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Der Spiegel reports that the imprisoned Moroccan scholar Muhammad Fizazi has issued a letter to Muslims in Germany declaring Germany “not a battle zone”. The letter, which was allegedly issued on 21 July, has not yet been made public.

Without knowing the precise content, it is difficult to assess its importance. We don’t know whether he is discouraging operations in Germany only, in Europe more broadly, or renouncing violence altogether.

But Fizazi is one of the most influential ideologues in the European/North African jihadi sphere, so this could be quite significant.

Of course, all the caveats of recantations from prison apply. Moreover, as I have said before, no individual recantation is going to end jihadism, but a critical mass of such declarations will have an influence.

In any case, Berlin must be relieved. After the latest barrage of anti-German al-Qaida statements, here is finally a jihadi with nice things to say about Germany.

It appears that this year’s Ramadan was one of the least violent in the nearly two decades of jihadi activism in Algeria. While this period is hailed by militants and their leaders as the most propitious one for jihadi attacks, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was not able to wage a major operation. The threat is still vibrant in the organization’s mountainous strongholds east of Algiers, but AQIM’s ability to strike the capital has been significantly reduced. (By contrast, the relative calm of Ramadan in 2007 was followed by the combined suicide attack against the UN headquarters and the Constitutional Court in Algiers, on December 11). This evolution fits the general trend, documented by Hanna Rogan (see also Thomas’s post on April 3), about the decreasing violent record of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the Algerian jihadi organization that turned into AQIM in January 2007.

Going global was obviously the option adopted by the GSPC leadership to reverse this trend, but the Al-Qaida boost was only temporary. And Abd al-Malik Drukdal, AQIM’s emir, failed to live by his commitment to energize an “Islamic Maghrib” dynamics: Moroccan and Tunisian jihadi networks are operating out of his realm, while Libyan activists are looking East. So AQIM had to rely on the jihadi networks that the GSPC had already developed in the Sahara, especially in Mauritania. But the control exerted by the AQIM leadership on those desert commandos is debatable: the killing of 4 French tourists in Eastern Mauritania on the eve of Christmas in 2007 probably jeopardized the more ambitious planning of a terror attack against the Paris-Dakar car-race, that was then cancelled.

AQIM dreams of striking the French or Spanish “Crusaders” on their own turf, while Al-Qaida central fuels the anti-European intensity of the jihadi propaganda. But Spanish and French security are well aware of this, and a large number of the jihadi networks dismantled North of the Mediterranean had Algerian connections (Javier Jordan concluded that 13 out of the 28 jihadi cells neutralized in Spain in the four years following the Madrid bombings were linked to GSPC/AQIM). So AQIM, frustrated so far in its “infidel” plotting, and contained in its Algerian safe havens, increasingly looked southward. After years of abducting Western tourists in the Sahara and releasing them against ransoms (quite a profitable activity for a relatively poor organization, see the jihadica posting on February 24), AQIM decided to sharpen its “jihadi” profile and executed a British hostage, at the very end of last May. AQIM also intensified its activities in Northern Niger, and even more in Northern Mali, where it suffered heavy losses in July at the hand of the regular army.

AQIM is therefore facing quite a dilemma: emir Drukdal is focusing his public attacks against the “Crusaders” and what he describes as their puppet or “apostate” regimes in North Africa. His mid-2008 New York Times interview was a fascinating and delusive piece of global rhetoric.

But the organization has to find a way to address the growing confrontation with local forces in the Sahel. Although AQIM has already proclaimed “jihad” against the Mauritanian regime, it is much less vocal about Mali and Niger. The opportunistic logic of global jihad, which exploits any available room to maneuver, can prove hard to package.

(Editor’s note: This piece is a sneak preview of our second guest blogger: Vahid Brown from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. He will not start writing regularly until October, and I will present him more formally then, but he has already written this important piece, which for obvious reasons cannot wait.)

I have just looked at the first three installments of the LIFG Revisions posted to the internet, and though these initial releases amount to less than ten percent of the work, we can already see that this is a very sweeping repudiation not just of salafi jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general.

