Entries Tagged 'Hezbollah' ↓

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:

• It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4
• Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5
• Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic Islamic state, which fills a void left by the absent caliphate. p.12-14
• Inwardly, Shia sincerely believe in Islam, but it is an Islam of their own making, not true Islam; they believe they are the only true Muslims; and they are seeking to dominate the Islamic world. p.15-16
• “The hostility between the Rejectionists [the Shia], America, and Israel is real hostility.” p.19
• Those who believe there is no real hostility between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other have bought into conspiracy theories, which are a regrettable flaw in our culture. p.19
• The hostility of Iran toward the U.S. and Israel is partly religious, in that Shi`ism retains the religious hostility toward Christians and Jews found in the true religion, Sunnism. It is also due to Iran’s desire for power. p.19
• Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its self-interest–the U.S. eliminated two of its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. This is a good example of the opportunistic and circumstantial nature of Shia politics. p.21
• The Shia make these kind of decisions because their greatest enemy is the Sunnis. They can live with Jews and Christians, but not Sunnis. Look how Iran treats its Sunni minorities, how Hezbollah behaves toward Sunnis, and how the Shia government in Iraq has dealt with Sunni Iraqis. p.21, 24
• Contrary to what many Jihadis say, Hezbollah is not Israel’s collaborator. But Hezbollah will talk to Israel and work with it on a limited basis if it suits Hezbollah’s interests. p.22-3
• The Shia are pragmatic. They are willing to work with anyone regardless of their stated beliefs. This includes working with Wahhabis. p.23
• Hezbollah supports Palestinian militants to achieve the wider aims of Iran. It has adopted a popular cause to increase its popularity. It is also filling a leadership vacuum left by other Arab states who have failed to step up. p.32-3
• Hezbollah is a tool of both Iran and Syria. It serves their interests and policies. p.36
• Hezbollah prevents any Sunni resistance from setting up on the Lebanese border with Israel. It has cut deals with Syria, the U.S., and even Israel to retain its control of the area. p.36

Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.

abu-abd-al-rahman-atiyyat-allah-ruya-kashifa رؤية كاشفة

Just in time for Craig Whitlock’s helpful survey of Jihadi internet propaganda, Ekhlaas member Usud al-Tawhid (Lions of Monotheism) has posted a message about the Islamic State of Iraq’s method of media distribution. The message is by an Abu al-Zarqa’ al-`Iraqi, who claims to be a member of the ISI.

AZ warns forum members not to post media material from Iraq outside of official channels online. He relates that he once made this mistake when he published clips of an attack carried out by a certain “Dr. Fathi” (probably alluding to this). AZ’s action angered people in the ISI’s Media Ministry and resulted in AZ and another brother being hauled before a Sharia tribunal.

A brother informed AZ that Furqan is the only entity that can publish media material for the ISI. By this, AZ says, the brother meant that members of the ISI’s Media Ministry in al-Furqan were the only people allowed to upload material to the internet and send it to al-Fajr Media Center for distribution.

AZ explains to the brothers that there are several good reasons why the members of Furqan only want to publish media material through official channels:

1. They do not want to cause hardship for their videographers and those who expose themselves to danger. (Presumably, he means that publishing material through unofficial channels increases the security risks.)
2. They do not want to make things hard for people in the Media Ministry or Furqan.
3. When material is published unofficially, the infidels think that their efforts are succeeding and that the information specialists are not able to publish material on the Internet because of security constraints. This, AZ says, is a very important point. Publishing through official channels demoralizes the infidels because it demonstrates that their plan isn’t working and that mujahids are still able to communicate.
4. (Basically the same as point #3).
5. The videographers capture an operation and give it to the brothers who clip the important material. Then the material goes to brothers who produce a product. Then the product goes to the Media Ministry and through it to the Fajr Center to determine the right time for publication.

After going through the benefits of posting ISI material through official channels, AZ attaches a letter that explains how to post ISI material when you don’t know how to contact the ISI: Compress the material, password protect it with with a number, and save it to one of the online file sharing sites. Then contact the administrators of Ekhlaas, Boraq, Hesbah, or Firdaws and give them the link. The administrators will send the material to Fajr, and Fajr will determine the right time to publish it.

