Entries Tagged 'Egypt' ↓

‘Abbud al-Zumar, one-time military intelligence colonel in the Egyptian army who was implicated in the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat, has recently released a co-authored document with his cousin and brother-in-law Tariq from prison. The document, al-Badil al-Thalith bayna al-Istibdad wa-al-Istislam (The Third Alternative between Despotism and Surrender) was published by the Egyptian newspaper al-Shuruq in late August and early September 2009 (the document was also published in al-Masriyyun and can also be found on the discussion forum of the Egyptian Islamic Group website - click here for a collated PDF printout).

The text has received surprisingly little media coverage so far. This is curious, not least considering the importance of ‘Abbud al-Zumar to the legacy of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group). According to Muntasir al-Zayyat (one-time activist in al-Jama‘a and now a lawyer who specializes in defending Islamist activists - see his website), ‘Abbud was the military strategist of the group that was led by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, the author of al-Farida al-Gha’iba (The Forgotten Obligation) and the leader of the group that assassinated Anwar al-Sadat.

Following Faraj’s execution, a split among al-Jama‘a ensued and ‘Abbud became leader of the group’s wing Tanzim al-Jihad (the Jihad Organization), while Sheikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman (who is currently serving a prison sentence in the US for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre) became leader of the wing known as al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (al-Zayyat, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, p. 229).

It is worth noting that ‘Abbud and Tariq al-Zumar were not among the authors of the series of books published by al-Jama’a leaders since 1997 as part of the so-called ‘Mubadarat Waqf al-‘Unf’ (The Initiative of Halting Violence).

With al-Badil al-Thalith, ‘Abbud and Tariq al-Zumar have produced what they believe to be an initiative containing a domestic plan of action based on political, not military, reform for Egyptian Islamists; and a global road map for Islamists and jihadis, including al-Qa‘ida, designed to develop a strategy based on working with (not against) select Western forces for the purpose of advancing the Islamist cause worldwide.

Given that this initiative was authored behind bars, to what extent should we assume that this is a document that genuinely represents the authors’ convictions instead of the views their jailors want us to believe that al-Zumars now espouse? For obvious reasons, this legitimate concern cannot be fully resolved, but two important points should be noted in this respect: first, al-Shuruq obtained the rights to publish al-Badil al-Thalith from ‘Abbud’s parents and the publication does not appear to have been orchestrated by Egyptian authorities; second, the authors’ critical stance of the Egyptian regime, as will be discussed below, suggests that that the document has not been tampered with by the hands of the authorities, wallahu a‘alam.

The authors are aware of their readers’ dilemma. That is why they are keen to stress that the muraja‘at (‘revisions/re-examinations/recantations’) cannot achieve their objectives unless three conditions are met: (1) the release of all political prisoners; (2) the removal of all the obstacles facing the youth from taking part in public life; (3) the opportunity of making peaceful regime change feasible, through  finding ways of making leaders accountable and removing them when necessary.

It is within this framework that al-Zumars have put forward a new initiative, proposing an amnesty for all those who participated in the crimes of torture in Egyptian prisons. This, they believe, should be part of a national reconciliation that includes (1) amnesty and release of all political prisoners, (2) compensating the thousands of prisoners who have endured torture and (3) compensating the families of those whose loved ones lost their lives in the process.

What’s in it for the Egyptian government? Al-Zumars point out that it is necessary to end quickly the ‘torture file’ before international forces use it as an excuse to interfere in the domestic affairs of Egypt. They highlight that such an intervention could be either at the hands of foreign governments as well as NGOs that are concerned with violations of human rights around the world. In other words, Husni Mubarak’s regime has more to gain by professing a mea culpa on its own domestic terms instead of being forced to do so through external international legal bodies.

How should ending military struggle proceed?
Al-Zumars enumerate several conditions towards this end. These include a call for regional and international co-operation between Arab and Islamic states, including Iran; forging alliances with those seeking to reform the United Nations in an effort to guarantee the interests of politically marginalized nations and oppressed peoples. While they obviously want the government to govern on the basis of the creed of divine unity (tawhid), al-Zumars stress that the interest of the Islamic mission (al-da‘wa) may entail adopting a neutral stance vis-a-vis the authorities and avoiding confrontations with them.

