Entries Tagged 'Hamas' ↓

In the past few years, an increasing number of news items have focused on the clashes between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and more radical Jihadi-Salafi groups. (For a recent example, see here.) Analyses of these groups have mostly concentrated on their alleged ties with al-Qa‘ida and their criticism of Hamas as being soft (see here, for example) but little is known about their actual ideology. Last year, however, a book giving a detailed ideological critique of Hamas (Al-Qawl al-Asas fi Hukumat Hamas) was released by a Jihadi-Salafi from Gaza called Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi, not to be confused with Abu l-Nur al-Maqdisi, the leader of Jund Ansar Allah, whose death at the hands of Hamas last year caused a widespread uproar among Jihadi-Salafis. It is not clear how representative this book is of Hamas’ radical opponents’ ideology in Gaza but the arguments are typically Jihadi-Salafi ones and are therefore likely to count for something among these groups.

Democracy and Legislation

As may be expected, the book is highly critical of Hamas’ acceptance of elections and the will of the people at the expense of the will of God. The author argues that the Qur’an states that “judgement belongs only to God alone; He has commanded that you shall not serve any but Him” (Q. 12: 40, transl. Arberry) and that the idea of power to the people is a flagrant violation of this. He takes a stand against all sorts of things he associates with democracy, such as the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the separation of religion and state, freedom of the press and equality. Interestingly, he also tries to explain that in a democracy, it is the majority that decides on issues and gets its way, even if their point of view is entirely wrong. Although the author wants to say that God’s will should be done, not the majority’s, his dim view of human beings’ ability to do what is right reminded me of a few Greek philosophers that I’m sure the author would not like to be compared with.

In what may be a reference to the previous American administration’s goal of democratisation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the author also tries to frame democracy as inherently linked with “loyalty to the infidel West, world Zionism and the crusader Christianity in Europe”, as well as joining them in “waging wars against Muslims”. Having built up his argument that democracy is not only against God’s will but also involves fighting fellow-believers, he then goes on to quote numerous Hamas leaders stating their support for the people’s will, even if they reject implementing Islamic law (shari‘a).

Hamas’ unwillingness to apply the shari‘a in full is also dealt with in detail. The author cites numerous verses about God’s rule and uses Q. 9: 31 (“they have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God”, transl. Arberry) to “prove” that following non-Islamic legislation – just like Jews and Christians did by following “their rabbis and their monks” in this verse – actually equals worshipping other gods, thus constituting polytheism. He backs this up with a well-known hadith about ‘Adi b. Hatim, in which the Prophet Muhammad seemingly supports this explanation, in order to emphasise that the Hamas government is nothing but a bunch of infidels who worship other legislative gods.

Jihad

The author then moves on to a subject on which Hamas may be assumed to be beyond reproach, namely its willingness to wage jihad against Israel. Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi disagrees, however. He lists a number of conditions that must apply for a group of Muslims to be allowed to accept a truce with their non-Muslim enemy, including that it must be negotiated by the rightful imam or his deputy, serve “Islamic interests” and be temporary. He then compares this with Hamas’ cease-fires with Israel and concludes that these come up short. He states that Hamas is an apostate organisation to begin with and may therefore not conclude truces at all. What’s more, Hamas’ cease-fires are all based on man-made laws instead of the shari‘a and the Palestinians - despite being the weakest party - have to make all the concessions, he states. Also, he says, “the Jews” are not going to stick to a truce agreement anyway.

Al-Maqdisi then moves on to scolding Hamas for condemning all kinds of armed attacks, including ones in Saudi Arabia, Britain, Qatar and Egypt, as well as those committed during cease-fires. To add insult to injury, he claims, Hamas does not just reject certain attacks but even actively kills mujahidin and people wanted by Israel. The author presents photographs of Hamas’ bullets and shoeprints from inside mosques supporting their Jihadi-Salafi opponents – hinting at the organisation’s willingness to shoot and wear shoes where that is strictly forbidden in order to crack down on their adversaries – as well as some gruesome pictures of fighters apparently slain by Hamas. All this is supposed to give the impression that Hamas is not only shunning its own duty to wage jihad against Israel but is even trying to disrupt the efforts of those who do fight.

