Entries Tagged 'Iraq' ↓

On 29 June 2009, the Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published an article in al-Hayat titled “Salafi–Jihadism: A New Face in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria’s Palestinian Camps.” The article talks about the new generation of “neo-Zarqawis” and the increasing radicalization of Palestinian refugees. This radicalisation, he argues, stems from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the deterioration of the PLO and its control over the refugee camps, the political ramifications of the Fatah-Hamas conflict, and rising poverty and unemployment. Al-Shishani states that attacks such as the 2008 incident in Jordan where Thaer al-Wahidi, a refugee from the al-Baq’ah refugee camp, assaulted a Lebanese classical music troupe, are emblematic of this phenomenon.

Al-Shishani argues that the Salafi-jihadi ideology in the refugee camps has come in three phases. The first was the establishment of the ideology in the mid-1980s. The establishment of ‘Usbat al-Ansar in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon was typical of this phase. According to al-Shishani, this period witnessed the beginning of nationalist groups using Islamic slogans and the establishment of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Al-Shishani writes that the second phase was when the Salafi-jihadis started playing a larger role in sheltering and training non-Palestinian Salafi-jihadis. Al-Shishani cited the 2003 bombing of the McDonalds in Lebanon by the Yemeni Muammar al-Awami as an example of this development.

According to al-Shishani, the third phase is when the Salafi-jihadi ideology becomes the primary ideology for Palestinian youth in the camps. This phase is occurring now,  as individuals and small groups are increasingly taking up the ideology. Al-Shishani states that the members of this new generation “are described as ‘neo-Zarqawis,’” and are the legacy of the Levantine Salafi-jihadi current that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started in his Afghan training camp in 2000. They believe the route to Israel is through Iraq. Al-Shishani maintains that this trend is regional, centering on Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and it rejects the Salafi-jihadism of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (more on the al-Maqdisi dispute here and here).

In describing the Salafi-jihadi situation in Jordan, al-Shishani states that the refugee camp in Irbid has become a transit point for foreign fighters headed to Iraq and this is important because commentators normally associate Salafi-jihadism in Jordan with the cities of Zarqa, Salt, and Maan in addition to Palestinians not living in camps and East Jordanians. According to al-Shishani, Irbid is where the leader of al-Wahidi’s cell, Shakir ‘Umar al-Khatib, recruited al-Wahidi and called on Palestinians to join “the fighters in Iraq and Lebanon.”

For Lebanon, al-Shishani agrees with Omayma Abdel-Latif, a research associate at the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Center, that Lebanon is “fertile ground” for radical Salafi organizations. The lack of official Lebanese control over the camps, due to a previous agreement between Palestinian factions and the Lebanese government, compounds this threat.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of information, al-Shishani does not provide many details of the situation in Syria except to say that there have been clashes between militants in the Yarmuk refugee camp and the Syrian government.

The study of Salafi-jihadism in the Levant often takes a backseat to that of Iraq and AfPak, and to that of Hamas and Hezbollah, but, as al-Shishani indicates, the ideology does have a persistent and dangerous following in the region. If the modicum of stability that Iraq currently enjoys holds after the US withdrawal, the next logical endpoint for the neo-Zarqawis would be the Palestinian Territories, where they could act as spoilers to any possible peace initiatives.

A quick addendum to Truls’s post about Abu Umar al-Baghdadi: The Islamic State in Iraq has now broken the silence over al-Baghadi’s alleged capture.  It released a brief statement this morning dismissing the reported arrest and denying any knowledge of the man depicted on the photograph circulating in the media.

Shortly afterwards, Furqan media released an audiotaped speech by al-Baghdadi himself. In the 17-minute recording, entitled “Lying Agents”, al-Baghdadi referred briefly to the rumours of his own capture before delivering a long tirade against the Shiite-led government of Iraq. For more on the statements, see here, here and here.

It seems, then, that the latest arrest report was yet another false alarm, and that we are back to square one with regards to the al-Baghdadi puzzle.

Document (Arabic): 05-12-09-faloja-isi-statement-on-baghdadi
Document (Arabic): 05-12-09-falluja-baghadi-speech

[Editor's note: I am pleased to introduce another new contributor, Scott Sanford, who is a graduate student at George Washington University specialising in jihadism in the levant. Scott has guest blogged for Jihadica in the past, but now he is joining us on a more regular basis.]