Islamic movements, al-Zumars hold, should meet several critical challenges. Al-Zumars propose a nuanced approach to dealing with non-Muslims. To begin with, they call for devising a new comprehensive vision that defines the nature of the relationship with Western civilization, away from the ‘clash of civilization’ paradigm (Third Alternative, part 4). In their minds, the importance of forging political alliances cannot be understated and it does not contradict ‘aqidat al-wala’ wa-al-bara’ (i.e., the Islamic creed that provides guidelines related to Muslims’ obligations to associate with and support fellow Muslims and when to dissociate from non-Muslims). Al-Zumars remind their readers that the Prophet himself forged alliances with non-Muslims when the objective of these alliances was in the interest of repelling oppression, as in the case of hilf al-fudul (‘pact of chivalry’ – this pact antedates Islam; the Prophet took part in it when he was young and he is said to have maintained his commitment to its principles after he received the Revelations. In other words, hilf al-fudul is a product of the jahiliyya era, but its principles stand even after the advent of Islam).

Al-Zumars also highlight that the Prophet entered into alliances with non-Muslims when he deemed that such alliances were in the interests of Muslims, as in the case of the ‘constitution of Medina’ (an alliance that is said to have been between the Muslims who escaped Meccan persecution (al-Muhajirun), their supporters in Medina (al-Ansar) and the Jews of Medina). Accordingly, al-Zumars assert that ‘forging alliances and cooperating with non-Muslims is permitted so long as the objective behind these alliances is legitimate’; indeed ‘forging alliances may be an obligation (wajib) if the objective is to realize the freedom of propagating the Islamic mission or simply preserve the life and safety of its preachers.’

Working within this pragmatic framework, al-Zumars argue that co-operating with non-Muslims can be in the interest of effectively resisting occupation. ‘The military and political campaigns led by the US and its allies against the Islamic world’, they hold, ‘do not necessarily represent the will and visions of the American and European people. That is why it is necessary to devise a plan that deals with these campaigns based on differentiating between the leaders/elites and their peoples. For we continue to observe the opposition against the military campaign against Iraq mounted by the American and European peoples; opinion polls in Europe reveal a great sympathy with the Palestinian cause … for this reason, it is not sensible to direct our bombs against societies that are calling on their governments to stop their aggression against Iraq’ and support other Islamic causes (Third Alternative, part 5).

Al-Zumars do not appear to have given up entirely on the hope of the US government changing its policies towards the Islamic world. They remark that the election of Barack Obama represents a clear coup against the aggressive policies of George W. Bush’s administration. The Obama administration’s policies however remain subject to implementation, not least considering that Iraq is still occupied and preparations are underway to send more troops to Afghanistan (note that al-Badil al-Thalith was published before the troop increase in Afghanistan). Al-Zumars called on President Obama to translate his statements into positive practical measures, among them the release of Sheikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman.

Al-Qa‘ida and Military Jihad
Despite al-Zumars’ new commitment to peaceful political reform, they do not reject military jihad without qualification nor do they condemn al-Qa‘ida outright. Instead, they state that with respect to al-Qa‘ida, ‘we declare our support for lawful jihad (al-jihad al-mashru‘) that al-Qa‘ida is mounting in those parts of the Islamic world that are subject to occupation or aggression; indeed, al-Qa‘ida’s jihad in this respect is esteemed and respected by all those who are sincere in the umma, and we are perfectly ready to pay with our lives as a price to defend this noble jihad.’  Al-Zumars however go on to call on the leaders of al-Qa‘ida to re-examine their strategies that seek to move military operations to the Islamic world; they hold that this strategy has breached many Islamic legal stipulations. They also call on al-Qa‘ida ‘to re-examine its legal opinion (fatwa) that makes it lawful to shed the blood of Western civilians, for it is not consistent with Islamic law’ (Third Alternative, part 8).

Undoubtedly, al-Badil al-Thalith represents a clear departure from the worldview al-Zumars once espoused. It is to be remembered that they, especially ‘Abbud, were once fully committed to the thesis Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj advocated in his al-Farida al-Gha’iba. Faraj believed that only the path of military jihad could save Muslims in this world and the next and that jihad must be directed first and foremost against the near enemy, i.e., Muslim rulers who are in apostasy of Islam because they do not govern according to the justice Islam preaches.

