Entries Tagged 'Islamic State of Iraq' ↓

[Scott Sanford]  Abu Kandahar (أبو قندهار) reported on Ekhlaas that coalition forces, “crusaders,” killed Ekhlaas member Abu Hurayra 2 (أبو هريرة 2), a major contributor to Ekhlaas, in northern Iraq’s Ninawa province on 21 August 2008.  Abu Kandahar is a main contributor to Ekhlaas and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “distinguished pen (قلم متميز),” one of the highest distinctions to achieve, which adds credibility to his report.

Abu Hurayra 2’s last post was on 14 August 2008 where he provided photos of militants supposedly engaging in combat and he reassured readers that operations were increasing by the day.  He also gave a cryptic message saying, “I give you these new photos.  They are the last for me before my departure from you because I will be absent for a long time.”  It is unclear exactly what this means, but it appears that he may have been preparing for his death or arrest.

Abu Kandahar claimed that he received a letter informing him of Abu Hurayra 2’s death and that Abu Hurayra 2 fought some soldiers trying to arrest him.  Abu Hurayra 2 allegedly engaged the soldiers with a pistol killing two and wounding one.  He also reported that Abu Hurayra 2 restored the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) media operations in Ninawa province.  If true, coalition forces may have dealt the ISI a major blow as far as its media arm is concerned.  However, if Abu Hurayra 2 was expecting his demise, it is possible that he trained someone else to fulfill his role making his death less of a blow to the ISI.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-killed

Document (Arabic): 8-14-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-last-post

Muhami al-Dawla (”Defender of the State”) has written an essay on Ekhlaas titled, “The Connection between the State of Islam and the Taliban is the Strategy of the ‘Chameleon.’”  His argument is that the Taliban’s recent successful surge in Afghanistan is the result of using “chameleon cells,” which are small, well-organized, armed bands that 1) blend into the population, 2) do not take orders from a commander, and 3) have penetrated the state security apparatus.

Muhami claims that the Taliban borrowed the strategy from the Islamic State of Iraq, which used it after the tribal Awakenings.  The chameleon groups in Iraq are able to carry out attacks on Awakening leaders because of their infiltration of the Awakening security forces.  Moreover, their presence in these forces means that they can undertake attacks for which the Awakening leaders get blamed.

Muhami argues that the Taliban has adopted this strategy because it is working so well in Iraq (is it?).  The group’s successful use of the strategy in Afghanistan is linked to its increased proficiency at gathering intelligence.

Document (Arabic): 8-19-08-ekhlaas-the-connection-bn-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-taliban-is-strategy-of-chameleon

On August 9, a member of the Islamic State of Iraq announced–via an intermediary on the Ekhlaas forum–the death of Sinam al-Ramadi. Sinam was an al-Qaeda member who operated in Ramadi and who participated on a number of forums, including Faloja.

On the day of the announcement, an Ekhlaas member named Halima posted an eyewitness account of Sinam’s capture. The account is interesting for the light it sheds on al-Qaeda’s activities in Anbar province and for what it tells us about the hectic lives of forum fighters–Jihadi forum members who are also active militants.

Halima writes that on Thursday, August 7 a certain Dr. Khattab `Ali al-Hayani was arrested in Haqlaniya, near Haditha. U.S. troops and Iraqi police had discovered evidence in Hayani’s home proving that he was Sinam al-Ramadi, one of the members of al-Qaeda in Ramadi. Sinam had left Ramadi for Kirkuk, Diyala, Bayji, and finally Haditha, where he was “considered one of the al-Qaeda returnees to the regions of western Anbar.” (I think this means that he was an al-Qaeda member in Anbar who had fled following the success of the tribal Awakening and later returned.) It was already known that Sinam had created al-Qaeda cells living in the environs of Haditha and that he had a death sentence passed against him for killing a Christian clergyman in Mosul.

