent sermon in mid-September, al-Siba‘i added a few comments on the matter of al-Qaida’s bay‘a to the Taliban leader. The bay‘a, he explained, is conditional. When al-Zawahiri gave bay‘a to Akhundzadah, he stipulated certain conditions, including that the Taliban adhere to the Sharia. Therefore, if the Taliban were to deviate from its current path, al-Qaida would be within its rights to withdraw the bay‘a. For al-Siba‘i, however, this was a worst-case scenario, and a remote one. Let us wait, he suggested, and see what happens. For as of now, the Taliban have conceded nothing.

No consensus, uncertain future

If one thing is clear from this motley of views concerning the Taliban’s deal with the United States and its negotiations with the Afghan government, it is that there is little consensus in the jihadi world on what the nature of the Taliban truly is. For the Islamic State, the Taliban is an ungodly movement ready and willing to renounce jihad and share power with the Afghan government. For al-Qaida, it is the future Islamic caliphate. And for HTS, it is a model of jihadi realpolitik. The scholars, for their part, wary as they are of where the negotiations will lead, reflect a deep uncertainty about the future of the Taliban. Their worst fear is that the Taliban will make peace with the Afghan government and shed its character as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” Their greatest hope is that the negotiations will turn out to be a time-saving ruse. They are not so hopeful, however, as to assume this outcome as a given.

Striving for Hegemony: The HTS Crackdown on al-Qaida and Friends in Northwest Syria

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The first indication that something was about to happen—again—came on June 17, when Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) security officers arrested Abu Salah al-Uzbeki (Sirajuddin Mukhtarov). Abu Salah, the founder of the mainly Uzbek Katibat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, is a prominent Jihadi commander and ideologue who shortly before his arrest had defected from HTS and, together with approximately 40 fighters, joined Ansar al-Deen, a rival Jihadi faction sympathetic to al-Qaida.

The atmosphere within the rebel landscape in Syria’s northwest was growing increasingly tense even before Abu Salah’s arrest. In a surprise move on June 12, the five groups Hurras al-Deen, Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Deen, Tansiqiyat al-Jihad, and Liwa al-Mouqatilin al-Ansar announced the establishment of the new operations room “So Be Steadfast” (Fa-thbutu), much to the displeasure of HTS. According to an insider, the operations room was created in response to the recent losses of territory to the Syrian regime and the implementation of the Sochi agreement.

After the arrest of Abu Salah, a series of events ensued that exacerbated tensions even further, leading to episodes of infighting between HTS and the operations room between June 22 and 27. The true trigger of conflict at this specific time remains unknown. One purported reason is that HTS instigated its crackdown when it became aware that the groups constituting the new “So Be Steadfast” operations room had their eyes set on taking control of Idlib city. Another explanation is that tensions grew due to a combination of (1) the operations room starting to see HTS as a new sahwa (“awakening”) movement on account of HTS’s strengthening of ties with Turkey and (2) HTS’s arrest of prominent commanders of the operations room and the rumours that HTS was involved in the assassination of high-ranking al-Qaida figures in June. A third and related argument is that the HTS crackdown played to Turkey’s desire to fulfil its responsibility as part of the Sochi Agreement to control the M4 highway.

 

Escalating tensions

Throughout June, tensions between HTS and rival al-Qaida-linked groups were mounting. Among al-Qaida sympathisers there is a feeling that HTS continues to defer to Turkey’s interests as part of the political negotiations between Turkey and Russia. This deference, they believe, is not only a transgression of religious principles but a threat to the Jihadi project in Syria. The recent killings of three senior al-Qaida members in US drone strikes have only further aggravated the situation. First, Abu al-Qassam, a military commander and shura council member of Hurras al-Deen, was killed together with Bilal Al-San‘ani, the former amir of Jaysh al-Badiya, on June 14. Eight days later Abu Adnan al-Homsi, Hurras al-Deen’s head of logistics, was similarly killed in a drone strike. According to al-Qaida members (and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi), HTS likely played a role in leaking details about the location of the al-Qaida leaders. Most recently, on August 13, a drone strike killed the al-Qaida military trainer Abu Yahya al-Uzbeki.