Download (Arabic): 6-24-08-ekhlaas-isi-media-distribution

Shakir al-`Absi, the fugitive leader of Fatah al-Islam, has issued his second audio statement since the defeat of his organization at the hands of the Lebanese Army last year. In it, he claims that the U.S. knows that it cannot directly break the “power” (shawka–a favorite Jihadi term) of the Sunnis in the Middle East, so it is using proxies to achieve the same result. This is particularly the case in Lebanon. Firstly, the U.S. is working through Sunni proxies to take control of the state’s material and media resources. Secondly, it is deliberately empowering Iran and its rejectionist allies in the region. (”Rejectionists” is a pejorative term used for Twelver Shia, who reject the first three caliphs).

`Absi goes on to say that the Sunnis of Lebanon have no one to fight for them. Hezbollah is not serious about fighting Jews; they just want control of Lebanon. And the Lebanese Army abandoned the Sunnis when Hezbollah militiamen swept into their neighborhoods in May. This, despite the fact that these same Sunnis had supported the army’s crackdown on Fatah al-Islam last year.

Toward the end of his audio statement, `Absi addresses the “heroes of Islam” in northern and southern Lebanon and the “lions of Islam” in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon:

The time of separation has come. Now you will find the lions of monotheism suddenly attacking the enemies of God, no matter who they are–Jew, Christian, hateful rejectionist [Shia], or apostate.

He also menacingly warns: “The car bombs of Iraq and the brigades of martyrdom seekers are not far from the enemies of God, wherever they are.”

Bin Laden’s statement on May 18th has prompted several Jihadi pundits to speculate on AQ’s future strategy in the Palestinian territories. Over the next few days, I’ll post the most interesting speculation. For part one, we’ll look at a short post by Ekhlaas member Khalid al-`Asqalani.

According to `Asqalani, Bin Laden has presented a complete program of action for the coming stage of the Jihadi movement, which is the liberation of Palestine.

1) Bin Laden explained that oppressive international order is in an alliance with Israel and its resources are at its disposal.

2) The apostate Arab regimes are the guardians of Israel’s security, so overthrowing these regimes will make liberating Palestine much easier.

3) The pressure of the repressive regimes causes the Islamic groups to abandon jihad on the justification that it harms the da`wa (spread of Islam).

4) Hezbollah is misleading the youth because it has duped them into thinking it is the only resistance to Israel and that any other resistance in southern Lebanon must give obeisance; it plays political games at the expense of the Muslim community; and it gives its allegiance to the Guardianship of the Jurist (i.e. the Iranian government).

5) Fighting and jihad are a “strategic choice” for the Muslim community to replace the strategic choice of the defeatist Arabs who submit to peace and recognize Israel.

6) A group of people must penetrate the borders of Palestine in order to resist the Israeli blockade.

This is not quite the program of action that we were promised, but `Asqalani does pick up on Bin Laden’s call for jihad against the countries surronding Israel as a prelude to action in the Palestinian territories.

More interesting than `Asqalani’s summary of Bin Laden’s message is his take on why the time is ripe for the Jihadis to liberate Palestine:

1) They have a mature mujahid leadership that is well aware of the situation on the ground and can make military plans accordingly.

2) A global community of Jihadis can be mobilized to fight in Palestine regardless of their nationality.

3) The Jihadis have established a central base with the Islamic State of Iraq that can supply every mujahid with weapons, money, and training and function as a gathering point.

4) The Jihadis know what they want, they understand their enemy, and they have pushed the religious scholars to mobilize the Muslim community to fight.

5) Palestinians now know that their conflict is not a national conflict but a religious conflict.

`Asqalani is not alone in feeling that al-Qaeda is getting ready for operations against Israel in the Paletinian territories, even though Zawahiri tried to downplay expectations in his recent Q&A. In the following days, we will be looking at other Jihadi pundits who are responding in a similar manner. Bin Laden may only be throwing a bone to the Jihadis online and to those living in countries surrounding around Israel, but this sort of talk (increasingly frequent) also creates expectations, which in turn creates pressure for the al-Qaeda High Command to do more than talk.

