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[Editor's note: This post was written by Christopher Radler and Behnam Said, who are intelligence analysts based in Hamburg, Germany. For links to the original document, see the comments to the preview post.]

On 3 May a message announcing the death of Eric Breininger (b. 3 August 1987) and three of his fellow combatants was posted on several German jihadist websites. Breininger, who travelled to the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the winter 2007, was one of the most infamous German jihadists. From Waziristan Breininger, a.k.a. “Abdul Ghaffar al-Almani”, sent several videotaped messages to the jihadist community in Germany, asking them to join the jihad or at least to support it financially. Since September 2008 the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) searched for Breininger, based on his assumed affiliation with a foreign terrorist organization.

A day after the announcement of his death, Breininger’s alleged autobiography, entitled Mein Weg nach Jannah (My Way to Paradise) was released on jihadi websites. The 108-page document mainly deals with Breiningers path into violent islamist militancy. It is not clear however, if Breininger wrote the document himself. In the messages he delivered from Waziristan, he spoke a very simple and often grammatically incorrect German. By contrast, the language of the published book is far more elaborate and correct. On the other hand, the content and details in the book argue for the authenticity of the document. Interestingly, the spelling of names differs throughout the book, which could indicate a collaborative effort. So we can assume that Breininger either 1) wrote it down by himself and had some help from his friends, or 2) told his story to some of his fellow jihadists and they wrote it down, as Spiegel journalist Yassin Musharbash suggested. Overall, however, we favour the first assumption.

After stating the reasons for writing down his autobiography, that is to say to disprove the lies spread by the media and to guide Muslims and non-Muslims to the path of Allah, he describes his conversion.

Radicalization and Recruitment in Germany
Breininger starts by telling us about his pre-Islamic life. Living together with his mother and sister since his parents’ divorce, he had the life of “a typical western teenager“, i.e. he went to parties and had relationships with girls. He calls this lifestyle  “following condemned Satan’s way“ (p. 6). Breininger further describes his search for the meaning of life that initially did not lead to satisfying results. However, in his workplace he came into contact with a Muslim colleague who gave him the first lessons in the Salafi way of Islam and took him to a local mosque where he felt very comfortable.

One day, Breininger and his “mentor” (who remains unnamed) were on their way home from work. They ran into “Abdullah” (a.k.a. Daniel Schneider, member of the terrorist Sauerland cell who was recently sentenced to 12 years for plotting to bomb US targets in Germany) and a person named Houssain al-Malla. Breininger was introduced to Schneider and al-Malla. It was the latter who provided the final inspiration for Breiniger to convert. After his conversion he devoted himself to the study of Islamic audiolectures and books. He quit school and spent more time with his new “brothers”. In the meantime, his former girlfriend had become Muslim and subsequently they contracted their marriage according to Islamic Law. It turned out, however, that this girl converted only to please Breininger, not out of genuine conviction. So Breininger ended the relationship and moved into Daniel Schneider’s appartment, where both of them regularly received al-Malla. Together they consumed a lot of jihadist propaganda downloaded from the Internet. The effect was dramatical:

“I knew that I had to take measures against the crusaders who where humiliating our brothers and sisters. Also every Muslim should stand up for a life according to the law of Allah and for the reason that we must build an Islamic state” (p. 53).

Breininger also states that they were appalled by the news from torture and prison abuse. Here we have another proof that it is these grievances caused by westerners themselves that help to radicalize.

Religio-ideological development
Breiningers first mentor in Germany invited him to his home and told him about the unity of God (tawhid) and the fundamentals of belief (´aqida). Breininger lays down the fundamentals of his belief by copying and pasting part of a book into his autobiography, dealing with the doctrine of tawhid.

Later on, after meeting Daniel Schneider and Houssain al-Malla, Breininger learned about the doctrine of “loyalty (towards believers and god) and enmity (towards infidels especially)” (al-wala` wa-l-bara`). Loyalty and enmity, Breininger tells us, are “the most important fundamentals in islam and are the two main conditions for the true belief” (p. 56). He underlines his point by quoting the former leader of the Iraqi al-Qaeda (AQ) branch Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi (p.58).

In the following part he writes about Jihad as an individual duty (fard al-´ayn), noting that “every Muslim who does not attend his duty to go out to follow Allahs path and to fight” is obviously a sinner (fasiq) and will be punished by God (p.59/60). As support he quotes the pamphlet The Defense of Muslim Land – The First Obligation after Iman by Abdullah Azzam.

Travelling for Jihad
After Breininger’s decision to participate in violent jihad and his abortion of his original plan to go to Algeria, he travels to Egypt and studies Arabic in Cairo. Four months later al-Malla joins him there and eventually convinces Breininger to travel to Afghanistan. Thus they went by airplane to Iran and subsequently took a bus to Zahidan near the Pakistani border. With the help of a human trafficker named “Mustafa” and after bribing an officer at the border they proceeded their journey to Waziristan covered with burqas (!) in a cab. Finally arrived at a safehouse of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), they were joined by mujahidin from Tajikistan and Turkey and were transferred to Afghanistan. Here they started a training which outlines as follows:

- Fajr prayer, dhikr, sports and stretching, one minute for breakfast, weaponry, time until dhuhr-prayer for memorizing
- Dhuhr prayer, tactics and “Anti-terror-fighting“ (close combat fighting)
- Asr Prayer, one minute for eating (bread and tea), weaponry-test (in case you failed you received punishment), dhikr
- Maghrib prayer, memorizing Qur’an until Isha-prayer
- Isha prayer, one hour guard duty once in a while

