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[Editor's note: I am pleased to introduce another new contributor, Scott Sanford, who is a graduate student at George Washington University specialising in jihadism in the levant. Scott has guest blogged for Jihadica in the past, but now he is joining us on a more regular basis.]

“What is the Secret of the Falluja Forum’s Success?” This was the intriguing title of a recent post on Falluja presenting a detailed analysis of the web traffic to the forum itself. The contributor, named “Song of Terror”, broke the article into two parts: the first supplying the web analytic data and the second providing strategies and further analysis.  While he claimed that jihadi propaganda efforts on the Internet are successful, the data does in fact not support his analysis. 

Using data from Alexa.com, Song of Terror started by asserting that Fallujah is the most “successful” jihadi forum.  Fallujah’s “Daily Reach”, the percent of global Internet users visiting Al-faloja.info, was up 42% from 0.00163% three months ago to 0.0022% on 27 April 2009.  A majority of Fallujah’s users, 36.5%, were in Iraq.  Algeria held the second spot with 9.1% followed by Egypt with 8.2%.  Al-faloja.info’s traffic rank was 220 in Iraq, 759 in Georgia, and 821 in the Palestinian Territories. 

Song of Terror reported that 19.64% of Fallujah’s visitors came from Google.com, 5.89% from Muslm.net, an Islamic forum that many militants frequent, and 5.56% from Youtube.com.  He appeared to be disappointed with Youtube.com’s third place ranking and suspected that it would increase in the next “two weeks” because “a campaign to spread Fallujah’s link via [YouTube] continues in its infancy.”  In fact, YouTube now has a new channel called FallujahTube that appears to be connected to this “campaign.”  He also recommended that others who post videos on YouTube put the Fallujah link in the video description under the user name to make it more visible to users.  He also claimed that the percentage reported for YouTube is inaccurate because other websites take videos from YouTube and post them elsewhere, which would make its percentage higher.  As for Muslm.net, he stated that due to his own personal efforts posting Fallujah links on the website since 2007, it now holds the number two spot. 

In regards to Google.com, Song of Terror claimed that Fallujah’s success is due to not requiring a login, which makes Fallujah searchable on Google.  The top Google search terms leading to Fallujah were “The Fallujah Forums” written in Arabic and “al-faloja” written in English.  He also noted that “proxy without installation” written in Arabic and “filezzz rapidleech” written in English lead visitors to the Fallujah Forums for technical advice.  Indeed, a 10 May 2009 Google search of “proxy without installation” in Arabic revealed that the third link on the page connected to a Fallujah post about surfing the Internet without a proxy. 

After visiting Fallujah, 14.85% of the visitors returned to Google, 5.46% returned to YouTube, 4.61% each went to Hanein.info and Muslm.net, and between 3.92% and 2.9% visited the upload sites Zshare.net, Rapidshare.com, and Archive.org.  Song of Terror noted that this is evidence that Fallujah users use the website as a means to access videos. 

In the second section of the post, Song of Terror outlined eight strategies and pieces of advice:

1.      “Determine Your Goal,” which is “Winning the Battle of Hearts and Minds,” “Planting the seed of jihad in the hearts of the general Muslim population,” and “Transmitting the mujahedeen voice to the general population.” 

2.      “Choose the Means of Arriving to Your Goal,” which is using the Internet.

3.      “Study the Field Data and the Means of Influence,” where he again stressed the importance of YouTube to the jihadi propaganda effort because of the supposed rising popularity of the Internet in the Middle East and because YouTube is the second most popular site in the world according to Song of Terror.  He added that Falluja should not be the primary focus of propaganda efforts because many Arab countries ban the site.

4.      Properly distribute one’s efforts to endeavors that yield the most results.

5.      Remain flexible to adjust to the different characteristics of various websites.

6.      This section dealt with security issues and Song of Terror added a link to a Fallujah post on how to use the Tor anonymity software.  He also added links to several “Crusader websites” because they “distribute mujahedeen films”.  It is unclear why he added this, but possibly, it is because jihadis could use links to videos on these sites as safe links that government censoring would not prevent.

7.      The connection between the real world and the “hypothetical world.”  Here it appears that Song of Terror was attempting to prove a connection to jihadi Internet propaganda efforts and the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq.  In making his argument, he cited reporting from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, an unidentified Rand report, and al-Qaeda in Iraq reporting about their “martyrs,” which all supposedly concluded that most foreign fighters in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia, followed by Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Algeria.  While he did not make his point explicit, it appears that he was insinuating that the movement of foreign fighters to Iraq from these Arab countries was proof of jihadi Internet propaganda success. 