Why then should al-Badil al-Thalith not receive the attention that other so-called muraja‘at of militant struggle through jihad have received, most notably, Dr Fadl’s Tarshid (2007) and his later response to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s (al-Ta‘riya li-Kitab al-Tabri’a), both of which have been covered here on Jihadica.

In his critique of al-Badil al-Thalith, Hani al-Siba‘i (a London-based Egyptian lawyer sympathetic with the strategy of military jihad and director of al-Maqrizi centre), remarked in a commentary that the reason why al-Zumars’ initiative has not received much media attention is due not just to its bad timing (it was released during Ramadan) but more importantly because its message did not win the approval of Egyptian authorities.

I suspect there is some truth to that. As al-Siba‘i remarks, unlike Dr Fadl who personalized his attacks against al-Qa‘ida and especially Ayman al-Zawahiri and therefore lost credibility, al-Zumars have refrained from polemical attacks.

There is more to this than al-Siba‘i is suggesting. From the Egyptian authorities’ point of view, Dr Fadl didn’t really present an alternative to Egyptians who might be sympathetic with al-Jama‘a, whereas al-Zumars are presenting a proactive alternative based on peaceful and political reform. While al-Badil al-Thalith is by no means a comprehensive plan, it nevertheless highlights basic and legitimate demands of the Egyptian government, most notably, accountability for the rulers and the freedom for all to partake in the political process.

Al-Badil al-Thalith presents yet another challenge to the Egyptian authorities, namely al-Zumars’ recognition of the efforts and sacrifices the Muslim Brotherhood has made to ‘open up channels for Islamic political engagement’ despite all the obstacles the government has placed in its way. Saluting the model of the Muslim Brotherhood could signal a potential problem for the Mubarak regime: a scenario whereby al-Jama‘a and al-Ikhwan could form an alliance and contest elections is not a prospect the Egyptian government is willing to entertain, especially with a Presidential election looming in 2011.

Will al-Badil al-Thalith make a dent in the jihadis’ global strategy? Probably not. Indeed, the jihadis are likely to point out that al-Zumars’ proposal has gone undebated not just in the Arab and Islamic world, but also in the West, which, in their minds, goes to prove that only polemical statements like those allegedly authored by Dr Fadl make it into the headlines. They are also likely to point out that Western analysts who rush to promote recantations such as those authored by Dr Fadl are wittingly or unwittingly doing the bidding of the Egyptian government. All this, they would say, proves why military jihad is the only path that could lead to genuine reform in the Islamic world.

We have heard Bin Ladin and Zawahiri’s comments, and Marc Lynch and others will tell us how the Arab mainstream reacted. But what are the grassroot jihadis saying about Obama’s Mideast tour in general and his Cairo speech in particular?

Let me begin by lowering your expectations. For a start, we should not expect to see any positive reactions to Obama’s initiative, for anybody thus inclined would not be on the forums in the first place. Second, there is no tradition among jihadi strategists or pundits for parsing presidential speeches. They might pick up on a phrase (like Bush’s reference to a “crusade”) and use it for their own purposes. But generally these guys don’t listen to what America says - they watch what she does.

I should also add that Faloja, the main jihadi forum, has been down since this morning (as has Shuraa), so our ability to gage the reactions to the Obama’s speech is limited. Fortunately I surveyed Faloja for Obama-related material yesterday, and Shumukh, the no.2 forum, is up today, so we have something to work with.

Overall, there is quite a bit of chatter about the Obama tour, and four types of postings recur. First are the political messages which denounce the visit and present it as further evidence that Egyptian and Saudi governments and ulama have submitted to American dominance. “In honour of Obama’s visit to Saudi Arabia”, one member reposted the classic bookThe evident proofs of the infidelity of the Saudi state (1990) by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Other posts circulate the pictures of Saudi and American flags side by side. Yet others claimed Egyptians are suffering as a result of Obama visit, because the security barriers in Cairo “confined 18 million Egyptians to their homes” and because the Sultan Hasan mosque had to be closed for security reasons.

