Entries Tagged 'AQ Leadership' ↓

Continuing…

• Why did al-Qaeda attack the U.S.?  Was it to drive the U.S. out of the Middle East?  Or was it to strike the far enemy for the sake of destroying the near enemy (i.e. regimes in the Arab and Islamic world)?
• Regardless of the intent of al-Qaeda’s leaders, the sequence of events gives weight to the second possibility, which could also be termed the Domino Scenario.
• According to a 2007 article by George Friedman, Bin Laden saw a rare opportunity after the fall of the USSR to begin re-establishing the worldwide caliphate.  But, says Friedman, armed groups can’t establish empires.  They can, however, seize a state and use it to begin to establish an empire.  UBL realized that Afghanistan wasn’t the ideal place for this because of its geographical position and its weakness.
• Based on Zawahiri’s pre-9/11 writings, Friedman believes that UBL wanted to topple local regimes and replace them with Islamic ones.  He was looking to do this in Egypt because it leads the Islamic world.
• Friedman says the two goals of the attacks were 1) to prove to Muslims that the US could be attacked and suffer great harm, and 2) to provoke a U.S. response.  Whatever the U.S. chose to do in response, Muslims would win.  If the U.S. failed to respond, it would look weak.  If it attacked, it would be engaged in a crusade.
• The authors of a report from Decision Supports Systems, Inc. written two months after 9/11 understood al-Qaeda’s intent.  The study says that before 9/11, AQ attacked three targets without sufficiently provoking the US: civil, diplomatic, and military.
• Based on al-Qaeda’s statements before 9/11, DSSI wrote that al-Qaeda was trying to provoke the U.S. into a conflict with it.  After the 9/11 strikes, the U.S. responded in the manner planned by al-Qaeda.
• According to DSSI, AQ wanted to provoke the U.S. into a large military invasion of the Middle East so AQ could destroy its military and upset the geopolitical balance of power.
• The DSSI report argues that the greatest indicator that this was AQ’s strategy is the fact that its operatives assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the commander of the Northern Alliance.  AQ knew that when the US retaliated for 9/11, it would work through tribal proxies because the U.S. does not like to get its hands dirty.  Thus, AQ had to kill the most effective leader of those trbies.
• As the DSSI study concludes, as long as the U.S. continues to behave in predicable ways, al-Qaeda can anticipate its responses and plan accordingly.
• According to the DSSI study, there are three possibilities after 9/11.  1) The U.S. intervention in the Middle East provokes uncontrolable violence in the Middle East which will make it ungovernable in the long term.  2) The U.S. sends more troops to stabalize the situation but its presence polarizes Muslims and puts strain on its allies in the region, particularly the Gulf states and Pakistan.  The government of Pakistan could become unstable and AQ or its allies could get control of its nukes by infiltrating the security apparatus or overthrowing the government.   The collapse of these states will create security vaccuums that AQ or its allies will fill, giving them control of oil and nukes.  3) AQ could choose to destroy oil production in the MIddle East, forcing the U.S. to look elsewhere to meet its energy needs.

[Update: All of DSSI's publications can be found here.]

Major Jihadi forums have been down for almost a week now, which ruined al-Qaeda’s release of its 9/11 anniversary video.  The video is now out, but those who prepared it for distribution included the wrong password and it probably won’t be until tomorrow that the problem is corrected.  Even when it finally sees the light of day, viewing it will be very anticlimactic.

My hat off to whomever succeeded in removing Ekhlaas, et al.   The usual suspects (the good Doctor and the Haganaut) have denied involvement and I believe them.  Still, whoever did it knew what they were doing, beyond technical proficiency–they targeted the right forums at the right time.  As a gauge of the attack’s effectiveness, look at how many days it’s taken to get the message out and how clumsily it’s been distributed.   If these attacks continue, al-Qaeda will have to find other means of distribution or stop telegraphing its intentions with banner ads.