“What is the Secret of the Falluja Forum’s Success?” This was the intriguing title of a recent post on Falluja presenting a detailed analysis of the web traffic to the forum itself. The contributor, named “Song of Terror”, broke the article into two parts: the first supplying the web analytic data and the second providing strategies and further analysis.  While he claimed that jihadi propaganda efforts on the Internet are successful, the data does in fact not support his analysis. 

Using data from Alexa.com, Song of Terror started by asserting that Fallujah is the most “successful” jihadi forum.  Fallujah’s “Daily Reach”, the percent of global Internet users visiting Al-faloja.info, was up 42% from 0.00163% three months ago to 0.0022% on 27 April 2009.  A majority of Fallujah’s users, 36.5%, were in Iraq.  Algeria held the second spot with 9.1% followed by Egypt with 8.2%.  Al-faloja.info’s traffic rank was 220 in Iraq, 759 in Georgia, and 821 in the Palestinian Territories. 

Song of Terror reported that 19.64% of Fallujah’s visitors came from Google.com, 5.89% from Muslm.net, an Islamic forum that many militants frequent, and 5.56% from Youtube.com.  He appeared to be disappointed with Youtube.com’s third place ranking and suspected that it would increase in the next “two weeks” because “a campaign to spread Fallujah’s link via [YouTube] continues in its infancy.”  In fact, YouTube now has a new channel called FallujahTube that appears to be connected to this “campaign.”  He also recommended that others who post videos on YouTube put the Fallujah link in the video description under the user name to make it more visible to users.  He also claimed that the percentage reported for YouTube is inaccurate because other websites take videos from YouTube and post them elsewhere, which would make its percentage higher.  As for Muslm.net, he stated that due to his own personal efforts posting Fallujah links on the website since 2007, it now holds the number two spot. 

In regards to Google.com, Song of Terror claimed that Fallujah’s success is due to not requiring a login, which makes Fallujah searchable on Google.  The top Google search terms leading to Fallujah were “The Fallujah Forums” written in Arabic and “al-faloja” written in English.  He also noted that “proxy without installation” written in Arabic and “filezzz rapidleech” written in English lead visitors to the Fallujah Forums for technical advice.  Indeed, a 10 May 2009 Google search of “proxy without installation” in Arabic revealed that the third link on the page connected to a Fallujah post about surfing the Internet without a proxy. 

After visiting Fallujah, 14.85% of the visitors returned to Google, 5.46% returned to YouTube, 4.61% each went to Hanein.info and Muslm.net, and between 3.92% and 2.9% visited the upload sites Zshare.net, Rapidshare.com, and Archive.org.  Song of Terror noted that this is evidence that Fallujah users use the website as a means to access videos. 

In the second section of the post, Song of Terror outlined eight strategies and pieces of advice:

1.      “Determine Your Goal,” which is “Winning the Battle of Hearts and Minds,” “Planting the seed of jihad in the hearts of the general Muslim population,” and “Transmitting the mujahedeen voice to the general population.” 

2.      “Choose the Means of Arriving to Your Goal,” which is using the Internet.

3.      “Study the Field Data and the Means of Influence,” where he again stressed the importance of YouTube to the jihadi propaganda effort because of the supposed rising popularity of the Internet in the Middle East and because YouTube is the second most popular site in the world according to Song of Terror.  He added that Falluja should not be the primary focus of propaganda efforts because many Arab countries ban the site.

4.      Properly distribute one’s efforts to endeavors that yield the most results.

5.      Remain flexible to adjust to the different characteristics of various websites.

6.      This section dealt with security issues and Song of Terror added a link to a Fallujah post on how to use the Tor anonymity software.  He also added links to several “Crusader websites” because they “distribute mujahedeen films”.  It is unclear why he added this, but possibly, it is because jihadis could use links to videos on these sites as safe links that government censoring would not prevent.

