Entries Tagged 'Islamic State of Iraq' ↓

Apologies for the slow publication pace here at Jihadica, but deadlines and an upcoming house move mean I can only dream about serious blogging these days.

This does not mean forums are quiet. Every morning this past week I found things on the forums that deserved commentary. In a dream world, here’s what I would have written about had I had the time:

-    France is taking heat. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb published a statement declaring “France the mother of all evils”, and other posts fumed over the recent French plans to ban the niqab or the burka. I suspect the Americans and the Brits (who of course have long argued that France is the mother of all evils)  are happy to share the burden of jihadi attention. Unfortunately for the Anglo-Saxons, however, I don’t think the veil weighs nearly as heavy in the jihadi basket of grievances as military occupations.

-    Another one bites the dust. Exiled leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group told al-Quds al-Arabi on 2 July they are laying down their arms. The declaration is now being spun in the media as the first case of a group leaving al-Qaida. This is a misrepresentation of what’s happening but I can see why people want to spin it that way.

-    The non-strategic “Special strategic study”. The “Department for Historical Studies and Strategic Advice” of the “Falluja Think Tank” released a widely publicized “special strategic study” of the war between America and the jihadi movement. The title and the high-profile advertising had raised my expectations, but I was a little disappointed, mainly because it’s not a proper strategic study. It is a political analysis which stays at the macro-level and doesn’t offer much in terms of meso-level considerations and concrete recommendations that I associate with classics of jihadi strategic studies. It is still worth reading, though, and there is an intriguing note on AQ and nuclear weapons at the end. Scott might be covering the study it in more detail later this week.

-   Jihadis “twittering” about Swat and Helmand campaigns. The jihadi commentary and analysis of battles in Afghanistan and Pakistan is coming out so quickly it is close to twittering. Within days of the Helmand offensive there was a long Faluja thread reporting news from the frontline. The Swat debacle has been followed closely for a while, and there is now already a strategic study of the campaign. I haven’t read it yet but it looks very interesting.

-    The other American.  The Somalia-based Abu Mansour al-Amriki has released a new audio statement in English entitled “The beginning of the end” It lambasts Obama along well-known lines in very articulate native English. I agree with Evan that Abu Mansour beats Adam Gadahn on presentation skills. Abu Mansour’s tajwid is really impressive. The message is clearly intended for the mobilisation of US-based Muslims. As interesting as the message itself was the accompanying pictures of three other alleged Americans in Somalia, not least given the New York Times story about Shabab recruitment in America. By the way, Evan has a fantastic post on the Shabab on the CTBlog today.

-    Happy birthday ISI. Last Thursday was the 1000-day anniversary of the foundation of the Islamic State in Iraq, and the occasion was marked with banners on all the forums, but not much more.

-    Good Qaradawi or bad Qaradawi? Marc Lynch had a great post the other day on Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s latest book on jihad, which he thinks will undermine al-Qaida, more so than the recantations of Dr Fadl and others. Rob at the Shack disagrees, saying the side effect of Qaradawi’s stance is more legitimacy for regular national liberation struggles, which might actually cause more problems for the US in the long term. They are of course both right.

Finally there is this gem from the CBS Terror Monitor (hat tip: Cecilie), by an analyst who has clearly had enough forum watching (here’s a pdf if they remove it). Hoda you have my sympathy - there have been days where I have felt the same.

Have a great week everyone!

On 15 May 2009, Falluja Forum contributor Wahj al-Rasas (Blazing Bullets) posted photos of leaflets the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) supposedly distributed recently in Gaza. The leaflets claim that the recent announcement of Abu-Omar al-Baghdadi’s capture is a fabrication, the ISI does not know the identity of the person in the alleged photos of al-Baghdadi, and al-Baghdadi is doing just fine. The leaflets were signed by the “Ministry of Information / The Islamic State of Iraq” and the “the al-Shahid Abi-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi Brigade for Jihadi Media Jerusalem.”

The content of the announcement is not surprising, given al-Baghdadi has already released a statement refuting claims of his capture, and it is possible that the announcement is a forgery. However, if it is legitimate, it is interesting that the ISI would be so concerned about how Palestinians perceived the alleged al-Baghdadi capture – I have not seen a special ISI statement issued by a Somalia, North African, or Yemeni ISI branch. Additionally, it could indicate that the ISI is looking beyond Iraq and has already started activities in Gaza. It remains unclear whether or not these activities are merely for propaganda value, i.e. another attempt to connect the Palestinian issue to the wider global jihad, or an actual effort to build an ISI presence in Gaza. However, if it is the latter, the ISI faces a step uphill battle because, as I have argued previously, it is unlikely that Hamas will allow a competing organization to operate in Gaza freely.