Continuing…

• It is no accident that the World Trade Center was the main object of the 9/11 attacks since it was the symbol of U.S. economic hegemony. Bear in mind that the attacks had been planned in the ’90s during the height of U.S. economic power.
• The strikes were meant to polarize Muslims as well as the enemy’s population. They were also intended to push the U.S. into overreacting and committing errors.
• Why didn’t all four strikes on 9/11 hit the Pentagon alone? Why did al-Qaeda attack civilians and the WTC? We need a new strategic framework to understand its reasoning. Three things needs to be considered.
• First, when the U.S. attacks a country, it abides by the principle of the ends justify the means. This is one of the foundational principles of American pragmatism. Studies that came out after 9/11 really brought this mindset to the fore. But, according to a principle of international relations, it is the right of oppressed people to respond in kind. Al-Qaeda decided that there was no difference between civilian and soldier among the enemy, especially since is a democracy. Since U.S. citizens vote, they are responsible for U.S. policies and thus subject to terrorism. This was the first strategic breakthrough of AQ.
• Second, although the U.S. is militarily superior to everyone else, it sometimes uses asymmetrical warfare against its enemies. In response, AQ decided to make use of it as well. Asymmetrical warfare is part of guerrilla warfare and AQ added terrorism to its asymmetrical toolkit.
• Third, the U.S. began promoting fourth generation warfare in ‘89 after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Fourth generation warfare means that there is no longer a battlefield; rather, the society of the enemy is the theater of conflict. 4GW puts emphasis on small, flexible forces. The goal is to destroy the enemy from within and the list of targets iss expanded to include the enemy’s culture and popular support for the war.
• For fourth generation warfare to succeed, it is necessary to correctly identify the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. In this type of warfare, there is no delineation between war and peace and no clear battlefields. In these circumstances, differences between civilian and soldier are erased.
• The idea of the center of gravity has changed the conceptual framework of warfare. In any war, you identify the enemy and identify the point on which you’ll concentrate all your effort to achieve victory with the least amount of effort and losses. This point is called the center of gravity.
• In traditional warfare, the center of gravity was the opposing army. If a country lost its military strength, it was unable to continue fighting and consequently lost the war. But the development of weapons and the growing complexity of the means of control in modern societies means that the center of gravity is now more flexible and elusive. It’s not just material power. The U.S. won all its battles in Vietnam but lost the war because public opinion turned against the war. “In other words, America lost the political will to pay the costs of the war and did not consider the hypothetical return on investment commensurate with the expected loses.”
• The center of gravity is certainly not the enemy’s point of weakness such that a strike at it will end everything. Clausewitz, who invented the term “center of gravity,” had difficulty defining it, as do contemporary American military theorists. The meaning slides between an enemy’s point of weakness or its point of strength. In Clausewitz’s work, it is evident that the concept is not confined to a place, a potentiality, or a fixed source of power. Rather, it is the point of equilibrium from which the enemy derives the potentialities of power and the will to fight.
• Identifying the enemy’s correct center of gravity is half the battle according to the American colonel, Antulio Echevarria. He believes that the center of gravity in Clausewitz’s original text is judged according to its impact on the whole, not according to its potentialities and capabilities. In other words, it is the specific point that, if struck sufficiently, will have a decisive impact on the whole body. On this basis, Echevarria suggests redefining the term as focal points which inhere to the combatant’s complete structural order and which bring it strength from several sources and give it purpose and direction. [To quote directly from Echevarria: "A center of gravity is the one element within a combatant’s entire structure or system that has the necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together."] He also believes that an enemy’s center of gravity should be continually reassessed due to its temporary and transitory nature.
• In total wars, the strategic center of gravity is a combatant’s economic-industrial potential.  In limited wars, it is the military-security potential.  National leaders are not centers of gravity because they themselves do no have the potential to defeat the enemy.  They are only catalysts.
• Now to return to the strikes on the U.S. center of gravity.  Firstly, the center of gravity for the U.S. during WWII was its industrial complex.
• Secondly, In the past two decades, U.S. financial centers seemed to be its center of gravity.  They absorbed the liquidity of the world and its interest.
• Thirdly, the U.S.’s primary means of attracting funds is its capacity to impose its will through force on other countries and its belief that it can’t be defeated because of its geographical and geopolitical protection (it’s surrounded by oceans) and its military dominance.
• Fourthly, hitting the U.S. homeland, despite all the strengths we mentioned, demonstrated the country’s brittleness, which gave reassurance to the U.S.’s enemies, especially in the Islamic world.
• Fifthly, the strike on the WTC was not enough to destroy the world’s confidence in the U.S., even though it shook one of the pillars of its control of the world.
• Does all of this mean that AQ committed the mistake of Japan in WWII, creating its own Peal Harbor?  In other words, did it provoke the giant without finishing it off and now it must bear the consequences?
• There is a difference in both cases.  Japan was a small, isolated, maritime nation that had no resources or raw materials.  Since Japan fought a traditional war, its defeat was certain given that it could not match or destroy the U.S.’s center of gravity [its industrial base].  AQ, on the other hand, stretches over continents and its resources are from the umma; these resources have been barely affected.  AQ’s mode of fighting is new and not one to which the U.S. is accustomed.