The text is remarkably broad in its scope, and strikes me as a 21st-century Sahwist renewal of the 1970s-era Muslim Brotherhood rejection of Qutbist Islamism. Indeed, the phrase in the last sentence of the excerpt below, about the authors being “preachers not judges,” refers to the famous 1977 Muslim Brotherhood tract of the same title (Hudaybi’s authorship is controversial) that repudiated Sayyid Qutb’s violent form of takfiri revolutionary politics.  Given the prominence of the group of people who have already publicly endorsed the Revisions - including Salman al-’Awda and Yusuf al-Qaradawi - the work promises to be quite consequential.

The first section includes a brief precis of the contents of the work, which I translate below. Much of this is somewhat allusive and often couched in the techinical terminology of Islamic jurisprudence, but I think the message comes through nonetheless:

“We have arranged this study in nine chapters, each with sections and sub-headings.  The first chapter is “The Covenant of Islam and how it is Established,” in which we discuss the qualities necessary for a person to establish their bond [covenant] with Islam and be endowed with the rights of a Muslim, and we point out certain errors in this regard and delineate their negative consequences.

The second chapter is “Knowledge and the Scholars,” (‘ilm wa’l-’ulama) in which we explicate the virtues of Shar’ia knowlege, the characteristics of its adherents, its importance, and the grave seriousness of issuing judgments without jurisprudential qualifications.  We mention that many of the calamities besetting the Muslims today have arisen on account of ignorance and the issuing of decisions, without jurisprudential qualifications, on matters of great importance, especially those having to do with blood and money.

The third chapter is “The Call to God,” which concerns that call (da’wa) which God has made a defining feature of this community (umma), and we discuss the objectives [of da'wa], its various types and areas of application, the need for it, and the obligations and characteristics of those that raise this call (du’at).

The fourth chapter is “Jihad,” in which we mention its virtue and position, and expound upon the ethical requirements, regulations and etiquette (adab) of jihad, mentioning the disastrous consequences of deviating from these regulations.  We discuss the history of the use of violence in political revolutions, the position of the scholars on this issue, as well as our own position on armed struggle, established on the basis of our personal experiences in this regard.

The fifth chapter is “Differences in Legal Opinions” (fiqh al-khilaf), in which we explain the various types [of acceptable multiplicity/contestation of legal views in Islamic jurisprudence], and define what is and is not permissible in this regard. We call attention to the deleterious effects on Muslim unity arising out of ignorance of the proper rules relating to divergence of legal opinion.

The sixth chapter is dedicated to “Religious Extremism” (ghuluw fi’l-din), in which we discuss its manifestations and causes, as well as its negative effects on the individual and the community (umma).

The seventh chapter is “The Beneficial and the Harmful,” (al-masalih wa’l-mafasid), in which we explain the importance of considering the consequences of actions, and the weighing of the beneficial and harmful in the scale of the purposes of sacred law; we conclude that neglect of this issue has been the cause of most of the errors in the Muslim community (al-umma al-islamiyya).

The eighth chapter is on “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong,” the basis of the community’s well-being. We discuss some of the errors committed under this rubric, which, despite the best of intentions, lead to evil results.

Finally, the ninth chapter is on “Passing Judgment on People,” in which we explain the grave seriousness of issuing decrees against people, and in particular the excommunication (takfir) of a Muslim. We discuss the regulations on passing judgment, the regulations on those qualified to pass such judgments, and we conclude that, indeed, we are preachers not judges, and that it is not ours to know the hearts of men, or to search their breasts, but rather to invite them unto righteousness.” (Kitab al-dirasat al-tashihiyya, part one).

There is a very significant development taking place in the so-called war of ideas. Senior leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), who recently laid down their arms, are publishing a Dr. Fadl-like treatise revising their previous understanding of jihad. The text, entitled “the Book of Correctional Studies” (kitab al-dirasat al-tashihiyya), is being published as a nine-part series on the website www.oealibya.com. You can find the first three chapters here, here and here. Unfortunately I don’t have the time to look at it in detail, but Jarret Brachman will be covering the story. He already has some interesting background info and analysis.

The text in itself is probably not a landmark work of Islamic jurisprudence, but it is important because it adds to what may now be called a corpus of treatises by former militants challenging al-Qaida on theological grounds. The trend started with al-Gamaa al-Islamiya in Egypt, continued with Dr Fadl and now it’s the LIFG’s turn. Credible MB figures like Yusuf al-Qaradawi have also chipped in. Of course, no one text is going to change the world, but put together, these treatises will constrain al-Qaida’s recruitment pool somewhat. The Libyan text has yet to make a big splash on the forums, though it is talked about. It will be very interesting to see if and how the AQ leadership will respond to the latest salvo.