However, adding this point contradicts his entire argument that the Fallujah Forums are successful.  Saudi Arabia placed tenth on the country list of Al-faloja.info users with only 2.5% of the site’s visitors being of Saudi origin.  If Song of Terror’s correlation between Internet propaganda and the number of foreign fighters were correct, we would expect the number of Saudis entering Iraq to be much lower or the number of Saudi visitors on the Fallujah Forums to be much higher.  Additionally, from the countries ranked above Saudi Arabia on the country list of Fallujah users – Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Libya, the UAE, Georgia, and Jordan – we would expect more of these nationalities to enter Iraq or less of them to visit the Fallujah Forums.  It is possible that many of Fallujah’s visitors have gone to Pakistan and Afghanistan instead of Iraq, but it is reasonable to assume, with the exception of Pakistan, that the numbers and nationalities of foreign fighters entering these countries would be similar to Iraq’s experience, which still negates Song of Terror’s analysis.  Finally, according Song of Terror, nearly 50 Yemenis entered Iraq, but Yemen is not even listed on the country list of Fallujah users.  According to his analysis, we would expect Yemen to hold a much higher position on the list.  In short, his data does not add up and it does not support the theory that jihadi Internet propaganda alone determines the flow of militants to war zones. 

8.      “Strategies of Intellectual Penetration and Contradicting Psychological Conditioning.”  In this final point, Song of Terror encouraged jihadi propagandists to distribute documentary programs supportive of jihadi ideology and to learn about “psychological conditioning” by mainstream Arab satellite stations such as al-Jazeera. 

Song of Terror attempted to apply some quantitative analytical reasoning to verify the success and usefulness of the Fallujah Forums and jihadi efforts at Internet propaganda.  However, the data does not support his analysis.  One might even use his data to make the exact opposite argument, that jihadi Internet propaganda has relatively little effect on radicalization and recruitment. 

Document (Arabic): 05-01-2009-falujah-traffic-ranking-1
Document (Arabic): 05-11-2009-fallujahtube-2
Document (Arabic): 05-10-2009-proxy-without-instillation-google-search-3
Document (Arabic): 05-10-2009-without-a-proxy-post-4
Document (Arabic): 05-11-2009-how-to-use-tor-5

Although I was away on vacation for the last week and a half, I read all of the excellent posts from everyone who guest blogged during my absence.  Chipotle Mystery, Scott Sanford, and Mike Honcho: I owe you one.  (By the way, make sure to check out Mike Honcho’s blog, The Tel’nik.  It’s a great resource for Caucasus-related analysis.)

[Scott Sanford]  On 28 August 2008, the Army of Islam (AI), a Gaza-based and al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist entity that gained notoriety for the kidnapping of BBC reporter Alan Johnston, issued a statement in response to what the AI claimed were many calls to unify Palestinian jihadi organizations under one banner. In the statement, the AI asserted that it is willing to accept any group into its fold as long as the group adheres to the AI’s Islamic standards.

It stated that it is a Salafi organization and that anyone raising partisan, nationalist, patriotic, socialist, secular, or democratic flags are infidels. Additionally, it claimed that anyone wishing to unify with the AI must publicly disavow such ideologies and pledge its loyalty to the jihadi, Islamic banner. The AI claimed that its dogma and actions are based on several factors:

1. Global jihad, the AI does not differentiate between jihad in the Palestinian Territories or outside of them

2. Jihad on the apostates, hypocrites, crusaders, Jews, and Shi’a inside and outside the Palestinian Territories

3. Achieving Shari’a law

4. The AI is a fighting organization and any unification will be established upon this and not on guidance and advice

5. The AI is not represented by one person [This is likely a response to criticisms that the AI is really an extension of the Dughmush clan. These criticisms were likely brought on because its late leader, Mumtaz Dughmush, was a member of this clan.] Only Abu Muhammad al-Ansari is allowed to speak on behalf of the AI. Additionally, only internet statements released by the Global Islamic Media Front are official AI statements

6. Any unity agreement must be based on a clear strategy that agrees with the global jihad

7. This statement represents the rules of the AI’s program

8. The AI will accept anyone meeting these requirements

9. The AI previously consulted with other organizations and Shaykhs when there was not a Salafi jihadi program in Gaza. Some blessed the program, but most were against the AI. Regardless, the AI raised its banner with aggression on it from near and far

The AI’s global view of jihad and its desire to be part of a global Islamic state represents a departure from Hamas’ nationalistic view that includes the formation of a Palestinian Islamic state encompassing the Palestinian Territories and Israel. This represents a direct challenge to Hamas’ ideology and rule. As a result, Hamas has harassed and attacked the AI since it seized control of Gaza in June 2007. Recently, it appears that Israel has also been fairly successful in eliminating AI members. It would not surprise me if Hamas operatives informed the Israeli military of the locations of AI members in order to let Israel do its dirty work.

