Entries Tagged 'Chechnya' ↓

[Mike Honcho]  Today Kavkaz Center released portions of a transcript from a June 12, 2008 video by the commander of the Shali Sector of the Caucasus Emirate Eastern Front, Amir Hussein (Hussein Gakaev).

Hussein is a Chechen with considerable fighting credentials, and his family has a long history of involvement in the resistance movement. During the last twelve years, he lost three brothers in the fighting, and had a sister kidnapped. His younger brother, Muslim Gakaev, is the Deputy Commander of the Shali sector. Prior to the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in late 2007, Amir Hussein was the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for several months.

The portion of the video transcribed had two main themes: one, that the mujahidin are unified, and two, that the services of the members of the so-called Chechen Government in-exile, which he calls the “London Criminal Group,” are no longer needed.

Amir Hussien states that after Dokku Umarov’s establishment of the Caucasus Emirate, rumors existed concerning dissension in the ranks of the mujahidin, which he categorically denies. He asserts that the mujhahidin are satisfied with this decision and will continue to support Umarov’s goals of establishing a unified Islamic Caliphate in the Caucasus. He reaffirms that Umarov made this decision according to the will of Allah, and therefore it is the path they must pursue.

Hussein also gives another reason why Umarov made the declaration: to unify the different units of mujahidin across all the republics of the Northern Caucasus. The mujahidin were fragmented and focused on their local struggles instead of consolidating their efforts across the whole region (reminiscent of the “Near” vs. “Far Enemy” strategy). There was no unity of command, and while they had successes, they were wasted in the bigger scheme of things. He then again tells us that “the mujahidin have accepted it [his decision] with great happiness.”

Amir Hussien then gives the Chechen Government in-exile, led by Ahmed Zakayev in London, a verbal thrashing. He warns them that there will be a cleaning of the ranks after the mujahidin victory. He then downplays their efforts at politics, calling them ineffective, and states that fighting is the only way to achieve their goals. Hussien also mocks them, calling them “actors” (clearly aimed at Zakayev, a former actor) and “window dressing.”

Perhaps they are re-issuing the transcript of the video for recruiting purposes or to assuage naysayers. Although judging from this article, it seems like they are reaching their numbers this summer.

Document (Russian): 8-27-08-amir-hussein-kavkaz-center

[Mike Honcho] This past week, the editorial board of the Caucasus Emirate asked the Chief of their Information and Analytical Service, Movladi Udugov to comment on the events in Georgia and the resulting challenges in relations between Russia and the West, as well as thoughts on the conflict from the leadership of the Emirate.

Udugov starts by stating that all sides in the conflict made serious miscalculations, with Georgia and the West making larger errors in judgment than the Russians. The West was fooled into thinking that because of its non-interference in matters concerning the Russian republics of the Northern Caucasus that Russia would not meddle in the affairs of the sovereign Southern Caucasus nations. Additionally, the West’s approval of the Russian campaign of terror against Muslims in the Northern Caucasus within the context of the “War on Islam,” combined with Russia’s newfound energy revenue, re-awakened the “imperial instinct” of Moscow’s leadership.

In fact, he claims the Chechen government (the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria at the time), warned Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1999 and 2000 that after Russia liquidated the sovereignty of Ichkeria, it will surely go after theirs. The Republics of the Northern Caucasus were a shield that protected Georgia and Azerbaijan. He also adds that the fighting by the mujahidin gave Baku and Tblisi time to strengthen their respective nations.

Georgia and Azerbaijan then showed their gratitude by initiating anti-Muslim and anti-mujahidin policies. Ugodov is particularly critical of Georgia and its treatment of Chechens in the Pankisi Gorge, where instead of granting the mujahidin refugee and a legalized status, Georgia forced them out. He strongly believes that without the withdrawal of Russian troops from lands of the Caucasus Emirate, the question of stability and security in the region will remain unsolved.

The conflict also demonstrated that the storming of Tskinvali on 8 August was unexpected by the Kremlin. However as a result of Russia’s overwhelming military response, NATO will speed up the process of naming Georgia and Ukraine members of the organization, an event which Moscow was seriously trying to prevent.

Towards the end of his statement, he summarizes with a list of conclusions:

1. The Western Alliance received a classic “Russian lesson:” you can’t trust any regime that occupies the Kremlin.

2. The configuration of forces and the political situation in the Caucasus has changed once more. The final arrangement of forces and political priorities for all participants of the conflict will become clearer in the near future.

3. Even with all of its blood lust and aggressiveness, Russia demonstrated weakness: they didn’t “ finish the enemy.”

4. The decisiveness and opportunism of Moscow will be directly proportional to the indecisiveness and alienation of the West.

5. There is no clear winner yet.

Document (Russian): 8-18-08 Kavkaz-Center-Udugov

Ekhlaas member Jibal Afghanistan (”Mountains of Afghanistan”) writes about a dream he had recently about two leaders of the Arab Jihadis in Chechnya, Muhannad and Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi. Here’s a translation:

This is what I saw today in a dream about Muhannad, Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi, and Ekhlaas.

I performed the midday prayer.

Then I prayed the sunna.

Then I retired to bed.

While sleeping, I saw…

I am in Chechnya and the snow is thick and harsh.

I was standing beside commander Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi.

Commander Abu al-Walid was standing over a snow vehicle that was to be driven by one of the brothers. It was a bomb. I said to commander Abu al-Walid, “Is it a martyrdom operation?” He said, “Yes.” Then the brother left with his vehicle.

I turned around and found commander Muhannad sitting simply on elevated ground.

I then walked with commander Abu al-Walid.

I said to him, “Will commander Muhannad hold a meeting with Ekhlaas and answer questions in an audio format?”

He said, “I beg your pardon?”

I asked him some questions, but regrettably I forgot them.

Can someone interpret what I saw?

Dreams of Jihadi leaders are a frequent topic on Jihadi forums and this one follows the general format. What is unusual is to have it tied to a media event.  Ekhlaas recently announced that it was accepting questions for the Jihadi leadership in Chechnya, which they will answer online.  So the dream seems to be either incredibly prophetic or a PR stunt.  Zawahiri, who also recently conducted an online Q&A, should have hired Jibal to promote his event.

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