Sinam was arrested after being followed by an American spy plane, which had spotted him after an Iraqi Hummer exploded between Barwana and Bayji. Sinam was stopped near the Haditha dam and badly wounded after he and his comrades resisted arrest. Halima relates that an American general said to him, “Are you the one who hassled us so much on the Internet?” Sinam couldn’t have been more than 24 years old, according to Halima.

There’s some things in Halima’s account that don’t make sense. It’s hard to believe that a U.S. general was involved in Sinam’s capture or that Halima overheard their conversation. And Halima does not write of Sinam’s martyrdom, which was being celebrated on the forums, but rather his bloody capture. (The title of Halima’s post does suggest that Sinam was executed later for killing the clergyman.)

Still, Halima’s details about Sinam’s route fit with what we know of al-Qaeda’s recent migration out of Anbar. And her story of Sinam’s arrest also dovetails with recent news about the al-Qaeda cell operating in Haqlaniya.

Document (Arabic): 8-9-08-ekhlaas-post-regarding-death-of-sinam-al-ramadi

Document (Arabic): 8-9-08-ekhlaas-biography-of-sinam-al-ramadi

Issue 28 of Sada al-Jihad is out.  Articles include, “Hamas Responds Negatively to the Invitation of Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri” and “The Intellectual Pollution of the Followers of the Salafi-Jihadi Method.”

A new journal, Qadaya Jihadiyya (Jihadi Issues), has also be released.  The production quality is better than most of the Jihadi journals and the articles look interesting.  There is a “Strategic Issues” section, reminding me of Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi’s column in the Ansar journal.  It has two articles: “The Islamic State of Iraq and Early Signs of American Failure” and “Regional Alliances and the Path of Jihad.”  Another section, “Thoughts of a Mujahid,” has the memoir of someone who attended the al-Faruq training camp.

Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-faloja-issue-28-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-issue-1-of-qadaya-jihadiyya

More evidence that the failure of the Islamic State of Iraq is severely demoralizing Jihadis, at least in the Arabic-speaking world.

Asad al-Jihad2, a popular commentator, has written a new booklet, “The State of Islam Remains Defiant.” In it, he seeks to assuage growing doubts about the viability of the Islamic State of Iraq:

Upon reflection, some may say, “The Islamic State of Iraq is still in the right. So why are things becoming so difficult for it, its enemies joining against it from all sides?” (p.7)

The answer is that God is testing the resolve of the mujahids in Iraq, the same answer Yaman Mukhaddab gave in July to dispel the pessimism of the Hesbah forum members.

On the Faloja forum, Hafid al-Husayn has a similarly defiant title for his post: “The State of Islam Remains, Despite the Tricks of the Tricksters.” Hafid acknowledges that things are not going well, but he blames the U.S. and its dirty tricks, which include the following:

• Spreading lies about the Islamic State of Iraq to turn the public against it. It wrongfully accuses the ISI of targeting civilians and sectarian killings.
• Using Arabic channels to spread these lies
• Seeking the publication of fatwas by religious clerics against the ISI
• Secretly co-opting Iraqi resistance groups and turning them against the ISI

Jihadi uberpundit Husayn b. Mahmud believes the tricks are working, turning insurgent groups against one another. He chastises his fellow mujahids:

So great is the contempt that your enemy has for you that he announces his plan and guides you to the hole he has dug for you. Then you walk to the hole and throw yourselves in voluntarily!!

Abu Osama1 on Firdaws is similarly clear eyed in his assessment of the ISI’s predicament, but he is more optimistic. He acknowledges that the number of explosions has decreased and the number of civilian deaths has gone down, but he argues that al-Qaeda is just playing dead and biding its time.

None of the authors can bring themselves to say that the condition of the Islamic State in Iraq is terminal, but that’s the barely-concealed prognosis.

