Entries Tagged 'Iraq' ↓

[Scott Sanford]  Abu Kandahar (أبو قندهار) reported on Ekhlaas that coalition forces, “crusaders,” killed Ekhlaas member Abu Hurayra 2 (أبو هريرة 2), a major contributor to Ekhlaas, in northern Iraq’s Ninawa province on 21 August 2008.  Abu Kandahar is a main contributor to Ekhlaas and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “distinguished pen (قلم متميز),” one of the highest distinctions to achieve, which adds credibility to his report.

Abu Hurayra 2’s last post was on 14 August 2008 where he provided photos of militants supposedly engaging in combat and he reassured readers that operations were increasing by the day.  He also gave a cryptic message saying, “I give you these new photos.  They are the last for me before my departure from you because I will be absent for a long time.”  It is unclear exactly what this means, but it appears that he may have been preparing for his death or arrest.

Abu Kandahar claimed that he received a letter informing him of Abu Hurayra 2’s death and that Abu Hurayra 2 fought some soldiers trying to arrest him.  Abu Hurayra 2 allegedly engaged the soldiers with a pistol killing two and wounding one.  He also reported that Abu Hurayra 2 restored the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) media operations in Ninawa province.  If true, coalition forces may have dealt the ISI a major blow as far as its media arm is concerned.  However, if Abu Hurayra 2 was expecting his demise, it is possible that he trained someone else to fulfill his role making his death less of a blow to the ISI.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-killed

Document (Arabic): 8-14-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-last-post

On August 9, a member of the Islamic State of Iraq announced–via an intermediary on the Ekhlaas forum–the death of Sinam al-Ramadi. Sinam was an al-Qaeda member who operated in Ramadi and who participated on a number of forums, including Faloja.

On the day of the announcement, an Ekhlaas member named Halima posted an eyewitness account of Sinam’s capture. The account is interesting for the light it sheds on al-Qaeda’s activities in Anbar province and for what it tells us about the hectic lives of forum fighters–Jihadi forum members who are also active militants.

Halima writes that on Thursday, August 7 a certain Dr. Khattab `Ali al-Hayani was arrested in Haqlaniya, near Haditha. U.S. troops and Iraqi police had discovered evidence in Hayani’s home proving that he was Sinam al-Ramadi, one of the members of al-Qaeda in Ramadi. Sinam had left Ramadi for Kirkuk, Diyala, Bayji, and finally Haditha, where he was “considered one of the al-Qaeda returnees to the regions of western Anbar.” (I think this means that he was an al-Qaeda member in Anbar who had fled following the success of the tribal Awakening and later returned.) It was already known that Sinam had created al-Qaeda cells living in the environs of Haditha and that he had a death sentence passed against him for killing a Christian clergyman in Mosul.

Sinam was arrested after being followed by an American spy plane, which had spotted him after an Iraqi Hummer exploded between Barwana and Bayji. Sinam was stopped near the Haditha dam and badly wounded after he and his comrades resisted arrest. Halima relates that an American general said to him, “Are you the one who hassled us so much on the Internet?” Sinam couldn’t have been more than 24 years old, according to Halima.

There’s some things in Halima’s account that don’t make sense. It’s hard to believe that a U.S. general was involved in Sinam’s capture or that Halima overheard their conversation. And Halima does not write of Sinam’s martyrdom, which was being celebrated on the forums, but rather his bloody capture. (The title of Halima’s post does suggest that Sinam was executed later for killing the clergyman.)

Still, Halima’s details about Sinam’s route fit with what we know of al-Qaeda’s recent migration out of Anbar. And her story of Sinam’s arrest also dovetails with recent news about the al-Qaeda cell operating in Haqlaniya.

Document (Arabic): 8-9-08-ekhlaas-post-regarding-death-of-sinam-al-ramadi

Document (Arabic): 8-9-08-ekhlaas-biography-of-sinam-al-ramadi

Issue 28 of Sada al-Jihad is out.  Articles include, “Hamas Responds Negatively to the Invitation of Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri” and “The Intellectual Pollution of the Followers of the Salafi-Jihadi Method.”