The US military has given CNN letters that Zawahiri wrote in March 2008 to senior al-Qaeda commanders in Iraq (hat tip SK). Much of the content has been filtered through an MNFI spokesman so it’s hard to use CNN’s summary to assess al-Qaeda’s fortunes in Iraq. Nevertheless, since the summary fits with the bleak picture that has been emerging these past few months, it’s worth noting. I’ve rearranged the information for ease of reference:

Zawahiri letter to al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri, March 2008. Letter was captured in April during U.S. op that killed AQI Information Minister Abu Nizar. Abu Nizar was an intermediary between Masri and AQ Central. The letter was found on Abu Nizar’s person.

• Leadership: Masri too isolated to keep watch of his operatives. Zawahiri questions Masri’s ability to lead AQI.
• Poor Communication with AQ Central: Zawahiri concerned that he is not getting regular updates on Iraq. He is also not receiving regular communication from Masri.
• Poor Recruits: Dissatisfied with poor quality of recruits for ops in Iraq
• ISI’s Legitimacy: Questions manner in which the Islamic State of Iraq was established
• ISI’s Blatant Propaganda: Unhappy that ISI is repackaging old footage of operations and claiming the ops are new. Also unhappy that ISI takes credit for ops carried out by other terror groups, like Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri writes: “The media policy for the Islamic State is using exaggeration, to the extent of lying.”

Zawahiri letter to Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, March 2008

• Relations b/n Zawahiri & Bin Laden: Zawahiri passing along advice from Bin Laden.
• Offer of Assistance: Zawahiri asks what ISI needs to be victorious.

We know from an earlier set of captured documents reviewed by a Washington Post reporter that Masri went to Afghanistan this summer to speak with AQ leadership. From the tone of Zawahiri’s letter, it might have been a trip to the woodshed.

This is at least the second time that captured AQI documents have been given to CNN. But in both cases, the original documents have not been released for general scrutiny. If the people releasing them hope their contents will demoralize al-Qaeda supporters around the world, it would help to release the documents to the general public soon after the news stories based on them are published. Despite all the attention paid to Jihadi visual media, Jihadis themselves love texts.

Update: Bill Roggio at Long Wars Journal was given the documents by MNFI and has a more extensive summary of their content. He also says that the documents will be made available shortly on the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy’s website. The documents are now up and I’ll post a more detailed summary once I’ve read them.

[Scott Sanford]  On 23 August 2008, Ekhlaas member Assad al-Jihad2 (أسد الجهاد2), or the Lion of Jihad 2, posted a statement concerning the state of al-Qaida in the world today. He started the statement with a 13 December 2001 news report about the battle in Tora Bora and how it seemed that al-Qaida was on the brink of total destruction. However, he argued, “In only seven years…they [al-Qaida] were able to…triumph over the world alliance against them.” He based this assertion on several events he attributed to al-Qaida:

1. Many United States government officials were forced to leave their posts after their failure to defeat al-Qaida
2. American historians have claimed that President Bush has been the worst president in American history
3. Al-Qaida weakened the most powerful country on Earth in “the Badr of the [21^st] century” (This is a reference to the 624CE Battle of Badr where approximately 300 Muslim soldiers defeated the much larger Meccan army of approximately 1000 soldiers. Muslims believe divine intervention granted them victory.)
4. Al-Qaida brought down the Spanish government after its 11 March 2004 attacks
5. Al-Qaida brought down the British government after its 7 July 2005 attacks
6. Al-Qaida defeated the Musharraf government after it attacked Islam

Assad al-Jihad2 (AJ2) did admit that after September 11^th, al-Qaida did not expect “the great betrayal of the Pakistani government” or “the betrayal of the scholars of evil.” (The scholars are likely prominent Salafi ideologues like Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl) or Salman al-‘Awda, who turned against al-Qaida’s bloody methods.) However, regardless of the supposed betrayals, he stated that today one can find al-Qaida in Iraq, North Africa, Somalia, Saudi Arabia(where he claimed that al-Qaida has huge human reserves), and Yemen. He also stated that the Palestinian Territories are merely in need of a “spark” for al-Qaida to show its presence there.

