Entries Tagged 'Iran' ↓

Not surprisingly, the recent bombing in Iran has received a lot of attention in the media and the security blogosphere (for good commentaries, see here, here, and here). But with a few exceptions, everyone has missed the new FFI Report by Audun Wiig. It is the best profile of Jundullah you will find in open sources, so go ahead and read it.

On 25 August 2009, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a plea by Dr. John Boutros for Muslims to aid the jihadi cause. He stated, “Do not mourn because the Islamic Caliphate is imminent… Trust me, the US is one or two thrusts” away from crumpling. However, in order to make this happen Muslims must give aid to the jihadis.

Boutros claimed that the United States is weak due to the financial crisis, which is allegedly causing the rich states to consider separating from the Union. He stated that militarily the United States is vulnerable because it has so many soldiers in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in the suburbs of Baghdad, who are easy targets. In regards to the United States homeland he continued, “Hundreds of thousand of soldiers stationed in the streets of Washington and Los Angeles wait for a martyr to cross the continents carrying a nuclear, biological, or chemical bomb.”

He alleged that from al-Qaida’s viewpoint, things are much better. Somalia is becoming more peaceful and prosperous because the Shabab al-Mujahidin are instilling sharia law and in Afghanistan the Taliban control 80% of the country while coalition forces only leave their bases in armored vehicles in the other 20%. However, the Islamic State of Iraq has made many sacrifices, as has Ansar al-Islam, who gave up their bombs, snipers, and bases.

He then stated that given the current state of affairs, if the United States fell, “In a short period, the Taliban Emirate will be a great state encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Turkistan, and a large part of Iran.” In the western area of the Islamic world, the Shabab al-Mujahidin will control all of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan after the US fall. Then, he maintained, there will be justice in the Afghanistan and Somali Emirates and in other areas like Iraq, Chechnya, Algeria, and Nigeria where things will either turn around for the already established emirates or the mujahidin will prevail.

He then gets to the point of his fairytale, “After your mujahid brothers sacrifice themselves and their funds on this path, will you be stingy in support and assistance? Will you be stingy in spreading the word? Will you be stingy in financial support after many operations are canceled because of a shortage of materials like what happened during operations within Denmark?”

The fanciful nature of this report is striking even for the GIMF and I am not sure what to make of it. Is this an indication that something structurally has changed within the GIMF? Or, is it simply an attempt to garner support and the editorial staff did not realize how unrealistic it sounds? Regardless of its meaning, if this is the grand strategy of budding al-Qaida strategists, I am not worried.

How will the Iran debacle affect al-Qaida? This was the question raised yesterday in a short strategic study titled “The Iran Crisis and Its Effects on the Global Jihad by Abu al-Fadl Madi (أبو الفضل ماضي), a Falluja forum member with so-called “great writer” status. He briefly outlined the situation in Iran claiming that the protests mark the end of the second period in Iran’s modern history, with the first ending in 1989. He called the new period the “Termination of the Rule of the Jurisprudent Theory.” He argued that the crisis could alter regional “balances, priorities, and strategies” and the “Global Jihadi Current” cannot ignore these events.

He described four possible outcomes of the Iranian protests. The first was the possibility of the regime defeating the opposition by force. He argued that this would increase Ahmadinejad’s power, giving him more leeway to negotiate with the West, but due to the protest he will fail in obtaining Western recognition of Iran as a regional and nuclear power. Abu al-Fadl believed that the West could try to help the opposition by striking Iran, which would create a 2003 Iraq-like scenario. He stated, “This is the best scenario possible for the jihadi movement” because they could benefit from the chaos and security void.

The second possibility was the opposition bringing down the current Iranian regime, which would lead to a new period of improved relations with the West. He argued that there would be better cooperation between the West and Iran on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and nuclear issues. That is in addition to more cooperation with President Obama vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Finally, he fretted about the greater pressure al-Qaeda would face in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This is ostensibly the worst-case scenario for the jihadi movement.

The third option is the possibility of a stalemate between the two sides. He believed that in such a situation, not much would change for the “global jihad” and Iran would continue to support its current foreign proxies. This is also not an ideal situation for al-Qaeda espousing terrorists.