After al-Malla leaves the group for reasons unknown to Breininger (!) the latter’s situation begins to deteriorate because there were no other German-speakers amongst his comrades. Nevertheless, he completes his first training which is immediately followed by a second one. Here, the focus lies on the training with heavy weapons like recoilless guns, anti-aircraft weaponry and mines. Also the usage of GPS and radio equipment was part of the training. After moving to the so called “Istishhadi-house” (house of martyrdom-seekers) he describes some operations, one of them conducted together with mujahidin from the Taliban and AQ. It raised our eyebrows when we read that a chemical agent was used in a martyrdom operation against “murtaddin” in Khost. According to Breininger more than 100 “apostates and infidels” died (allegedly partly in the aftermath of the assault when the chemical agent began to take effect).

Assuming that Breiningers account is true,  this suggests ongoing cooperation between different organizations in Afghanistan. It also suggests, very worryingly, that Taliban and/or affiliated groups may be using crude chemical weapons.

German Taliban Mujahidin
After three years as a member of the IJU Breininger still had problems communicating with his comrades. When he was approached by his commander and told that some German Muslims had recently completed their training and planned to join the Taliban, Breininger decided to do so as well. The Taliban had no objections to the founding of a subgroup, so the “German Taliban Mujahidin” (GTM) emerged. Thanks to Breininger´s account we finally know about the background of this group that virtually emerged out of nothing and kept analysts busy for a long time. Especially since the Taliban never officially approved the GTM as part of their movement.

Threatening the Far Enemy
Breininger ends his story with an appeal to German Muslims to support the jihad financially:

“If the brothers would buy one doner kebab less a week it would be possible to buy almost 20 sniper bullets to fight the kuffar” (p. 102).

This appeal is followed by a call to Muslims to join the mujahidin because many of them want to start a family. The environment allows the breeding of children “free from the kufr of western society (…) This new generation of mujahidin grows up multilingual. They usually learn Arabic, Turkish, English, Pashtu, Urdu and their parent’s tongue” (p. 103).

Breininger’s conclusion gives us an idea about the long-term strategy of jihadist groups and clearly shows that the threat for Western countries is anything but averted yet:

“With God’s permission this offspring will become a special generation of terrorists [sic] that is not listed in any of the enemy’s databases. They speak their enemy’s languages, know their manners and customs and are able to mask and infiltrate the land of the kuffar because of their appearance. There they will insha’allah be able to conduct one after another operation against Allah’s enemies thereby sowing fear and terror in their hearts” (p. 104).

In the past few years, an increasing number of news items have focused on the clashes between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and more radical Jihadi-Salafi groups. (For a recent example, see here.) Analyses of these groups have mostly concentrated on their alleged ties with al-Qa‘ida and their criticism of Hamas as being soft (see here, for example) but little is known about their actual ideology. Last year, however, a book giving a detailed ideological critique of Hamas (Al-Qawl al-Asas fi Hukumat Hamas) was released by a Jihadi-Salafi from Gaza called Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi, not to be confused with Abu l-Nur al-Maqdisi, the leader of Jund Ansar Allah, whose death at the hands of Hamas last year caused a widespread uproar among Jihadi-Salafis. It is not clear how representative this book is of Hamas’ radical opponents’ ideology in Gaza but the arguments are typically Jihadi-Salafi ones and are therefore likely to count for something among these groups.

Democracy and Legislation

As may be expected, the book is highly critical of Hamas’ acceptance of elections and the will of the people at the expense of the will of God. The author argues that the Qur’an states that “judgement belongs only to God alone; He has commanded that you shall not serve any but Him” (Q. 12: 40, transl. Arberry) and that the idea of power to the people is a flagrant violation of this. He takes a stand against all sorts of things he associates with democracy, such as the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the separation of religion and state, freedom of the press and equality. Interestingly, he also tries to explain that in a democracy, it is the majority that decides on issues and gets its way, even if their point of view is entirely wrong. Although the author wants to say that God’s will should be done, not the majority’s, his dim view of human beings’ ability to do what is right reminded me of a few Greek philosophers that I’m sure the author would not like to be compared with.

In what may be a reference to the previous American administration’s goal of democratisation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the author also tries to frame democracy as inherently linked with “loyalty to the infidel West, world Zionism and the crusader Christianity in Europe”, as well as joining them in “waging wars against Muslims”. Having built up his argument that democracy is not only against God’s will but also involves fighting fellow-believers, he then goes on to quote numerous Hamas leaders stating their support for the people’s will, even if they reject implementing Islamic law (shari‘a).

Hamas’ unwillingness to apply the shari‘a in full is also dealt with in detail. The author cites numerous verses about God’s rule and uses Q. 9: 31 (“they have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God”, transl. Arberry) to “prove” that following non-Islamic legislation – just like Jews and Christians did by following “their rabbis and their monks” in this verse – actually equals worshipping other gods, thus constituting polytheism. He backs this up with a well-known hadith about ‘Adi b. Hatim, in which the Prophet Muhammad seemingly supports this explanation, in order to emphasise that the Hamas government is nothing but a bunch of infidels who worship other legislative gods.