Apologies for the slow publication pace here at Jihadica, but deadlines and an upcoming house move mean I can only dream about serious blogging these days.

This does not mean forums are quiet. Every morning this past week I found things on the forums that deserved commentary. In a dream world, here’s what I would have written about had I had the time:

-    France is taking heat. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb published a statement declaring “France the mother of all evils”, and other posts fumed over the recent French plans to ban the niqab or the burka. I suspect the Americans and the Brits (who of course have long argued that France is the mother of all evils)  are happy to share the burden of jihadi attention. Unfortunately for the Anglo-Saxons, however, I don’t think the veil weighs nearly as heavy in the jihadi basket of grievances as military occupations.

-    Another one bites the dust. Exiled leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group told al-Quds al-Arabi on 2 July they are laying down their arms. The declaration is now being spun in the media as the first case of a group leaving al-Qaida. This is a misrepresentation of what’s happening but I can see why people want to spin it that way.

-    The non-strategic “Special strategic study”. The “Department for Historical Studies and Strategic Advice” of the “Falluja Think Tank” released a widely publicized “special strategic study” of the war between America and the jihadi movement. The title and the high-profile advertising had raised my expectations, but I was a little disappointed, mainly because it’s not a proper strategic study. It is a political analysis which stays at the macro-level and doesn’t offer much in terms of meso-level considerations and concrete recommendations that I associate with classics of jihadi strategic studies. It is still worth reading, though, and there is an intriguing note on AQ and nuclear weapons at the end. Scott might be covering the study it in more detail later this week.

-   Jihadis “twittering” about Swat and Helmand campaigns. The jihadi commentary and analysis of battles in Afghanistan and Pakistan is coming out so quickly it is close to twittering. Within days of the Helmand offensive there was a long Faluja thread reporting news from the frontline. The Swat debacle has been followed closely for a while, and there is now already a strategic study of the campaign. I haven’t read it yet but it looks very interesting.

-    The other American.  The Somalia-based Abu Mansour al-Amriki has released a new audio statement in English entitled “The beginning of the end” It lambasts Obama along well-known lines in very articulate native English. I agree with Evan that Abu Mansour beats Adam Gadahn on presentation skills. Abu Mansour’s tajwid is really impressive. The message is clearly intended for the mobilisation of US-based Muslims. As interesting as the message itself was the accompanying pictures of three other alleged Americans in Somalia, not least given the New York Times story about Shabab recruitment in America. By the way, Evan has a fantastic post on the Shabab on the CTBlog today.

-    Happy birthday ISI. Last Thursday was the 1000-day anniversary of the foundation of the Islamic State in Iraq, and the occasion was marked with banners on all the forums, but not much more.

-    Good Qaradawi or bad Qaradawi? Marc Lynch had a great post the other day on Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s latest book on jihad, which he thinks will undermine al-Qaida, more so than the recantations of Dr Fadl and others. Rob at the Shack disagrees, saying the side effect of Qaradawi’s stance is more legitimacy for regular national liberation struggles, which might actually cause more problems for the US in the long term. They are of course both right.

Finally there is this gem from the CBS Terror Monitor (hat tip: Cecilie), by an analyst who has clearly had enough forum watching (here’s a pdf if they remove it). Hoda you have my sympathy - there have been days where I have felt the same.

Have a great week everyone!

[Editor’s note: I am thrilled to introduce Einar Wigen, author of the recent FFI report on the IJU, as a guest contributor. Einar interned at FFI last summer and is currently a a student fellow at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI). A fluent Turkish speaker, Einar specialises in jihadism among the Turkics. Not many people produce world-class research as summer interns, so this guy is really someone to look out for in the future.]

The Turkic peoples have until now played a fairly peripheral role in global jihadism. They have not attracted much academic attention, and apart from the 2003 Istanbul bombings and the 2008 American Consulate attacks, operations carried out by Turkics have gained little attention. The Waziristan-based group Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) seems to be trying to change this (as Jihadica has suggested before).