The AI’s relative weakness to Hamas is a likely reason why it is willing to accept other terrorist organizations into its fold. However, by integrating like-minded organizations now, the AI may be attempting to lay the foundation for the arrival of al-Qaeda to the Palestinian Territories in the future. In the past year, several al-Qaeda leaders have hinted at this, including Assad-al-Jihad2. Regardless of the AI’s intent in unifying terrorist entities in the Palestinian Territories or of its success in doing so, it is likely that it will remain weak in comparison to Hamas, which would make it difficult to carry out its intended strategy.

Document (Arabic): 8-28-2008-Ek-ls.org-28AUG08-Message-from-AI

[Scott Sanford]  On 23 August 2008, Ekhlaas member Assad al-Jihad2 (أسد الجهاد2), or the Lion of Jihad 2, posted a statement concerning the state of al-Qaida in the world today. He started the statement with a 13 December 2001 news report about the battle in Tora Bora and how it seemed that al-Qaida was on the brink of total destruction. However, he argued, “In only seven years…they [al-Qaida] were able to…triumph over the world alliance against them.” He based this assertion on several events he attributed to al-Qaida:

1. Many United States government officials were forced to leave their posts after their failure to defeat al-Qaida
2. American historians have claimed that President Bush has been the worst president in American history
3. Al-Qaida weakened the most powerful country on Earth in “the Badr of the [21^st] century” (This is a reference to the 624CE Battle of Badr where approximately 300 Muslim soldiers defeated the much larger Meccan army of approximately 1000 soldiers. Muslims believe divine intervention granted them victory.)
4. Al-Qaida brought down the Spanish government after its 11 March 2004 attacks
5. Al-Qaida brought down the British government after its 7 July 2005 attacks
6. Al-Qaida defeated the Musharraf government after it attacked Islam

Assad al-Jihad2 (AJ2) did admit that after September 11^th, al-Qaida did not expect “the great betrayal of the Pakistani government” or “the betrayal of the scholars of evil.” (The scholars are likely prominent Salafi ideologues like Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl) or Salman al-‘Awda, who turned against al-Qaida’s bloody methods.) However, regardless of the supposed betrayals, he stated that today one can find al-Qaida in Iraq, North Africa, Somalia, Saudi Arabia(where he claimed that al-Qaida has huge human reserves), and Yemen. He also stated that the Palestinian Territories are merely in need of a “spark” for al-Qaida to show its presence there.

Normally I do not give much credence to such reports emanating from the forums, but this one is important for two reasons. First, it is possible that AJ2 is a military commander for al-Qaida. The blogger and Jordan University professor Akram Hijazi stated in a reference to one of AJ2’s statements, “It is not inconceivable that [AJ2] is one of al-Qaida’s military commanders.” (Hijazi is an al-Qaida supporter and his blogs are regularly posted on takfiri websites. He is the “senior researcher” at the Arab Researchers’ Center, which sells takfiri videos and statements that are otherwise free on the Internet. Fu’ad Husayn, who wrote a biography of al-Zarqawi and spent time with him in prison, runs the center. The website for the Arab Researchers’ Center is Arabresearchers.net.) Additionally, the fact that AJ2 often times posts through the al-Qaida-affiliated Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “innovative pen 1,” which is one of the highest titles one can achieve on Ekhlaas, adds credibility to Hijazi’s assertion.

Second, in a January 2008 statement, AJ2 stated that the Palestinian territories will be the primary front for terrorists graduating from Afghanistan and Iraq. He claimed that due to Hamas’ suppression of al-Qaida-inspired militants in Gaza, al-Qaida cannot announce its presence in the Palestinian Territories at this time. However, he added that al-Qaida will announce its presence sometime after the current US presidential cycle. He then mentioned that the battle with Israel will begin between 2010 and 2013. Finally, he claimed that al-Qaida has already begun preparing for war with Israel and he gave advice for how the Palestinians should prepare. In this context, AJ2’s recent remark about al-Qaida needing a spark to start operations in the Palestinian Territories takes on more significance. It is unclear what exactly this spark could be, but it does seem that AJ2 is again indicating that al-Qaida is preparing to engage Israel.

