Entries Tagged 'Islamic State of Iraq' ↓

Yaman Mukhaddab, a popular contributor to al-Hesbah (the most exclusive Jihadi forum), wrote an essay on July 21 in which he expressed alarm at the low morale and pessimism of some of his fellow forum members on account of al-Qaeda setbacks in Iraq.

One brother, he notes, said that the jihad in Iraq is ending like the jihad in Algeria (badly).

Another brother criticized Mukhaddab for being optimistic about Iraq.

A third said the situation is out of control and the outcome is already known.

Mukhaddab responds that such pessimism is unwarranted.  As scripture says, victory will come after severe testing.  And things can turn around at any time.  If AQ is able to strike the U.S. or if the U.S. strikes Iran, the mujahids in Iraq will benefit greatly (he doesn’t explain why).

Mukhaddab ends by reminding his readers that there was a similar level of despondency after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan but things turned out well in the end.

Despite his optimism, the fact that Mukhaddab would admit that other Jihadis on al-Hesbah–where the most influential pundits hold court–are souring on Iraq means that al-Qaeda is truly almost done there and that foreign fighters will be looking for greener pastures.

Document (Arabic): 7-21-08-ekhlaas-yaman-mukhaddab-criticizes-pessimism-about-iraq

That’s the claim of Abu Islam al-`Iraqi, one of the leaders of the “popular committees” in Diyala Province. 25 seems high, but it dovetails with what I wrote about the Harbi group last week.

When we left Harbi, he had met a Algerian Jihadi who told him how to get to Iraq.

According to Furqan al-Junubi’s account, Harbi and two other Kuwaitis–Abu Salih (`Abd Allah Salih al-`Ajami), and Abu Talha (Nasir) al-Dawsari–pledged to go to Iraq and die there. They called this “The Pledge of the Houris” (the virgins promised to those allowed to enter Paradise–martyrs are a shoe in). Al-Miskin al-Muhajir was with them, but he could not go due to personal circumstances (he was able to go to Afghanistan latter–see part 1).

I haven’t been able to find much on Dawsari, but there’s plenty on `Ajami. He was actually being held in Guantanamo until the U.S. transferred him to Kuwaiti custody in 2005; the Kuwaits acquitted him of all charges. By the time `Ajami met Harbi, he was married, had one child, and was financially comfortable. Those who knew him thought he had been rehabilitated.

After several days, the three men departed for Iraq. Junubi relates that Harbi left behind a large house, eight children (now ten), and a substantial sum of money. (Harbi was a car salesman.  From the looks of this, he also seems to have been a racing enthusiast. You can see Harbi at the 0:38 mark.)

Before Harbi left, Junubi, the author of our account, wrote and wished him well. Harbi replied that they would soon meet in Paradise. Harbi’s response was dated April 5, 2008, which is probably after he had left Kuwait (one of his traveling companions, `Ajami, died in late March).

Junubi relates that the three men wen to Iraq through a coordinator, but he doesn’t say where their transit point was. It has now come to light that the men went through Syria. Indeed, one of the last photos of Harbi was taken by himself on the flight to Syria.

According to press reports, `Ajami called his family from Syria to tell them where he was headed and why. The next time they would hear news of him was when they received an anonymous call informing them that `Ajami had carried out a suicide bombing. Harbi’s family got the same call a few weeks later.

According to a Furqan video that was posted on June 21, `Ajami carried out a March 23 suicide attack on the Harmat neighborhood of Mosul. A little over a month later, Harbi carried out an April 26 attack on the Tel al-Rumman police station in Mosul. (Bill Roggio at Long War Journal has a good summary of the contents, based partially on Nibras Kazimi’s analysis).

The video is over 30 minutes long and tedious in parts, but many of the useful bits can be viewed here. Harbi is the bearded, long-haired man in the center of everything (his coiffure and beard seem to be deliberately modeled on that of Khattab, a Jihadi commander in Chechnya that Harbi emulated, according to Junubi).

The first clip you see is that of Harbi talking about jihad and then chanting a nashid (hymn) with his brethren (notice the childrens’ voices in the background). The next clip is Harbi standing next to the vehicle he will use to blow himself up. After that is his attack on Tel al-Rumman, followed by `Ajami’s attack on the Harmat neighborhood. Last is Harbi again leading a group chanting a hymn.

In the full video, Harbi gives his final testament (wasiyya), summarized here. In it, he criticizes a hardline Kuwaiti Salafi scholar, Hamid al-`Ali, for badmouthing the Islamic State of Iraq. He then explains to his family that he decided to leave for Iraq because the Companions of Muhammad did not choose to sit with their families when fighting was called for.  (Harbi may have been feeling a little guilty–Junubi tells us that his mother was very ill when he left.) Harbi then chastizes other Jihadis for sitting behind their computers and doing nothing.

At the end of his testament, Harbi stands next to his car bomb. As he pats the explosive tank, he says:

I have everything: a house, a car, two wives, and eight children. But now I find happiness in my heart that I did not find in any other place.