Finally, the fourth option he mentioned is the possibility of a settlement between the two sides. In this scenario, he believed that Khamenei would weaken considerably and Rafsanjani would emerge as the “Godfather of the Regime.” He estimated that Iran’s foreign policy would be more restrained and pragmatic in this scenario. Like options two and three, this option is unlikely to make the jihadi movement happy.
If, as Abu al-Fadl suggests, the geopolitical nature in the Middle East changes because of the Iran crisis, the question will become how will the jihadi movement react to the possibility of a weakened Hezbollah, Syria, or Hamas?  If the United States or Israel attacks Iran to help the protesters, handing al-Qaeda “the best scenario possible,” will the jihadi movement be strong enough to exploit that opportunity?  As events continue to develop on the ground in Iran, it will be interesting to watch the jihadis’ response.

In part 8, Sayyid Imam continues to hammer al-Qaeda for bringing disaster to the Middle East and for the hypocrisy of its leaders.  He

• puts forward the odd claim that AQ lied to the U.S. about WMD in Iraq and about AQ ties with Iraq to push the U.S. to invade
• observes that Iran and Syria have been the primary beneficiaries of AQ’s antics in Iraq
• notes what any observer of the region already knows but rarely says: bashing the U.S. and Israel and talking about the Palestinian issue is great PR
• offers an excellent explanation as to why AQ will not get a foothold in the Palestinian territories
• claims that Bin Laden gave Saudi donations for jihad to Nawaz Sharif in support of his candidacy against Benazir Bhutto

Continuing…

Z claims that only the mujahids have thrawted the plans of the U.S.  That’s like Gamal Abdel Nasser’s slogan after the ‘67 defeat that “no voice rises above the voice of battle” in order to silence his critics.

AQ brought the U.S. into the region and caused it to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan.  It gave the U.S. false information about WMD in Iraq and tying Iraq to al-Qaeda to give the U.S. the excuse to invade Iraq.  They did this to lure the U.S. into a battlefield where it could be destroyed.  But AQ killed far more Iraqis than it killed Americans.  It brought the U.S. in and excommunicated the people of Iraq solely to fulfill its desire to fight America.

Z claims that AQ thwarted the plans of the U.S. but the truth is the opposite.  Wherever AQ goes, it brings destruction to Muslims.

Those who have benefitted from the killing in Iraq are first Iran, then Syria.  Is Syria facilitating those who seek to fight in Iraq out its love for jihad, for the Iraqis, or for its own self interest?  Aren’t some of the leaders of AQ who are encouraging others to fight in Iraq located in Iran, particularly the son of UBL?  Is fighting for the interests of Syria and Iran a jihad?  Hasn’t Z previously paid his brothers to fight in Egypt in service of Sudanese intel?  Isn’t killing the Iraqis and demolishing their homes exactly what Jews are doing to Palestinians?  Is this jihad or even thwarting the plans of America?  Wasn’t Iraq part of the Abode of Islam under Saddam before the American occupation?  Didn’t al-Qaeda, at the hands of Zarqawi, trigger a sectarian civil war in Iraq by killing the Shia en masse?  Haven’t the Sunnis paid the ultimate price for this?  Killing the Iraqi Shia only strengthened their ties to Iran and facilitated Iranian involvement in Iraq, whereas it did nothing but weaken the Sunni position in Iraq.

Does the mentality that lost an actual Islamic state in Afghanistan really believe that an Islamic state will be established in Iraq and not just on the Internet?  Are the Islamic peoples to be test animals for Bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s experiment?

No one is more pleased with al-Qaeda today than Iran and Syria.  All they have to do is turn a blind eye to the fighters who travel through their countries to blow themselves up, which serves Iranian and Syrian interests.

One of Z’s ignorant beliefs is that he proves the truth of what he says by pointing to the number of his followers.

Z says I heaped abuse on Bin Laden, but then he asks which of us has better understood reality and affected more of Muslim youth and masses? (Exoneration, p. 10)

The truth is known by its agreement with the Sharia, not by the number of its followers.

I have not called on anyone to follow me.  I am only relaying what I think is right according to the Sharia. 

Aren’t those who extol Bin Laden the same people that previously extolled Saddam Hussein?

Z’s words [ie the truth of what you say is proven by the number of your followers] indicate a fundamental aspect of his character: he has always been looking for fame and he is willing to get it by killing the innocent.