A quick addendum to Truls’s post about Abu Umar al-Baghdadi: The Islamic State in Iraq has now broken the silence over al-Baghadi’s alleged capture.  It released a brief statement this morning dismissing the reported arrest and denying any knowledge of the man depicted on the photograph circulating in the media.

Shortly afterwards, Furqan media released an audiotaped speech by al-Baghdadi himself. In the 17-minute recording, entitled “Lying Agents”, al-Baghdadi referred briefly to the rumours of his own capture before delivering a long tirade against the Shiite-led government of Iraq. For more on the statements, see here, here and here.

It seems, then, that the latest arrest report was yet another false alarm, and that we are back to square one with regards to the al-Baghdadi puzzle.

Document (Arabic): 05-12-09-faloja-isi-statement-on-baghdadi
Document (Arabic): 05-12-09-falluja-baghadi-speech

Editor’s note: I am delighted to introduce a new contributor, Truls Tønnessen, who is a FFI research fellow as well as a PhD candidate in History at the University of Oslo. He works on jihadism in Iraq and will be covering Iraq for Jihadica.

The alleged arrest of the emir of al-Qaida led Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, has not incited a torrent of reactions on the jihadi web forums so far. Interestingly, the major Iraqi insurgent groups, including the ISI itself, have not commented upon the alleged arrest. 

There may be several reasons for this lack of reactions. One reason may be concern over security. A participant on the Falluja forum recently recommended his fellows not to comment on news concerning arrests of any leaders unless the information stems from reliable jihadi sources. One of his arguments was that their enemies may be putting forward a rumour in order to monitor the reactions on the jihadi websites, so as to determine whether they have arrested al-Baghdadi or not. 

However, the most important reason may be related to the confusion over the identity (and existence) of al-Baghdadi and his leadership role in the Islamic State of Iraq. I will not venture into the confusing debate over the identity of al-Baghdadi, but those interested in more details should check out these postings by the Long War Journal and Talisman Gate. 

Most of the reactions on the jihadi forums so far relate to the identity question. Several contributors have argued that the contradictory information from different Iraqi and US sources indicates that they don’t know who they have arrested. This is notably the view of Akram Hijazi who concludes that is it not possible to confirm Baghdadi’s arrest at this point. He writes that only a statement from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) may clarify the issue. However, Hijazi argues that it may take a while before ISI does so, especially if al-Baghdadi is in fact arrested, in order to protect his family and relatives.  

The question of al-Baghdadi’s identity is further complicated by his alleged position as Amir al-mu’minin or Commander of the faithful of the al-Qaida led Islamic State in Iraq. Al-Baghdadi has been presented as a member of the Quraysh (the Prophet’s tribe), presumably in an attempt to buttress his credentials. His alleged full name is Abu Umar al-Qurashi al-Husayni al-Hashimi al-Baghdadi. If al-Baghdadi has indeed been arrested, we will soon know his lineage. If he is not a Qurashi, the credibility of the Islamic State of Iraq will suffer. 

There is in other words much at stake here, which makes ISI’s silence all the more deafening.

Document (Arabic): 04-28-09-al-fallujah-baghdadi
Document (Arabic): 04-30-09-akram-hijazi

I have been busy the past two weeks, but the jihadis have been busier. Bin Ladin has issued two audio statements, one proposing practical steps to liberate Palestine and the other about the treacherous government in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri warned against the forthcoming Crusader attack on Sudan, while Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has addressed the people of Pakistan. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi has spoken about the US plan to withdraw from Iraq, but he does not seem to get the same attention from the online community as his colleagues in Afghanistan. Abu Qatada has issued a statement from prison about the decision to extradite him to Jordan. Fatah al-Islam sharia officer Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi has been taking questions since Monday, but nobody is allowed to ask about Shakir al-Absi or Asad al-Jihad2 (hmm).

On the magazine front, Sumud 33  has been out for a little while. Fortunately Sada al-Malahim 8 came out on Sunday so now Greg can sleep again. Turkestan al-Islamiyya 3 came out earlier this week, adding to the past month’s increasing flow of Uighur jihadi propaganda.

We have also seen the publication of a couple of unusual videos featuring Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one with him delivering a funeral sermon in front of a crowd of several hundred people, and another showing him at a large wedding alongside half the jihadi community in Zarqa.  I suspect these videos are part of an attempt to bolster al-Maqdisi’s legitimacy by showing that he is enjoying freedom of movement and expression. By the way I highly recommend the 2-hour wedding video. It offers a fascinating inside look into the sociology of Islamism. It serves as a great illustration of a point I made in a recent article about Zarqa, namely that you cannot deradicalise entire communities. The film may depress you, but you might enjoy the songs.

