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Al-Qaeda’s Past and Present

The newest issue of Foreign Affairs on the ten-year anniversary of 9/11 includes an essay by me (free registration required) on the history of al-Qaeda and its prospects after the Arab Spring. The essay covers the reasons for al-Qaeda’s founding, its targeting of the United States, its strategic thinking under Zawahiri’s leadership, its concept of an Islamic state, and its enduring problem with Islamist parliamentary politics.

Regular readers of Jihadica will find much that is familiar but the essay makes one point I have not seen elsewhere: al-Qaeda is not against democratic elections, just parliamentary politics. The misperception that it is against democratic elections arises from a general ignorance of al-Qaeda’s thought on Islamic states and statecraft, a subject I also treat in the essay. Islamic states, not the caliphate, are central to al-Qaeda’s strategic planning and its interpretation of the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

I look forward to your comments. Original Arabic for the passages I translated in the article are below the fold.

  • Update 1: My postscript for Foreign Affairs on the death of Atiyya.
  • Update 2: I give some As to the Qs of Foreign Affairs.
  • Update 3: Foreign Affairs has published “Al Qaeda’s Challenge” in its 9/11 Ten Year Anniversary ebook. Brynjar’s article on Bin Laden’s death is in there too.

Page 2 (of the online version):

Al Qaeda, which was created in 1988, grew out of those camps. Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian Islamist who merged his organization, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with al Qaeda in 2001, explained al Qaeda’s mission in 2010 as providing a “base for indoctrination, training, and incitement that gathered the capabilities of the ummah [universal Islamic community], trained them, raised their consciousness, improved their abilities, and gave them confidence in their religion and themselves.” This base, Zawahiri said, involved “large amounts of participation in jihad, bearing the worries of theummah, and seizing the initiative in the most urgent calamities confronting the ummah.” In other words, al Qaeda envisioned itself as a revolutionary vanguard and special operations unit working to defend the Muslim world.

ولم يصل المجاهدون للنجاح بسهولة ويسر، ولا مضوا إليه على طريق مفروش بالورود، بل مروا بمراحل كثيرة من التدريب والإعداد وتجهيز الوثائق وتمويه الرحلات والصبر والترقب والقلق، ثم كل هذا المجهود الجبار كان لا بد له من قاعدة دعوية تدريبية تحريضية، تجمع كفاءات الأمة، وتدربها، وتوعيها، وترفع من قدراتها، وتغرس في نفسها الثقة بدينها وأمتها، ثم تختار منها العناصر الصالحة لكل مهمة.

وهذه القاعدة التدريبية الدعوية التحريضية استغرقت سنيناً طويلة من والإعداد والدعوة والاتصالات والعلاقات وتنمية الثقة المتبادلة بين الحلفاء وبين القيادة والقاعدة، وهي أيضاً ثقة تنبني على رصيد ضخم من المشاركة في الجهاد وحمل هموم الأمة، والمبادرة للصف الأول عند كل ملمة تلم بالأمة

Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 220-21

Page 2:

Bin Laden later described these attacks in his will and testament as the second of three “escalating strikes” against the United States — the first being Hezbollah’s bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the third being 9/11 — all of which would “lead to the withdrawal [from the Middle East] of the United States and the infidel West, even if after dozens of years.”

وقفة نيويورك وواشنطن الضربة الثالثة من الضربات المتصاعدة التي تلقتها اميركا أولاها تفجير المارينز في لبنان وثانيتها تفجير سفارة اميركا في نيروبي التي انطلق منها الغزو الاميركي للصومال حيث قتل من اخواننا 31 ألفا تحت راية الأمم المتحدة، رغم النكسة التي ابتلانا بها الله سبحانه وتعالى ستؤدي هذه الموقعة الى زوال أميركا والغرب الكافر ولو بعد عشرات السنين

Bin Ladin, Wasiyyat Bin Ladin

Page 3:

Just as victory is not achieved for an army unless its foot soldiers occupy land, the mujahid Islamic movement will not achieve victory against the global infidel alliance unless it possesses a base in the heart of the Islamic world. Every plan and method we consider to rally and mobilize the ummah will be hanging in the air with no concrete result or tangible return unless it leads to the establishment of the caliphal state in the heart of the Islamic world.