Al-Wala’ wa-l-Bara’

The author’s most interesting topic of the book is perhaps his use of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty to God, Islam and Muslims and disavowal of everything and everyone else). This concept is applied almost exclusively by Salafis, who use it to indicate that Muslims should have total and undivided allegiance to God and Islam in every sphere of life and must not show loyalty – expressed in friendship, help and affection – to “infidels”. Instead, they must disavow everything that may distract them from their devotion to Islam and Muslims, all in order to remain pure in one’s beliefs and lifestyle. Jihadi-Salafis often use the concept to portray relations between Muslim- and non-Muslim states, particularly if these result in alliances against other Muslims, as loyalty to “infidels” who should be disavowed instead.

Considering this interpretation of the concept, it is hard to think of how Hamas can be criticised. After all, the most likely “infidel” state to which Hamas could be accused of expressing loyalty would be Israel, the organisation’s sworn enemy. The author, however, takes an entirely different approach. He claims that Hamas’ frequent attempts to attain national unity mean that it has to co-operate with other Palestinian factions. Although it is left unsaid who those faction are, it is obvious that these include secular as well as Marxist Palestinian parties and organisations. This way, the author accuses Hamas of being loyal to these other, godless Palestinian groups in the name of national unity instead of doing what is best for Islam.

Similarly, Abu ‘Abdallah al-Maqdisi accuses Hamas of being loyal to “apostate” Arab regimes (by allowing them to visit and by having meetings with their leaders), Christians (by congratulating them with their religious holidays) and Shiites (read: Iran and Hizbullah, for co-operating with them and accepting their financial help). All of these forms of loyalty supposedly cause Hamas to deviate from “true” Islam and it is therefore not surprising that the author unambiguously concludes that “there is not the least bit of doubt about the apostasy of the Hamas government”. He specifically accuses “the prime minister, the ministers and the members of parliament” as well as “the different security apparatuses” that are allied to the Hamas government of being apostates as well. Interestingly, however, the author does not call for fighting Hamas since jihad against Israel has a higher priority and “fighting this government will scare people away from the da‘wa (the call to Islam)”.

Un-Palestinian

The latter paragraph might indicate why Jihadi-Salafism is a growing but nevertheless small phenomenon among Palestinians and is likely to remain limited in its influence in the long run: its emphasis on Islam over Palestinian identity, its disdain of national unity in a context where this is sorely needed and its rejection of ties with Iran, Hizbullah and Arab countries when dealing with a group that can hardly afford to lose any of its few friends is not only totally unrealistic and pig-headedly ideological but also rather un-Palestinian. Jihadi-Salafism, being anti-nationalist, proudly raises the banner of Islam over conflicts such as the Palestinian-Israeli one but ignores the strong sense of national identity Palestinians have. This, combined with the fact that these groups are up against a well-established, credible and powerful group like Hamas, means they are unlikely to gain control over the Gaza Strip, let alone the West Bank, any time soon. Unfortunately, that is probably not going to stop them from trying.

Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders have been issuing some very mixed messages of late, and the online jihadi community is in an uproar, with some calling these developments “the beginning of the end of relations” between the two movements.  Beginning with a statement from Mullah Omar in September, the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta-based leadership has been emphasizing the “nationalist” character of their movement, and has sent several communications to Afghanistan’s neighbors expressing an intent to establish positive international relations.  In what are increasingly being viewed by the forums as direct rejoinders to these sentiments, recent messages from al-Qa’ida have pointedly rejected the “national” model of revolutionary Islamism and reiterated calls for jihad against Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan and China.  However interpreted, these conflicting signals raise serious questions about the notion of an al-Qa’ida-Taliban merger.

The trouble began with Mullah Omar’s message for ‘Eid al-Fitr, issued on September 19, in which he calls the Taliban a “robust Islamic and nationalist movement,” which “wants to maintain good and positive relations with all neighbors based on mutual respect.”  Mullah Omar further stated that he wishes to “assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan … will not extend its hand to jeopardize others, as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us.”  A week later, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most influential living Salafi jihadi ideologues, released an angry rebuke to these “dangerous utterances” of the Taliban amir, pointing out that they were of the same order as Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s statement that the Chechen struggle is a Russian “internal matter.” For a person of Maqdisi’s stature to equate the Taliban with Hamas, especially in light of the recent jihadi media onslaught  against Hamas for its “crimes” against the Jund Ansar Allah, is an extremely serious charge.  Maqdisi ends his statement with the hope that he has misunderstood Mullah Omar’s message and that some clarification from the Taliban leadership will be forthcoming; more on this below.