In a widely diffused and entertaining post, a contributor named “Abu al-Bashar” describes a daydream about Egyptian Salafi Ulama confronting Obama. The text is written like a short skit which goes something like this (loosely translated):
“Here are our ulama from Egypt: Sheikhs Yasir al-Barhami, Muhammad Hussain Ya’qub, Ahmad al-Sisi, Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni, Tal’at Zahran, Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad Ismail al-Muqaddam and Mahmud al-Misri. They hear about Obama’s visit to Egypt and decide to convene a meeting in which the following conversation takes place.
Ismail gets angry and says we have been silent for long enough.
Hasan asks: what about Obama? He is coming here to salvage relations with the Muslim world.
Al-Huwayni intervenes: But he’s coming here while is armies are killing Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan and supports the Jews in their killing of Palestinians.
Burhami says: The bottom line is that Obama the pig is coming here to slaughter us and he smiles at us in the process.
Al-Sisi sayd: Sure, but Obama the pig is coming here, so what should we do?
After long discussions, the scholars announce their decision, which consists of two steps.
First, a statement, denouncing Obama’s visit. It would be distributed on the satellite tv stations and on the internet forums and on facebook, and in all newspapers and journals, in Arabic and English and French. Second, a demonstration on the day of the speech. All preachers and scholars and their students would go to the location where Obama will deliver his speech and show their opposition.

- The end -
Here Sheikh Muhammad Husain Ya’qub intervenes, saying ‘I retract my positions’.”

The final part is quite funny – even in a dream official ulama lack moral courage.

The second type of posts are strategic assessments in which writers try to second-guess the real purpose and implications of the visit. These posts are neither numerous nor sophisticated, and so far none of the serious jihadi strategists have weighed in. “Al-Munasir1” warns that part of the purpose of Obama’s visit to Egypt is to make final preparations for an international campaign against Sudan.

The third and most widespread type of post focuses on tactical issues such as the detailed program of Obama’s visit, the size and nature of his security attachment and the prospects of carrying out an assassination. One writer quoted the Saudi opposition abroad as saying observers and Saudi security officials fear for Obama’s life in Saudi Arabia. He argued that the recent shooting in Jubayl is indicative of a surge in pro-al-Qaida sentiment in the Kingdom. The fact that the perpetrators of the Jubayl shooting have not been caught further worried the authorities. Most responses to the post expressed hope that Obama be assassinated, but one commentator drily noted that Obama comes and goes as he wishes so long as the royal family is in power.

Another post by “Baghdad al-Khilafa” presented a more detailed “Plan for killing Barak Obama” in Egypt. It included a picture of Cairo university followed by the note: “the best way of killing Obama: Suicide belt, suicide belt, suicide belt.” Then followed detailed instructions on how to manufacture a suicide belt, including links to downloadable instruction videos.

The fourth type of posting consists of reproductions of articles from other, more mainstream Arab and Islamic media. These posts are interesting not so much for the debates they generate (usually very little), but because they tell us something about which voices the forum participants would at least consider listening to. So we find
- Abd al-Bari Atwan ‘s article “Our advice to Obama”
- An article by Mahmud Abduh Ali at Islamonline entitled “An examination of Obama’s position on the big issues that concern the Muslim world”
- An article from al-Jazeera.net on the Muslim Brotherhood’s reaction to the Obama visit.
- An article from Middle East Online entitled “Egyptians: No Ahlan wa Sahlan for Obama”, which cites a poll showing three quarters of Egyptians were skeptical of Obama’s visit.

Of particular interest is the posting of an article from Sabq News reporting that the Saudi Islamist Ayidh al-Qarni loved Obama’s speech. The article is posted by the same Baghad al-Khilafa who wanted Obama blown up, and he is naturally expressing dismay at al-Qarni’s reaction, to the point of declaring him an infidel. This triggers a debate, with several contributors objecting to the excommunication (takfir) of al-Qarni. “Brothers, don’t declare him an infidel, he is just a regime cleric”, writes “Asad al-Jazira”.

In my two days of surfing the forums I was able to find one single statement mildly favourable to the Obama administration. A contributor named “Khaldun Halwani” wrote in a comment to a post: “Let us hope that this is the beginning of a new direction that will serve Muslim interests. I would add that Foreign Secretary has started changing US policy toward the enemy of Islam, Israel.” But this is of course an isolated statement by an anonymous contributor and thus not indicative of anything.