ولا بد أن تبني الحركة الجهادية خطتها على أساس السيطرة على بقعة من الأرض في قلب العالم الإسلامي تقيم دولة الإسلام فيها وتستطيع حمايتها وتخوض منها معركتها لإعادة الخلافة الراشدة على منهاج النبوة. فكما أن النصر لا يتحقق للجيوش إلا باحتلال المشاة للأرض، فكذلك النصر للحركة الإسلامية المجاهدة لن يتحقق ضد التحالف العالمي الكفري إلا بامتلاكها لقاعدة في قلب العالم الإسلامي، وكل ما استعرضناه من وسائل وخطط لحشد الأمة وتجييشها سيظل معلقا في الهواء دون نتيجة ملموسة وعائد مشاهد ما لم يؤد إلى إنشاء دولة الخلافة في قلب العالم الإسلامي

Zawahiri, Fursan, 1st ed., 237

Page 3:

It is not possible to incite a conflict for the establishment of a Muslim state if it is a regional conflict. . . . The international Jewish-Crusader alliance, led by America, will not allow any Muslim force to obtain power in any of the Muslim lands. . . . It will impose sanctions on whomever helps it, even if it does not declare war against them altogether. Therefore, to adjust to this new reality, we must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not confined to a single region but rather includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusader external enemy.

لا يمكن خوض الصراع من أجل إقامة الدولة المسلمة على أنه صراع إقليمي

فقد اتضح مما سبق أن التحالف الصليبي اليهودي الدولي بزعامة أمريكا لن يسمح لأية قوة مسلمة بالوصول للحكم في أي من بلاد المسلمين، وأنه سيحشد كل طاقاته لضربها وإزالتها من الحكم إن تمكنت من الوصول، وأنه تحقيقا لذلك سيفتح عليها ميدانا للمعركة يشمل العالم كله، بل وسيفرض على كل من يساعدها العقوبات هذا إن لم يشن عليهم الحرب، ولذا فإننا تكيفا مع هذا الوضع الجديد يجب أن نعد أنفسنا لمعركة لا تقتصر على إقليم واحد بل تشتمل العدو الداخلي المرتد والعدو الخارجي الصليبي اليهودي

Zawahiri, Fursan, 1st ed., 241

Page 4:

“Any government established on the basis of a constitution that is secular, atheist, or contradictory to Islam cannot be a respected government because it is un-Islamic and not according to sharia,” he wrote in a revision of Knights published in 2010. “It is unacceptable that a leader in the Brotherhood evinces respect for such a government, even if it comes about through fair elections.”

وأية حكومة تقوم على دستور علماني أو إلحادي أو مخالف للإسلام لا يمكن أن تكون حكومة محترمة لأنها حكومة غير شرعية جاهلية. ولا يمكن أن يقبل أن يعطيها قيادي في الإخوان شهادة احترام، حتى وإن جاءت بانتخابات صحيحة

Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 373

Page 4:

We demand . . . the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty of sharia and not on the whims of the majority. Its ummah chooses its rulers. . . . If they deviate, the ummah brings them to account and removes them. The ummah participates in producing that government’s decisions and determining its direction. . . . [The caliphal state] commands the right and forbids the wrong and engages in jihad to liberate Muslim lands and to free all humanity from all oppression and ignorance.

إن الحكومة التي نطالب بها ليست حكومة البابوات، ولا حكومة الولي الفقيه، الذي يتحدث باسم الإمام الغائب في السرداب، ولكنها حكومة الخلافة الراشدة، التي تقوم على حاكمية الشريعة، وليس على هوى الأغلبية، والتي تختار الأمة فيها حكامها، الذين لا يتمتعون بأية عصمة أو قداسة، وتحاسبهم، وتعزلهم إن انحرفوا، وتشارك في صنع قراراتها وتحديد مصيرها في ضوء الشرع وفي هدي الكتاب والسنة

Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 441

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8 Responses

  1. It’s all in there. Sterling stuff!

    “To be clear, Zawahiri does not oppose all elections; for example, he supports elections for the rulers of Islamic states and for representatives on leadership councils, which would ensure that these governments implemented Islamic law properly.”

    I’m not sure where you get ‘elections’ from, Will:

    “the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty of sharia and not on the whims of the majority”

    Surely this negates support for any meaningful democratic participation (‘al-Qaeda is not against democratic elections’)?