A week after the Maqdisi message was posted, al-Sahab issued Ayman al-Zawahiri’s eulogy for Baitullah Mehsud (on which, see my earlier post). Midway through that speech, Zawahiri turns to the Palestinian issue, arguing that the mujahidin in Palestine should destroy the “laws of Satan” being imposed upon them, among which he singles out the notion that there should be “national unity with the traitors and those who sold out the religion and the homeland.” He goes on to lambast Hizbullah as representing a model of “turning jihad into a national cause,” a model which “must be rejected by the umma, because it is a model which makes jihad subject to the market of political compromises and distracts the umma from the liberation of Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate.”

On October 6, Abu Yahya al-Libi’s al-Sahab video, “East Turkestan: The Forgotten Wound,” was released, which calls for support for the defensive jihad in northwestern China, one of those neighbors with whom Mullah Omar expressed a hope for “good and positive relations.” As in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, al-Libi emphasizes the dangers of dividing the umma into nations and ethnicities. He says that “East Turkestan [Xinjiang, China] is part of the Islamic lands that cannot be divided”; that it is the duty of all Muslims to support the Uighurs in their fight against the Chinese state; and that all who would appease China are “apostates.”  In these messages, then, both al-Libi and Zawahiri are denouncing, in the strongest possible terms, a political strategy being enunciated by the Taliban’s supreme leaders.

A week later, on October 12, Jordanian jihadi writer Ahmad Bawadi posted an exchange of correspondence that he’d recently had with the editors of the Taliban’s al-Sumud magazine. Bawadi, without naming names, points out that Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message had engendered significant controversy, leading some to say that the Taliban supported making the same sort of compromises as Hamas.  The “clarification” sent in response by al-Sumud and posted by Bawadi pretty much dodged the question. Amid some tortuous sophistry about words being like a double-edged sword, the al-Sumud editors defended Mullah Omar’s position by comparing it to the Prophet Muhammad’s divide-and-conquer strategy of distinguishing between different groups of enemies: What’s wrong, as-Sumud asks, with saying we don’t want to fight the Buddhists (read: China) now, since the aim is to divide them from the Christians (read: ISAF/NATO forces) in order to weaken the latter?  Regardless of how one reads the al-Sumud  “clarification,” any doubts that the controversies were causing the Quetta Shura to rethink its public relations strategy were laid to rest the following day, when the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan issued an open letter to the Shanghai Cooperation Conference, reiterating verbatim the “neighborly” sentiments from Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message.  The SCO, it should be pointed out, includes China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all countries that are directly targeted by al-Qa’ida-allied groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

All of this has sparked a great deal of heated argument and anxious hand-wringing on several jihadi forums, but for reasons of space I’ll just single out one thread from the al-Hisbah forum. On October 14, “al-Najjar,” in a post entitled “Mullah Omar and Zawahiri Diametrically Opposed: A plan, a problem, or…?!,” contrasts the neighborly outreach of Mullah Omar’s ‘Eid message with the aforementioned statements about the “laws of Satan” in Zawahiri’s Baitullah eulogy, and ends by asking Zawihiri, “Oh our Shaykh, how is it that these are ‘Satanic laws’ when they are essentially the same as what has been mentioned by Mullah Omar, the Commander of the Faithful, to whom the mujahidin in Afghanistan and Pakistan have pledged their allegiance?”  A later poster, “Abu Azzam 1,” adds that Mullah Omar’s messages imply some level of recognition of the United Nations, an organization which al-Qa’ida has unequivocally labelled as “infidel,” and that these opposing moves seem to him to signal “the beginning of the end of relations between al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.”  Another forum participant, “Abu Salam,” agrees, writing yesterday that “this is a clear indication that al-Qa’ida and the Taliban movement are not of one mind, and that al-Qa’ida may turn on the Taliban in the near future.”  We shall see.  But one thing is clear: the recent shift in the Quetta Shura’s strategic communications is not to al-Qa’ida’s liking, and it is raising serious concerns among the broader Salafi jihadi movement about the religio-political legitimacy of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership.