The IJU broke off from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 2001, and went for a while under the name Islamic Jihad Group. When the name changed in 2005, the group also assumed a new strategy, one that looked beyond Uzbekistan and focused more on global issues. This may also have involved a merger with other groups, as indicated in the “Union”. What binds the group together appears to be language, and it is primarily made up of Turkic-speaking members.

The number of IJU fighters has been estimated at between 100 and 200, the bulk of which comprises Uzbeks, who remain relatively anonymous compared to the Turks and Germans arriving in the camps. This makes it much smaller than the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which operates in nearby Southern Waziristan and is hosted by Baitullah Mahsud.

Although smaller than the IMU, the IJU maintains a higher profile through its use of the website Şehadet Zamanı. It is unclear whether this website is run by the IJU itself, or by a sympathiser with privileged access to the group. The website is in Turkish and presents news on the group’s operations and on other issues relating to Jihad. It is the most important of the Turkish jihadi websites, and is frequently referred to on other forums and jihadi websites.

The IJU is based in Mir Ali in North Waziristan, where it is hosted by the influential tribal leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. Until the latter was killed in an American drone attack in January 2008, the group was in contact with the centrally placed Libyan al-Qaida member Abu Laith al-Libi. Abu Laith seems to have exerted considerable influence over the group, seemingly pushing it to take its struggle beyond Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

The group’s best known plot was the Sauerland Cell’s planned attack in September 2007. The group was led by a German convert called Fritz Gelowicz and consisted of at least one more German and two German Turks. The plan was to attack the Uzbek and the American Consulates and the Rammstein Airbase in Germany with hydrogen peroxide bombs, each equivalent of about 250kg of dynamite. The trial against the cell is still going on, and the four main suspects have pleaded guilty.

The Sauerland Cell was trained by the IJU in Waziristan, and while in Germany it was in contact with the IJU via email. Since the attack became known, more German recruits have turned up in the IJU’s camps. In March 2008, Germany got its first suicide bomber when the Bavarian Turk, Cüneyt Çiftçi, blew himself up at an American base in Afghanistan. Another German in the IJU is the convert Eric Breininger, who has become something of a celebrity on the IJU’s webpages. He has made several appearances in videos. In his rhetoric, Germany should expect attacks because of its close cooperation with Uzbekistan and for its involvement in Afghanistan. Breininger’s picture now hangs at every point of entry to the EU, and publicly at all German airports. It was long speculated that he may become a suicide bomber, but that has not happened so far.

Through its use of the Şehadet Zamanı website the IJU is becoming a hub in the Turkic network of jihadists. The spokes go to Germany, Turkey and obviously also to Uzbekistan. Such a development would seem to give al-Qaida a foothold among radicals of the Turkic peoples.

Continued from here.

The fourth panel on “networks, strategy and ideology” started off with a paper by CTC’s Scott Helfstein on the dynamics of terrorist networks. Helfstein has examined six key al-Qaida plots using network analysis tools to find out why certain individuals come to play central roles in attack networks, and how attack networks change over time. He showed that people’s centrality was a function of personal attributes (skills, education) and their function in the network (weapons acquisition etc). Helfstein is one of a small but growing number of American political scientists who are applying formal methods to the theoretically starved field of terrorism studies with very interesting results (other scholars include CTC-affiliated Princeton professor Jake Shapiro).

Bill Braniff, also from CTC, presented a very interesting model for thinking about al-Qaida’s future strategic evolution. He identified five scenarios: 1) persistence (no-change), 2) horizontal escalation (concerted geographic spread), 3) vertical escalation (dedicated prioritization of mega-terrorism), 4) pursuit of loose affiliations (extending resources to Islamist groups without extending their brand-name or demanding strict adherence to their ideology), and 5) the diversification of core activities (conducting activities such as governance, da’wa, and social service provision under the al-Qa’ida banner in a addition to waging jihad).

FFI’s Petter Nesser then talked about the ideological evolution of jihadi community in Europe. He showed how the ideological and strategic dilemmas facing jihadis in the diaspora differ from those faced by militants in the Muslim world. He also argued that jihadism in Europe has undergone three distinct phases of ideological evolution. A first phase (mid- or late 1990s), different local and internationalist jihadi trends co-existed in relative harmony. In the second phase (late 1990s-2003), Europe’s jihadis were torn between “classical” and “global jihadism”. The third phase, triggered by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, saw the emergence of a new generation that increasingly adopted al-Qaida’s global jihadi identity.