Jihad

The author then moves on to a subject on which Hamas may be assumed to be beyond reproach, namely its willingness to wage jihad against Israel. Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi disagrees, however. He lists a number of conditions that must apply for a group of Muslims to be allowed to accept a truce with their non-Muslim enemy, including that it must be negotiated by the rightful imam or his deputy, serve “Islamic interests” and be temporary. He then compares this with Hamas’ cease-fires with Israel and concludes that these come up short. He states that Hamas is an apostate organisation to begin with and may therefore not conclude truces at all. What’s more, Hamas’ cease-fires are all based on man-made laws instead of the shari‘a and the Palestinians - despite being the weakest party - have to make all the concessions, he states. Also, he says, “the Jews” are not going to stick to a truce agreement anyway.

Al-Maqdisi then moves on to scolding Hamas for condemning all kinds of armed attacks, including ones in Saudi Arabia, Britain, Qatar and Egypt, as well as those committed during cease-fires. To add insult to injury, he claims, Hamas does not just reject certain attacks but even actively kills mujahidin and people wanted by Israel. The author presents photographs of Hamas’ bullets and shoeprints from inside mosques supporting their Jihadi-Salafi opponents – hinting at the organisation’s willingness to shoot and wear shoes where that is strictly forbidden in order to crack down on their adversaries – as well as some gruesome pictures of fighters apparently slain by Hamas. All this is supposed to give the impression that Hamas is not only shunning its own duty to wage jihad against Israel but is even trying to disrupt the efforts of those who do fight.

Al-Wala’ wa-l-Bara’

The author’s most interesting topic of the book is perhaps his use of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty to God, Islam and Muslims and disavowal of everything and everyone else). This concept is applied almost exclusively by Salafis, who use it to indicate that Muslims should have total and undivided allegiance to God and Islam in every sphere of life and must not show loyalty – expressed in friendship, help and affection – to “infidels”. Instead, they must disavow everything that may distract them from their devotion to Islam and Muslims, all in order to remain pure in one’s beliefs and lifestyle. Jihadi-Salafis often use the concept to portray relations between Muslim- and non-Muslim states, particularly if these result in alliances against other Muslims, as loyalty to “infidels” who should be disavowed instead.

Considering this interpretation of the concept, it is hard to think of how Hamas can be criticised. After all, the most likely “infidel” state to which Hamas could be accused of expressing loyalty would be Israel, the organisation’s sworn enemy. The author, however, takes an entirely different approach. He claims that Hamas’ frequent attempts to attain national unity mean that it has to co-operate with other Palestinian factions. Although it is left unsaid who those faction are, it is obvious that these include secular as well as Marxist Palestinian parties and organisations. This way, the author accuses Hamas of being loyal to these other, godless Palestinian groups in the name of national unity instead of doing what is best for Islam.

Similarly, Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi accuses Hamas of being loyal to “apostate” Arab regimes (by allowing them to visit and by having meetings with their leaders), Christians (by congratulating them with their religious holidays) and Shiites (read: Iran and Hizbullah, for co-operating with them and accepting their financial help). All of these forms of loyalty supposedly cause Hamas to deviate from “true” Islam and it is therefore not surprising that the author unambiguously concludes that “there is not the least bit of doubt about the apostasy of the Hamas government”. He specifically accuses “the prime minister, the ministers and the members of parliament” as well as “the different security apparatuses” that are allied to the Hamas government of being apostates as well. Interestingly, however, the author does not call for fighting Hamas since jihad against Israel has a higher priority and “fighting this government will scare people away from the da‘wa (the call to Islam)”.

Un-Palestinian

The latter paragraph might indicate why Jihadi-Salafism is a growing but nevertheless small phenomenon among Palestinians and is likely to remain limited in its influence in the long run: its emphasis on Islam over Palestinian identity, its disdain of national unity in a context where this is sorely needed and its rejection of ties with Iran, Hizbullah and Arab countries when dealing with a group that can hardly afford to lose any of its few friends is not only totally unrealistic and pig-headedly ideological but also rather un-Palestinian. Jihadi-Salafism, being anti-nationalist, proudly raises the banner of Islam over conflicts such as the Palestinian-Israeli one but ignores the strong sense of national identity Palestinians have. This, combined with the fact that these groups are up against a well-established, credible and powerful group like Hamas, means they are unlikely to gain control over the Gaza Strip, let alone the West Bank, any time soon. Unfortunately, that is probably not going to stop them from trying.

‘Abbud al-Zumar, one-time military intelligence colonel in the Egyptian army who was implicated in the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat, has recently released a co-authored document with his cousin and brother-in-law Tariq from prison. The document, al-Badil al-Thalith bayna al-Istibdad wa-al-Istislam (The Third Alternative between Despotism and Surrender) was published by the Egyptian newspaper al-Shuruq in late August and early September 2009 (the document was also published in al-Masriyyun and can also be found on the discussion forum of the Egyptian Islamic Group website - click here for a collated PDF printout).

The text has received surprisingly little media coverage so far. This is curious, not least considering the importance of ‘Abbud al-Zumar to the legacy of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group). According to Muntasir al-Zayyat (one-time activist in al-Jama‘a and now a lawyer who specializes in defending Islamist activists - see his website), ‘Abbud was the military strategist of the group that was led by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, the author of al-Farida al-Gha’iba (The Forgotten Obligation) and the leader of the group that assassinated Anwar al-Sadat.