    Plus, you’ve translated ‘tushaariku’ (تشارك) as ‘participate’, but it could just as easily refer to a ‘contribution’ by the ummah represented by the learned worthies; Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd, for instance. From what’s written there, he doesn’t outline the process of deciding on a ruler(s). Does he go into detail elsewhere in any of his (Zawahiri’s) works?

  2. I don’t see why that quote negates democratic elections. Zawahiri is talking about the overall system, not how leaders are chosen. He has a problem with a parliamentary system, not with people choosing their rulers or representatives.

    Here’s another quote along the same lines from the Fursan (2nd ed, p. 442):

    في ختام هذا العرض الموجز لحملة التضليل الفكرية الصليبية، يبقى التأكيد على أن خلاص البشرية ليس في العلمانية المادية ولا هوى الأغلبية، ولا في الدين المحرف، وإنما في دولة الخلافة التي تقوم على الشرع المنزل الصحيح، والتي تنشر العدل وتبسط الشورى، وتختار حكامها وتحاسبهم، وتعزلهم إن انحرفوا، وتأمر بالمعروف وتنهى عن المنكر، وتجاهد لتحرير ديار المسلمين، ولتحرير البشرية كل البشرية من الظلم كل الظلم ومن الجاهلية كل الجاهلية

    Zawahiri does not spell out a specific mechanism for elections but you might also look at the statements he and Bin Ladin issued in 2009 that I mentioned in the article.

    I realize I’m going against the prevailing wisdom here but I have not read a statement from Zawahiri or Bin Ladin that says popular elections are against the Sharia. Have you? On the other hand, I’ve read several things that support my argument.

  3. I am just a humble correspondent offering my tuppence worth.

    You wrote: “Regular readers of Jihadica will find much that is familiar but the essay makes one point I have not seen elsewhere: al-Qaeda is not against democratic elections, just parliamentary politics.

    This is what initially peaked my interest. ‘Not against democratic elections’, you say? Tell me more! So I read your piece expecting al-Zawahiri to refer to voting or popular sovereignty as an indication of his endorsement for democracy. Instead, we get:

    “وليس على هوى الأغلبية” and “ولا هوى الأغلبية”

    which seem to pretty much rule out any ‘meaningful democratic participation’ or a notion of popular sovereignty. Indeed, he says

    حكومة الخلافة الراشدة، التي تقوم على حاكمية الشريعة

    a rightly-guided or rightly guiding govt. which is based on governance of the shari’ah. That ‘sovereignty (governance) of the (by) shari’ah’ bit would also seem to rule out things that people might want if enough of them voted for it.

    In short, I still don’t see where ‘al-Qaeda is not against democratic elections’.

  4. Your tuppence is worth a lot!

    You’re focusing too narrowly on phrases and missing the larger context of Zawahiri’s discussion (see also his letter to Zarqawi). Here’s my understanding. People can choose their rulers and their representatives. The ruler then implements Islamic law and the representatives make sure he’s doing it correctly. If the people don’t like what they’re doing, they can choose different rulers and representatives. The key distinction from a parliamentary system is that the rulers and the representatives do not get to make new laws–that would be the tyranny of the majority and usurping God’s role.

    This may not be a Western understanding of democracy but I don’t think it’s fair to state flatly that AQ is against democratic elections. To argue that, you’d have to ignore things like this:

    https://www.jihadica.com/bin-laden-and-zawahiri-not-sharing-talking-points/

  5. You’re right.

    Zawahiri’s talk of an Islamic state on Mo’s model, electing reps. and his advice to Zarqawi about not repeating the mistakes of the Taliban and securing a sort of popular consent are telling. So too are a couple of points from Bin Laden’s statement on Op CL. Your thesis is much clearer with this in mind.

    Thanks!

    1. I had included a lot more material in my draft of the article but it was getting too long and esoteric for a general readership.

  6. Dear Mr. McCants,
    I have read your fabulous analysis about AlQaeda in last FP issue.
    The sutile difference between admitted “democratic elections” to choose presidents to apply the God’s Law and unadmitted “parlamentary elections”, because the divine source of the Law doesn’t permit human changes is only understood from the “(Islamist) believer” point of view but it will be the real key to interpret the Al Qada’s evolution and future approach to democratic elections, if any.
    Thank you very much for your clever words.

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