The fifth panel included two Maghreb-focused papers and one on suicide bombings. Jean-Pierre Filiu analysed the formation and evolution of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and asked: how Maghribi is AQIM? Not very, he argued, because AQIM has essentially become an Algerian outfit with a a Saharan branch. This was despite a considerable potential for cooperation between the Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Libyan jihadi communities, and despite the fact that the non-Algerian groups have historically been more integrated into al-Qaida.

Hanna Rogan presented very interesting quantitative study of AQIM’s attack patterns (see her Sentinel piece for details). She notably showed that the frequency and geographical reach of AQIM’s attacks had decreased markedly in 2008 after a spike in 2007. This suggests to me that the initial momentum gained from GSPC’s late 2006 alliance with al-Qaida is wearing off.

The third paper was presented by yours truly and looked at patterns of suicide bombings and jihadi ideologies. I argued that jihadi groups whose primary enemy is non-Muslim (irredentist or pan-Islamist groups) use suicide bombings much more frequently than groups whose primary enemy is Muslim (revolutionary or moral vigilante groups). There are in fact extremely few cases of suicide attacks by revolutionary groups (GIA, GSPC, EIJ, GI etc), despite their being jihadi salafi and very violent. To me, this shows that Robert Pape is less wrong than most terrorism/Islamism scholars think. I don’t believe literal occupation causes suicide bombings, but I think there exists a mechanism whereby people fight harder when they are confronting outsiders. The paper predictably generated a very heated debate.

The sixth panel focused on the Gulf and began with a presentation by Stephane Lacroix on apolitical Salafism (sometimes referred to as pietist salafism or Madkhalism) and its potential role as a counterweight to jihadism. Saudi Arabia and other countries (especially Jordan, Libya and Algeria) are promoting it as such, so this is a question with deep policy implications. Lacroix highlighted a crucial dilemma: On the one hand, apolitical salafis fiercely oppose global jihadism and preach absolute loyalty to governments. (Lacroix notably argued that the absence of terrorist attacks in France in recent years is partly due to the strength of apolitical salafism in France). On the other hand, apolitical salafis are socially extremely conservative and sectarian, and tend to isolate themselves from society around them. Politics is indeed not the only way to militancy; extreme puritanism or apocalypticism may also produce violence, as illustrated by the 1979 Mecca siege.

The second paper, by Sciences Po PhD candidate Asiem El Difraoui, offered an excellent analysis of al-Qaida’s propaganda dilemmas in Saudi Arabia. El Difraoui, a leading expert on jihadi visual media, argued that al-Qaida in the Kingdom had failed to mobilise Saudis for global jihad, in large part because the Saudi state itself had considerable “jihadi legitimacy” as a former supporter of jihad in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In the last paper Norwegian Sciences Po PhD candidate Audun Wiig spoke about Jundullah, the Sunni militant group active in the south of Iran. This was in my view the best presentation of the entire conference. Jundullah is very poorly known, but Wiig has dug up a wealth of new information from Baluch blogs and regional media (though not from fieldwork, which remains impossible in Iranian Baluchistan). The discussion was even more fascinating, with Mariam Abou Zahab contributing insights on Baluch nationalism on the Pakistani side of the border.

In the final discussion the “bosses” reconvened to discuss approaches to the study of jihadi movements. There was some disagreement on the need to contextualise terrorist groups and on what “contextualization” means. This no doubt reflected differences in the purpose and focus of the three institutions; Kepel, representing a general Middle East Studies community, argued for breadth, while Sawyer, representing a more specialised institution, emphasised depth. Lia, also coming from a specialised community, leant toward the latter position, on the basis that jihadi groups are often small and not always representative of broad societal trends. However there was agreement on the value of area knowledge and primary sources, elements that have long been somewhat lacking in the terrorism literature.

I should mention that all the papers will be published in an FFI report later this spring. I will keep you posted.