Following Faraj’s execution, a split among al-Jama‘a ensued and ‘Abbud became leader of the group’s wing Tanzim al-Jihad (the Jihad Organization), while Sheikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman (who is currently serving a prison sentence in the US for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre) became leader of the wing known as al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (al-Zayyat, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, p. 229).

It is worth noting that ‘Abbud and Tariq al-Zumar were not among the authors of the series of books published by al-Jama’a leaders since 1997 as part of the so-called ‘Mubadarat Waqf al-‘Unf’ (The Initiative of Halting Violence).

With al-Badil al-Thalith, ‘Abbud and Tariq al-Zumar have produced what they believe to be an initiative containing a domestic plan of action based on political, not military, reform for Egyptian Islamists; and a global road map for Islamists and jihadis, including al-Qa‘ida, designed to develop a strategy based on working with (not against) select Western forces for the purpose of advancing the Islamist cause worldwide.

Given that this initiative was authored behind bars, to what extent should we assume that this is a document that genuinely represents the authors’ convictions instead of the views their jailors want us to believe that al-Zumars now espouse? For obvious reasons, this legitimate concern cannot be fully resolved, but two important points should be noted in this respect: first, al-Shuruq obtained the rights to publish al-Badil al-Thalith from ‘Abbud’s parents and the publication does not appear to have been orchestrated by Egyptian authorities; second, the authors’ critical stance of the Egyptian regime, as will be discussed below, suggests that that the document has not been tampered with by the hands of the authorities, wallahu a‘alam.

The authors are aware of their readers’ dilemma. That is why they are keen to stress that the muraja‘at (‘revisions/re-examinations/recantations’) cannot achieve their objectives unless three conditions are met: (1) the release of all political prisoners; (2) the removal of all the obstacles facing the youth from taking part in public life; (3) the opportunity of making peaceful regime change feasible, through  finding ways of making leaders accountable and removing them when necessary.

It is within this framework that al-Zumars have put forward a new initiative, proposing an amnesty for all those who participated in the crimes of torture in Egyptian prisons. This, they believe, should be part of a national reconciliation that includes (1) amnesty and release of all political prisoners, (2) compensating the thousands of prisoners who have endured torture and (3) compensating the families of those whose loved ones lost their lives in the process.

What’s in it for the Egyptian government? Al-Zumars point out that it is necessary to end quickly the ‘torture file’ before international forces use it as an excuse to interfere in the domestic affairs of Egypt. They highlight that such an intervention could be either at the hands of foreign governments as well as NGOs that are concerned with violations of human rights around the world. In other words, Husni Mubarak’s regime has more to gain by professing a mea culpa on its own domestic terms instead of being forced to do so through external international legal bodies.

How should ending military struggle proceed?
Al-Zumars enumerate several conditions towards this end. These include a call for regional and international co-operation between Arab and Islamic states, including Iran; forging alliances with those seeking to reform the United Nations in an effort to guarantee the interests of politically marginalized nations and oppressed peoples. While they obviously want the government to govern on the basis of the creed of divine unity (tawhid), al-Zumars stress that the interest of the Islamic mission (al-da‘wa) may entail adopting a neutral stance vis-a-vis the authorities and avoiding confrontations with them.

Islamic movements, al-Zumars hold, should meet several critical challenges. Al-Zumars propose a nuanced approach to dealing with non-Muslims. To begin with, they call for devising a new comprehensive vision that defines the nature of the relationship with Western civilization, away from the ‘clash of civilization’ paradigm (Third Alternative, part 4). In their minds, the importance of forging political alliances cannot be understated and it does not contradict ‘aqidat al-wala’ wa-al-bara’ (i.e., the Islamic creed that provides guidelines related to Muslims’ obligations to associate with and support fellow Muslims and when to dissociate from non-Muslims). Al-Zumars remind their readers that the Prophet himself forged alliances with non-Muslims when the objective of these alliances was in the interest of repelling oppression, as in the case of hilf al-fudul (‘pact of chivalry’ – this pact antedates Islam; the Prophet took part in it when he was young and he is said to have maintained his commitment to its principles after he received the Revelations. In other words, hilf al-fudul is a product of the jahiliyya era, but its principles stand even after the advent of Islam).

Al-Zumars also highlight that the Prophet entered into alliances with non-Muslims when he deemed that such alliances were in the interests of Muslims, as in the case of the ‘constitution of Medina’ (an alliance that is said to have been between the Muslims who escaped Meccan persecution (al-Muhajirun), their supporters in Medina (al-Ansar) and the Jews of Medina). Accordingly, al-Zumars assert that ‘forging alliances and cooperating with non-Muslims is permitted so long as the objective behind these alliances is legitimate’; indeed ‘forging alliances may be an obligation (wajib) if the objective is to realize the freedom of propagating the Islamic mission or simply preserve the life and safety of its preachers.’

Working within this pragmatic framework, al-Zumars argue that co-operating with non-Muslims can be in the interest of effectively resisting occupation. ‘The military and political campaigns led by the US and its allies against the Islamic world’, they hold, ‘do not necessarily represent the will and visions of the American and European people. That is why it is necessary to devise a plan that deals with these campaigns based on differentiating between the leaders/elites and their peoples. For we continue to observe the opposition against the military campaign against Iraq mounted by the American and European peoples; opinion polls in Europe reveal a great sympathy with the Palestinian cause … for this reason, it is not sensible to direct our bombs against societies that are calling on their governments to stop their aggression against Iraq’ and support other Islamic causes (Third Alternative, part 5).