There’s a lot to talk about here and it probably deserves a separate post, but just few closing thoughts to end the series:

• A mixture of indignation, glory seeking, camaraderie, and promise of eternal reward motivated Harbi and `Ajami to pledge themselves to die in Iraq. Since both had been detained and likely treated harshly, they may have been motivated by a desire for personal revenge as well.
• Syria is the transit point for our group, as it is for many other Gulfis seeking martyrdom in Iraq. But note that it is an Algerian Jihadi, not a local Kuwaiti, that informs the Kuwaiti group of the route.
• After reading Junubi’s account, one Ekhlaas member asked 1) why Harbi went to Iraq rather than Afghanistan and 2) why he chose to be a martyrdom operative when he had enough experience to be a trainer. In other words, why didn’t a skilled Jihadi like Harbi put his talents to better use. Junubi answers that Harbi went to Iraq because it is much easier to travel there than to Afghanistan. Moreover, many go to Iraq because it is close by. On the second question, Junubi discloses that Harbi had thought about becoming a coordinator but decided he wanted to die a martyr and not fight (presumably since the latter did not guarantee martyrdom).

Document (Arabic): 6-26-08-ekhlaas-furqan-al-junubi-story-of-harbi-and-bawasil

Just in time for Craig Whitlock’s helpful survey of Jihadi internet propaganda, Ekhlaas member Usud al-Tawhid (Lions of Monotheism) has posted a message about the Islamic State of Iraq’s method of media distribution. The message is by an Abu al-Zarqa’ al-`Iraqi, who claims to be a member of the ISI.

AZ warns forum members not to post media material from Iraq outside of official channels online. He relates that he once made this mistake when he published clips of an attack carried out by a certain “Dr. Fathi” (probably alluding to this). AZ’s action angered people in the ISI’s Media Ministry and resulted in AZ and another brother being hauled before a Sharia tribunal.

A brother informed AZ that Furqan is the only entity that can publish media material for the ISI. By this, AZ says, the brother meant that members of the ISI’s Media Ministry in al-Furqan were the only people allowed to upload material to the internet and send it to al-Fajr Media Center for distribution.

AZ explains to the brothers that there are several good reasons why the members of Furqan only want to publish media material through official channels:

1. They do not want to cause hardship for their videographers and those who expose themselves to danger. (Presumably, he means that publishing material through unofficial channels increases the security risks.)
2. They do not want to make things hard for people in the Media Ministry or Furqan.
3. When material is published unofficially, the infidels think that their efforts are succeeding and that the information specialists are not able to publish material on the Internet because of security constraints. This, AZ says, is a very important point. Publishing through official channels demoralizes the infidels because it demonstrates that their plan isn’t working and that mujahids are still able to communicate.
4. (Basically the same as point #3).
5. The videographers capture an operation and give it to the brothers who clip the important material. Then the material goes to brothers who produce a product. Then the product goes to the Media Ministry and through it to the Fajr Center to determine the right time for publication.

After going through the benefits of posting ISI material through official channels, AZ attaches a letter that explains how to post ISI material when you don’t know how to contact the ISI: Compress the material, password protect it with with a number, and save it to one of the online file sharing sites. Then contact the administrators of Ekhlaas, Boraq, Hesbah, or Firdaws and give them the link. The administrators will send the material to Fajr, and Fajr will determine the right time to publish it.

Download (Arabic): 6-24-08-ekhlaas-isi-media-distribution

That’s the opening line from a letter by Kenyan named `Uthman Turawari.   `Uthman relates that he had high hopes for the jihad in Iraq.  But the more he read about it, the more he saw that the Jihadis were willing to compromise the principle of bara’ (shunning anyone who differs from them ideologically).  Rather than fighting together, they are willing to work with the Baathists and with the tyrannical rulers of neighboring countries.

`Uthman was very depressed until he met a certain Abu `Abd Allah (also Bin Laden’s kunya).  Abu `Abd Allah asked `Uthman if he had ever heard of `Umar al-Baghdadi, the amir of the Islamic State of Iraq.  “No” replied `Uthman.  Abu `Abd Allah reassured `Uthman that Baghdadi is fighting for all Muslims, not just the Muslims of Iraq, and that the Islamic State of Iraq is the hope of the Muslim community.  `Uthman ends his letter by saying is now feels confident that the ISI is fighting for him, even though he is far away in Kenyan.

This letter is probably pure propaganda, but it’s the sort of propaganda that Jihadis are exceptionally good at: treating serious subjects in a casual way through stories.  In this case, they accomplish several things.  First, they take a shot at their main Jihadi rivals in Iraq, the Islamic Army in Iraq, which has been willing to work with more secular insurgents and has a good relationship with Syria and Saudi.  Second, they diffuse a common complaint against AQ, which is that it is narrowly focused on the Arab world.  Third, the storyteller is from Kenya, an old stomping ground of al-Qaeda and a place that its operatives are likely to return (particularly along the coast).

Document (Arabic): 5-18-08-ekhlaas-kenyans-story-of-isi