I will be back soon with a report from the jihadi roundtable in Oslo.

Update (27 March): The Christian Science Monitor became the first Western newspaper to report on the Maqdisi controversy today - and Jihadica is mentioned.

Document (Arabic): 03-26-09-shouraa-mustafa-abu-al-yazid
Document (Arabic): 03-19-09-shouraa-abu-qatada-statement
Document (Arabic): 03-23-09-shamikh-abu-abdallah-al-maqdisi-qa
Document (Arabic): 03-22-09-shouraa-sada-al-malahim-8
Document (Arabic): 03-25-09-shouraa-turkestan-al-islamiyya-3
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-faloja-maqdisi-fima-kuntum
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-ansar-maqdisi-wedding-video

That’s the question asked by a member of the Faloja forum.  Here are some of the answers:

• Al-Yamami: The Shabaab will soon declare its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); that’s why ISI’s head, `Umar al-Baghdadi, mentioned the movement recently.
• Muhibb al-Muqrin: It will be become an emirate and remain so until the ISI returns to full strength after the occupiers leave Iraq at the end of the coming month.  It will then give its allegiance to the ISI.
•  Buya`tu Allah: It is not in the Shabaab’s best interest to declare a state or to join al-Qaeda right now because it doesn’t want to face more enemies.
• Al-Mu`tazz bi-Din Allah: It should declare a state after the Ethiopians withdraw from Somalia.
• Qannas al-Dawla al-Islamiyya: It should declare an emirate soon.
• Khayr Jubnd Allah: The Shabaab will declare a state after the occupiers have been driven from all of the important cities.
• Abu Bakr al-Muhajir: I think that this business of declaring separate states and emirates will end and a single emirate or caliphate will be declared for the whole world.

As can be seen from above, the declaration of the “Islamic State of Iraq” has caused some confusion.  Does the “State” (dawla) part of the name mean that it is the nucleus of a future superstate, like previous Islamic superstates or empires (e.g. Dawla `Abbasiyya)?  If so, then other Jihadis groups should forgo setting up their own states and declare their allegiance to Baghdadi and the ISI.  Or does the the “Iraq” part of the name mean that the ISI is only a national entity, which is a little bothersome for Islamists since they reject nationalism? 

Document (Arabic): 11-15-08-faloja-when-will-somalia-declare-islamic-state

That’s the title of a post by hamzacom on the Faloja forum.  In it, he draws an analogy with Afghanistan just after the U.S. invasion.  It was a time of defeat for the mujahids but now they are resurging.  The same will happen in Iraq.

Other forum members are predictably annoyed by hamzacom’s pessimistic title.  Abu `Umar al-Masri retorts that it is merely “a knight’s stumble,” not a loss.  Qannas al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (”The Islamic State’s Hunter”) is even more optimistic: “We will never lose the war as long as God is with us.”

Others share hamzacom’s pessimism but are nonchalant.  “If al-Qaeda has lost the war, what’s the problem?” Shabab Lubnan (”Youth of Lebanon”) states blithely.  “There really isn’t a problem.  There are a number of Jihadi groups that possess the idea of al-Qaeda even if they do not aid (the organization) publicly.  It is possible for these groups to launch a new war and to undertake the duty of jihad if al-Qaeda loses the war.”

The most sober commentator is Abu al-Fadl Madi, whose work we’ve been reading.  Abu Fadl believes the insurgency was largely comprised of members of the Iraqi army that the U.S. disbanded and left without a livelihood.  Now that the U.S. has started paying them off, they have stopped fighting and the insurgency has ended.  The only true resistance to the occupation was Zarqawi and his men; everything else was limited and spontaneous.  “The resistance will not return to Iraq,” Abu al-Fadl remarks, “until al-Qaeda returns to the theater of jihad.  But that won’t happen until after careful study of the lessons (learned).”

Document (Arabic): 9-4-08-faloja-member-believes-aq-is-losing-war-in-iraq

The US military has given CNN letters that Zawahiri wrote in March 2008 to senior al-Qaeda commanders in Iraq (hat tip SK). Much of the content has been filtered through an MNFI spokesman so it’s hard to use CNN’s summary to assess al-Qaeda’s fortunes in Iraq. Nevertheless, since the summary fits with the bleak picture that has been emerging these past few months, it’s worth noting. I’ve rearranged the information for ease of reference:

Zawahiri letter to al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri, March 2008. Letter was captured in April during U.S. op that killed AQI Information Minister Abu Nizar. Abu Nizar was an intermediary between Masri and AQ Central. The letter was found on Abu Nizar’s person.