Al-Zumars do not appear to have given up entirely on the hope of the US government changing its policies towards the Islamic world. They remark that the election of Barack Obama represents a clear coup against the aggressive policies of George W. Bush’s administration. The Obama administration’s policies however remain subject to implementation, not least considering that Iraq is still occupied and preparations are underway to send more troops to Afghanistan (note that al-Badil al-Thalith was published before the troop increase in Afghanistan). Al-Zumars called on President Obama to translate his statements into positive practical measures, among them the release of Sheikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman.

Al-Qa‘ida and Military Jihad
Despite al-Zumars’ new commitment to peaceful political reform, they do not reject military jihad without qualification nor do they condemn al-Qa‘ida outright. Instead, they state that with respect to al-Qa‘ida, ‘we declare our support for lawful jihad (al-jihad al-mashru‘) that al-Qa‘ida is mounting in those parts of the Islamic world that are subject to occupation or aggression; indeed, al-Qa‘ida’s jihad in this respect is esteemed and respected by all those who are sincere in the umma, and we are perfectly ready to pay with our lives as a price to defend this noble jihad.’  Al-Zumars however go on to call on the leaders of al-Qa‘ida to re-examine their strategies that seek to move military operations to the Islamic world; they hold that this strategy has breached many Islamic legal stipulations. They also call on al-Qa‘ida ‘to re-examine its legal opinion (fatwa) that makes it lawful to shed the blood of Western civilians, for it is not consistent with Islamic law’ (Third Alternative, part 8).

Undoubtedly, al-Badil al-Thalith represents a clear departure from the worldview al-Zumars once espoused. It is to be remembered that they, especially ‘Abbud, were once fully committed to the thesis Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj advocated in his al-Farida al-Gha’iba. Faraj believed that only the path of military jihad could save Muslims in this world and the next and that jihad must be directed first and foremost against the near enemy, i.e., Muslim rulers who are in apostasy of Islam because they do not govern according to the justice Islam preaches.

Why then should al-Badil al-Thalith not receive the attention that other so-called muraja‘at of militant struggle through jihad have received, most notably, Dr Fadl’s Tarshid (2007) and his later response to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s (al-Ta‘riya li-Kitab al-Tabri’a), both of which have been covered here on Jihadica.

In his critique of al-Badil al-Thalith, Hani al-Siba‘i (a London-based Egyptian lawyer sympathetic with the strategy of military jihad and director of al-Maqrizi centre), remarked in a commentary that the reason why al-Zumars’ initiative has not received much media attention is due not just to its bad timing (it was released during Ramadan) but more importantly because its message did not win the approval of Egyptian authorities.

I suspect there is some truth to that. As al-Siba‘i remarks, unlike Dr Fadl who personalized his attacks against al-Qa‘ida and especially Ayman al-Zawahiri and therefore lost credibility, al-Zumars have refrained from polemical attacks.

There is more to this than al-Siba‘i is suggesting. From the Egyptian authorities’ point of view, Dr Fadl didn’t really present an alternative to Egyptians who might be sympathetic with al-Jama‘a, whereas al-Zumars are presenting a proactive alternative based on peaceful and political reform. While al-Badil al-Thalith is by no means a comprehensive plan, it nevertheless highlights basic and legitimate demands of the Egyptian government, most notably, accountability for the rulers and the freedom for all to partake in the political process.

Al-Badil al-Thalith presents yet another challenge to the Egyptian authorities, namely al-Zumars’ recognition of the efforts and sacrifices the Muslim Brotherhood has made to ‘open up channels for Islamic political engagement’ despite all the obstacles the government has placed in its way. Saluting the model of the Muslim Brotherhood could signal a potential problem for the Mubarak regime: a scenario whereby al-Jama‘a and al-Ikhwan could form an alliance and contest elections is not a prospect the Egyptian government is willing to entertain, especially with a Presidential election looming in 2011.

Will al-Badil al-Thalith make a dent in the jihadis’ global strategy? Probably not. Indeed, the jihadis are likely to point out that al-Zumars’ proposal has gone undebated not just in the Arab and Islamic world, but also in the West, which, in their minds, goes to prove that only polemical statements like those allegedly authored by Dr Fadl make it into the headlines. They are also likely to point out that Western analysts who rush to promote recantations such as those authored by Dr Fadl are wittingly or unwittingly doing the bidding of the Egyptian government. All this, they would say, proves why military jihad is the only path that could lead to genuine reform in the Islamic world.

Not surprisingly, the recent bombing in Iran has received a lot of attention in the media and the security blogosphere (for good commentaries, see here, here, and here). But with a few exceptions, everyone has missed the new FFI Report by Audun Wiig. It is the best profile of Jundullah you will find in open sources, so go ahead and read it.

On 25 August 2009, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a plea by Dr. John Boutros for Muslims to aid the jihadi cause. He stated, “Do not mourn because the Islamic Caliphate is imminent… Trust me, the US is one or two thrusts” away from crumpling. However, in order to make this happen Muslims must give aid to the jihadis.

Boutros claimed that the United States is weak due to the financial crisis, which is allegedly causing the rich states to consider separating from the Union. He stated that militarily the United States is vulnerable because it has so many soldiers in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the suburbs of Baghdad, who are easy targets. In regards to the United States homeland he continued, “Hundreds of thousand of soldiers stationed in the streets of Washington and Los Angeles wait for a martyr to cross the continents carrying a nuclear, biological, or chemical bomb.”