Nearly a year earlier, on September 9, 2019, Abu al-Abd Ashida had delivered a stinging critique of HTS in a video entitled “So as Not to Sink the Ship.” Ashida used to be HTS’s head of Aleppo City and the administrator of its Umar bin al-Khattab army, but defected mainly because of the group’s reliance on external actors. At some point during spring 2020, he established Tansiqiyat al-Jihad. When announcing his defection, Ashida complained that HTS was no longer a movement for the ummah since it had been seized by individuals who have made the group their own little kingdom. “Whoever has different opinions, they marginalize him,” he said.

Abu al-Abd Ashida’s ‘So as Not to Sink the Ship’

These tensions between HTS and its more ideologically hardline rivals had been several years in the making. In November 2017, HTS established the Syrian Salvation Government (Hukumat al-Inqadh al-Suriyya) with a view to taking total control of Idlib and western Aleppo. Heavily criticised for not tolerating rival political entities and for implementing contested policies, the Salvation Government quickly came to be viewed as HTS’s exclusive political project. Examples of exclusivist policies include banning the books of al-Maqdisi, restricting communication within areas under its control, and, from December 2018, banning Islamic education unless it was under the Salvation Government’s authority. Prior to its establishment, however, HTS had already made several declarations intended to control the political environment and discipline its own members. First, it prohibited its preachers and ordinary members from proclaiming takfir without an official fatwa from the sharia council (the prohibition for preachers was issued on June 19, 2017; the prohibition for rank-and-file members was issued on July 12, 2017). Then it prohibited its members from watching Islamic State videos and, most controversially of all, forbade the establishment of any new factions in its territory.

 

Infighting begins

On the morning of June 22, HTS moved to arrest Abu Malik al-Tali, a former Jabhat al-Nusra commander in Qalamoun and subsequently a prominent HTS commander in Idlib. A few months earlier, al-Tali had defected from HTS and established Liwa al-Mouqatilin al-Ansar, which later became part of the So Be Steadfast operations room with al-Tali as its leading military commander. This was followed by an official statement from HTS prohibiting its members from leaving the group without getting permission from its “Monitoring and Overseeing Committee.” Even if an HTS member is allowed to leave, according to the statement, he is prohibited from forming a new military faction or joining any existing group in the area.

These events led the So Be Steadfast operations room to issue a statement warning HTS of any further provocations and accusing it of taking actions that pleased the Assad regime and foreign occupiers. Speculating about HTS’s intentions, the statement remarks, “This raises the question about the motives of the arrests, particularly in times when we are witnessing the full implementation of the terms of the Astana process, the latest being the completion of joint patrols on the M4 highway.” The operations room ended the statement by demanding the release of its detained members and the establishment of independent courts to ensure fair trials.

During the night of June 22, the first bout of infighting broke out in Arab Saeed, and over the following days the infighting would spread to several cities and villages in Idlib. The rival parties reacted by mobilizing their fighters and establishing checkpoints around the governorate. (For examples of So Be Steadfast operations room checkpoints outside of Idlib city, see here, here, here and here.) Over the following days, the contending parties began using heavy weapons, with HTS targeting the headquarters of Hurras al-Deen, Ansar al-Deen, and Ansar al-Islam. Apparently in reaction to the HTS leadership’s appeal to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a prominent Jihadi group in Idlib with longstanding ties to al-Qaida but that sided with HTS in recent years, to set up road blocks in and around Jisr al-Shughour, the So Be Steadfast operation asked TIP to remain neutral.

In terms of numbers, HTS is typically assessed to command between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters, while Hurras al-Deen—the largest of the factions comprising the operations room— numbers approximately 3,000. The numerical advantage of HTS meant that from the beginning the operations room had an interest in ending the conflict quickly. But neither did HTS seek a prolonged conflict as fighting rival Jihadis is not a popular cause among its base. Nonetheless, in this case HTS deemed it necessary in order to cement its local hegemony. Casualty numbers for the period June 22-27 are hard to ascertain. An interview with an operations room member revealed the number of killed fighters from the operations room to be between 10 and 15. This is likely too low, and the combined casualty number probably exceeds 100.