7.      The connection between the real world and the “hypothetical world.”  Here it appears that Song of Terror was attempting to prove a connection to jihadi Internet propaganda efforts and the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq.  In making his argument, he cited reporting from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, an unidentified Rand report, and al-Qaeda in Iraq reporting about their “martyrs,” which all supposedly concluded that most foreign fighters in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia, followed by Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Algeria.  While he did not make his point explicit, it appears that he was insinuating that the movement of foreign fighters to Iraq from these Arab countries was proof of jihadi Internet propaganda success. 

However, adding this point contradicts his entire argument that the Fallujah Forums are successful.  Saudi Arabia placed tenth on the country list of Al-faloja.info users with only 2.5% of the site’s visitors being of Saudi origin.  If Song of Terror’s correlation between Internet propaganda and the number of foreign fighters were correct, we would expect the number of Saudis entering Iraq to be much lower or the number of Saudi visitors on the Fallujah Forums to be much higher.  Additionally, from the countries ranked above Saudi Arabia on the country list of Fallujah users – Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Libya, the UAE, Georgia, and Jordan – we would expect more of these nationalities to enter Iraq or less of them to visit the Fallujah Forums.  It is possible that many of Fallujah’s visitors have gone to Pakistan and Afghanistan instead of Iraq, but it is reasonable to assume, with the exception of Pakistan, that the numbers and nationalities of foreign fighters entering these countries would be similar to Iraq’s experience, which still negates Song of Terror’s analysis.  Finally, according Song of Terror, nearly 50 Yemenis entered Iraq, but Yemen is not even listed on the country list of Fallujah users.  According to his analysis, we would expect Yemen to hold a much higher position on the list.  In short, his data does not add up and it does not support the theory that jihadi Internet propaganda alone determines the flow of militants to war zones. 

8.      “Strategies of Intellectual Penetration and Contradicting Psychological Conditioning.”  In this final point, Song of Terror encouraged jihadi propagandists to distribute documentary programs supportive of jihadi ideology and to learn about “psychological conditioning” by mainstream Arab satellite stations such as al-Jazeera. 

Song of Terror attempted to apply some quantitative analytical reasoning to verify the success and usefulness of the Fallujah Forums and jihadi efforts at Internet propaganda.  However, the data does not support his analysis.  One might even use his data to make the exact opposite argument, that jihadi Internet propaganda has relatively little effect on radicalization and recruitment. 

Document (Arabic): 05-01-2009-falujah-traffic-ranking-1
Document (Arabic): 05-11-2009-fallujahtube-2
Document (Arabic): 05-10-2009-proxy-without-instillation-google-search-3
Document (Arabic): 05-10-2009-without-a-proxy-post-4
Document (Arabic): 05-11-2009-how-to-use-tor-5

Editor’s note: I am delighted to introduce a new contributor, Truls Tønnessen, who is a FFI research fellow as well as a PhD candidate in History at the University of Oslo. He works on jihadism in Iraq and will be covering Iraq for Jihadica.

The alleged arrest of the emir of al-Qaida led Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, has not incited a torrent of reactions on the jihadi web forums so far. Interestingly, the major Iraqi insurgent groups, including the ISI itself, have not commented upon the alleged arrest. 

There may be several reasons for this lack of reactions. One reason may be concern over security. A participant on the Falluja forum recently recommended his fellows not to comment on news concerning arrests of any leaders unless the information stems from reliable jihadi sources. One of his arguments was that their enemies may be putting forward a rumour in order to monitor the reactions on the jihadi websites, so as to determine whether they have arrested al-Baghdadi or not. 

However, the most important reason may be related to the confusion over the identity (and existence) of al-Baghdadi and his leadership role in the Islamic State of Iraq. I will not venture into the confusing debate over the identity of al-Baghdadi, but those interested in more details should check out these postings by the Long War Journal and Talisman Gate. 

Most of the reactions on the jihadi forums so far relate to the identity question. Several contributors have argued that the contradictory information from different Iraqi and US sources indicates that they don’t know who they have arrested. This is notably the view of Akram Hijazi who concludes that is it not possible to confirm Baghdadi’s arrest at this point. He writes that only a statement from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) may clarify the issue. However, Hijazi argues that it may take a while before ISI does so, especially if al-Baghdadi is in fact arrested, in order to protect his family and relatives.  