Regardless of AJ2’s views, I remain skeptical that al-Qaida will be able to gain a significant presence in Gaza and then maintain that presence. After Hamas forced the al-Qaida-inspired Army of Islam (AI) to release BBC reporter Alan Johnston, the two organizations have been at loggerheads, which has been at the detriment of AI. If an indigenous group of terrorists with backing from a prominent Gazan clan, the Dughmush, cannot operate relatively freely in Gaza, I doubt a group of foreign al-Qaida operatives will do much better.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ek-ls.org-AJ2-After-the-Fall-of-Pervez

Document (Arabic): 2-18-2008-Ek-ls.org-Akram-Hijazi-Blog

Document (English): 8-27-2008-Arabresearchers.net-about-the-Arab-Researchers-Center

Document (English): 8-27-2008-Arabresearchers.net-Research-by-the-Arab-Researchers-Center

Document (Arabic): 29-01-2008-Ek-ls.org-AJ2-GIMF-Statement

[Scott Sanford]  Abu Kandahar (أبو قندهار) reported on Ekhlaas that coalition forces, “crusaders,” killed Ekhlaas member Abu Hurayra 2 (أبو هريرة 2), a major contributor to Ekhlaas, in northern Iraq’s Ninawa province on 21 August 2008.  Abu Kandahar is a main contributor to Ekhlaas and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “distinguished pen (قلم متميز),” one of the highest distinctions to achieve, which adds credibility to his report.

Abu Hurayra 2’s last post was on 14 August 2008 where he provided photos of militants supposedly engaging in combat and he reassured readers that operations were increasing by the day.  He also gave a cryptic message saying, “I give you these new photos.  They are the last for me before my departure from you because I will be absent for a long time.”  It is unclear exactly what this means, but it appears that he may have been preparing for his death or arrest.

Abu Kandahar claimed that he received a letter informing him of Abu Hurayra 2’s death and that Abu Hurayra 2 fought some soldiers trying to arrest him.  Abu Hurayra 2 allegedly engaged the soldiers with a pistol killing two and wounding one.  He also reported that Abu Hurayra 2 restored the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) media operations in Ninawa province.  If true, coalition forces may have dealt the ISI a major blow as far as its media arm is concerned.  However, if Abu Hurayra 2 was expecting his demise, it is possible that he trained someone else to fulfill his role making his death less of a blow to the ISI.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-killed

Document (Arabic): 8-14-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-last-post

[Scott Sanford] On 21 August 2008, the al-Qaida-affiliated Global Islamic Media Front released a statement written by Abu al-Harith al-Ansari concerning the conversion of Mosab Hassan Yousef from Islam to Christianity. This conversion is significant because Yousef’s father is a senior Hamas leader in an Israeli prison and Yousef himself allegedly was in a leadership position in Hamas’ youth movement. Ansari explains that he felt compelled to respond to Yousef’s conversion and he uses four points to frame the conversion. He then outlines a course of action Muslims should take in response. The following is a brief synopsis:

1. Further research must be done to ascertain the truth about whether or not Yousef converted and then pass judgment.

2. Yousef chose his own path and it is important to remember other noteworthy infidels, who also chose their own path, like Noah’s son and wife, Abraham’s father, and Muhammad’s paternal uncle.

3. The fate of infidels does not change. The previously mentioned notables are all in Hell.

4. “Islam is larger than men.” Yousef’s actions will not harm Islam.

Ansari then gives several pieces of advice to individual Muslims and Hamas:

1. Muslims must announce their disavowal from Yousef’s actions and ask for God’s forgiveness upon him.

2. Just like the United States is dangerous and attacks Islam, Christianity’s evangelical institutions are dangerous too. There are many Christian schools in Gaza where 90% of the students are Muslims. Hamas must be aware of this.

3. While Yousef’s criticisms of individuals are not related to Islam, his criticisms of Hamas’ leadership have merit. Hamas must review its actions and seek guidance from Islam in further decisions.

4. Due to his apostasy, Yousef is weak-minded. “What do [Hamas supporters] know of Islam except the name? We see their fanaticism for the movement as if it were fanaticism for religion.” Hamas must learn about Salafism and read the proper books from writers like al-Tahawi, Ibn Taymiyya, and the Najdi scholars.

5. Yousef went to the United States in search of work. However, the immigration of a Muslim to a non-Islamic country for work is forbidden.

6. Israeli and Hamas oppression in Gaza is probably the biggest reason for Yousef’s apostasy. This does not justify it, but it is possible that God will guide him back to Islam.