* One of the deceptions of Z is his trading on the Palestinian question

It is well-known that the fastest way to gain popularity among the Arab and Muslim masses is to bash the United States and Israel and talk a great deal about the Palestinian issue.  Nasser did it, Saddam did it, Ahmadinejad does it, as do others.  However, these people have actually done something for Palestinians, particularly Nasser, whereas Bin Laden and Z just talk.  Z even says in his Exoneration that “the slogan which the masses of the Muslim umma have understood and responded to well for 50 years is the slogan of calling for jihad against Israel.  Moreover, in this decade the umma is mobilized by the American presence in the heart of the Islamic world.” [I think this quote is from Knights but haven't checked it yet]

Z and Bin Laden talk about Palestinian children being hurt but not about the death they bring to the children of Afghanistan.

* Why doesn’t al-Qaeda undertake operations in Palestine?

If Al-Qaeda is so interested in the Palestinian question, why hasn’t it undertaken operations against the Jews there?  There are two reasons.  First, killing Jews is not one of Bin Laden’s priorities.  Second, al-Qaeda is an organization without a state; wherever it is, it is a stranger.  One can’t carry out operations in a country without the help of some of the people in that country. 

Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with any of the Palestinian organizations for four reasons:

1) Palestinian organizations don’t trust Bin Laden.  There’s no room to explain here, but it is an old matter from the days of the Afghan jihad.

2) Al-Qaeda has nothing to offer Palestinian groups militarily since the latter are far more advanced.  Indeed, Al-Qaeda relied on the cadres of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad trained by the Palestinian groups in Lebanon from 1990 to 1992.

3) Different tactics with respect to the use of force.  Bin Laden uses blind force to kill as many people as possible, even if it leads to the destruction of his organization–“organizational suicide.”  Palestinian organizations, on the other hand, use limited force to make gains against the enemy while ensuring the survival of their organization.  They follow the traditional principles of guerrilla war, the “war of the flea and the dog.”  Bin Laden’s new way is the war of the elephant, which makes mass killing the goal.

4) Palestinian organizations don’t need Bin Laden’s money since they have their own resources, just as they are more politically sophisticated than Bin Laden.

This is why Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with Palestinian groups and failed to gain a foothold in Palestine.  That’s why Z in his recent statement called for the Bedouin of Sinai to engage in jihad in Palestine.  It’s just propaganda.

When the Palestinian organizations rebuffed al-Qaeda, Z started criticizing them. Z accused Hamas of killing Jewish children with their missiles.  Is this a rational person?  What about the innocents al-Qaeda has killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, and elsewhere?  Is what is permitted for Al-Qaeda forbidden for Hamas?  Z is sad for Jewish children but kills Muslim children.

Z accuses Hamas of participating in elections on the basis of a secular constitution.  Why does Z criticize Hamas only?  Why not also criticize his shaykh Bin Laden?  Bin Laden paid a lot of money in support of Nawaz Sharif in parliamentary elections in Pakistan against Benazir Bhutto.  This was money for jihad that Saudis had give Bin Laden.  When I found out about this in 1992, I said to Abu Hafs al-Masri, who was the one who gave the money to Nawaz Sharif, “Abu Hafs! By God, Bin Laden is leading you to Hell!”

Document (Arabic): 11-27-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-8

A member of the Faloja Forum, Abu Muhammad al-Rafhawi, has posted pictures of anti-Shia graffiti from Gaza that he claims was written by youth in the Qassam Brigades and the internal security forces.  I don’t know if this sort of graffiti is typical or if it reflects rising hostility toward Hezbollah and Iran among younger Hamas members, but it’s interesting nonetheless.