Document (Arabic): asad-al-jihad2-the-state-of-islam-remains-proud

Document (Arabic): 8-13-08-faloja-describing-recent-success-of-us-io-campaigns-against-isi

Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-husayn-b-mahmud-angry-about-success-of-us-dividing-jihadi-groups

Document (Arabic): 8-13-08-firdaws-aq-just-playing-dead-in-iraq1

Earlier this week, I noted that members of the Hesbah forum are increasingly pessimistic about Iraq. And in May I wrote about the death of Sulayman al-`Utaybi, an al-Qaeda leader in Iraq who had left for Afghanistan after his dismissal from his post. Here’s what I wrote at the time:

That he headed straight for Afghanistan makes me wonder if this is a sign of things to come as AQ gets squeezed out of Iraq.

Now the Washington Post gives us further evidence that Iraq is a sinking ship for al-Qaeda and Afghanistan is the lifeboat, at least for the senior leadership. Amit Paley has written a well-sourced article on the departure of Abu Ayyub al-Masri (aka Abu Hamza al-Muhajer), the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, for Afghanistan. Here’s what we learn from the article (sources in parentheses):

Foreign fighters

• AQ is diverting new recruits to Afghanistan and Iraq. (U.S. officials)
• The number of foreign fighters going to Iraq a year ago was 110/mo. Earlier this year it was 50/mo. Now it is 20/mo. (senior U.S. intel analyst)
• The flow of most of AQI’s foreign fighters, money, and weapons is controlled by Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih (aka Abu Ghadiya), a Mosul native who is based in Syria. (U.S. intel officials)

AQI Leadership

• Masri designated Abu Khalil al-Souri to run AQI when he left for Afghanistan. Souri came to Iraq in 2003. (Ansari, AQI leader in Fallujah)
• Souri is one of 33 fighters, known as “the first line,” who came with Zarqawi in 2003. (Milehmi, senior AQI leader north of Fallujah)
• Souri’s name is attached to a July 10 AQI communique, a document usually signed by Masri.
• Masri has gone to Afghanistan twice before to meet with Jihadis and come back. (Milehmi, senior AQI leader north of Fallujah)
• Masri went to Afghanistan to review situation of AQI with Bin Laden. (Qaisi, commander of AQI recruitment unit)

Route to Afghanistan

• Masri went to Afghanistan through Iran (Ansari, AQI leader in Fallujah)
• Masri and two others went into Iran on June 12 through border town of Zorbatia (Col. Abdullah, Iraqi intel official in Ramadi)
• Masri went through Iran with 15 leaders (captured AQI member Abu Abeer al-Muhajer via an Iraqi police officer)

AQ Splinter Group

• Abu Taha al-Lihebi is leader of an AQI group in eastern Anbar. He and his group split from AQI because Masri condoned attacks on the Awakening movement and on civilians, which lost the group support. (Abu Taha al-Lihebi)
• Lihebi’s group disavows suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI. (Abu Taha al-Lihebi)

It’s not surprising that Iran is a transit point to Afghanistan (see my previous posts on the Harbi group from Kuwait) or that Masri is consulting with al-Qaeda Central (another nail in the “leaderless jihad” coffin).  It’s also not surprising that AQI is losing support because its senior leadership decided to shit where it slept.

I am surprised that most of AQI’s material and human resources are so tightly coordinated by an AQ operative in Syria.  The Sinjar data suggests that the flow is more decentralized.

What also stands out to me is that the AQI splinter group renounced suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI, an interesting turn for those who see the adoption of suicide bombings as either a natural result of being a devout Muslim or the result of militant groups competing to outdo each other.  In this case, competition is a factor, but it’s going the opposite direction.

Yaman Mukhaddab, a popular contributor to al-Hesbah (the most exclusive Jihadi forum), wrote an essay on July 21 in which he expressed alarm at the low morale and pessimism of some of his fellow forum members on account of al-Qaeda setbacks in Iraq.

One brother, he notes, said that the jihad in Iraq is ending like the jihad in Algeria (badly).

Another brother criticized Mukhaddab for being optimistic about Iraq.

A third said the situation is out of control and the outcome is already known.