If he comes back to Islam great, but if he does not, his fate is as an infidel without honor. The prophet Muhammad said, “Whoever alters his religion, kill him [Ansari’s font changes].” He should not have proper burial rights and he should not be buried with Muslims.

This is his fate under God’s law. The situational laws and human legislation is what causes the spread of apostasy, allows infidel institutions, and protects these institutions.

Such attacks on Hamas are common by al-Qaida and its supporters because Hamas’ nationalistic and more pragmatic approach to Islam challenges al-Qaida’s dogmatically unchanging and global Islamic view. Al-Qaida supporters see Hamas as a direct threat to its hegemony in the Middle East and it is attempting to break Hamas by bringing its followers into al-Qaida’s fold. Ansari tries to do this through discrediting Hamas’ leadership by blaming Gaza’s problems on them and proposing al-Qaida’s ideology as a solution. This is a common al-Qaida tactic against Hamas.

Ansari is also able to connect the believed dangers from the United States and Christianity to Gaza. In doing so, he is attempting to frame the Palestinian conflict in al-Qaida’s Islamic narrative where almost everyone is an enemy. This is in contrast to Hamas’ Palestinian narrative that has much more grey area, depending on Hamas’ goals at a particular time, about who the enemy is and how to deal with the threat.

Ansari does not mention that one of Yousef’s stated criticisms of Islam are those who have an unwavering and rigid doctrinal view, such as Ansari’s view. Thus, Ansari’s solution to the so-called problems in Gaza is unlikely to alleviate any of his stated grievances. It will be interesting to monitor the standoff between al-Qaida and Hamas, but given Hamas’ current authority and popularity in Gaza, it is unlikely that al-Qaida will make much headway in its goal of splitting Hamas’ leadership from its rank and file.

Document (Arabic): 8-21-08-ekhlaas-GIMF-on-mosab-hassan-yousef

I’m temporarily adding three members to the Jihadica roster while I’m on vacation the next week and a half: Scott Sanford, Chipotle Mystery, and Mike Honcho.

• Scott is an Arabic speaker who covers the forums and specializes in Lebanon, Palestinian territories, and Syria, so expect a lot of good stuff on Jihadi activity in the Levant.
• Chipotle Mystery is an Urdu speaker who works on al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan.  He reads tons of fascinating stuff but never writes about it because he believes (wrongly) that it’s already common knowledge.  You’ll have to bait him.
• Mike Honcho knows Russian and other languages with funny alphabets.  He’ll be keeping us posted on what’s going on in the Caucasus.

Jihadica is a clearinghouse for materials related to militant, transnational Sunni Islamism, commonly known as Jihadism. At the moment, much of this material is diffuse, known only to a few specialists, and inaccessible to the public and policymakers unless they pay a fee. Jihadica provides this material for free and keeps a daily record of its dissemination that can be easily searched and studied. These records are accompanied by the expert commentary of people who have the requisite language training to understand the primary source material and advanced degrees in relevant fields.

The Team

The founder of Jihadica, William McCants, is also co-founder of Insight Collaborative, a DC-based company that provides education and expertise on Islamism. He has a PhD from Princeton University and is the editor of the Militant Ideology Atlas and the author of various other publications and translations related to Jihadism. He is on indefinite leave from Jihadica and Insight Collaborative but hopes to return.

Thomas Hegghammer is a fellow at Harvard Kennedy School and a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). He has a PhD from Sciences-Po in Paris and is the author of a forthcoming book entitled Jihad in Saudi Arabia.

Brynjar Lia is the director of terrorism research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). He holds a PhD from the University of Oslo. He is the author of several books on terrorism and Islamism, including Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus`ab al-Suri.

Hanna Rogan is a research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and a PhD candidate at the University of Oslo. She wrote a Master’s thesis on al-Qaida’s media strategy and is currently working on jihadism in North Africa.

Scott Sanford is a graduate student at George Washington University, Washington D.C.  His research focus is militant movements in the Levant.

Anne Stenersen is a research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and a PhD candidate at the University of Oslo. She is the author of the book Al-Qaida’s Quest for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Her current research focuses on the history of the Arabs in Afghanistan and Pakistan after 9/11.

Truls Tønnessen is also a research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and a PhD candidate in History at the University of Oslo. His MA degree focused on Islamism in Egypt, while his doctoral research centers on the Iraqi insurgency.

All contributors are writing in a private capacity; the views expressed here do not represent those of their employers, their affiliate institutions, or the governments of the countries in which they live.