The question of al-Baghdadi’s identity is further complicated by his alleged position as Amir al-mu’minin or Commander of the faithful of the al-Qaida led Islamic State in Iraq. Al-Baghdadi has been presented as a member of the Quraysh (the Prophet’s tribe), presumably in an attempt to buttress his credentials. His alleged full name is Abu Umar al-Qurashi al-Husayni al-Hashimi al-Baghdadi. If al-Baghdadi has indeed been arrested, we will soon know his lineage. If he is not a Qurashi, the credibility of the Islamic State of Iraq will suffer. 

There is in other words much at stake here, which makes ISI’s silence all the more deafening.

Document (Arabic): 04-28-09-al-fallujah-baghdadi
Document (Arabic): 04-30-09-akram-hijazi

Sayyid Imam has some surprising things to say about Sayyid Qutb and some interesting speculation on Zawahiri’s tenuous position in al-Qaeda.  He also observes that Libyan and Mauritanian students serve as Zawahiri’s primary research assistants.  I don’t know about their nationalities, but there’s no doubt Zawahiri has research assistants (as do many productive academics).  Moreover, Zawahiri talks about Mauritanian seminarians coming to visit him and Bin Laden in his Exoneration, so it makes sense that some stayed on to help him write.

Continuing…

Zawahiri says in Knights that he joined al-Qaeda to unite the efforts of the Muslims.  That’s not true.  Zawahiri knew Bin Laden for 14 years, from 1987 to 2001, and never joined with him.  Rather, he criticized Bin Ladin harshly as a Saudi intelligence agent for merely reducing donations to his (Zawahiri’s) group in 1995.  To this end, Zawahiri wrote an article critical of Bin Laden called “The Youth Are Generous with Their Lives and The Rich Are Stingy with Their Money” (جاد الشباب بأرواحهم وضنّ الأغنياء بأموالهم), in the Kalimat Haqq journal.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad did not join Al Qaeda; only Zawahiri and eight others joined.  It wasn’t to unite jihad; it was because Zawahiri saw his fame and fortune linked to Bin Laden.  Bin Laden knew Zawahiri had nothing to offer him except his name.  He kept Zawahiri out of the dark regarding 9/11 and didn’t allow him or anyone else to make media appearances.

Zawahiri used to visit the al-Qaeda media committee under Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in Kandahar to learn about its activities [ie he was out of the loop].  

9/11 was a big break for Zawahiri because it gave him the opportunity to play a role in the media because the leaders of al-Qaeda were either hiding, killed, or captured.

Here are some of the things Zawahiri did to capitalize on 9/11:

• He glorified the 9/11 attacks and berated those who criticized them as American agents.
• He justified the 9/11 attacks.
• He didn’t take responsibility for the negative effects of 9/11, the immediate aftermath of which ruined al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Afghanistan.

Even though they tried to obscure their crimes, current and future generations will never forget that Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their followers bear sole responsibility for losing an Islamic state, which had been established by the Taliban.

Zawahiri has canonized Bin Laden to such an extent that he denies his errors, as if Bin Laden is infallible.  It’s odd that Zawahiri has criticized the Muslim Brotherhood his entire life yet became a follower of one of them (Bin Laden).  Zawahiri justifies all of Bin Laden’s crimes like Goebbels did for Hitler.

Here are the reasons why Zawahiri has canonized bin Laden after criticizing him and accusing him of collaboration:

• Reason one: Bin Laden provided the greatest opportunity for Zawahiri to get the fame he’s craved for 30 years, an opportunity realized after 9/11.
• Reason two: Zawahiri knows that al-Qaeda is Bin Laden and no one else.  99% of its membership is Saudi and Yemeni and is tied to Bin Laden personally.  Zawahiri has canonized him in order to get the allegiance of his followers if Bin Laden dies.  It’s doubtful that Bin Laden’s followers will follow Zawahiri, but he tries nonetheless.
• Reason three: 99% of al-Qaeda’s financing comes from Saudi Arabia to Bin Laden personally.  Zawahiri has to canonize him to continue to get their support if bin Laden dies.  “Zawahiri is preparing for the moment of the announcement of Bin Laden’s death so that he can inherit his organizational legacy.”
• Finally: Zawahiri has to talk about all the issues of the umma to be perceived as its leader, especially the Palestinian issue.