In the continuing salafi-jihadi media barrage against Hamas, the al-Sumud Media entity released its inaugural edition of the journal “Coveters of Paradise”. The cover is adorned with a photo of the battle-scarred Ibn Taymiya Mosque, which is where Hamas waged a battle against the salafi-jihadi group Jund Ansar Allah in August. The journal mainly consists of reprints of articles written by others.

The Table of contents listed the following articles:

· The Opening Article – by the Believer in God

· The Piercing Pen and the Candid Word – by Abu al-Hasan Ghuraib

· Comments on the Speech of Sheikh Osama bin Laden – by Sheikh Abi Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Masri

· Golden Advice for the Ismail Haniyah Government – by Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi

· Raising the Argument between the Martyred Sheikh Abi al-Nur al-Maqdisi and between Secular Hamas – by Sheikh Abi Ahmad Abd-al-Rahman al-Masri

· The 80 Year Old Ghost: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Condemnation of the Global Jihad – by the journalist Akram Hijazi

· You Kill a Man Who Says My Lord is God? Is there not Among You a Rightly Guided Man? – By Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

· Hamas Kills One Seeking Protection in the House of God – by Doctor Hani al-Sibai

· As If They Wanted to Say, “Sorry Abd al-Naser, We Wronged You”: A Reflection on the Gaza Events – by Walid Yusuf

· Take Refuge in the People’s Lord from the Evil of What Hamas Did – by Muhammad Asad Buyud al-Tamimi

· We Lead with the One God and We Excommunicate with International Legitimacy – by Abd al-Aziz bin Naser al-Jalil

· Do not Grieve, the Islamic United States is at the Gates – by Doctor John Boutros

· Western Education is Forbidden [al-Buku Haram] and the Crime of the Villans: Between Cataracts of Blood and Media Collusion – by The Eagle’s Banner [Rayat al-‘Uqab]

· The Art of Fighting from a Motorcycle

· Smuggling

The journal does not provide any other identifying information except its own transliteration of al-Janna (Paradise) into English, which is “elgana”. Using “g” instead of the “j” indicates either the Egyptian dialect or another Arabic dialect heavily influenced by Egypt such as Gaza. Given the journal’s heavy focus on Hamas and Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, I think it is reasonable to assume that whoever compiled this journal is in Gaza or of Gazan origins.

Salafi-jihadi anti-Hamas rhetoric has existed for some time, but it seems that the amount of it has increased since Hamas killed Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi. It will be interesting to see the effects, if any, this propaganda will have on Hamas, Gazans, international jihadis, and the West. I believe that Hamas will continue to oppose the salafi-jihadis, but if the organization weakens under international sanctions, will it attempt to appease the salafi-jihadis to maintain its Gaza power base? Again, I think it is unlikely, but what if Gazans, frustrated with Hamas, turn to salafi-jihadis and transform these jihadis into more than a marginal movement? Will international salafi-jihadis make a stronger effort to enter Gaza? Will these jihadis have a more receptive audience when they get there? Finally, how will Israel and the West react if its efforts against Hamas do manage to weaken the organization significantly and salafi-jihadis become more powerful?

The “Department of Documents and Research” from the “Jihadi Media Elite,” a jihadi media production entity, has recently announced its “Series for God and then for History” publications. These productions are intended to “document the important events” in the jihadi world “that are considered historical turning points in the Ummah’s path and in the circle of conflict between truth and falsehood.”

The first installment is a book titled, “The Ibn-Taymiyyah Mosque Incident.” It deals with the violent August 2009 clash in Gaza between Hamas and Jund Ansar Allah, a group espousing salafi-jihadi ideology. The book is divided into several sections including jihadi “Statements” and “Hamas Statements” about the attack, “Articles Justifying Hamas’s Crime,” “Articles Regarding the Event,” “Photos,” and “Video.”

The book is a salafi-jihadi attempt to capitalise on the event and ensure the jihadi storyline of events is the dominant version. Including the statements from Hamas and various other pro-Hamas commentators is an effort to make the jihadi version more objective and credible, which would strengthen salafi-jihadi arguments against Hamas.

Due to current time restrictions, I will be reading the book in its entirety once this semester concludes. If I glean any useful information or analyses, I will share them at that time.