He alleged that from al-Qaida’s viewpoint, things are much better. Somalia is becoming more peaceful and prosperous because the Shabab al-Mujahidin are instilling sharia law and in Afghanistan the Taliban control 80% of the country while coalition forces only leave their bases in armored vehicles in the other 20%. However, the Islamic State of Iraq has made many sacrifices, as has Ansar al-Islam, who gave up their bombs, snipers, and bases.

He then stated that given the current state of affairs, if the United States fell, “In a short period, the Taliban Emirate will be a great state encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Turkistan, and a large part of Iran.” In the western area of the Islamic world, the Shabab al-Mujahidin will control all of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan after the US fall. Then, he maintained, there will be justice in the Afghanistan and Somali Emirates and in other areas like Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, and Nigeria where things will either turn around for the already established emirates or the mujahidin will prevail.

He then gets to the point of his fairytale, “After your mujahid brothers sacrifice themselves and their funds on this path, will you be stingy in support and assistance? Will you be stingy in spreading the word? Will you be stingy in financial support after many operations are canceled because of a shortage of materials like what happened during operations within Denmark?”

The fanciful nature of this report is striking even for the GIMF and I am not sure what to make of it. Is this an indication that something structurally has changed within the GIMF? Or, is it simply an attempt to garner support and the editorial staff did not realize how unrealistic it sounds? Regardless of its meaning, if this is the grand strategy of budding al-Qaida strategists, I am not worried.

The forums are ablaze with postings regarding the 14 August 2009 Hamas attack on the Ibn Taymiya Mosque that Jund Ansar Allah (JAA), a group espousing Salafi-jihadi ideology, controlled.  Hamas assaulted the mosque in response to JAA leader Abd al-Latif Musa, AKA Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, declaring an Islamic emirate in Gaza and general JAA criminal activity. Not surprisingly, commentators are condemning Hamas’s actions and linking these actions to a larger Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian conspiracy to combat Salafi-jihadis.

Akram Hijazi claimed that Hamas has distorted the facts surrounding Salafi-jihadi groups. He maintained that through its violent targeting of Salafi-jihadis like the Army of Islam, whom Hamas also largely destroyed in September 2008, and now the JAA, Hamas is effectively practicing takfir against its fellow Muslims. In regards to the declared Islamic emirate, Hijazi stated that anyone who “read the emirate announcement well” knows that it was very general, for all of Palestine, and did not threaten Hamas’s authority. Hijazi exonerated JAA from any accusations Hamas has made against the group and he declared Hamas as the real criminal group in Gaza.

Hijazi also railed against Hamas in a second article stating that the Salafi-jihadis are not against pious Hamas members, but rather they are against Hamas hypocrites and liars. He used Ahmad Yassin and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, both former Hamas leaders who Israel assassinated in 2004, as examples of good Hamas members. He went on to claim that the Salafi-jihadis were the first to attack former Fatah chief in Gaza Muhammad Dahlan, the Oslo Accords, and Mahmud Abbas.

These assertions are important because Hamas members consider Yassin and al-Rantisi good leaders, but now Hijazi is linking these leaders with the Salafi-jihadi movement, of which Yassin and al-Rantisi were not a part. In short, Hijazi is attempting to hijack the legacy of these leaders from Hamas to the Salafi-jihadi cause, giving latter more credibility. His comments about Dahlan, Oslo, and Abbas reiterate this point because Hamas is famous for its opposition to these Fatah symbols, not the Salafi-jihadis who played a minor, if any, role in opposing Fatah and its goals.

Hijazi was not the only commentator who attempted to lure rank-and-file Hamas members towards Salafi-jihadism. Hani Siba’i, a radical preacher in the UK, claimed the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have strayed from the right path and true Islam. He encouraged ordinary Hamas members to turn against the group by adjusting its slogan of “death in the path of God” to “death in the path of the man-made parliament.”

It is not surprising that jihadi commentators are condemning Hamas for its attack against the JAA. However, their attempts to exploit this event to their advantage by luring Hamas members away from the movement are interesting. To do this, propagandists are linking Hamas symbolism and achievements to Salafi-jihadism and reaching out to rank-and-file members. As long as Hamas remains in control of Gaza, this attempt will not likely achieve many results. However, if Hamas starts to lose control, either physically or ideologically, Salafi-jihadis may see a boon in recruitment, which will mean more violence in Gaza and against Israel.  

A couple of Jihadi journals have been released recently. To get an idea of what they cover, I have roughly translated their tables of contents.