There are in other words no big surprises in the forum reactions to Obama’s Middle East tour, although it is still too early to tell how the jihadi movement will adapt to these initiatives. Hopefully we will see more serious jihadi strategic studies of Obama’s PR offensive in the weeks to come. I will keep my eye out for them and keep you posted. If anybody sees anything interesting, please let me know.

Update: Parts of this post was reproduced on the Foreign Policy Blog on 5 June and on NPR.com on 8 June.

As most Jihadica readers probably know, the jihadi internet is used for many things, but not for operational planning. I have yet to come across online discussions or instructions for concrete operations by professional militants. However, once in a while you see amateurs proposing specific operations – “prêt a porter plots” – for others to carry out.

One such bright idea was posted on Faloja yesterday by a member named Sabir, who proposes that al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) fire Katyusha rockets from the Saudi shore of the Gulf of Aqaba toward Sharm al-Sheikh, where international leaders are meeting today to raise money for the reconstruction of Gaza.

Sabir addresses his message “to Abu Basir [Nasir al-Wuhayshi], Emir of al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula” and humbly presents “a small and simple operation for three Islamic lions from the military corps under your command.” He notes that Ras al-Shaykh Hamid on the Saudi coast is only 7-8 kilometers away from Sharm al-Shaykh, while Katyusha rockets have a range of 10-22 kilometers. One could even use medium or heavy mortar shells, which have a range of 4.9-8.2km and 10 km respectively. Having done a certain amount of background research, Sabir includes maps, satellite pictures and photographs from the area to illustrate his point. Unconcerned about Muslim collateral damage, he concedes that one might not succeed in hitting the conference venue directly, but even striking nearby will send a strong signal, as did the failed mortar attack on UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon during the latter’s visit to Baghdad in March 2007. Sabir also admits that “you may not have time to do it today, but you have plenty of time in the coming days to acquire long-range missiles”.

There have been missile plots in Saudi Arabia in the past. In January 1998, Saudi security forces intercepted a shipment of missiles on the Yemeni-Saudi border intended for an al-Qaida attack on the US consulate in Jidda (see p 708 of this article). In May 2002, guards discovered empty missile tubes from a failed attack on planes taking off from the Prince Sultan Airbase. The missiles from the latter attack had been acquired in Yemen, and they were allegedly from the same batch as those used in the Mombasa attack later the same year.

Still, Sabir’s idea is completely off the wall. Katyushas have never been found on the Arabian Peninsula, the QAP is currently holed up in Yemen, and it takes more than a few days to plan an operation like this. Moreover, as other forum members dryly note in their comments, the idea is useless the moment you post it on online for all the intelligence services in the world to see.

The posting is nevertheless interesting, first of all because it is unusually specific and shows that we cannot completely dismiss the Internet’s potential as an arena for operational brainstorming. At the same time, it illustrates the lack of military know-how of many online jihadists. In much of the forum material, there is a spectacular disconnection between intention and capability. Unfortunately, the haute couture of terrorism is prepared behind closed doors.

Document (Arabic): 03-01-09-military-plan-for-qap

Update (6 March): This post not only prompted enthusiastic comments (see below), but was also discussed on Faloja itself. We wish our new readers a warm welcome.
Document (Arabic): 03-05-09-faloja-on-jihadica

Asad al-Jihad2, who some claim is senior AQ member Hukayma, is taking questions on Gaza.  The Q&A session, modeled on that of Zawahiri, is open for four days of questions; AJ2 will give his answers soon after.  Individuals are allowed to ask five question and news orgs can ask ten.

One has to be careful not to read too much into these questions since some were probably posted by intel orgs.  But the concerns raised jive with everything else I’ve seen on the forums: what’s our stance on Hamas, who are the authentic Jihadi groups and why aren’t they doing more, and what do we do about Egypt and the Gulf countries?

I don’t have time to summarize them all, but one question directed to Asad al-Jihad2 struck me: “What is your view regarding the recent disclosure that Gaza is being annexed to Egypt and the West Bank is being annexed to Jordan?”