Zawahiri does not care about the destruction he has justified.  In his life, only three things matter to him: preserving his personal well-being, media attention in any form, and gathering money.  “In short: fleeing, microphones, and donation boxes.”

Bin Laden and Zawahiri care nothing for the people of Afghanistan.  During the four years Bin Laden was in Sudan, he spent millions of dollars on the Sudanese and paved hundreds of kilometers of road.  He was in Afghanistan for five years before 9/11 and gave an oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar, yet he did not pave a single road, build a single school, or construct a single hospital.  Hundreds of Afghan kids were dying at that time yet he did nothing and things only got worse after 9/11.

Al-Qaeda entered Iraq after its occupation in 2003 by standing on the shoulders of Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish group.  Then al-Qaeda renounced Ansar al-Islam and operated in Iraq independently.  (The amir of this group, Mullah Krekar, told me in 1990 that he had translated my book, al-`Umda, into Kurdish.)

Al-Qaeda in Iraq was accused of being made up of foreigners.  To establish that it was an Iraqi resistance, al-Qaeda sent one of their senior leaders, `Abd al-Hadi al-`Iraqi, from Waziristan to Iraq, but the U.S. captured him along the way.

I want to remind readers that Zawahiri was influenced by the words of Sayyid Qutb.  Although both men have severe jurisprudential shortcomings, there’s a big difference in their level of sincerity.  If Qutb had lived, I think he would have realized his jurisprudential mistakes.  But whereas Qutb had studied his whole life, Zawahiri stopped his intellectual development after reading Qutb.  I tried for years to push him to study the Sharia but to no avail.  He doesn’t have the patience for it.

When I was part of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Zawahiri put his name on some of my works to cover up his Sharia shortcomings.  When I broke my ties with them, they continued to steal from my book.  Later, Zawahiri came to rely on the seminary students around him from Libya and Mauritania, especially for writing the Exoneration.  They merely hunted for statements that justified their actions without distinction between sound and weak statements.

I’ve written these words, as I did in the Document, to warn Muslims, especially the younger youth, about these reckless, opportunistic people and their like.  Do not be fooled by slogans or by the justice of a specific cause until you know the reality of the person’s life who raises these slogans.  Is he honest or is he hunting for ignorant quarry and trading upon them?

Document (Arabic): 12-1-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-12

In part 8, Sayyid Imam continues to hammer al-Qaeda for bringing disaster to the Middle East and for the hypocrisy of its leaders.  He

• puts forward the odd claim that AQ lied to the U.S. about WMD in Iraq and about AQ ties with Iraq to push the U.S. to invade
• observes that Iran and Syria have been the primary beneficiaries of AQ’s antics in Iraq
• notes what any observer of the region already knows but rarely says: bashing the U.S. and Israel and talking about the Palestinian issue is great PR
• offers an excellent explanation as to why AQ will not get a foothold in the Palestinian territories
• claims that Bin Laden gave Saudi donations for jihad to Nawaz Sharif in support of his candidacy against Benazir Bhutto

Continuing…

Z claims that only the mujahids have thrawted the plans of the U.S.  That’s like Gamal Abdel Nasser’s slogan after the ‘67 defeat that “no voice rises above the voice of battle” in order to silence his critics.

AQ brought the U.S. into the region and caused it to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan.  It gave the U.S. false information about WMD in Iraq and tying Iraq to al-Qaeda to give the U.S. the excuse to invade Iraq.  They did this to lure the U.S. into a battlefield where it could be destroyed.  But AQ killed far more Iraqis than it killed Americans.  It brought the U.S. in and excommunicated the people of Iraq solely to fulfill its desire to fight America.

Z claims that AQ thwarted the plans of the U.S. but the truth is the opposite.  Wherever AQ goes, it brings destruction to Muslims.