Document (Arabic): 5-19-08-ekhlaas-khalid-asqalani-response-to-bin-laden-statement-on-palestine

Ekhlaas member al-Sarim al-Shami (”the Stern Shami”) asks: Why aren’t the armed Salafi groups entering the fight in Lebanon? He is particularly critical of their religious leaders, who are sitting on their hands. Sarim acknowledges, as I wrote a few days ago, that some Ekhlaas members endorse this tactical neutrality in order to prepare for a larger battle against the state. But he retorts that there is no better time than now to begin “the holy war” (al-harb al-muqadassa) against the infidel foreign powers that are trying to shape the destiny of Lebanon. These powers know that conflict in Lebanon will only benefit “the sons of al-Qaeda,” so they are pushing their proxies to negotiate. They realize that if there is not a peaceful settlement, Lebanon “will become a second Iraq and (turn into) the Islamic State of Lebanon.”

Another Ekhlaas member, abu_3ubayda, disagrees. Armed Salafi groups should not enter the fray because it is merely a political dispute between al-Mustaqbal, Hezbollah, and Amal. It is not a battle to raise the banner of Islam. Moreover, the war is not caused by Sunnism or Shi’ism; if that were the case, then the situation would be different and there would be no way for the warring factions to reconcile because pious people on both sides would not agree to it.

Another member, Abu Suhayb al-Shami, agrees with Sarim for the most part, but does not think it is appropriate to criticize the Salafi religious scholars for not acting. No matter the near-term resolution to the crisis, he argues, Sunnis are now more receptive to al-Qaeda in Lebanon because of what happened (i.e. they will want AQ to defend them against Hezbollah).

Document (Arabic): 5-15-08-jihadis-debate-should-sunnis-fight-in-lebanon

The May issue of the Jannat (”Paradise”) Journal has been released.  The monthly journal is a collection of short news stories on the global jihad and excerpts from online Jihadi discussion forums.  If you haven’t been following the latest goings on in the jihadosphere, this is a good place to look to get caught up.

Although Jannat covers most of the open conflict zones in each issue, it focuses heavily on the Palestinian territories, which means that’s where its producers likely live (Gaza would be a good bet).  Since it is critical of Hamas and hateful toward Hezbollah, it’s also safe to assume that its producers are Jihadi-Salafis of some sort.  Jihadis are trying to gain greater visibility in Gaza, but it has been tough given Hamas’s monopoly on Sunni Islamist violence there.

The headline story in this issue is the Shia march from Iran to Iraq to Syria to Lebanon to the Gulf and finally to Yemen (which seems pretty circuitous).  The headline screams that Hezbollah is appropriating Sunni Beirut and that the extermination of Fatah al-Islam (a Lebanese Jihadi group which rebelled against the government last summer) has paved the way for Hezbollah’s control of Lebanon.

The Jihadi forums are buzzing today about the impending civil war in Lebanon, which they ominously refer to as being “in the mouth of the dragon.” There were two items of particular interest. One was advice from a Jihadi name al-Jawahir to militants in Lebanon:

5-8-08-advice-to-mujahids-in-lebanon2

He counsels his brothers to operate in secret, shun reporters, gather armor-piercing weaponry, and refuse to help either the Lebanese Army or Hezbollah. The bit about shunning reporters does not seem consistent with Zawahiri’s type of revolutionary vanguardism, which is very dependent on the media.

The second item is a short post recommending that the mujahids in Lebanon read Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery (you can find my translation of it here). Naji is probably dead (I’ll save that for another post), but this is the second time his ideas have been trotted out before a Muslim civil war; Iraq was the first. His main idea is that Jihadis should move into security vacuums and establish rudimentary governments that provide basic services to the people, which will win them the support of the locals. They can then network and coordinate with one another for common objectives, even if the areas they control (which he calls “regions of savagery”) are not contiguous.  These areas need not be large; they can be as small as city blocks. Combined with the advice above, this seems a plausible scenario for some Jihadi groups in Lebanon if the country descends into a full civil war.

5-9-08-ekhlaas-recommendation-of-najis-management-of-savagery