A new journal, Qadaya Jihadiyya (Jihadi Issues), has also be released.  The production quality is better than most of the Jihadi journals and the articles look interesting.  There is a “Strategic Issues” section, reminding me of Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi’s column in the Ansar journal.  It has two articles: “The Islamic State of Iraq and Early Signs of American Failure” and “Regional Alliances and the Path of Jihad.”  Another section, “Thoughts of a Mujahid,” has the memoir of someone who attended the al-Faruq training camp.

Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-faloja-issue-28-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-issue-1-of-qadaya-jihadiyya

More evidence that the failure of the Islamic State of Iraq is severely demoralizing Jihadis, at least in the Arabic-speaking world.

Asad al-Jihad2, a popular commentator, has written a new booklet, “The State of Islam Remains Defiant.” In it, he seeks to assuage growing doubts about the viability of the Islamic State of Iraq:

Upon reflection, some may say, “The Islamic State of Iraq is still in the right. So why are things becoming so difficult for it, its enemies joining against it from all sides?” (p.7)

The answer is that God is testing the resolve of the mujahids in Iraq, the same answer Yaman Mukhaddab gave in July to dispel the pessimism of the Hesbah forum members.

On the Faloja forum, Hafid al-Husayn has a similarly defiant title for his post: “The State of Islam Remains, Despite the Tricks of the Tricksters.” Hafid acknowledges that things are not going well, but he blames the U.S. and its dirty tricks, which include the following:

• Spreading lies about the Islamic State of Iraq to turn the public against it. It wrongfully accuses the ISI of targeting civilians and sectarian killings.
• Using Arabic channels to spread these lies
• Seeking the publication of fatwas by religious clerics against the ISI
• Secretly co-opting Iraqi resistance groups and turning them against the ISI

Jihadi uberpundit Husayn b. Mahmud believes the tricks are working, turning insurgent groups against one another. He chastises his fellow mujahids:

So great is the contempt that your enemy has for you that he announces his plan and guides you to the hole he has dug for you. Then you walk to the hole and throw yourselves in voluntarily!!

Abu Osama1 on Firdaws is similarly clear eyed in his assessment of the ISI’s predicament, but he is more optimistic. He acknowledges that the number of explosions has decreased and the number of civilian deaths has gone down, but he argues that al-Qaeda is just playing dead and biding its time.

None of the authors can bring themselves to say that the condition of the Islamic State in Iraq is terminal, but that’s the barely-concealed prognosis.

Document (Arabic): asad-al-jihad2-the-state-of-islam-remains-proud

Document (Arabic): 8-13-08-faloja-describing-recent-success-of-us-io-campaigns-against-isi

Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-husayn-b-mahmud-angry-about-success-of-us-dividing-jihadi-groups

Document (Arabic): 8-13-08-firdaws-aq-just-playing-dead-in-iraq1

Jihadica reader Jallen asks some good questions about the pessimism of Jihadis regarding Iraq:

How long have forum members been pessimistic over Iraq? Is the pessimism widespread or just a few members in one forum? Is pessimism over Iraq matched by increased optimism over Afghanistan or are these independent?

It depends which forum you read. On Hesbah, there is a more frank discussion of the fortunes of al-Qaeda in Iraq (at least judging from the posts that leak out). This is probably because Hesbah is a closed forum full of old Jihadi hands, so members don’t have to be so guarded. The opposite is true on Ekhlaas, where newbies take turns one-upping each other with paeans to al-Qaeda. No one wants to be a downer.

But since the end of 2007, I’ve noticed a steady increase in posts on Ekhlaas that say, “Just wait, a major victory is right around the corner!” You wouldn’t write that unless you were worried that things weren’t going so well at the moment.

To give you a sense of the genre, here’s a summary of a post from a few days ago by forum member Murabit Muwahhid (Monotheist Frontier Fighter):

• Everyone is in a state of anticipation these days.
• There have been consecutive announcements of the martyrdoms of first and second tier al-Qaeda leaders.
• People in Europe fear martyrdom operations there.
• There have been a series of attacks on the Islamic State of Iraq and attempts to break its power.
• There have been victories for the mujahids in Somalia and Yemen.
• “Are we living in difficult days or are we and the world waiting for (even more) difficult days?”
• Will the coming days be marked by more of our leaders dying, such that the U.S. will proclaim victory over terrorism?
• Or will these victories be followed by major setbacks that will put the lie to their proclamations?
• It looks like the coming days will be difficult for everyone.