The Global Islamic Media Front, in cooperation with the Faloja Forums, has announced, “The Media Incursion of the Imam and Martyr Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.” It has five goals:

1. Expose the truth about Hamas’s “crime” and “lies,” i.e. the recent attack on Jund Ansar Allah (JAA).
2. Expose the truth about Hamas today and how it has “strayed” from its foundational roots.
3. Let Muslims know that the money they give Hamas equates to “bullets in Muslims’ chests.”
4. “Support the monotheistic mujahidin, who fight for the word of God and for the rule of God’s absent law.”
5. “Distribute the legacy of the Imam Shaykh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.”

Thus far, the effort consists of a new forum dedicated to Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi on Faloja. There are not many posts yet, but several appear to be interesting, such as a photo list of JAA members killed in the battle with Hamas. Other posts include: “Two Imams of Truth: The Red Mosque and the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque. What is the difference?”; “Was Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi one of the Khawarij or a Tyrant?”; “Dangerous Speech: Hasan al-Banna – Hamas is not Islamic and it Claimed That”; “A Resounding Scandal: A Voice Recording Confirming the Execution of Wounded Mujahedin by Hamas During their Ride to the Hospital”; and “Hamas’s Crime in Rafah.”

This makes the split between Hamas and the salafi-jihadi movement plainly obvious. As the attack against JAA and last year’s attack on the Army of Islam indicate, Hamas is currently powerful enough to deal with these fringe elements. However, if conditions in Gaza continue to worsen or Hamas’s position becomes more perilous, these groups may gain more momentum and power, complicating any reconciliation with Fatah or Palestinian agreements with Israel.

The “Followers of Monotheism and Jihad” in Palestine released a statement on 31 August 2009 that lambasted Hamas for its narrow interests and the killing of Salafis (Part 1 and Part 2). They claimed that Hamas continues to arrest and harass members of the Salafi movement in Gaza and that “a long beard and Sunni clothes have become an accusation to be arrested for.”

They stated that they carry weapons and train only to “fight the apes and pigs.” They maintained that if Hamas were to implement Sharia law, if only gradually, they would serve Hamas, but Hamas “fights anyone who threatens its position.” They continued, “[Hamas] is forcing us to use our weapons to defend ourselves after [they] severed every method of settling differences.”

Therefore, they announced that on 29 August 2009, they had attacked a Hamas governmental compound, the Security and Protection HQ, and the Internal Security HQ using “sound charges as a message to you [Hamas] to stop your crimes against the sons of monotheism and jihad, and the adherents to Salafism in Gaza.” They stated that they did not intend to spill any pious blood and they disavowed any responsibility of that happening during their attacks.

These types of groups come and go in Gaza and it is unclear if the Followers of Monotheism and Jihad in Palestine are an actual jihadi group backed by a cleric, like Jund Ansar Allah, which was backed by Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, or merely a group of thugs. The fact that their statement was not distributed by an established media production company like the Global Islamic Media Front suggests the latter, but time will tell. However, the document does clearly indicate the stark division between Hamas, which is attempting to assert its authority, and the Salafi-jihadis (or at least poser Salafi-jihadis), who are trying to usurp the “un-Islamic” elements of Hamas.

On 30 August 2009, Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published a new article in al-Hayat where he asserts that an Islamist’s clothes are often political statements and can indicate his precise type of Islamist orientation.

Al-Shishani states that during the 1980s, the Salafi style of “short clothing” (a likely reference to the ankle-high pants Salafis commonly wear) became prominent along with “Afghan clothing,” which is the shalwar kameez and which represented solidarity with the Afghan-Arab Mujahidin. Today, he claims that someone with a beard is often described as one of the “brotherhood.”

He writes that two prominent differences in clothing currently exist. The first is the contention between those who follow Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the “neo-Zarqawis,” who consider themselves as the legacy of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. The second is between Hamas and the jihadi groups in Gaza.

In the al-Maqdisi—neo-Zarqawi split, al-Shishani states that the neo-Zarqawis wear a black skullcap, which some consider a representation of the Salafi-jihadis.  Al-Maqdisi himself said the black skullcap, or any color skullcap for that matter, did not accurately represent someone’s religious tilt. Rather, he claimed, to know someone’s religious affiliations one should look into someone’s heart and actions. However, he did acknowledge that “some simple and novice youth” recognize the black skullcap as a Salafi-jihadi symbol.