Normally I do not give much credence to such reports emanating from the forums, but this one is important for two reasons. First, it is possible that AJ2 is a military commander for al-Qaida. The blogger and Jordan University professor Akram Hijazi stated in a reference to one of AJ2’s statements, “It is not inconceivable that [AJ2] is one of al-Qaida’s military commanders.” (Hijazi is an al-Qaida supporter and his blogs are regularly posted on takfiri websites. He is the “senior researcher” at the Arab Researchers’ Center, which sells takfiri videos and statements that are otherwise free on the Internet. Fu’ad Husayn, who wrote a biography of al-Zarqawi and spent time with him in prison, runs the center. The website for the Arab Researchers’ Center is Arabresearchers.net.) Additionally, the fact that AJ2 often times posts through the al-Qaida-affiliated Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “innovative pen 1,” which is one of the highest titles one can achieve on Ekhlaas, adds credibility to Hijazi’s assertion.

Second, in a January 2008 statement, AJ2 stated that the Palestinian territories will be the primary front for terrorists graduating from Afghanistan and Iraq. He claimed that due to Hamas’ suppression of al-Qaida-inspired militants in Gaza, al-Qaida cannot announce its presence in the Palestinian Territories at this time. However, he added that al-Qaida will announce its presence sometime after the current US presidential cycle. He then mentioned that the battle with Israel will begin between 2010 and 2013. Finally, he claimed that al-Qaida has already begun preparing for war with Israel and he gave advice for how the Palestinians should prepare. In this context, AJ2’s recent remark about al-Qaida needing a spark to start operations in the Palestinian Territories takes on more significance. It is unclear what exactly this spark could be, but it does seem that AJ2 is again indicating that al-Qaida is preparing to engage Israel.

Regardless of AJ2’s views, I remain skeptical that al-Qaida will be able to gain a significant presence in Gaza and then maintain that presence. After Hamas forced the al-Qaida-inspired Army of Islam (AI) to release BBC reporter Alan Johnston, the two organizations have been at loggerheads, which has been at the detriment of AI. If an indigenous group of terrorists with backing from a prominent Gazan clan, the Dughmush, cannot operate relatively freely in Gaza, I doubt a group of foreign al-Qaida operatives will do much better.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ek-ls.org-AJ2-After-the-Fall-of-Pervez

Document (Arabic): 2-18-2008-Ek-ls.org-Akram-Hijazi-Blog

Document (English): 8-27-2008-Arabresearchers.net-about-the-Arab-Researchers-Center

Document (English): 8-27-2008-Arabresearchers.net-Research-by-the-Arab-Researchers-Center

Document (Arabic): 29-01-2008-Ek-ls.org-AJ2-GIMF-Statement

[Chipotle Mystery] Since late July a number of suicide attacks have struck Pakistan, reminiscent of the spate of violence that ringed in the New Year and witnessed the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The rise in violence comes as the Pakistani military appears to be engaging in a large-scale offensive in Bajaur, one of the seven agencies that make up the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and also follow the visit of Yusuf Raza Gillani to Washington in July (It appears that the U.S. Government gave its approval for the removal of Musharraf during this meeting - but this is just speculation).

Quick background: The FATA serves as a sanctuary for various Taliban-affiliated groups, notably the “Pakistani Taliban” led by Baitullah Mehsud who has been blamed for Ms. Bhutto’s assassination. The FATA may also house Al-Qaeda leaders, and Bajaur in particular has often been speculated as serving as a hiding place for Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has been the target of a number of air strikes in the area in recent years.

With this “raising of the temperature” by the Pakistani military, lead by Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani since late 2007, the Pakistani Taliban and its cohorts appear to be returning to their time-tested tactic of spreading terror in order to persuade the government to return to the status quo: reduced Pakistani military interference in the FATA in exchange for a termination of terrorist attacks. This dance has played out regularly in the past, seeing the army launching offensives, only to sign peace deals and retreat, allowing militants a relatively free-hand along the Afghan border. Understandably, such maneuvers by Pakistan have been criticized by Afghanistan and NATO for allowing militants to increasingly target forces in Afghanistan.