The Global Islamic Media Front released the 35^th volume of “Sada al-Jihad” or “Echo of Jihad.” The table of contents includes:

“The Jihadi Movements and the Sweet Harvest – The Fruits of the Siege”

“Obama: A Repeat Copy of Bush”

“So We Understand the Balances of the Apostate Regime in Algeria”

“The Pakistani Regime and the Conflict with the Taliban: The Flight Forward”

“The Iranian Elections and Signs of the Iranian Program’s Regression”

“The Tragedy of the Muslims in Egypt’s al-Wadi al-Jadid Prison”

“The Fate of Karzai will be Worse than his Traitor Forefathers” by Qari Muhammad Yusuf the spokesman for the Taliban

“The Abandoners of Loyalty”

“Civil Strife: The Adaptation of Reality”

“Security Warnings (Negatives)”

The Turkistan Islamic Party released the fourth volume of the “Islamic Turkistan” journal. Its table of contents includes:

“The Sino-American Agreements Regarding Cooperation Between the two Countries for the Case of Pakistan and Afghanistan”

“Chinese and Pakistani Media Fraud and Its Reliance on Lying and Slander”

“A Statement by the Military Commander in Remembrance of the Communist Slaughter of Our Muslim Ummah in China and Urumqi”

“A Meeting with the Brother Abd-al-Haqq – The Leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party”

“From the Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime: The Exposed Secret”

“The Muslim Turkistan People are Barred from [Receiving] a Passport”

“Our Martyrs: The Martyr Balal”

“Global Journalism”

“From the Quran’s Guidance: The Story of Saul and Goliath”

“War is Stratagem”

“Security and the Quran”

“The Islamic Ummah: A Body with no Spirit and Writing with no Clarity”

“The Beautiful Coverings Collapse and Display the Shameful Faces”

“Political Stratagems that the Chinese Practiced to Conquer the Turks”

“Save Turkistan Before it is too Late”

How will the Iran debacle affect al-Qaida? This was the question raised yesterday in a short strategic study titled “The Iran Crisis and Its Effects on the Global Jihad by Abu al-Fadl Madi (أبو الفضل ماضي), a Falluja forum member with so-called “great writer” status. He briefly outlined the situation in Iran claiming that the protests mark the end of the second period in Iran’s modern history, with the first ending in 1989. He called the new period the “Termination of the Rule of the Jurisprudent Theory.” He argued that the crisis could alter regional “balances, priorities, and strategies” and the “Global Jihadi Current” cannot ignore these events.

He described four possible outcomes of the Iranian protests. The first was the possibility of the regime defeating the opposition by force. He argued that this would increase Ahmadinejad’s power, giving him more leeway to negotiate with the West, but due to the protest he will fail in obtaining Western recognition of Iran as a regional and nuclear power. Abu al-Fadl believed that the West could try to help the opposition by striking Iran, which would create a 2003 Iraq-like scenario. He stated, “This is the best scenario possible for the jihadi movement” because they could benefit from the chaos and security void.

The second possibility was the opposition bringing down the current Iranian regime, which would lead to a new period of improved relations with the West. He argued that there would be better cooperation between the West and Iran on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and nuclear issues. That is in addition to more cooperation with President Obama vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Finally, he fretted about the greater pressure al-Qaeda would face in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This is ostensibly the worst-case scenario for the jihadi movement.

The third option is the possibility of a stalemate between the two sides. He believed that in such a situation, not much would change for the “global jihad” and Iran would continue to support its current foreign proxies. This is also not an ideal situation for al-Qaeda espousing terrorists.

Finally, the fourth option he mentioned is the possibility of a settlement between the two sides. In this scenario, he believed that Khamenei would weaken considerably and Rafsanjani would emerge as the “Godfather of the Regime.” He estimated that Iran’s foreign policy would be more restrained and pragmatic in this scenario. Like options two and three, this option is unlikely to make the jihadi movement happy.
If, as Abu al-Fadl suggests, the geopolitical nature in the Middle East changes because of the Iran crisis, the question will become how will the jihadi movement react to the possibility of a weakened Hezbollah, Syria, or Hamas?  If the United States or Israel attacks Iran to help the protesters, handing al-Qaeda “the best scenario possible,” will the jihadi movement be strong enough to exploit that opportunity?  As events continue to develop on the ground in Iran, it will be interesting to watch the jihadis’ response.

Continued from here.

The fourth panel on “networks, strategy and ideology” started off with a paper by CTC’s Scott Helfstein on the dynamics of terrorist networks. Helfstein has examined six key al-Qaida plots using network analysis tools to find out why certain individuals come to play central roles in attack networks, and how attack networks change over time. He showed that people’s centrality was a function of personal attributes (skills, education) and their function in the network (weapons acquisition etc). Helfstein is one of a small but growing number of American political scientists who are applying formal methods to the theoretically starved field of terrorism studies with very interesting results (other scholars include CTC-affiliated Princeton professor Jake Shapiro).

Bill Braniff, also from CTC, presented a very interesting model for thinking about al-Qaida’s future strategic evolution. He identified five scenarios: 1) persistence (no-change), 2) horizontal escalation (concerted geographic spread), 3) vertical escalation (dedicated prioritization of mega-terrorism), 4) pursuit of loose affiliations (extending resources to Islamist groups without extending their brand-name or demanding strict adherence to their ideology), and 5) the diversification of core activities (conducting activities such as governance, da’wa, and social service provision under the al-Qa’ida banner in a addition to waging jihad).

FFI’s Petter Nesser then talked about the ideological evolution of jihadi community in Europe. He showed how the ideological and strategic dilemmas facing jihadis in the diaspora differ from those faced by militants in the Muslim world. He also argued that jihadism in Europe has undergone three distinct phases of ideological evolution. A first phase (mid- or late 1990s), different local and internationalist jihadi trends co-existed in relative harmony. In the second phase (late 1990s-2003), Europe’s jihadis were torn between “classical” and “global jihadism”. The third phase, triggered by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, saw the emergence of a new generation that increasingly adopted al-Qaida’s global jihadi identity.