The post has a more defiant tone:  We may be down, but we’re not out.  It is also ambivalent about the fortunes of the Jihadi community.  (And for those convinced that Jihadis are indifferent to news of their leaders’ deaths, take note.)

The morale of the forum fighters is the lowest I’ve seen it, at least among Jihadis who live in the Middle East. Afghanistan is a bright spot, but it doesn’t seem to offset the despair of Arab Jihadis, who can’t understand why al-Qaeda hasn’t gained traction in the Middle East.

The bleaker things look for the Islamic State in Iraq–the embryo of the new caliphal order–and the longer al-Qaeda goes without a major attack in Israel, the U.S., or its closely-allied countries, the more anticipation builds that al-Qaeda will do something spectacular. When it fails to deliver, morale wanes.

The al-Qaeda narrative that has developed since 9/11 is that it tricked the U.S. into invading the Middle East, where it got bogged down and bled dry.  Once the U.S. leaves and the Islamic State in Iraq is secure, al-Qaeda will move into Syria and Lebanon, and from there stage attacks on Israel.

But the failure of AQ in Iraq, the inability of AQ to strike in Europe and the U.S., and its lack of traction in the Middle East are interfering with the narrative and a new one has not emerged, at least not one that excites Arab Jihadis.  Like Murabit Muwahhid hints, it will take a major attack to reaffirm the narrative.

But circumstances at the moment allow the U.S. to create a counter narrative: al-Qaeda started in Afghanistan and it will end in Afghanistan.  With the death of the top leadership that ordered the attacks on America, the cycle will be complete.

Document (Arabic): 8-4-08-ekhlaas-are-the-coming-days-difficult

Under_cover2, a member of Ekhlaas, announced two weeks ago that two of his fellow forum members have made the transition from forum fighters to foreign fighters.  One went to Somalia, the other to Iraq.

Iraq makes sense, particularly for Jihadis living nearby.   But Somalia?  I don’t see it mentioned much as a destination anymore.

Document (Arabic): 7-11-08-ekhlaas-news-of-forum-member-who-went-to-somalia-and-another-who-went-to-iraq

That’s the claim of Abu Islam al-`Iraqi, one of the leaders of the “popular committees” in Diyala Province. 25 seems high, but it dovetails with what I wrote about the Harbi group last week.

Issue 4 of Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Glorious Battles), the main organ of al-Qaeda in Yemen, is out. One article caught my eye: “Somalia…The Forgotten Land.”

Issue 27 of Sada al-Jihad (The Echo of Jihad) is also out. SJ is produced by the Global Islamic Media Front. A few articles look interesting: “Al-Qaeda Is a Stone’s Throw From Palestine,” “Apostates Are More Dangerous Than the Enemy,” and “Interrogation (Methods and Phases).”

Finally, the Ansar Media Institute published issue 50 of Hassad* al-Mujahidin (Harvester of the Mujahids). The periodical focuses mainly on Iraq and most of this issue is about various attacks and prison breaks. There is one article worth noting: “The Camera: A Weapon Without Bullets.”

* Note: Hisad (”harvest”) seems to make more sense than Hassad (”harvester”) for the title, but that’s how the .pdf file is vocalized, so I’m going with it.

Document (Arabic): 7-13-08-ekhlaas-issue-4-of-sada-al-malahim

Document (Arabic): 7-10-08-ekhlaas-issue-27-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 7-14-08-ekhlaas-issue-50-of-hassad-al-mujahidin

Today we continue our look at a Kuwaiti cell and how its members transitioned from forum fighters to foreign fighters.

When we left off, Badr al-Harbi and Bawasil had returned to Kuwait from the front in Afghanistan via Iran, entrusted with a special mission by Abu al-Layth al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda leader. They were delayed in carrying out their task by Iranian, and then Kuwaiti, security forces. The latter, according to al-Furqan al-Junubi’s account, had tortured them and confiscated their passports.