Amidst this apparent repetition of history is an interesting report from a Pakistani journalist, Syed Saleem Shahzad, claiming that the Pakistan has decided to pursue an all-out offensive against militants. Before delving into the report, I should point out that Shahzad’s own background is murky: He often reports exclusives on the Taliban and appears to have an unprecedented amount of access and information about militant activities in the frontier regions. He has been alleged to be everything from an Indian intelligence agent (by some Pakistani extremist groups) to an affiliate of Pakistani intelligence. I would bet the later is true to some degree as some of his previous reports have come true, while others haven’t panned out (maybe he serves to spread disinformation for intelligence?). The fact that he has had so much apparent access to militants along the Pak-Afghan border indicates that he has some sort of protection, as journalists sniffing around in the area have regularly died on the job.

Shahzad’s claims are notable as he claims that Pakistan will not just confront Mehsud, who poses a real threat to Pakistan, but members of other Taliban and pro-Taliban groups. This includes the leadership of the Afghan Taliban, led by the faceless Mullah Omar, and militants under the command of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a famed Afghan warrior who made his name fighting the Soviets. Both of these factions have not pursuing attacks against Pakistan or its military, and in fact have historic links with Pakistani intelligence. A number of reports in the Pakistani media earlier in the year, claimed that Omar had removed Mehsud from his position of power due to the latter’s willingness to pursue confrontation with Pakistan. It is very difficult to know if such reports are true, but it makes sense if Omar is really hiding in Quetta as has been alleged. At the same time, as if often the case when discussing the Taliban, it could be a ruse to separate Omar from being blamed for Mehsud’s actions (the degree of coordination between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban remains unknown, but they surely maintain some level of links). Omar and other Afghan Taliban leaders may also be loathe to provoke Pakistan due to the possible continued existence of links between Pakistani intelligence and the Afghan Taliban, maintained due in part to Pakistani strategic concerns, an allegation that has been forth in the media after last month’s attack in Kabul on the Indian Embassy.

With that said if Shahzad is correct, this indicates a major paradigm shift by the Pakistani government. It means that the government has either decided to attempt to eradicate militancy, which is unlikely if only due to the nature of militancy; or the government has been received some major incentives or pressure to take such action by an outside power. It could also be that the military (Pakistani intelligence is part of the military structure) has decided to clamp down on militants in the interests of its own preservation, or no longer finds them useful for its strategic objectives.

Ultimately, whether or not Shahzad’s report is prophetic; the changing situation in Pakistan bears watching as it will have an effect on both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and South Asia at large, especially in light of worsening tensions between Pakistan and India. The removal of Musharraf, infighting in the government, increased international scrutiny and a renewed terrorist campaign could make things very hot in the coming weeks. This may also be portended by Zawahiri’s recent video focused exclusively on addressing Pakistanis, where he spoke English for the first time, perhaps serving as a warning before the launch of an Al-Qaeda campaign to coincide with the upcoming holy Islamic month of Ramadan.

That’s the claim of Zamjari, which Ekhlaas ranks as “a major author” on the forum.  He writes:

We proclaim to the supporters of the mujahids everywhere that our beloved shaykh is alive, prosperous, fighting, moving about freely, and leading battalions of mujahids.  Martyrdom has not yet been decreed for him.

That’s quite a claim for a major forum member to make given that al-Qaeda could release a statement that would prove him wrong.   Since there’s been no such statement, I’m inclined to give this unofficial proclamation some weight.

Document (Arabic): 8-16-08-ekhlaas-major-forum-member-says-mustafa-abu-al-yazid-still-alive

A few days ago, ARY (a Pakistani network) ran an extremely truncated version of a lengthy audio tape of Zawahiri addressing Pakistanis in English.  Yesterday, Sahab (the media production arm of al-Qaeda) released the full audio recording online (open the .pdf below for links).  Here are the interesting bits:

