Entries Tagged 'North Caucasus' ↓

[Mike Honcho]  The Ingush State of the Caucasus Emirate released a statement last week via Kavkaz Center highlighting some its failures and successes since the 2^nd Chechen War. While it contained the usual lip service to mujahidin unity and the need to expel the Russians from the Northern Caucasus, it also detailed how, even though outnumbered and outgunned, the establishment of Special Operation Groups (SOG) proved tremendously effective in eliminating apostates, hypocrites, and traitors.

The message begins with an admission of bad judgment, stating that the mujahidin realized they had been too lenient on some of their fellow Ingush who were employed in the Republic’s security and military services. Allegedly there was an unwritten agreement between the mujahidin and local security forces. The agreement was that as long as Muslims and resistance fighters were left alone, the focus of mujahidin attacks would be on the Russians and that state employees would not be bothered. However in 2002, the Ingush collaborators began to target, detain, kill, rape and torture Muslims. Even after these transgressions, the mujahidin claimed that they approached the local authorities to stop such policies, but the abuses continued. The mujahidin then discontinued the gentlemen’s agreement and actively pursued all enemies, Russian and Ingush.

The Ingush mujahidin also state that what has been most effective for their operations is the establishment of special intelligence units, called Special Operation Groups (SOG), which were responsible for collecting information and infiltrating the Ingush security apparatus. One of the groups successful initiatives is that they have also started (or stolen) a database full of the names of collaborators who work with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Apparently these units have served their purpose so well that they have Ingush police and politicians shaking in their boots. The local forces are now reportedly resorting to bribing the mujahidin with money and information in order for guarantees of personal security.

Interestingly, the message also refers to a centralized “Mukharabat of the Caucasus Emirate.” It now appears that this is the central command for all intelligence units throughout the Emirate, but with each ‘state’ in charge of its own collection efforts.

What is striking about this message and others written recently is that all of elements of the Caucasus Front seem to be in-lock step with their “unity” message. Both the Chechen Front and the Dagestani Front (Jamaat Shariat) released similar messages last week, detailing support for Dokku Umarov’s declaration and highlighting the preparedness and high morale of their forces. It looks as if Umarov is really pushing to retool the Caucasus Emirate into a highly effective fighting force, at least in word.

Although Umarov’s upbeat prognosis of the Emirate needs to be taken with a dose of salt, it make you wonder if the FSB’s declaration of imminent “al-Qaeda” attacks is, perhaps, somewhat credible.

8-29-08-Ingush-Front-SOG-kavkaz-center

[Mike Honcho]  Today Kavkaz Center released portions of a transcript from a June 12, 2008 video by the commander of the Shali Sector of the Caucasus Emirate Eastern Front, Amir Hussein (Hussein Gakaev).

Hussein is a Chechen with considerable fighting credentials, and his family has a long history of involvement in the resistance movement. During the last twelve years, he lost three brothers in the fighting, and had a sister kidnapped. His younger brother, Muslim Gakaev, is the Deputy Commander of the Shali sector. Prior to the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in late 2007, Amir Hussein was the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for several months.

The portion of the video transcribed had two main themes: one, that the mujahidin are unified, and two, that the services of the members of the so-called Chechen Government in-exile, which he calls the “London Criminal Group,” are no longer needed.

Amir Hussien states that after Dokku Umarov’s establishment of the Caucasus Emirate, rumors existed concerning dissension in the ranks of the mujahidin, which he categorically denies. He asserts that the mujhahidin are satisfied with this decision and will continue to support Umarov’s goals of establishing a unified Islamic Caliphate in the Caucasus. He reaffirms that Umarov made this decision according to the will of Allah, and therefore it is the path they must pursue.

Hussein also gives another reason why Umarov made the declaration: to unify the different units of mujahidin across all the republics of the Northern Caucasus. The mujahidin were fragmented and focused on their local struggles instead of consolidating their efforts across the whole region (reminiscent of the “Near” vs. “Far Enemy” strategy). There was no unity of command, and while they had successes, they were wasted in the bigger scheme of things. He then again tells us that “the mujahidin have accepted it [his decision] with great happiness.”

Amir Hussien then gives the Chechen Government in-exile, led by Ahmed Zakayev in London, a verbal thrashing. He warns them that there will be a cleaning of the ranks after the mujahidin victory. He then downplays their efforts at politics, calling them ineffective, and states that fighting is the only way to achieve their goals. Hussien also mocks them, calling them “actors” (clearly aimed at Zakayev, a former actor) and “window dressing.”

Perhaps they are re-issuing the transcript of the video for recruiting purposes or to assuage naysayers. Although judging from this article, it seems like they are reaching their numbers this summer.

Document (Russian): 8-27-08-amir-hussein-kavkaz-center

[Mike Honcho] This past week, the editorial board of the Caucasus Emirate asked the Chief of their Information and Analytical Service, Movladi Udugov to comment on the events in Georgia and the resulting challenges in relations between Russia and the West, as well as thoughts on the conflict from the leadership of the Emirate.