 

Managing conflict

Interest in settling the conflict was visible from the beginning. Already on June 24, Sami al-Uraydi, a senior Hurras al-Deen ideologue, called on the warring parties to halt the violence and implement a judicial process to settle their disagreements. Al-Uraydi has been the fiercest critic of HTS among al-Qaida loyalists in Syria in recent years, so for him to take a leading role in de-escalating tensions indicates that Hurras al-Deen saw no benefit in fighting HTS.

On the same day, in a statement titled “Allah Has Forbidden Me From Killing a Believer,” al-Qaida Central weighed in on the conflict with criticism and advice. Accusing HTS of being the aggressor, al-Qaida writes that it was alarmed to see how the group started targeting the mujahideen, who like al-Qaida are dedicated to jihad, despite continuous calls to settle the parties’ differences through arbitration. Al-Qaida reminds HTS that “unity among the mujahideen is a Quranic duty and an indispensable legal necessity,” one that it is “not permissible to neglect.” Therefore it is “not a legitimate solution to overcome the Muslims and violate the blood of the believers.” In a direct reference to the fact that HTS considers itself the dominant faction in northwestern Syria, al-Qaida writes that not even the strongest groups “have a verse from Allah’s book, a Hadith from the traditions of the Messenger of Allah, or a consensus from the Muslims on considering the blood of their believing brothers permissible.”

Commenting on another issue leading to tensions between HTS and rival Jihadis, al-Qaida affirms that no group has the right to forbid an individual from fighting Jihad under the banner of the group of his choice. This is in direct opposition to HTS’s ruling from two days before that prohibited fighters from leaving and joining other Jihadi groups. The statement continues, “The mujahideen are now preoccupied with fighting each other while the enemy surprises them and prepares to eradicate them (…) For this reason, we call on all the mujahideen to fear Allah for the sake of the blood of their Muslim brothers in all factions, and to apply the language of reason and sharia, and to quickly initiate the application of the rule of Allah the Almighty through an independent judiciary.” Addressing the al-Qaida supporters who still remain within HTS, al-Qaida prohibits them from taking part in the ongoing conflict. An to the “people of pride” within HTS, it says, “so take as your slogan, ‘you are forbidden from killing your mujahideen brothers.’” In a final note, al-Qaida calls on Jihadi scholars to intervene and fulfil their responsibility to end the fitna.

Just one day after, a scholarly peace initiative was proposed by a group of nine scholars, the best known of the group being Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi. The initiative called for an immediate ceasefire and a judicial process to rule in the conflict between HTS and the So Be Steadfast operations room. While the latter was quick to accept the proposal, it took HTS several hours to do so (page 1 and 2), and when it eventually did respond it blamed its opponents, and Hurras al-Deen and Ansar al-Deen in particular, for instigating the conflict. HTS specifically mentions the prohibited defections from HTS, the presence of checkpoints set up by the groups operating outside the al-Fatah al-Mubin operations room, and the fact that these groups previously arrested some of HTS’s members. While accepting the scholars’ call to de-escalate tensions, the group placed the responsibility on the So Be Steadfast operations room, arguing that a solution to the conflict depends on dismantling the checkpoints not administered by al-Fatah al-Mubin and the aggressors’ being held accountable in court.

The So Be Steadfast operations room quickly responded, arguing in a statement that HTS’s statement was built on lies and that HTS had in fact rejected the scholarly peace initiative by demanding the disbandment of So Be Steadfast-controlled checkpoints. Nonetheless, the operations room declared itself ready to disband its checkpoints for three days under the supervision of Jund al-Sham and Ajnad al-Kavkaz, to foster an environment where peace negotiations and a judicial process could be initiated. At the top of its list of priorities was the resolution of the situation of Abu Salah al-Uzbeki and Abu Malik al-Tali.

In the end, as both groups were wary about the negative impact of prolonged conflict, it only took a few days to de-escalate tensions through various local ceasefire agreements. The first of these agreements was reached in the village of Arab Saeed in the Sahl al-Rooj area on June 26. Signed by Abu Hafs Binnish (HTS) and Abu Abdullah al-Suri (So Be Steadfast operations room), the agreement stipulated five points: (1) a ceasefire in Arab Saeed and Sahl al-Rooj and the lifting of checkpoints from both sides, (2) that the fighters from the village of Arab Saeed be allowed to remain in the village and keep their weapons, (3) that those required to leave Arab Saeed be allowed to do so and be allowed to bring their weapons, (4) that those fighters accused of crimes be transferred to the Turkistanis (likely TIP) who are to manage the legal proceedings, and (5) that Hurras al-Deen’s headquarter in Arab Saeed be closed and the group not be allowed to establish new checkpoints in the village. Other local ceasefires were also signed in the villages of Yaqubiya and Hamama and in the Harem area.