• Zawahiri says at the beginning that he wants to address Pakistanis in Urdu, but he can’t speak the language.  He is speaking English to communicate with them, even though it is the language of the enemy.
• Zawahiri’s attachment to Pakistan began in his childhood.  His grandfather was the first to translate the poetry of Muhammad Iqbal into Arabic.
• Musharraf is a tool of the U.S.
• Pakistan made a “strategic blunder’ when it allowed the U.S. to install Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan since Karzai is friendly to India.  Now, Pakistan has no “strategic depth” in the mountains of Afghanistan, which would be useful in a war with India.
• How can military officers and soldiers not be bothered by Musharraf’s strategic blunders?  How can they not be bothered by killing fellow Muslims and Pakistanis?  How can they not be troubled by their defeats at the hands of the mujahids?
• Until the mujahids in Kashmir free themselves of ISI influence, they won’t be able to liberate it.
• The new head of the Pakistani army, Kiyani, is also an enemy of Islam like his predecessor.
• Officers and soldiers in the Pakistani army are apostates if they fight against fellow mujahids.  Zawahiri belabors this point a great deal.
• There are historical examples of Muslim resistance to British rule in the region, such as `Abd al-`Aziz, Ahmad Shahid, Isma`il Shahid, Shah `Abd al-Hayy, Shaykh al-Hind Mahmud al-Hasan, and his student Sayyid Husayn Ahmad Madani.
• Zawahiri invites Pakistanis to join the jihad.  If they don’t rise up, Pakistan will become part of Greater Hindustan.

It may not come across in the summary, but Zawahiri directs a lot of his remarks to Pakistani military personnel to explain why they will have to be killed if they don’t disobey orders.  Perhaps this is a prelude to an increase of violence in Pakistan against military installations and personnel outside the tribal regions.   I better understand now why ARY cut most of the video.

If you’re interested in watching it, open the .pdf below and download it from one of the first two sections of links (the links below these are for an Urdu translation).  The password is the long string of letters and numbers above the links.

Document (Arabic): 8-16-08-ekhlaas-complete-zawahiri-english-message-to-pakistan

Reuters reports, on the authority of a Pakistani security official, that an “Abu Saeed al-Masri” was killed.  The official said Masri is “among the top leadership of al Qaeda.”  The identity of Masri is unknown, but the news media is claiming that it’s Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, a close Egyptian friend of Zawahiri’s from the Sadat assassination days (Long War and CT Blog have good summaries of the news).

If true, it is horrible news for al-Qaeda.  Abu al-Yazid is the head of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and one of the few public faces of the organization (he sometimes gets the job of announcing the death of AQ operatives killed in Afghanistan).  Moreover, it comes after a string of successful strikes on high-profile al-Qaeda leaders this year: Abu Layth al-Libi, Abu Sulayman al-Jaza’iri, and Abu Khabab.  Of course, there are other capable leaders waiting in the wings, but don’t underestimate the damage these deaths cause.  It is sending AQ Central back to 2003.

To get a spatial and chronological sense of what is happening, I’ve put together a map of the 2008 killings based on Bill Roggio’s nice summary of the information.  The marks for al-Jaza’iri and Abu Khabab are accurate since we know where they died; for Libi and Abu al-Yazid (if dead), all we know is the province.

In the past week, there have been a spate of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, the Muslim-majority province in China. On Aug. 4, militants killed 16 police in Kashgar, Xinjiang Province, which is near the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. On Sunday, bombers attacked 17 sites in Kuqa, west-central Xianjiang. Although I haven’t seen any claim of responsibility for the attacks, a good candidate is the Islamic Party of Turkistan (IPT), which in recent weeks has been threatening terrorist attacks in China during the Olympic Games.  They have also claimed other recent attacks.

Although little is known about the IPT, Aaron Weisburd has done some amazing cyber sleuthing and discovered that the IPT hosted the website of `Abd al-Hakim Hassan. Aaron did not know who Hassan was and neither did the Jihadi ideologues on the elite Hesbah forum. But he knew that Hassan was someone important because al-Qaeda’s media distribution organization, al-Fajr, announced the establishment of his website.

As I wrote in June, Hassan is the alias for al-Qaeda cleric Shaykh `Isa. `Isa has a lot of sway over the Pakistani Taliban and has provided the doctrinal justification for its campaign against the Pakistani government. He is a near-enemy ideologue that would rather Jihadis in Afghanistan and Pakistan decrease attacks against the U.S. in foreign countries and focus on achieving power locally (see my analysis of one of his articles here).

I don’t know if Hassan/`Isa’s internet connection with the IPT gives us any hints about the group’s strategy, but tells us something about its ideological orientation. It is also further proof that the group has direct links with al-Qaeda Central.