After being released, Harbi and Bawasil stayed in Kuwait a full year to complete their special mission: gathering money, clothes, and food for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. In this, they relied on their network of friends, many of whom were already committed to the cause. Yet Harbi and Bawasil’s efforts aroused the suspicions of other Jihadis, who wrote the brothers in Afghanistan and told them that they were spies. They even made films that portrayed Harbi and Bawasil in a negative light.

Upon completing their task, Harbi and Bawasil wanted to return to the front in Afghanistan, but their passports had been confiscated. Nevertheless, they were both able to get new passports. Harbi and Bawasil then went with their families to Mecca and returned without incident.

After returning to Kuwait, Harbi and Bawasil asked the Jihadis in Afghanistan about the route to the front. The Jihadis told them that it was “broken,” but this, al-Furqan al-Junubi comments, was only because they had believed the bad rumors that had been spread about Harbi and Bawasil.

Harbi suggested the two travel to Iraq instead, but he was hesitant to go because he was not sure he would be guaranteed a martyrdom operation. Harbi and Bawasil soon met a coordinator and obtained a guarantee of safe passage from him, but they did not end up using him.

At this time, Harbi decided he wanted to marry for the second time, but wasn’t sure it was right to do so as a mujahid. Bawasil assured him it was, and so he did.

One month after Harbi’s marriage, a message came from Abu al-Layth al-Libi vouching for the integrity of Harbi and Bawasil. This meant the two could now travel to Afghanistan. But personal circumstances prevented Harbi from traveling to Afghanistan with Bawasil, who was anxious to leave because the government was pursuing him.

Bawasil first went to the United Arab Emirates with one of his close cousins (on his mother’s side). The Jihadis (it is unclear if they were in the Emirates or Afghanistan) told Bawasil that they only wanted him and not his cousin, so the latter returned to Kuwait.

Bawasil had to wait four days in the airport because of snow in Iran (indicating that Iran again served as his transit point for Afghanistan). Bawasil succeeded in finding the brothers (presumably in Iran) and soon found a coordinator, but they had stopped using the old route.

Harbi waited four months to find new way to Afghanistan, but failed. It was around this time that Harbi met a Jihadi from Algeria who told him how to go to Iraq.

(To be continued….)

Some thoughts:

• Al-Qaeda Leadership - Abu al-Layth al-Libi personally requested Harbi and Bawasil to gather funds and supplies for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. He also personally intervened in the rumor campaign against them.
• Support Networks - The way Harbi and Bawasil went about accomplishing their task for Libi is instructive. Like Tupperware salespeople, they relied on their personal network of friends rather than reach out to anonymous donors. But this did not protect them from allegations of spying, a consequence of their mission’s secrecy. (This is a constant problem for clandestine terrorist groups–see Jake Shapiro’s work in this regard.) On another subject, Bawasil tried to bring his close cousin to Afghanistan, reinforcing the idea that friends and family of dedicated militants are more likely than others to be involved in the Jihadi Movement.
• Security Lapse - The Kuwaiti government was monitoring the two militants, as indicated by Bawasil’s eagerness to escape their scrutiny. So how in the world did they regain their passports?
• Transit - As in part 2, Iran is mentioned as a transit point to Afghanistan. But this time we have the added transit point of the UAE. Moreover, travel coordinators are twice mentioned, once with regard to Afghanistan, the other with regard to Iraq.
• Family Life - Even though Harbi knows he will die as a martyrdom operative, he still wants to marry a second wife.

As I said last post, none of this is a big revelation (with the exception of Iran). But it really adds texture to the recent abstract debates about terror networks and helps to weigh their relative merits.

The title of al-Faruq al-`Iraqi’s post on Ekhlaas is more exciting than the content.  Faruq, like countless corporate PR offices, has discovered that Wikipedia entries can be edited by users (although it seems much easier to do on Arabic Wikipedia). As proof, he points readers to his addition of two sections (“supervisory positions” and “the stance of the leaders of jihad toward him”) at the end of the Arabic entry on Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State of Iraq.

Faruq appeals to his comrades to start editing the profiles of prominent Jihadi leaders on Wikipedia “since many people refer to this site to obtain information on a specific person.”

Document (Arabic): 6-29-08-ekhlaas-how-to-raid-wikipedia