Mukhaddab responds that such pessimism is unwarranted.  As scripture says, victory will come after severe testing.  And things can turn around at any time.  If AQ is able to strike the U.S. or if the U.S. strikes Iran, the mujahids in Iraq will benefit greatly (he doesn’t explain why).

Mukhaddab ends by reminding his readers that there was a similar level of despondency after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan but things turned out well in the end.

Despite his optimism, the fact that Mukhaddab would admit that other Jihadis on al-Hesbah–where the most influential pundits hold court–are souring on Iraq means that al-Qaeda is truly almost done there and that foreign fighters will be looking for greener pastures.

Document (Arabic): 7-21-08-ekhlaas-yaman-mukhaddab-criticizes-pessimism-about-iraq

That’s the claim of Abu Islam al-`Iraqi, one of the leaders of the “popular committees” in Diyala Province. 25 seems high, but it dovetails with what I wrote about the Harbi group last week.

When we left Harbi, he had met a Algerian Jihadi who told him how to get to Iraq.

According to Furqan al-Junubi’s account, Harbi and two other Kuwaitis–Abu Salih (`Abd Allah Salih al-`Ajami), and Abu Talha (Nasir) al-Dawsari–pledged to go to Iraq and die there. They called this “The Pledge of the Houris” (the virgins promised to those allowed to enter Paradise–martyrs are a shoe in). Al-Miskin al-Muhajir was with them, but he could not go due to personal circumstances (he was able to go to Afghanistan latter–see part 1).

I haven’t been able to find much on Dawsari, but there’s plenty on `Ajami. He was actually being held in Guantanamo until the U.S. transferred him to Kuwaiti custody in 2005; the Kuwaits acquitted him of all charges. By the time `Ajami met Harbi, he was married, had one child, and was financially comfortable. Those who knew him thought he had been rehabilitated.

After several days, the three men departed for Iraq. Junubi relates that Harbi left behind a large house, eight children (now ten), and a substantial sum of money. (Harbi was a car salesman.  From the looks of this, he also seems to have been a racing enthusiast. You can see Harbi at the 0:38 mark.)

Before Harbi left, Junubi, the author of our account, wrote and wished him well. Harbi replied that they would soon meet in Paradise. Harbi’s response was dated April 5, 2008, which is probably after he had left Kuwait (one of his traveling companions, `Ajami, died in late March).

Junubi relates that the three men wen to Iraq through a coordinator, but he doesn’t say where their transit point was. It has now come to light that the men went through Syria. Indeed, one of the last photos of Harbi was taken by himself on the flight to Syria.

According to press reports, `Ajami called his family from Syria to tell them where he was headed and why. The next time they would hear news of him was when they received an anonymous call informing them that `Ajami had carried out a suicide bombing. Harbi’s family got the same call a few weeks later.

According to a Furqan video that was posted on June 21, `Ajami carried out a March 23 suicide attack on the Harmat neighborhood of Mosul. A little over a month later, Harbi carried out an April 26 attack on the Tel al-Rumman police station in Mosul. (Bill Roggio at Long War Journal has a good summary of the contents, based partially on Nibras Kazimi’s analysis).

The video is over 30 minutes long and tedious in parts, but many of the useful bits can be viewed here. Harbi is the bearded, long-haired man in the center of everything (his coiffure and beard seem to be deliberately modeled on that of Khattab, a Jihadi commander in Chechnya that Harbi emulated, according to Junubi).

The first clip you see is that of Harbi talking about jihad and then chanting a nashid (hymn) with his brethren (notice the childrens’ voices in the background). The next clip is Harbi standing next to the vehicle he will use to blow himself up. After that is his attack on Tel al-Rumman, followed by `Ajami’s attack on the Harmat neighborhood. Last is Harbi again leading a group chanting a hymn.