Those who have benefitted from the killing in Iraq are first Iran, then Syria.  Is Syria facilitating those who seek to fight in Iraq out its love for jihad, for the Iraqis, or for its own self interest?  Aren’t some of the leaders of AQ who are encouraging others to fight in Iraq located in Iran, particularly the son of UBL?  Is fighting for the interests of Syria and Iran a jihad?  Hasn’t Z previously paid his brothers to fight in Egypt in service of Sudanese intel?  Isn’t killing the Iraqis and demolishing their homes exactly what Jews are doing to Palestinians?  Is this jihad or even thwarting the plans of America?  Wasn’t Iraq part of the Abode of Islam under Saddam before the American occupation?  Didn’t al-Qaeda, at the hands of Zarqawi, trigger a sectarian civil war in Iraq by killing the Shia en masse?  Haven’t the Sunnis paid the ultimate price for this?  Killing the Iraqi Shia only strengthened their ties to Iran and facilitated Iranian involvement in Iraq, whereas it did nothing but weaken the Sunni position in Iraq.

Does the mentality that lost an actual Islamic state in Afghanistan really believe that an Islamic state will be established in Iraq and not just on the Internet?  Are the Islamic peoples to be test animals for Bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s experiment?

No one is more pleased with al-Qaeda today than Iran and Syria.  All they have to do is turn a blind eye to the fighters who travel through their countries to blow themselves up, which serves Iranian and Syrian interests.

One of Z’s ignorant beliefs is that he proves the truth of what he says by pointing to the number of his followers.

Z says I heaped abuse on Bin Laden, but then he asks which of us has better understood reality and affected more of Muslim youth and masses? (Exoneration, p. 10)

The truth is known by its agreement with the Sharia, not by the number of its followers.

I have not called on anyone to follow me.  I am only relaying what I think is right according to the Sharia. 

Aren’t those who extol Bin Laden the same people that previously extolled Saddam Hussein?

Z’s words [ie the truth of what you say is proven by the number of your followers] indicate a fundamental aspect of his character: he has always been looking for fame and he is willing to get it by killing the innocent.

* One of the deceptions of Z is his trading on the Palestinian question

It is well-known that the fastest way to gain popularity among the Arab and Muslim masses is to bash the United States and Israel and talk a great deal about the Palestinian issue.  Nasser did it, Saddam did it, Ahmadinejad does it, as do others.  However, these people have actually done something for Palestinians, particularly Nasser, whereas Bin Laden and Z just talk.  Z even says in his Exoneration that “the slogan which the masses of the Muslim umma have understood and responded to well for 50 years is the slogan of calling for jihad against Israel.  Moreover, in this decade the umma is mobilized by the American presence in the heart of the Islamic world.” [I think this quote is from Knights but haven't checked it yet]

Z and Bin Laden talk about Palestinian children being hurt but not about the death they bring to the children of Afghanistan.

* Why doesn’t al-Qaeda undertake operations in Palestine?

If Al-Qaeda is so interested in the Palestinian question, why hasn’t it undertaken operations against the Jews there?  There are two reasons.  First, killing Jews is not one of Bin Laden’s priorities.  Second, al-Qaeda is an organization without a state; wherever it is, it is a stranger.  One can’t carry out operations in a country without the help of some of the people in that country. 

Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with any of the Palestinian organizations for four reasons:

1) Palestinian organizations don’t trust Bin Laden.  There’s no room to explain here, but it is an old matter from the days of the Afghan jihad.

2) Al-Qaeda has nothing to offer Palestinian groups militarily since the latter are far more advanced.  Indeed, Al-Qaeda relied on the cadres of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad trained by the Palestinian groups in Lebanon from 1990 to 1992.

3) Different tactics with respect to the use of force.  Bin Laden uses blind force to kill as many people as possible, even if it leads to the destruction of his organization–“organizational suicide.”  Palestinian organizations, on the other hand, use limited force to make gains against the enemy while ensuring the survival of their organization.  They follow the traditional principles of guerrilla war, the “war of the flea and the dog.”  Bin Laden’s new way is the war of the elephant, which makes mass killing the goal.

4) Palestinian organizations don’t need Bin Laden’s money since they have their own resources, just as they are more politically sophisticated than Bin Laden.

This is why Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with Palestinian groups and failed to gain a foothold in Palestine.  That’s why Z in his recent statement called for the Bedouin of Sinai to engage in jihad in Palestine.  It’s just propaganda.

When the Palestinian organizations rebuffed al-Qaeda, Z started criticizing them. Z accused Hamas of killing Jewish children with their missiles.  Is this a rational person?  What about the innocents al-Qaeda has killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, and elsewhere?  Is what is permitted for Al-Qaeda forbidden for Hamas?  Z is sad for Jewish children but kills Muslim children.