In mid-December 2008, UN special envoy to Niger, Robert Fowler, and his aide, Louis Guay, mysteriously disappeared while on a field trip. The fate of the two Canadians long remained shrouded in uncertainty. A Nigerian Tuareg rebel group first claimed responsibility for their abduction, but this claim was quickly retracted. In early February Canadian authorities received a video tape from unknown sources which confirmed the two diplomats were still alive, and demanded a prisoner swap for their release. Last Wednesday, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb released an online statement in which it claimed responsibility not only for the abduction of Fowler and Guay, but also that of four European tourists who disappeared from the Mali-Niger border area in late January.

The latest statement is brief and raises as many questions as it answers. It names and depicts the four tourists (one Briton, one German and two Swiss), but offers no indications of their approximate geographical whereabouts, nor on whether the six hostages are held together. The statement includes no specific demands, but states that the hostages are held as prisoners under the shari‘a law and that conditions for their release will be given at a later time.

These two recent cases resemble the kidnapping case of two Austrian tourists last year in several respects (see also here). They were abducted by AQIM elements in Tunisia in February, then taken to Mali and held there until released for a ransom in October.

First, all three cases illustrate AQIM’s extended geographical reach. While the Austrian operation involved Tunisian, Algerian, (possibly Libyan), and Malian territory, the two latest cases represent the first AQIM incursions into Niger (officially, at least). It has been speculated that local Tuareg groups in Niger executed the abductions, and then handed the hostages over to AQIM in Mali or Algeria, but the statement affirms that the operations were carried out by “mujahideen” (which normally refers to AQIM’s own elements). Whether the AQIM presence is direct or indirect, it has significant operational implications.

Second, the current cases echo the Austrian abduction through the confusing set of messages and demands presented by the captors. In the Austrian case, the AQIM first demanded the release of members imprisoned in Algeria and Tunisia. They then changed the request to include two Muslims imprisoned on terrorism charges in Austria, before settling on a ransom. It is not clear whether this evolution reflected a lack of internal coordination, a poor negotiation strategy or simply the unrealistic nature of the initial demands.

Nevertheless, in economic terms, kidnapping has proved profitable for AQIM lately. In this regard, it should be noted that abductions have long been a favoured tactic of AQIM (and GSPC before it). Most victims in the past have tended to be wealthy Algerians kidnapped for money. Third, then, the three recent cases illustrate the increase in anti-Western activity by AQIM. Algeria and Mauritania in particular have experienced a rise in attacks on foreign interests and nationals. The latest abduction cases indicate that this now also applies to other countries in the region.

Finally, if these new cases follow the pattern of the Austrian affair, we will hear more from the captors soon. In any case let us hope for a more rapid release than last time, when the  hostages were held for over eight months. To be continued.

Document (Arabic): 02-18-09-aqim-abduction-un-representatives-and-european-tourists

Sayyid Imam has some surprising things to say about Sayyid Qutb and some interesting speculation on Zawahiri’s tenuous position in al-Qaeda.  He also observes that Libyan and Mauritanian students serve as Zawahiri’s primary research assistants.  I don’t know about their nationalities, but there’s no doubt Zawahiri has research assistants (as do many productive academics).  Moreover, Zawahiri talks about Mauritanian seminarians coming to visit him and Bin Laden in his Exoneration, so it makes sense that some stayed on to help him write.

Continuing…

Zawahiri says in Knights that he joined al-Qaeda to unite the efforts of the Muslims.  That’s not true.  Zawahiri knew Bin Laden for 14 years, from 1987 to 2001, and never joined with him.  Rather, he criticized Bin Ladin harshly as a Saudi intelligence agent for merely reducing donations to his (Zawahiri’s) group in 1995.  To this end, Zawahiri wrote an article critical of Bin Laden called “The Youth Are Generous with Their Lives and The Rich Are Stingy with Their Money” (جاد الشباب بأرواحهم وضنّ الأغنياء بأموالهم), in the Kalimat Haqq journal.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad did not join Al Qaeda; only Zawahiri and eight others joined.  It wasn’t to unite jihad; it was because Zawahiri saw his fame and fortune linked to Bin Laden.  Bin Laden knew Zawahiri had nothing to offer him except his name.  He kept Zawahiri out of the dark regarding 9/11 and didn’t allow him or anyone else to make media appearances.

Zawahiri used to visit the al-Qaeda media committee under Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in Kandahar to learn about its activities [ie he was out of the loop].  