Document (Arabic): 10-24-08-faloja-anti-shia-graffiti-in-gaza

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:

• It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4
• Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5
• Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic Islamic state, which fills a void left by the absent caliphate. p.12-14
• Inwardly, Shia sincerely believe in Islam, but it is an Islam of their own making, not true Islam; they believe they are the only true Muslims; and they are seeking to dominate the Islamic world. p.15-16
• “The hostility between the Rejectionists [the Shia], America, and Israel is real hostility.” p.19
• Those who believe there is no real hostility between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other have bought into conspiracy theories, which are a regrettable flaw in our culture. p.19
• The hostility of Iran toward the U.S. and Israel is partly religious, in that Shi`ism retains the religious hostility toward Christians and Jews found in the true religion, Sunnism. It is also due to Iran’s desire for power. p.19
• Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its self-interest–the U.S. eliminated two of its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. This is a good example of the opportunistic and circumstantial nature of Shia politics. p.21
• The Shia make these kind of decisions because their greatest enemy is the Sunnis. They can live with Jews and Christians, but not Sunnis. Look how Iran treats its Sunni minorities, how Hezbollah behaves toward Sunnis, and how the Shia government in Iraq has dealt with Sunni Iraqis. p.21, 24
• Contrary to what many Jihadis say, Hezbollah is not Israel’s collaborator. But Hezbollah will talk to Israel and work with it on a limited basis if it suits Hezbollah’s interests. p.22-3
• The Shia are pragmatic. They are willing to work with anyone regardless of their stated beliefs. This includes working with Wahhabis. p.23
• Hezbollah supports Palestinian militants to achieve the wider aims of Iran. It has adopted a popular cause to increase its popularity. It is also filling a leadership vacuum left by other Arab states who have failed to step up. p.32-3
• Hezbollah is a tool of both Iran and Syria. It serves their interests and policies. p.36
• Hezbollah prevents any Sunni resistance from setting up on the Lebanese border with Israel. It has cut deals with Syria, the U.S., and even Israel to retain its control of the area. p.36

Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.

abu-abd-al-rahman-atiyyat-allah-ruya-kashifa رؤية كاشفة

Earlier this week, I noted that members of the Hesbah forum are increasingly pessimistic about Iraq. And in May I wrote about the death of Sulayman al-`Utaybi, an al-Qaeda leader in Iraq who had left for Afghanistan after his dismissal from his post. Here’s what I wrote at the time:

That he headed straight for Afghanistan makes me wonder if this is a sign of things to come as AQ gets squeezed out of Iraq.

Now the Washington Post gives us further evidence that Iraq is a sinking ship for al-Qaeda and Afghanistan is the lifeboat, at least for the senior leadership. Amit Paley has written a well-sourced article on the departure of Abu Ayyub al-Masri (aka Abu Hamza al-Muhajer), the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, for Afghanistan. Here’s what we learn from the article (sources in parentheses):

Foreign fighters

• AQ is diverting new recruits to Afghanistan and Iraq. (U.S. officials)
• The number of foreign fighters going to Iraq a year ago was 110/mo. Earlier this year it was 50/mo. Now it is 20/mo. (senior U.S. intel analyst)
• The flow of most of AQI’s foreign fighters, money, and weapons is controlled by Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih (aka Abu Ghadiya), a Mosul native who is based in Syria. (U.S. intel officials)

AQI Leadership

• Masri designated Abu Khalil al-Souri to run AQI when he left for Afghanistan. Souri came to Iraq in 2003. (Ansari, AQI leader in Fallujah)
• Souri is one of 33 fighters, known as “the first line,” who came with Zarqawi in 2003. (Milehmi, senior AQI leader north of Fallujah)
• Souri’s name is attached to a July 10 AQI communique, a document usually signed by Masri.
• Masri has gone to Afghanistan twice before to meet with Jihadis and come back. (Milehmi, senior AQI leader north of Fallujah)
• Masri went to Afghanistan to review situation of AQI with Bin Laden. (Qaisi, commander of AQI recruitment unit)

Route to Afghanistan

• Masri went to Afghanistan through Iran (Ansari, AQI leader in Fallujah)
• Masri and two others went into Iran on June 12 through border town of Zorbatia (Col. Abdullah, Iraqi intel official in Ramadi)
• Masri went through Iran with 15 leaders (captured AQI member Abu Abeer al-Muhajer via an Iraqi police officer)

AQ Splinter Group

• Abu Taha al-Lihebi is leader of an AQI group in eastern Anbar. He and his group split from AQI because Masri condoned attacks on the Awakening movement and on civilians, which lost the group support. (Abu Taha al-Lihebi)
• Lihebi’s group disavows suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI. (Abu Taha al-Lihebi)

It’s not surprising that Iran is a transit point to Afghanistan (see my previous posts on the Harbi group from Kuwait) or that Masri is consulting with al-Qaeda Central (another nail in the “leaderless jihad” coffin).  It’s also not surprising that AQI is losing support because its senior leadership decided to shit where it slept.