• Leadership: Masri too isolated to keep watch of his operatives. Zawahiri questions Masri’s ability to lead AQI.
• Poor Communication with AQ Central: Zawahiri concerned that he is not getting regular updates on Iraq. He is also not receiving regular communication from Masri.
• Poor Recruits: Dissatisfied with poor quality of recruits for ops in Iraq
• ISI’s Legitimacy: Questions manner in which the Islamic State of Iraq was established
• ISI’s Blatant Propaganda: Unhappy that ISI is repackaging old footage of operations and claiming the ops are new. Also unhappy that ISI takes credit for ops carried out by other terror groups, like Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri writes: “The media policy for the Islamic State is using exaggeration, to the extent of lying.”

Zawahiri letter to Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, March 2008

• Relations b/n Zawahiri & Bin Laden: Zawahiri passing along advice from Bin Laden.
• Offer of Assistance: Zawahiri asks what ISI needs to be victorious.

We know from an earlier set of captured documents reviewed by a Washington Post reporter that Masri went to Afghanistan this summer to speak with AQ leadership. From the tone of Zawahiri’s letter, it might have been a trip to the woodshed.

This is at least the second time that captured AQI documents have been given to CNN. But in both cases, the original documents have not been released for general scrutiny. If the people releasing them hope their contents will demoralize al-Qaeda supporters around the world, it would help to release the documents to the general public soon after the news stories based on them are published. Despite all the attention paid to Jihadi visual media, Jihadis themselves love texts.

Update: Bill Roggio at Long Wars Journal was given the documents by MNFI and has a more extensive summary of their content. He also says that the documents will be made available shortly on the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy’s website. The documents are now up and I’ll post a more detailed summary once I’ve read them.

In response to Bush’s recent statement that al-Qaeda lost Anbar Province in Iraq, Ekhlaas member Abu Mu`adh al-Maqdisi defiantly writes that it is the U.S. and its allies that lost the province. Nevertheless, he tacitly admits the truth of Bush’s words, writing: “War has ups and downs. Soon, by the permission of God, Anbar will return and the law of God will be applied in it. However, ye are an impatient people.”

Mukashshir Anyabahu (”Bares His Teeth”) replies that the people of Anbar, not just the Awakening members, deeply betrayed the mujahids.

Mu`adh optimistically responds, “As long as the Commander of the Faithful Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi is present, there is no need to worry.”

To which Mukashshir retorts:

You have no idea of the extent of the betrayal and apostasy which transpired in Iraq, especially in Anbar….The people of Iraq completely betrayed the mujahids and allied with everyone who had turned away from religion, except those whom my Lord had mercy on….The situation of the mujahids has become extremely difficult.

I am not saying that the jihad in Iraq has ended; it still continues by the grace of God.

Asad Misr (”Lion of Egypt”) concurs, arguing that the failure of the Jihadis in Anbar stems from their loss of support among its people:

Anbar was lost because of the betrayal of its people.  I will not say that it was due to the power of the Awakening and the apostates.  By God, I believe that this entity called “The Awakening” is very weak.  The problem is not the Awakening; rather, it is the betrayal in Anbar–those people who betrayed God and our master Muhammad by allying with the crusaders and the Jews.

Document (Arabic): 9-2-08-ekhlaas-member-admits-that-anbar-has-been-lost-to-isi

[Scott Sanford]  Abu Kandahar (أبو قندهار) reported on Ekhlaas that coalition forces, “crusaders,” killed Ekhlaas member Abu Hurayra 2 (أبو هريرة 2), a major contributor to Ekhlaas, in northern Iraq’s Ninawa province on 21 August 2008.  Abu Kandahar is a main contributor to Ekhlaas and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “distinguished pen (قلم متميز),” one of the highest distinctions to achieve, which adds credibility to his report.

Abu Hurayra 2’s last post was on 14 August 2008 where he provided photos of militants supposedly engaging in combat and he reassured readers that operations were increasing by the day.  He also gave a cryptic message saying, “I give you these new photos.  They are the last for me before my departure from you because I will be absent for a long time.”  It is unclear exactly what this means, but it appears that he may have been preparing for his death or arrest.

Abu Kandahar claimed that he received a letter informing him of Abu Hurayra 2’s death and that Abu Hurayra 2 fought some soldiers trying to arrest him.  Abu Hurayra 2 allegedly engaged the soldiers with a pistol killing two and wounding one.  He also reported that Abu Hurayra 2 restored the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) media operations in Ninawa province.  If true, coalition forces may have dealt the ISI a major blow as far as its media arm is concerned.  However, if Abu Hurayra 2 was expecting his demise, it is possible that he trained someone else to fulfill his role making his death less of a blow to the ISI.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-killed

Document (Arabic): 8-14-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-last-post