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A Little-Known Syrian Jihadi Magazine

November 8, 2013 by Joas Wagemakers 1 Comment

In various previous posts, I have paid attention to the Syrian-British Jihadi-Salafi ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi, for example because of his criticism of other jihadis and his support for the Free Syrian Army at the expense of Jabhat al-Nusra. His position, differing somewhat from that of other major radical scholars, was interesting because it was more conciliatory towards non-Islamists and remnants of previous regimes and also because it was less dismissive of the widespread calls for democracy that the Arab Spring showed.

The Arab Spring also pulled Abu Basir out of the semi-isolation that he was in when he was still living in Britain. Since the early protests against the Syrian regime, he has been very active in promoting the downfall of President Bashar al-Asad, with an unprecedented amount of footage of his speeches, lessons, etc. appearing on YouTube. Part of this greater exposure in the media was a Facebook page that al-Tartusi had, called The Islamic Resistance to the Syrian Regime. This “Islamic Resistance” also published a magazine that I have not heard mentioned anywhere and that I also could not find on Aaron Zelin’s Jihadology website, which probably means it’s not very well-known. This post looks at the topics dealt with in this magazine.

Short-lived

The first thing that you notice about the magazine, entitled simply “The Magazine of the Islamic Resistance, is that publishing it must have been a rather short-lived affair. The entire magazine numbers only five issues (here, here, here, here and here), with the first one appearing in March/April 2012 and the latest one – despite the fact that it was supposed to be published every fortnight – in May 2013. Given the long time period between the different issues, one could argue that no. 5 is not the last one and that no. 6 has simply not been published yet, although it has been over six months since the last issue, so that does not seem likely.

The second thing that is striking about the magazine is the fact that Abu Basir plays a very prominent part in it. (Parts of) his articles feature regularly in the magazine’s pages and the back pages of issues 2-5 explicitly mention al-Tartusi’s website, as well as the aforementioned Facebook page of the Islamic Resistance to the Syrian Regime. The magazine as a whole often features material that has been published elsewhere before and is also quite thin (12 pages), thereby giving the impression that not too much work has been put into producing it. One could argue that such magazines are made under less than ideal circumstances, what with the country being embroiled in a civil war, but that has not stopped other jihadi magazines from looking rather slick.

Information, Encouragement and Defamation

The magazine’s contents are diverse, but can basically be summed up by the words information, encouragement and defamation. Particularly at first, the magazine sought to inform its readers by giving them a list of attacks perpetrated by the Free Syrian Army (no. 1, p. 3) or a story about the history of Dar’a (no. 1, p. 5). This continued by posting bits from Abu Basir’s “scrapbook of the revolution and the revolutionaries” (for more on this, see here), yet as time went by these became less and less informative and more and more crudely anti-regime.

As I recall from my research several years ago on Saudi jihadi magazines such as Sawt al-Jihad and Mu’askar al-Battar, both published by Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (and about one of which Nico Prucha has written a very interesting book, by the way), one of the things the editors of such magazines try to do is to encourage their readers to continue the fighting, to keep the faith and not to lose hope. (Such behaviour is often seen among social movements trying to ensure the support of their followers.) This can be done by celebrating victories, showing progress that has been made or pointing to goals that have already been reached, for instance. In this magazine, such encouragement is found in singing the praises of the people who actually go out and fight in Syria (no. 2, p. 7), lauding Syria as a country worth fighting for (no. 2, p. 8) or calling on people to help free prisoners (no. 3, p. 10).

The most “encouraging” aspect of the magazine, particularly in the later issues, was undoubtedly the increasing number of rather graphic photographs of dead Syrian children and gruesome wounds suffered by the people hit in attacks. Perhaps such photographs were simply published to show what the regime had done, yet it is tempting to see them as implicit (or sometimes not so implicit) calls for revenge. This dovetails with the third thing the magazine tries to do, namely to defame the Syrian regime and its ‘Alawi beliefs. Perhaps the most frequent theme of articles in the magazines is the crimes of the Syrian regime, which is quite understandable, and the supposedly deviant nature of the ‘Alawites in general.