An audio statement by Zawahiri was just posted to the forums.  Here’s a summary:

• Bin Laden swore he would keep fighting until Palestine and Muslim lands are free of foreign occupiers.
• The Israeli attacks are Obama’s “gift” to the Palestinians before he takes office.  President Mubarak of Egypt is an accomplice in this slaughter since he has closed Egypt’s border with Gaza.
• To the Muslims and mujahids in Gaza and Palestine: Al-Qaeda is with you.  We are attacking the American-Zionist Crusade wherever we can and we are quickly moving toward you.  The American withdrawal from Iraq heralds our approach toward you.
• To the Muslims in Egypt: Strike and protest to force Mubarak to end the blockade.
• To the Bedouins in Sinai: Help break the blockade.
• To the Muslims of the world: American propaganda portrayed Obama as your savior but here he is “killing” Muslims in Gaza.  Demonstrating against these atrocities is not enough; you must engage in jihad.  Strike the American-Zionist Crusade everywhere.

Document (Arabic): 1-6-09-shamikh-zawahiri-on-gaza

Several days ago, Marc Lynch linked to a very a thoughtful article by Hussam Tammam on the significance of the revisions by the Islamic Group and by Sayyid Imam.  Today, Rob at the Shack has cited the article as one more piece of incontrovertible evidence for his Imam-doesn’t-matter argument.  I won’t rehash all of that (if you’re interested, you can start here), but as you’ll see, Tammam’s article is a lot more complicated than Rob’s assessment suggests.

Tammam’s basic argument is that organizations like the Islamic Group and al-Jihad will not be able to stop violence today because the nature of Islamist authority in Egypt has changed.  In the past people had to join groups and institutions to engage in Islamist activism.  But in the last ten years, the role of organizations and institutions has faded because of the rapprochement between the Egyptian regime and Islamist groups and because the state controls so many Islamic institutions.  So today, Islamist activism, both violent and nonviolent, is more individualistic.  It is loose associations of people engaging in the “market of religious performance.”  In this new environment, missionaries and teachers are more influential than organizations and movements.  For these reasons, Tammam argues, the revisions of groups like the Islamic Group and al-Jihad have no impact on Jihadis because these groups no longer have power over people committed to an ideology, not an organization.

I’m intrigued by Tammam’s general thesis that individualism is on the rise in Egyptian Islamism.  I also agree with his general assertion that Imam won’t impact other Egyptian Jihadis.  But I disagree with the way he reached this conclusion.  For one, Imam is not the head of al-Jihad, trying to exert organizational control over Egyptian Jihadis.  He’s trying to change the minds of his former al-Jihad associates in prison with him and secure their release.  More importantly, Imam’s not trying to persuade other Jihadis at all.  As he says repeatedly, he is reaching out to youth that might be swayed by Jihadis.  Since Tammam himself argues that Egyptian Islamists today care more about a learned man’s opinion’s than his organizational affiliation, perhaps Imam will have greater traction with the fence-sitting sort.  But that’s not where Tammam or Rob are looking, which is a mistake.

Monika Maslikowski has a smart take on Sayyid Imam’s communication strategy vs. that of Zawahiri (it’s part of a larger assessment of the latter’s stumbles as a communicator this year).  She seconds my argument that Imam’s personal attacks on Zawahiri are effective because “Zawahiri’s success as a leader is dependent on whether or not he can gain trust and support.”

On the same subject, the Shack has an essay by an Egyptian lamenting Imam’s personal attacks.  For a different perspective by another Egyptian, I’d point you to Caliph’s remarks in the comments section of a previous post.  Without revealing too much, Caliph has closely followed Egyptian media and Islamism for years.  I’d rate his comments pretty high on their own merit, but one’s background seems to matter in these sorts of debates.

We’re probably now at the point of diminishing returns, but the issue of Jihadi revisions is important enough to work through the particulars until it’s clear what’s fact, what’s unproven, and what’s merely a matter of taste.  It’s important not just for assessing the impact of Sayyid Imam’s work but for understanding how ideological challenges to Jihadism fail or succeed.  My response to Rob is below the fold: Continue reading →

Rob at Media Shack has posted a summary of a discussion on al-`Arabiyya’s “Death Industry.”  Of interest to him (and me) is Montasir Zayat’s assessment of Sayyid Imam’s latest book (Zayat only read the first one and a half chapters).  Here’s Rob’s take:

In Zayat’s view, what’s being printed now in Al-Masri Al-Youm is a disgrace and jeopardizes the reputation of the entire Revisions process.   No Jihadists or even Muslims anywhere will treat them seriously.