9/11 was a big break for Zawahiri because it gave him the opportunity to play a role in the media because the leaders of al-Qaeda were either hiding, killed, or captured.

Here are some of the things Zawahiri did to capitalize on 9/11:

• He glorified the 9/11 attacks and berated those who criticized them as American agents.
• He justified the 9/11 attacks.
• He didn’t take responsibility for the negative effects of 9/11, the immediate aftermath of which ruined al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Afghanistan.

Even though they tried to obscure their crimes, current and future generations will never forget that Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their followers bear sole responsibility for losing an Islamic state, which had been established by the Taliban.

Zawahiri has canonized Bin Laden to such an extent that he denies his errors, as if Bin Laden is infallible.  It’s odd that Zawahiri has criticized the Muslim Brotherhood his entire life yet became a follower of one of them (Bin Laden).  Zawahiri justifies all of Bin Laden’s crimes like Goebbels did for Hitler.

Here are the reasons why Zawahiri has canonized bin Laden after criticizing him and accusing him of collaboration:

• Reason one: Bin Laden provided the greatest opportunity for Zawahiri to get the fame he’s craved for 30 years, an opportunity realized after 9/11.
• Reason two: Zawahiri knows that al-Qaeda is Bin Laden and no one else.  99% of its membership is Saudi and Yemeni and is tied to Bin Laden personally.  Zawahiri has canonized him in order to get the allegiance of his followers if Bin Laden dies.  It’s doubtful that Bin Laden’s followers will follow Zawahiri, but he tries nonetheless.
• Reason three: 99% of al-Qaeda’s financing comes from Saudi Arabia to Bin Laden personally.  Zawahiri has to canonize him to continue to get their support if bin Laden dies.  “Zawahiri is preparing for the moment of the announcement of Bin Laden’s death so that he can inherit his organizational legacy.”
• Finally: Zawahiri has to talk about all the issues of the umma to be perceived as its leader, especially the Palestinian issue.

Zawahiri does not care about the destruction he has justified.  In his life, only three things matter to him: preserving his personal well-being, media attention in any form, and gathering money.  “In short: fleeing, microphones, and donation boxes.”

Bin Laden and Zawahiri care nothing for the people of Afghanistan.  During the four years Bin Laden was in Sudan, he spent millions of dollars on the Sudanese and paved hundreds of kilometers of road.  He was in Afghanistan for five years before 9/11 and gave an oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar, yet he did not pave a single road, build a single school, or construct a single hospital.  Hundreds of Afghan kids were dying at that time yet he did nothing and things only got worse after 9/11.

Al-Qaeda entered Iraq after its occupation in 2003 by standing on the shoulders of Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish group.  Then al-Qaeda renounced Ansar al-Islam and operated in Iraq independently.  (The amir of this group, Mullah Krekar, told me in 1990 that he had translated my book, al-`Umda, into Kurdish.)

Al-Qaeda in Iraq was accused of being made up of foreigners.  To establish that it was an Iraqi resistance, al-Qaeda sent one of their senior leaders, `Abd al-Hadi al-`Iraqi, from Waziristan to Iraq, but the U.S. captured him along the way.

I want to remind readers that Zawahiri was influenced by the words of Sayyid Qutb.  Although both men have severe jurisprudential shortcomings, there’s a big difference in their level of sincerity.  If Qutb had lived, I think he would have realized his jurisprudential mistakes.  But whereas Qutb had studied his whole life, Zawahiri stopped his intellectual development after reading Qutb.  I tried for years to push him to study the Sharia but to no avail.  He doesn’t have the patience for it.

When I was part of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Zawahiri put his name on some of my works to cover up his Sharia shortcomings.  When I broke my ties with them, they continued to steal from my book.  Later, Zawahiri came to rely on the seminary students around him from Libya and Mauritania, especially for writing the Exoneration.  They merely hunted for statements that justified their actions without distinction between sound and weak statements.

I’ve written these words, as I did in the Document, to warn Muslims, especially the younger youth, about these reckless, opportunistic people and their like.  Do not be fooled by slogans or by the justice of a specific cause until you know the reality of the person’s life who raises these slogans.  Is he honest or is he hunting for ignorant quarry and trading upon them?

Document (Arabic): 12-1-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-12