Z accuses Hamas of participating in elections on the basis of a secular constitution.  Why does Z criticize Hamas only?  Why not also criticize his shaykh Bin Laden?  Bin Laden paid a lot of money in support of Nawaz Sharif in parliamentary elections in Pakistan against Benazir Bhutto.  This was money for jihad that Saudis had give Bin Laden.  When I found out about this in 1992, I said to Abu Hafs al-Masri, who was the one who gave the money to Nawaz Sharif, “Abu Hafs! By God, Bin Laden is leading you to Hell!”

Document (Arabic): 11-27-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-8

The US military has given CNN letters that Zawahiri wrote in March 2008 to senior al-Qaeda commanders in Iraq (hat tip SK). Much of the content has been filtered through an MNFI spokesman so it’s hard to use CNN’s summary to assess al-Qaeda’s fortunes in Iraq. Nevertheless, since the summary fits with the bleak picture that has been emerging these past few months, it’s worth noting. I’ve rearranged the information for ease of reference:

Zawahiri letter to al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri, March 2008. Letter was captured in April during U.S. op that killed AQI Information Minister Abu Nizar. Abu Nizar was an intermediary between Masri and AQ Central. The letter was found on Abu Nizar’s person.

• Leadership: Masri too isolated to keep watch of his operatives. Zawahiri questions Masri’s ability to lead AQI.
• Poor Communication with AQ Central: Zawahiri concerned that he is not getting regular updates on Iraq. He is also not receiving regular communication from Masri.
• Poor Recruits: Dissatisfied with poor quality of recruits for ops in Iraq
• ISI’s Legitimacy: Questions manner in which the Islamic State of Iraq was established
• ISI’s Blatant Propaganda: Unhappy that ISI is repackaging old footage of operations and claiming the ops are new. Also unhappy that ISI takes credit for ops carried out by other terror groups, like Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri writes: “The media policy for the Islamic State is using exaggeration, to the extent of lying.”

Zawahiri letter to Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, March 2008

• Relations b/n Zawahiri & Bin Laden: Zawahiri passing along advice from Bin Laden.
• Offer of Assistance: Zawahiri asks what ISI needs to be victorious.

We know from an earlier set of captured documents reviewed by a Washington Post reporter that Masri went to Afghanistan this summer to speak with AQ leadership. From the tone of Zawahiri’s letter, it might have been a trip to the woodshed.

This is at least the second time that captured AQI documents have been given to CNN. But in both cases, the original documents have not been released for general scrutiny. If the people releasing them hope their contents will demoralize al-Qaeda supporters around the world, it would help to release the documents to the general public soon after the news stories based on them are published. Despite all the attention paid to Jihadi visual media, Jihadis themselves love texts.

Update: Bill Roggio at Long Wars Journal was given the documents by MNFI and has a more extensive summary of their content. He also says that the documents will be made available shortly on the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy’s website. The documents are now up and I’ll post a more detailed summary once I’ve read them.

In response to Bush’s recent statement that al-Qaeda lost Anbar Province in Iraq, Ekhlaas member Abu Mu`adh al-Maqdisi defiantly writes that it is the U.S. and its allies that lost the province. Nevertheless, he tacitly admits the truth of Bush’s words, writing: “War has ups and downs. Soon, by the permission of God, Anbar will return and the law of God will be applied in it. However, ye are an impatient people.”

Mukashshir Anyabahu (”Bares His Teeth”) replies that the people of Anbar, not just the Awakening members, deeply betrayed the mujahids.

Mu`adh optimistically responds, “As long as the Commander of the Faithful Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi is present, there is no need to worry.”

To which Mukashshir retorts:

You have no idea of the extent of the betrayal and apostasy which transpired in Iraq, especially in Anbar….The people of Iraq completely betrayed the mujahids and allied with everyone who had turned away from religion, except those whom my Lord had mercy on….The situation of the mujahids has become extremely difficult.

I am not saying that the jihad in Iraq has ended; it still continues by the grace of God.