As for the Hamas—Salafi-jihadi split, Abd al-Latif Musa, AKA Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, a former preacher for Jund Ansar Allah stated on 15 February 2009 that the Salafi-jihadi wears dark-colored Pakistani clothes with “a military jacket” that is a bit larger than the person so he can “hide his personal weapon or radio under it. He wears a small black hat that resembles the hat Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi … [wore]. Some of them allow their hair to grow to their shoulders covering it was a piece of cloth called a hatteh or a shaleh.”

Al-Shishani provides a practical guide on the type of clothes one could expect a jihadi to wear. However, he warns that in the case of Salafi-jihadis, they will not likely wear their typical jihadi clothes during an operational mission because doing so could garner unwanted attention.

(In case anyone is interested, the article reminded me of this unrelated piece about the Qubaisiyat, a secretive female Islamic group in Syria.)

On 24 August 2009, Falluja Forum member Abu Yahya al-Mu’tasim issued a statement titled “A Jund Ansar Allah Clarification Regarding the Events of Rafah.” He claimed the statement is Jund Ansar Allah’s (JAA) newest, but forum comments to the post expressed doubts over its authenticity, referring to the fact that Hamas arrested JAA’s normal Internet spokesman after the “slaughter.” In the statement, JAA denounced several media allegations against the group and provided some clues to the make-up and outlook of the group.

According to the statement, fifteen of the JAA casualities in the Hamas attack were former members of Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades. These included Ibn Shaqiq Musa Abu Marzuq, a supposed former deputy to Khaled Mash’al, and a former leader in a “manufacturing unit” for the Qassam Brigades. It also alleged that JAA leader Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir “was very close to the Qassam leaders and participated in Qassam combat training.”

The statement claimed that Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi’s announcement of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian Territories was “symbolic.” It maintained that al-Maqdisi was aware of a possible Hamas strike and “wanted to illustrate to Muslims that Hamas actually rejects the idea of the Islamic emirate and fights the idea militarily.” The statement alleged that in al-Maqdisi’s final sermon, he dismissed many of the accusations levelled against the JAA, such as bombing merchants, declaring takfir on Hamas, and having connections to secular powers. The statement clarified that JAA did not join al-Qaida, and that it is not seeking revenge on Hamas. The declaration also denied that Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi preached Khawarij teachings or that he blew himself up during the Hamas raid.

The statement maintained that Hamas is waging a campaign against the Salafi-jihadis. As evidence it cited the Hamas attack on the Army of Islam last year, recent arrests of Jaysh al-Ummah members, and the attack on JAA. It concluded, “We believe that Hamas does not want anyone to fight Jews unless it is under Hamas’s banner. Hamas sees that the Salafis who leave Hamas are the best fighters and most pious.”

This statement, regardless of its veracity, is an excellent example of the rhetorical war between Hamas and the Salafi-jihadis. The Salafi-jihadis depict Hamas as a power hungry entity that is not actually interested in Islam nor fighting Israel, while the Salafi-jihadis are pious and actively engaging Israel militarily. At the same time, they are careful not to insult rank-and-file members of Hamas. Given JAA’s allegation that fifteen of its recently deceased members were former Qassam members, and given Hamas’s need to confront the group militarily, it appears that this tactic is having some effect on Hamas’s members and that the leadership is taking notice.

In several instances, the statement denied that JAA were Khawarij, showing the Salafi-jihadi sensitivity to such names. The remarks denying al-Maqdisi’s suicide death may be an indication that suicide bombings, at least within Gaza, are taboo and another source of sensitivity for Salafi-jihadis. Finally, the statement made clear that JAA was not using takfir, making a distinction between itself and al-Qaida. Forum comments to the JAA statement took issue with this aspect of the statement and demanded further clarification. This would suggest that the Salafi-jihadism that is gaining ground in Gaza is not necessarily identical to that of al-Qaida. Moreover, On another level, it is yet an indication that the brand name al-Qaida is losing some of its appeal in the Muslim world.

The forums are ablaze with postings regarding the 14 August 2009 Hamas attack on the Ibn Taymiya Mosque that Jund Ansar Allah (JAA), a group espousing Salafi-jihadi ideology, controlled.  Hamas assaulted the mosque in response to JAA leader Abd al-Latif Musa, AKA Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, declaring an Islamic emirate in Gaza and general JAA criminal activity. Not surprisingly, commentators are condemning Hamas’s actions and linking these actions to a larger Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian conspiracy to combat Salafi-jihadis.