I am surprised that most of AQI’s material and human resources are so tightly coordinated by an AQ operative in Syria.  The Sinjar data suggests that the flow is more decentralized.

What also stands out to me is that the AQI splinter group renounced suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI, an interesting turn for those who see the adoption of suicide bombings as either a natural result of being a devout Muslim or the result of militant groups competing to outdo each other.  In this case, competition is a factor, but it’s going the opposite direction.

Today we continue our look at a Kuwaiti cell and how its members transitioned from forum fighters to foreign fighters.

When we left off, Badr al-Harbi and Bawasil had returned to Kuwait from the front in Afghanistan via Iran, entrusted with a special mission by Abu al-Layth al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda leader. They were delayed in carrying out their task by Iranian, and then Kuwaiti, security forces. The latter, according to al-Furqan al-Junubi’s account, had tortured them and confiscated their passports.

After being released, Harbi and Bawasil stayed in Kuwait a full year to complete their special mission: gathering money, clothes, and food for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. In this, they relied on their network of friends, many of whom were already committed to the cause. Yet Harbi and Bawasil’s efforts aroused the suspicions of other Jihadis, who wrote the brothers in Afghanistan and told them that they were spies. They even made films that portrayed Harbi and Bawasil in a negative light.

Upon completing their task, Harbi and Bawasil wanted to return to the front in Afghanistan, but their passports had been confiscated. Nevertheless, they were both able to get new passports. Harbi and Bawasil then went with their families to Mecca and returned without incident.

After returning to Kuwait, Harbi and Bawasil asked the Jihadis in Afghanistan about the route to the front. The Jihadis told them that it was “broken,” but this, al-Furqan al-Junubi comments, was only because they had believed the bad rumors that had been spread about Harbi and Bawasil.

Harbi suggested the two travel to Iraq instead, but he was hesitant to go because he was not sure he would be guaranteed a martyrdom operation. Harbi and Bawasil soon met a coordinator and obtained a guarantee of safe passage from him, but they did not end up using him.

At this time, Harbi decided he wanted to marry for the second time, but wasn’t sure it was right to do so as a mujahid. Bawasil assured him it was, and so he did.

One month after Harbi’s marriage, a message came from Abu al-Layth al-Libi vouching for the integrity of Harbi and Bawasil. This meant the two could now travel to Afghanistan. But personal circumstances prevented Harbi from traveling to Afghanistan with Bawasil, who was anxious to leave because the government was pursuing him.

Bawasil first went to the United Arab Emirates with one of his close cousins (on his mother’s side). The Jihadis (it is unclear if they were in the Emirates or Afghanistan) told Bawasil that they only wanted him and not his cousin, so the latter returned to Kuwait.

Bawasil had to wait four days in the airport because of snow in Iran (indicating that Iran again served as his transit point for Afghanistan). Bawasil succeeded in finding the brothers (presumably in Iran) and soon found a coordinator, but they had stopped using the old route.

Harbi waited four months to find new way to Afghanistan, but failed. It was around this time that Harbi met a Jihadi from Algeria who told him how to go to Iraq.

(To be continued….)

Some thoughts:

• Al-Qaeda Leadership - Abu al-Layth al-Libi personally requested Harbi and Bawasil to gather funds and supplies for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. He also personally intervened in the rumor campaign against them.
• Support Networks - The way Harbi and Bawasil went about accomplishing their task for Libi is instructive. Like Tupperware salespeople, they relied on their personal network of friends rather than reach out to anonymous donors. But this did not protect them from allegations of spying, a consequence of their mission’s secrecy. (This is a constant problem for clandestine terrorist groups–see Jake Shapiro’s work in this regard.) On another subject, Bawasil tried to bring his close cousin to Afghanistan, reinforcing the idea that friends and family of dedicated militants are more likely than others to be involved in the Jihadi Movement.
• Security Lapse - The Kuwaiti government was monitoring the two militants, as indicated by Bawasil’s eagerness to escape their scrutiny. So how in the world did they regain their passports?
• Transit - As in part 2, Iran is mentioned as a transit point to Afghanistan. But this time we have the added transit point of the UAE. Moreover, travel coordinators are twice mentioned, once with regard to Afghanistan, the other with regard to Iraq.
• Family Life - Even though Harbi knows he will die as a martyrdom operative, he still wants to marry a second wife.