Asad Misr (”Lion of Egypt”) concurs, arguing that the failure of the Jihadis in Anbar stems from their loss of support among its people:

Anbar was lost because of the betrayal of its people.  I will not say that it was due to the power of the Awakening and the apostates.  By God, I believe that this entity called “The Awakening” is very weak.  The problem is not the Awakening; rather, it is the betrayal in Anbar–those people who betrayed God and our master Muhammad by allying with the crusaders and the Jews.

Document (Arabic): 9-2-08-ekhlaas-member-admits-that-anbar-has-been-lost-to-isi

[Scott Sanford]  Abu Kandahar (أبو قندهار) reported on Ekhlaas that coalition forces, “crusaders,” killed Ekhlaas member Abu Hurayra 2 (أبو هريرة 2), a major contributor to Ekhlaas, in northern Iraq’s Ninawa province on 21 August 2008.  Abu Kandahar is a main contributor to Ekhlaas and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “distinguished pen (قلم متميز),” one of the highest distinctions to achieve, which adds credibility to his report.

Abu Hurayra 2’s last post was on 14 August 2008 where he provided photos of militants supposedly engaging in combat and he reassured readers that operations were increasing by the day.  He also gave a cryptic message saying, “I give you these new photos.  They are the last for me before my departure from you because I will be absent for a long time.”  It is unclear exactly what this means, but it appears that he may have been preparing for his death or arrest.

Abu Kandahar claimed that he received a letter informing him of Abu Hurayra 2’s death and that Abu Hurayra 2 fought some soldiers trying to arrest him.  Abu Hurayra 2 allegedly engaged the soldiers with a pistol killing two and wounding one.  He also reported that Abu Hurayra 2 restored the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) media operations in Ninawa province.  If true, coalition forces may have dealt the ISI a major blow as far as its media arm is concerned.  However, if Abu Hurayra 2 was expecting his demise, it is possible that he trained someone else to fulfill his role making his death less of a blow to the ISI.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-killed

Document (Arabic): 8-14-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-last-post

On August 9, a member of the Islamic State of Iraq announced–via an intermediary on the Ekhlaas forum–the death of Sinam al-Ramadi. Sinam was an al-Qaeda member who operated in Ramadi and who participated on a number of forums, including Faloja.

On the day of the announcement, an Ekhlaas member named Halima posted an eyewitness account of Sinam’s capture. The account is interesting for the light it sheds on al-Qaeda’s activities in Anbar province and for what it tells us about the hectic lives of forum fighters–Jihadi forum members who are also active militants.

Halima writes that on Thursday, August 7 a certain Dr. Khattab `Ali al-Hayani was arrested in Haqlaniya, near Haditha. U.S. troops and Iraqi police had discovered evidence in Hayani’s home proving that he was Sinam al-Ramadi, one of the members of al-Qaeda in Ramadi. Sinam had left Ramadi for Kirkuk, Diyala, Bayji, and finally Haditha, where he was “considered one of the al-Qaeda returnees to the regions of western Anbar.” (I think this means that he was an al-Qaeda member in Anbar who had fled following the success of the tribal Awakening and later returned.) It was already known that Sinam had created al-Qaeda cells living in the environs of Haditha and that he had a death sentence passed against him for killing a Christian clergyman in Mosul.

Sinam was arrested after being followed by an American spy plane, which had spotted him after an Iraqi Hummer exploded between Barwana and Bayji. Sinam was stopped near the Haditha dam and badly wounded after he and his comrades resisted arrest. Halima relates that an American general said to him, “Are you the one who hassled us so much on the Internet?” Sinam couldn’t have been more than 24 years old, according to Halima.

There’s some things in Halima’s account that don’t make sense. It’s hard to believe that a U.S. general was involved in Sinam’s capture or that Halima overheard their conversation. And Halima does not write of Sinam’s martyrdom, which was being celebrated on the forums, but rather his bloody capture. (The title of Halima’s post does suggest that Sinam was executed later for killing the clergyman.)

Still, Halima’s details about Sinam’s route fit with what we know of al-Qaeda’s recent migration out of Anbar. And her story of Sinam’s arrest also dovetails with recent news about the al-Qaeda cell operating in Haqlaniya.

Document (Arabic): 8-9-08-ekhlaas-post-regarding-death-of-sinam-al-ramadi

Document (Arabic): 8-9-08-ekhlaas-biography-of-sinam-al-ramadi