The fifth panel included two Maghreb-focused papers and one on suicide bombings. Jean-Pierre Filiu analysed the formation and evolution of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and asked: how Maghribi is AQIM? Not very, he argued, because AQIM has essentially become an Algerian outfit with a a Saharan branch. This was despite a considerable potential for cooperation between the Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Libyan jihadi communities, and despite the fact that the non-Algerian groups have historically been more integrated into al-Qaida.

Hanna Rogan presented very interesting quantitative study of AQIM’s attack patterns (see her Sentinel piece for details). She notably showed that the frequency and geographical reach of AQIM’s attacks had decreased markedly in 2008 after a spike in 2007. This suggests to me that the initial momentum gained from GSPC’s late 2006 alliance with al-Qaida is wearing off.

The third paper was presented by yours truly and looked at patterns of suicide bombings and jihadi ideologies. I argued that jihadi groups whose primary enemy is non-Muslim (irredentist or pan-Islamist groups) use suicide bombings much more frequently than groups whose primary enemy is Muslim (revolutionary or moral vigilante groups). There are in fact extremely few cases of suicide attacks by revolutionary groups (GIA, GSPC, EIJ, GI etc), despite their being jihadi salafi and very violent. To me, this shows that Robert Pape is less wrong than most terrorism/Islamism scholars think. I don’t believe literal occupation causes suicide bombings, but I think there exists a mechanism whereby people fight harder when they are confronting outsiders. The paper predictably generated a very heated debate.

The sixth panel focused on the Gulf and began with a presentation by Stephane Lacroix on apolitical Salafism (sometimes referred to as pietist salafism or Madkhalism) and its potential role as a counterweight to jihadism. Saudi Arabia and other countries (especially Jordan, Libya and Algeria) are promoting it as such, so this is a question with deep policy implications. Lacroix highlighted a crucial dilemma: On the one hand, apolitical salafis fiercely oppose global jihadism and preach absolute loyalty to governments. (Lacroix notably argued that the absence of terrorist attacks in France in recent years is partly due to the strength of apolitical salafism in France). On the other hand, apolitical salafis are socially extremely conservative and sectarian, and tend to isolate themselves from society around them. Politics is indeed not the only way to militancy; extreme puritanism or apocalypticism may also produce violence, as illustrated by the 1979 Mecca siege.

The second paper, by Sciences Po PhD candidate Asiem El Difraoui, offered an excellent analysis of al-Qaida’s propaganda dilemmas in Saudi Arabia. El Difraoui, a leading expert on jihadi visual media, argued that al-Qaida in the Kingdom had failed to mobilise Saudis for global jihad, in large part because the Saudi state itself had considerable “jihadi legitimacy” as a former supporter of jihad in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In the last paper Norwegian Sciences Po PhD candidate Audun Wiig spoke about Jundullah, the Sunni militant group active in the south of Iran. This was in my view the best presentation of the entire conference. Jundullah is very poorly known, but Wiig has dug up a wealth of new information from Baluch blogs and regional media (though not from fieldwork, which remains impossible in Iranian Baluchistan). The discussion was even more fascinating, with Mariam Abou Zahab contributing insights on Baluch nationalism on the Pakistani side of the border.

In the final discussion the “bosses” reconvened to discuss approaches to the study of jihadi movements. There was some disagreement on the need to contextualise terrorist groups and on what “contextualization” means. This no doubt reflected differences in the purpose and focus of the three institutions; Kepel, representing a general Middle East Studies community, argued for breadth, while Sawyer, representing a more specialised institution, emphasised depth. Lia, also coming from a specialised community, leant toward the latter position, on the basis that jihadi groups are often small and not always representative of broad societal trends. However there was agreement on the value of area knowledge and primary sources, elements that have long been somewhat lacking in the terrorism literature.

I should mention that all the papers will be published in an FFI report later this spring. I will keep you posted.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the leading Jihadi scholar in Jordan (and worldwide for that matter), has issued a statement on his website regarding Gaza.  In short: Hamas has let down the Muslim community and needs to step out of the way and allow the Jihadis there and abroad to take over the fight against Israel.  Maqdisi is particularly enraged by Hamas’ recent crackdown on the Army of Islam.  Here’s a summary of the highlights:

• If not for tyrranical rulers and their armies, Muslims would be flocking across their countries’ borders to Gaza now on a jihad.
• We’re not surprised by the failure of our feckless rulers.  We’re surprised by the leaders of Hamas, who spurn the Taliban, Jihadi clerics, and true monotheists [eg Army of Islam] while praising the Shia and its leaders [eg Hezbollah and Iran] and even secular governments that plot against Islam.
• Some might say this is the time for solidarity and not reproaching others.  We say that there is no time like the present.  Neglecting to speak out is one of the main reasons the enemies have been ascendant.
• Hamas is misleading Muslims with its glittering slogans, which blind people to their wayward goals and strategies, leading them down the path of criminals.
• Hamas is selling out Islam and cozying up to tyrants.
• Hamas started the bloodshed in Gaza several weeks ago when it killed members of the Army of Islam organization.  In this they brought joy to the Jews.
• We support those who fight for pure monotheism, not democracy or nationalism.  We won’t stand in the way of those who want to fight for these things, but we won’t support them and we don’t want others to follow them.
• Hamas needs to abandon democracy and return to pure monotheism.  It needs to stop hindering those who would fight under monotheism’s banner.

Document (Arabic): 12-29-08-tawhed-maqdisi-statement-on-hamas