Rob agrees with this sentiment (as does Nathan Field).  But that’s not exactly what Zayat says.  Zayat does say the book is a disgrace, but he’s also pessimistic that anything can move Jihadis, no matter how refined.  Here he is in the same interview responding to the host’s question of which man, Imam or Zawahiri, has more popularity:

Dr. Sayyid Imam has an abundance of Sharia knowledge and he certainly had these beliefs before he was imprisoned.  He used to say the same things before he was imprisoned and I believe him.  However, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has charisma and popularity, and he is readily accepted among the youth also.  Many of the youths’ hearts and heads are attached to him.  It is difficult for the words of Sayyid Imam to affect them.

Exactly.  There is nothing Sayyid Imam can say to sway hardcore fans of Zawahiri.  It doesn’t matter how mean or nice he is.  Thus, as I argued yesterday, we shouldn’t be assessing the impact of Imam’s book on Jihadis but rather on neutral pious, educated Arabs, particularly high school and college-age youth, whom Imam considers his primary audience.

But how do we measure this impact?  Rob says that it is by looking at the discussion of Sayyid Imam’s new book in the mainstream press.  By this measure, he says, it’s a failure because “there has been almost no coverage in the Arabic media.”  I don’t concede the latter assertion–the book was printed in full in Islam Online, al-Masry al-Youm, and al-Sharq al-Awsat and commented on in at least thirteen print news venues.  It is also all over the forums and the Arabic blogosphere.  Still, I agree that it is getting less coverage than Imam’s last book.  Rob says that’s because the tone of the book is bitter and personal.  A simpler explanation is that the subject–Imam turning on Zawahiri–is old news.

However, for the sake of argument, let’s say the story wasn’t covered by anyone in the mainstream media.  So what?  As I observed regarding a different matter (Jihadi forums), the fact that the Arab press ignores a phenomenon does not mean the phenomenon has little impact on Arabs.  The Arab press wrote nothing about Abu Bakr Naji until the Saudi arrests.  The Arab press has also missed the recent Maqdisi story.  Aside from this blog and an excellent article in Jamestown, only al-Hayat has caught it.

So how are we to assess the impact of Sayyid Imam’s new book on its target audience?  Here are a few places to look:

• Mainstream Muslim discussion forums
• News discussion forums (al-Jazeera, etc)
• Personal blogs

Much of the circulation, of course, will be person-to-person, which we can’t possibly track.  Still, I’m willing to partially concede that it’s a dud if the mainstream forums and blogs are largely negative.  But let’s wait a little bit before rendering judgment.  As Sayyid Imam said in his last installment, it’s simply unfair to judge a book before it’s even been released.

Sayyid Imam wraps up his new book today.  Much of his final criticism is aimed at Bin Laden, whom he describes as incurious and incapable of holding himself accountable for his errors.  Regarding the latter, Imam compares Bin Laden negatively to Hassan Nasrallah, who apologized and offered compensation to the Lebanese civilians whose homes had been destroyed by Israeli bombing in the 2006 war (paging Andrew Exum).  

Sayyid Imam ends by explaining why his attacks on Zawahiri and Bin Laden have become more personal: he felt obliged to do it after Zawahiri accused him of being an Egyptian tool before Imam’s first book had even been released.  Zawahiri’s more pointed personal attacks in the Exoneration prompted an even more personal response.

Concluding…

The Denudation is divided into four sections:

• Exposing the lies of Zawahiri
• Exposing his jurisprudential errors
• Exposing the ways he misleads the reader
• Exposing his search for fame

In this, the conclusion, I wish to say: If there are Muslims who have been led astray by bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their like, how are they going to remain firm during the fitna of the Anti-Christ, which the prophet says will be the greatest fitna?

In like manner, people have been led astray by Ataturk for 90 years.  They praised him for expelling the allies from Turkey in World War I and called him “al-Ghazi” (pious frontier warrior), but that didn’t stop him from abolishing the caliphate and attacking Islam.

People should not fall under the spell of those who talk about religion and jihad before they know what these people stand for and what they know of the Sharia.