Despite these various local ceasefire agreements, the infighting did not stop immediately. In the ensuing hours there were several complaints about continued aggression. For instance, it was reported that HTS forces attacked the headquarters of Ansar al-Islam in Sarmada and in the village of Hamama. Later in the day came reports that HTS had launched attacks north of Idlib in Armanaz and that these had been repelled by factions of the So Be Steadfast operations room. This prompted the operations room to issue a statement in the evening of June 26 criticizing HTS for violating the terms of the ceasefires, specifically mentioning the attack in Sarmada.

While tensions did for the most part subside, there would continue to be reports of new episodes over the following days, one example being HTS cracking down on the headquarters of Tansiqiyat al-Jihad in Western Aleppo, leaving the small group on the brink of survival.

 

Who’s the aggressor?

Like he has done so many times before, Abu Abdullah al-Shami, the right-hand man of HTS-leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, would of course weigh in. As Hassan Hassan explained, al-Shami argued that HTS was not the aggressor. HTS and Hurras al-Deen had, according to al-Shami, signed an agreement regulating the al-Qaida affiliates’ activities in Syria. Following these regulations, Hurras al-Deen would not be allowed to set up checkpoints or conduct intelligence or security operations—yet this was exactly what Hurras al-Deen was doing, al-Shami writes. The purpose of these regulations was for Syria’s northwest to be dominated by a unified militant movement led by HTS. From the perspective of HTS, the establishment of new groups and operations rooms would be counterproductive to unification.

HTS would also issue an official statement through its Ebaa News Network on the conflict, accusing Hurras al-Deen of behaving like the Islamic State— an accusation others have previously directed against HTS. According to the alleged eyewitness account of a certain “Abu Dujana”—an HTS fighter—in one incident a group of fighters from HTS surrounded a Hurras al-Deen checkpoint. Abu Asid, the leader of the HTS contingent, offered the Hurras fighters a safe way out if they surrendered, which they agreed to do. What allegedly happened next was that one of the Hurras fighters approached Abu Asid and, instead of leaving peacefully, fired his weapon, killing Abu Asid and injuring three other HTS fighters. According to the HTS statement, this “treacherous” behavior was a clear reminder of how the Islamic State under al-Baghdadi failed to adhere to such agreements.

In the days following the ceasefire, HTS and the National Salvation Government would issue several new decrees in an attempt to further limit the space and activities of rival Jihadi groups. On June 26, HTS published a highly controversial, if not unprecedented, declaration prohibiting the formation of new groups and operations rooms and requiring any existing group to operate under the authority of HTS’s own al-Fatah al-Mubin operations room. On June 28, the National Salvation Government ordered the closure of all military bases in Idlib city except those under the command of al-Fatah al-Mubin. This was followed later that day by another order to close all Hurras al-Deen bases in and around Jisr al-Shughour, the group’s stronghold. The statement also prohibits any Hurras al-Deen-controlled checkpoints in the area.

 

Arresting critical voices

Alongside its efforts to cement institutional and organizational hegemony, HTS also began to target critical voices in the Idlib region. The first person to be targeted was the former British national Tauqir “Tox” Sharif, better known as Abu Husam al-Britani, who is often described as an “aid worker” but who is also affiliated with Tansiqiyat al-Jihad. His arrest on June 22 led to major protests in several cities throughout Idlib in reaction to the perceived injustice of HTS’s unilateral power projection.

Over the following days, social media was flooded with calls for the release of “Tox.” Most surprising was on June 30 when Hani al-Sibai, a London-based Egyptian Jihadi ideologue, joined the chorus decrying HTS’s arrest of Tox. Since 2018 al-Sibai had sought, unlike his colleagues Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al-Filastini, to take a neutral position in the conflict between HTS and al-Qaida members in Syria. Yet the arrest of Tox appeared to provoke al-Sibai to issue a strong condemnation of HTS’s aggressive behavior.