As I said last post, none of this is a big revelation (with the exception of Iran). But it really adds texture to the recent abstract debates about terror networks and helps to weigh their relative merits.

On Monday, we looked at the case of al-Miskin al-Muhajir/asdasd99, who finally made his way to Afghanistan. Miskin had hoped to go to Iraq in April with a group from Kuwait, but unnamed obstacles stood in his way. We don’t yet know the fate of Miskin, but we do know what happened to this earlier group.

The story begins with Abu `Umar Badr al-Harbi, 36, from Kuwait. According to a friend of his, al-Furqan al-Junubi, Harbi was the oldest of his brothers and very close to his mother. He became “committed to the path (of jihad)” at the age of 14.

During his military service in Kuwait, Harbi met his best friend, al-Bawasil. Bawasil was at the beginning of his commitment to jihad when 9/11 happened. Both men rejoiced at the attack and were impressed that someone had been able to strike so deep inside the U.S.

One day, Harbi came to Bawasil and convinced him of the duty to undertake jihad. By 2004, both men were encouraging others to also take up arms. Many people said they were being foolish or accused them of being spies; others said there was no permanent jihad or banner to fight under.

In 2005, Harbi and Bawasil met the followers of Shaykh `Amir Khalif, the co-leader of a militant network in Kuwait, but they didn’t get to meet him before he died.

Soon after meeting Khalif’s followers, they learned of a way to go to Afghanistan through Iran. Both men were worried that it was a trap. Bawasil went first to make sure the way was secure. After arriving safely, he spent two weeks in Afghanistan with the mujahids before returning to Kuwait.

Upon Bawasil’s return, he told Harbi of the glories that awaited him on the front.  The two then began preparing for to go to Afghanistan for a longer period of time. They trained themselves physically and psychologically, studied some Islamic legal subjects pertaining to their endeavors, and gathered money.

Together with their friend Abu Khalid al-Kuwaiti, Bawasil and Harbi went to Iran by airplane and then made their way to Afghanistian. They stayed there three months training and guarding the front line.

While there, Abu Layth al-Libi (a high-ranking, now-deceased al-Qaeda member) entrusted them with a special mission in Kuwait. The mission was so secret that not even Abu Nasir al-Qahtani, another high-ranking AQ member, knew of it and was puzzled when the men refused his request for them to stay.

Harbi and Bawasil tried to return to Kuwait via Iran, but Iranian security forces imprisoned them for several days because they had lost their passports. They were finally released and returned to Kuwait, but the Kuwaiti security forces imprisoned them for twelve days, tortured them, and took their passports.

To be continued…..

In part 3 we’ll look at Harbi and Bawasil’s special mission and their preparations for another trip to the front. Some of the details already sound familiar if you’re read up on the foreign fighter literature. What stands out to me is the role that Iran plays as a transit point between Kuwait and Afghanistan. A few days ago, I noted that the Saudis are claiming that a Jihadi in Iran is directing a large network of militants in the Kingdom. By itself, this doesn’t mean much given the source. But here we have an insider remarking that Iran is a transit point for Jihadis going to fight in Afghanistan. That’s worrying.

There’s been a lot of talk about Syria’s role as a transit point, but it’s still unclear from the open source materials if it’s ignorance, benign neglect, or something more sinister.  It looks like Iran presents the same puzzle.

Trita Parsi’s new book, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. is the subject of a long post on Ekhlaas. The poster uses it to prove his thesis that Iran is secretly working with the U.S. and Israel against the Sunnis. Many Jihadis maintain that the Shia, with Iran at their head, are allied with Israel. To bolster their claim, they will often point out that `Abd Allah b. Saba, a Jewish convert to Islam, originated the Shia practice of excessively venerating `Ali. Thus, it is natural that the Shia would work with a Jewish nation–it’s in their spiritual DNA. Never mind that `Ali rejected his excessive veneration and most Shia don’t believe he even existed.