The Prophet has said that, “God helps this religion with a debauched man.”  The man he is talking about fought alongside the prophet at Khaybar, mightily vexed the infidels, and did not harm a single Muslim.  He only harmed himself by committing suicide on account of his wounds.  Compare him with those who bring great harm to Muslims.  What has been the benefit of destroying two buildings in America, destruction which led to the downfall the Taliban state, the only Islamic state in the world?  Bin Laden left Afghanistan to pay the price for his stupidity.  He cries for the children of Palestine but forgets the children of Afghanistan.  And behind him stands Zawahiri, justifying all of it.

Now Bin Laden is using his organization for his own personal security, leaving many of its members to be killed or captured.  Bin Laden even abandoned his most sincere supporter, Abu Hafs al-Masri, who had built al-Qaeda for him.  He, along with others, were killed in the American bombings in 2001 because they didn’t have the protection that Bin Laden had.  The captain is usually the last one to abandon the ship, but not Bin Laden or Zawahiri; they are the first.

Bin Laden talks of jihad, yet he withdrew from every battle he and his companions fought without the support of the Afghans against the communists.  Bin Laden was even captured during one of the battles.  The Arabs had no effective military role in the Afghan jihad against Russia.  To say otherwise is a lie. [On this, see Wright's Looming Tower.]

What of Bin Laden’s religious knowledge?  In 1994 in Sudan, there was a subject that he was interested in.  I suggested he read a certain book about it.  He said to me, “I am unable to read a whole book.”  As for his speeches, his followers write them for him.

Is one who destroyed two buildings, and thus destroyed the Taliban state, knowledgeable in Sharia or military matters? Does someone who sends hundreds of his brothers to their graves or to jail for the sake of “the idea” and “the flame” of jihad (Exoneration p. 193) have Sharia or military skills?

These people are mischief makers.  And why not, as long as there is someone to pay for their mischief.  They can flee and accumulate popularity and money (Exoneration, p. 79, 199).

What are the consequences of their knowledge?  The operation succeeded (9/11), the patient died (Taliban state), and the doctor fled (Bin Laden and Zawahiri).

When Gamal Abdel Nasser lost the 1967 war, he presented his resignation from the presidency three days later.  Hassan Nasrallah apologized to the Lebanese people only one month after the July 2006 war with Israel and promised to pay compensation to those who had been harmed.  This was despite the fact that Lebanon was not occupied. It was partially destroyed, which Nasrallah could have prevented if he’d had good anti-aircraft weapons.  Compare this to Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their followers.  They make no apologies to anyone.

Every follower of Bin Laden and those that approve their actions will be gathered together under the same banner on the Day of Judgment if they do not repent [ie they're hell bound].

I had not intended to write a single word about Bin Laden, Zawahiri, or anyone else.  It did not occur to me to do so when I wrote the Document in December 2006 and when I revised it in March 2007.  I have witnesses who can attest to this.  But then I showed the Document to the brothers in prison in April 2007.  Afterwards, there was a lot of talk in the press about the Document, so I released a statement to stop speculation, which was published in May 6, 2007 in al-Hayat and al-Sharq al-Awsat.  I said it was a call to the Islamic groups to put Jihadi operations on the right path.  I said it deals with jurisprudential matters and not with a specific group.  Nevertheless, Zawahiri issued a statement in June 2007 criticizing the Document before it had been published and before he had a chance to read it.

Why did Zawahiri launch this preemptive strike?  He knew my opinion about the mistakes of the Islamic groups, such as prohibiting visa holders from operations in the Abode of War and other things that he cut from my book, The Compendium, in 1994.  Zawahiri and his colleagues in Europe continued to badmouth me, so I added material which was not in the Document I had initially shared with the brothers in April 2007 so I could respond to Zawahiri’s and his colleagues’ stupidity and reveal to the people what they stand for, but I wasn’t too specific.  I spoke more specifically about them in my interview with al-Hayat.

An important lesson: the matter of the masses relying on religious scholars

The religious scholars are the sources of religious guidance.  Al-Juwayni has said that when there is no caliphate, the religious scholars are the heads of the Muslims.

I’ve seen a lot of ignorant people like Bin Laden and Zawahiri presenting themselves as religious scholars for Muslims.  They are not, as I have shown in part two of this note.  I want to caution you against them here.  Warning against such people was the main reason I wrote The Compendium in 1993.

Document (Arabic): 12-2-08-al-masri-al-youm-denudation-part-13