In the full video, Harbi gives his final testament (wasiyya), summarized here. In it, he criticizes a hardline Kuwaiti Salafi scholar, Hamid al-`Ali, for badmouthing the Islamic State of Iraq. He then explains to his family that he decided to leave for Iraq because the Companions of Muhammad did not choose to sit with their families when fighting was called for.  (Harbi may have been feeling a little guilty–Junubi tells us that his mother was very ill when he left.) Harbi then chastizes other Jihadis for sitting behind their computers and doing nothing.

At the end of his testament, Harbi stands next to his car bomb. As he pats the explosive tank, he says:

I have everything: a house, a car, two wives, and eight children. But now I find happiness in my heart that I did not find in any other place.

There’s a lot to talk about here and it probably deserves a separate post, but just few closing thoughts to end the series:

• A mixture of indignation, glory seeking, camaraderie, and promise of eternal reward motivated Harbi and `Ajami to pledge themselves to die in Iraq. Since both had been detained and likely treated harshly, they may have been motivated by a desire for personal revenge as well.
• Syria is the transit point for our group, as it is for many other Gulfis seeking martyrdom in Iraq. But note that it is an Algerian Jihadi, not a local Kuwaiti, that informs the Kuwaiti group of the route.
• After reading Junubi’s account, one Ekhlaas member asked 1) why Harbi went to Iraq rather than Afghanistan and 2) why he chose to be a martyrdom operative when he had enough experience to be a trainer. In other words, why didn’t a skilled Jihadi like Harbi put his talents to better use. Junubi answers that Harbi went to Iraq because it is much easier to travel there than to Afghanistan. Moreover, many go to Iraq because it is close by. On the second question, Junubi discloses that Harbi had thought about becoming a coordinator but decided he wanted to die a martyr and not fight (presumably since the latter did not guarantee martyrdom).

Document (Arabic): 6-26-08-ekhlaas-furqan-al-junubi-story-of-harbi-and-bawasil

Just in time for Craig Whitlock’s helpful survey of Jihadi internet propaganda, Ekhlaas member Usud al-Tawhid (Lions of Monotheism) has posted a message about the Islamic State of Iraq’s method of media distribution. The message is by an Abu al-Zarqa’ al-`Iraqi, who claims to be a member of the ISI.

AZ warns forum members not to post media material from Iraq outside of official channels online. He relates that he once made this mistake when he published clips of an attack carried out by a certain “Dr. Fathi” (probably alluding to this). AZ’s action angered people in the ISI’s Media Ministry and resulted in AZ and another brother being hauled before a Sharia tribunal.

A brother informed AZ that Furqan is the only entity that can publish media material for the ISI. By this, AZ says, the brother meant that members of the ISI’s Media Ministry in al-Furqan were the only people allowed to upload material to the internet and send it to al-Fajr Media Center for distribution.

AZ explains to the brothers that there are several good reasons why the members of Furqan only want to publish media material through official channels:

1. They do not want to cause hardship for their videographers and those who expose themselves to danger. (Presumably, he means that publishing material through unofficial channels increases the security risks.)
2. They do not want to make things hard for people in the Media Ministry or Furqan.
3. When material is published unofficially, the infidels think that their efforts are succeeding and that the information specialists are not able to publish material on the Internet because of security constraints. This, AZ says, is a very important point. Publishing through official channels demoralizes the infidels because it demonstrates that their plan isn’t working and that mujahids are still able to communicate.
4. (Basically the same as point #3).
5. The videographers capture an operation and give it to the brothers who clip the important material. Then the material goes to brothers who produce a product. Then the product goes to the Media Ministry and through it to the Fajr Center to determine the right time for publication.

After going through the benefits of posting ISI material through official channels, AZ attaches a letter that explains how to post ISI material when you don’t know how to contact the ISI: Compress the material, password protect it with with a number, and save it to one of the online file sharing sites. Then contact the administrators of Ekhlaas, Boraq, Hesbah, or Firdaws and give them the link. The administrators will send the material to Fajr, and Fajr will determine the right time to publish it.

Download (Arabic): 6-24-08-ekhlaas-isi-media-distribution