Akram Hijazi claimed that Hamas has distorted the facts surrounding Salafi-jihadi groups. He maintained that through its violent targeting of Salafi-jihadis like the Army of Islam, whom Hamas also largely destroyed in September 2008, and now the JAA, Hamas is effectively practicing takfir against its fellow Muslims. In regards to the declared Islamic emirate, Hijazi stated that anyone who “read the emirate announcement well” knows that it was very general, for all of Palestine, and did not threaten Hamas’s authority. Hijazi exonerated JAA from any accusations Hamas has made against the group and he declared Hamas as the real criminal group in Gaza.

Hijazi also railed against Hamas in a second article stating that the Salafi-jihadis are not against pious Hamas members, but rather they are against Hamas hypocrites and liars. He used Ahmad Yassin and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, both former Hamas leaders who Israel assassinated in 2004, as examples of good Hamas members. He went on to claim that the Salafi-jihadis were the first to attack former Fatah chief in Gaza Muhammad Dahlan, the Oslo Accords, and Mahmud Abbas.

These assertions are important because Hamas members consider Yassin and al-Rantisi good leaders, but now Hijazi is linking these leaders with the Salafi-jihadi movement, of which Yassin and al-Rantisi were not a part. In short, Hijazi is attempting to hijack the legacy of these leaders from Hamas to the Salafi-jihadi cause, giving latter more credibility. His comments about Dahlan, Oslo, and Abbas reiterate this point because Hamas is famous for its opposition to these Fatah symbols, not the Salafi-jihadis who played a minor, if any, role in opposing Fatah and its goals.

Hijazi was not the only commentator who attempted to lure rank-and-file Hamas members towards Salafi-jihadism. Hani Siba’i, a radical preacher in the UK, claimed the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have strayed from the right path and true Islam. He encouraged ordinary Hamas members to turn against the group by adjusting its slogan of “death in the path of God” to “death in the path of the man-made parliament.”

It is not surprising that jihadi commentators are condemning Hamas for its attack against the JAA. However, their attempts to exploit this event to their advantage by luring Hamas members away from the movement are interesting. To do this, propagandists are linking Hamas symbolism and achievements to Salafi-jihadism and reaching out to rank-and-file members. As long as Hamas remains in control of Gaza, this attempt will not likely achieve many results. However, if Hamas starts to lose control, either physically or ideologically, Salafi-jihadis may see a boon in recruitment, which will mean more violence in Gaza and against Israel.  

It’s late, I know, but I couldn’t let Mustafa Abu al-Yazid’s interview with al-Jazeera go uncommented. I found it absolutely fascinating. My hat is off to Ahmad Zaydan for finding Mustafa and asking him excellent questions.

International media focused on the A-bomb remark, but this was neither a very significant or surprising part of the interview (here I agree with Dan Drezner). It was just a quick unrehearsed side comment in an answer to a question about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

The most significant part of the interview was Abu al-Yazid’s endorsement of Hamas. “We support the sincere mujahidin in Palestine, even the mujahidin of Hamas. We support them and help them; they are our brothers; we and they have the same ideology and the same method,” Abu al-Yazid said. This is quite a different message from that of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who have been relentless in their criticism of Hamas in the past few years.

Not surprisingly, this caused quite a debate on the forums (see also here and here), where Hamas has long been subject of criticism (see e.g. here, here and here).

Abu al-Yazid’s statement was clearly an attempt by al-Qaida to mend fences with the broader Islamist movement and reach out to a wider audience. His choice of podium was surely no coincidence, for he is well aware that most al-Jazeera viewers are sympathetic to Hamas.

It has been a while since I heard a top al-Qaida member speak as clearly and straightforwardly as Abu al-Yazid did here.  He gave simple and seemingly honest answers to questions about al-Qaida’s organizational structure in Afghanistan, attacks called off against the US, the issue of two Islamic emirates (Iraq and Afghanistan), and many other things. Rob at the Shack is also right that overall, Abu al-Yazid’s remarks were not outlandishly radical when seen from the Arab street (the nuclear remark apart, obviously).

With the Abu al-Yazid interview, al-Qaida undoubtedly regained some of the popular support lost over the past few years. It is a reminder of how good al-Qaida can be at PR when they want to.

Watch the whole thing, look at the extracts or read it – I guarantee you will not be disappointed.