Al-Sibai wrote that “the aqidah and manners of your brother who is detained in Idlib, Tauqir Sharif otherwise known as Abu Husam al-Britani, have been praised by virtuous & trustworthy non-Arab & Arab brothers in Britain who know him and who I have personally known for years.” “Abu Husam al-Britani,” he continued, “preferred to live in roughness rather than luxury! He preferred to share in the grievances of the people of Shaam, and how many they are! He preferred to share in their joyous occasions, how rare they are! And now he has been arrested for so-called security reasons! The correct thing to do would have been to present him to an impartial Sharia judge who has full right to give permission for an arrest or to deny it! Even if he were to order his arrest based on, for example, the seriousness of the accusations, he [Tox] should be presented to the judge to defend himself!” In a direct message to HTS, al-Sibai ends by saying, “Do not be deluded by your power or numbers! Hasten towards releasing your brother Abu Husam al-Britani and all your brothers detained recently even if they disagreed with you. Let your problems be solved by reform and ruling with Sharia.”

On July 15, Tox was finally released after having been subject to torture during his incarceration according to his wife and himself. This provoked Bilal Abdul Kareem, an American journalist operating in Idlib, to interview Hani al-Sibai on the legality of torture in Islamic law. Unsurprisingly, in the interview, al-Sibai, who has previously written extensively on torture, explained that torture is indeed prohibited. Tox’s freedom would last less than a month. On August 11, HTS security officials once against arrested him, and two days later, the group also moved to arrest Bilal Abdul Kareem at his home in Atmeh.

Finally, on September 1, HTS announced in an official statement that it had also arrested Omar Diaby, better known as Omar Omsen. Originally known as the “French super-recruiter,” Omsen had established the group Firqat al-Ghuraba, a French-dominated faction close to Hurras al-Deen. According to HTSs’ media department, Omsen had on more than one occasion violated the rules in northern Syria and HTS had filed several court cases against him. Specifically, HTS complained that Omsen was running his own administration, bringing charges against people in his local court and incarcerating them in his prison. For HTS, considering itself the ultimate authority in Syria’s northwest, this was intolerable.

 

The future of the Jihadi project in Idlib

Given these recent developments , it appears that the struggle between Jihadi pragmatists—or realists—and purists will continue to define the militant landscape in Syria’s northwest in the coming years.

HTS is likely to continue to pursue a pragmatic approach to the political context in which it operates. The group and its leaders argue that understanding this context, or this “reality” (waqi‘a), is essential, and that the group’s methodology must necessarily be adjusted in order to survive. Importantly, an ideological corpus, mainly authored by Abu Qatada al-Filastini and his student Abu Mahmoud al-Filastini, is slowly emerging to support the direction HTS is taking, thus giving ideological backing to Abu Muhammad al-Julani’s political project.

Similar to its competitor the Islamic State, HTS’s ambition is to establish a state, yet its approach to how such a state should be established and what form it should take is different. This is particularly evident in its relations with external actors—most of all Turkey—with which the group has shown itself willing to engage and negotiate agreements. However, when it comes to internal competitors, HTS’s approach is similar to that of the Islamic State, which tried to suppress and control any competing actors including other Jihadis such as Jabhat al-Nusra.

This dual strategy is likely to continue as recent events testify. HTS will do anything in its power to control the actions and undermine the support of al-Qaida elements in Idlib. In response, al-Qaida supporters will attempt to take advantage of HTS’s pragmatism, which remains controversial in Jihadi circles. On numerous occasions, senior figures have defected from HTS, either becoming “independent” or joining al-Qaida-aligned groups. In addition to these senior figures, HTS still comprises ideological hardliners among its rank and file whose sympathy remains in line with al-Qaida’s ideological project. Thus, when al-Julani makes deals with the Turks and moves away from sporting traditional religious clothing, he repels segments of his own constituency.

In June 2020, in the midst of the infighting between HTS and the So Be Steadfast operations room, al-Maqdisi published an article titled “The Predicament of the Supporters of the Sharia between the Client Factions and the Manipulated Factions.” In it he advises true Jihadis, meaning al-Qaida loyalists, to concede defeat and disband. HTS’s suppression, he says, has become too severe. True Jihad in Syria, in his view, can only be successful when HTS is defeated.