Udugov starts by stating that all sides in the conflict made serious miscalculations, with Georgia and the West making larger errors in judgment than the Russians. The West was fooled into thinking that because of its non-interference in matters concerning the Russian republics of the Northern Caucasus that Russia would not meddle in the affairs of the sovereign Southern Caucasus nations. Additionally, the West’s approval of the Russian campaign of terror against Muslims in the Northern Caucasus within the context of the “War on Islam,” combined with Russia’s newfound energy revenue, re-awakened the “imperial instinct” of Moscow’s leadership.

In fact, he claims the Chechen government (the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria at the time), warned Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1999 and 2000 that after Russia liquidated the sovereignty of Ichkeria, it will surely go after theirs. The Republics of the Northern Caucasus were a shield that protected Georgia and Azerbaijan. He also adds that the fighting by the mujahidin gave Baku and Tblisi time to strengthen their respective nations.

Georgia and Azerbaijan then showed their gratitude by initiating anti-Muslim and anti-mujahidin policies. Ugodov is particularly critical of Georgia and its treatment of Chechens in the Pankisi Gorge, where instead of granting the mujahidin refugee and a legalized status, Georgia forced them out. He strongly believes that without the withdrawal of Russian troops from lands of the Caucasus Emirate, the question of stability and security in the region will remain unsolved.

The conflict also demonstrated that the storming of Tskinvali on 8 August was unexpected by the Kremlin. However as a result of Russia’s overwhelming military response, NATO will speed up the process of naming Georgia and Ukraine members of the organization, an event which Moscow was seriously trying to prevent.

Towards the end of his statement, he summarizes with a list of conclusions:

1. The Western Alliance received a classic “Russian lesson:” you can’t trust any regime that occupies the Kremlin.

2. The configuration of forces and the political situation in the Caucasus has changed once more. The final arrangement of forces and political priorities for all participants of the conflict will become clearer in the near future.

3. Even with all of its blood lust and aggressiveness, Russia demonstrated weakness: they didn’t “ finish the enemy.”

4. The decisiveness and opportunism of Moscow will be directly proportional to the indecisiveness and alienation of the West.

5. There is no clear winner yet.

Document (Russian): 8-18-08 Kavkaz-Center-Udugov

The consensus on the forums is that Russia’s war with Georgia in South Ossetia is a boon for the Caucasus Emirate, a Jihadi group that seeks rule over the North Caucasus. According to its founder and self-proclaimed amir, Dokka Umarov, the emirate includes:

“Dagestan, Nokhchiycho (Chechnya), Ghalghaycho (Ingushetia), Iriston (North Ossetia), the Nogay steppe (includes parts of northern Chechnya, Dagestan and Stavropol district) and the combined areas of Kabarda, Bulkar and Karachay.” (see his proclamation)

Basically, all of these regions are north of Georgia in Russia.

On Ekhlaas, Shamil `Abd Allah opines that Russia’s incursion into Georgia will take pressure off the mujahids and turn Russia’s attention away from the Georgia-Chechnya border.  Quraysh1 cryptically observes that the war will “open the door of help to the mujahids by means of Georgia.”

On his website, popular Jihadi scholar Hamid al-`Ali writes that the war is really between the West and Russia.  American ambition crept up to Russia’s door and Russia responded.

The U.S. is interested in Georgia, `Ali argues, because it protects the oil pipelines that run from the Caspian Sea to Turkey.  Bush even sent Green Berets there in 2002 with the ostensible purpose of helping Georgia fight al-Qaeda elements in the Pankisi region.  But the real reason, `Ali maintains, was to train forces loyal to Washington so they could protect the pipeline.  If Russia now threatens this vital U.S. interest, then the war is a good thing.

As for the Caucasus Emirate, it has decided to wait and see how the war unfolds.

Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-ekhlaas-discussion-of-significance-of-war-between-russia-and-georgia

The attention of Western analysts today was focused on Abu Yahya al-Libi’s statement on Somalia. I read it and there’s not a lot there. Basically, Libi says keep fighting, no matter who is in power, until an Islamic state is established.

More interesting is Kavkaz Center’s newly-released interview with Dokka Umarov, the amir of the North Caucasus Emirate that he declared at the end of 2007. Here’s what stands out:

• The decision to declare an emirate was not taken lightly and occurred after much debate.
• Umarov acknowledges that he has taken a lot of heat from fellow travelers for aligning himself ideologically with al-Qaeda and declaring war on the world.
• The mujahids do control some territory, but their control is not absolute. Therefore, he does not want his supporters rushing to form a state.

The two translations, Arabic and English, diverge over what sort of state Umarov is talking about. In Arabic, he says he doesn’t want his supporters rushing to form an “actual state” (dawla fi`liyya). In English, he says he doesn’t want them rushing to form a “virtual state.” The difference is significant and if anyone can download the video and make out the right translation, I’d appreciate it. (The links to the video are in the Arabic translation below.)

Document (Arabic): 6-22-08-ekhlaas-umarov-interview-arabic

Document (English): 622-08-ekhlaas-umarov-interview-english