Epitome

Two things come to mind when flicking through the pages of these magazines: firstly, the increasing emphasis on defaming the regime and ‘Alawis seems to reflect the more and more radical nature of the Islamist groups fighting the Syrian regime; secondly, given the small number of issues published, the early demise of this magazine seems to mirror the fortunes of the Free Syrian Army and the moderate Islamist opposition that Abu Basir supported at the beginning. If recent reports are correct, these factions play a much smaller role than they did at the beginning, with groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) now calling the shots. As such, the magazine seems to be the epitome of the moderate Islamist opposition in Syria: it started out with plenty of ambition, but eventually seems to have been reduced to something small and relatively irrelevant.

Filed Under: Jihadi media, propaganda, Syria

66 Important Jihadist Twitter Accounts (part 2)

September 4, 2013 by Nico Prucha 1 Comment

In our earlier post, together with Ali Fisher we detailed and assessed 66 accounts listed by Shumukh al-Islam jihadi Forum member Ahmad ‘Abdallah as ‘important jihadist’ members on twitter. We looked primarily at the users individually, using the data of these 66 accounts to create this infographic to give our readers an overview of these users.

In this post we focus on what we are able to find out about them as a group and provide an interactive network map to show the links between these advocated ‘important jihadist’ twitter accounts.

Relational dynamics

Analysing the relational dynamics between these accounts as a group and those who choose to follow them is a key part of understanding the online strategies of “The most important jihadi and support sites for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter”.

As we identified previously, the accounts had been categorized in different types by Ahmad ‘Abdallah. This underlines the diverse range of information, which was recommended to further the jihadist endeavour in general. In addition to understanding the specific accounts, the data can be used to analyse the network of individuals who follow the 66 ‘important jihadist’ accounts. The relationships are important as they influence the way individuals search for information, what they find and the behaviours they adopt.

We began by identifying the followers of the 66 ‘important jihadist’ accounts. If each of these accounts were followed by a different group of Twitter users, then this would mean that collectively they were reaching 1.8 million users. However, @mujtahidd alone is followed by over 1.1 million followers, and the real number following the remaining important jihadi accounts is much lower than 700,000. This is because some users follow more than one of the ‘important jihadist’ accounts. Using network analysis, we found that the network following one or more of these accounts (excluding @mujtahidd) was 377235 users and 852948 follower/following relationships. The image below represents the network of important accounts and their respective followers. Each Twitter account is represented by a dot, and those with a follower / following relationship are connected by a line.

The graph (above) shows the network of users identified to be following at least one of the ‘important jihadist’ accounts (excluding @mujtahidd). The colours have been used to highlight the groups of users who follow the same users (or same combination of the 66 ‘important jihadist’ accounts). A quick view of the network image reinforces the previous observation that most of the users are following only one or two of these high-profile accounts in the jihadist online media mind-set. The importance of this combined approach is the ability to analyse the combinations of accounts which users have chosen to follow.

For example, this view of the network shows the concentration of user names near the bottom of the image, (highlighted in red) indicating that there are a number of accounts with fewer followers where the overlaps in follower groups are more pronounced. The Jabhat al-Nusra twitter account (discussed in greater detail here) also has a number of followers in common with the cluster of users highlighted.

Focusing on the Network of the 66 ‘important jihadist’ Accounts

In addition to the potential to look at the followers of the 66 accounts claimed to be ‘most important’ by the Shumukh al-Islam posting, their profiles and time zones, the relationships between these specific 66 accounts can also provide analysts with insights. For example, JbhatALnusra, WaleedGaj2002, AsadAljehad2 are most frequently followed by the 66 ‘important jihadist’ accounts. Conversely, SaveArakan4, Mhaajrr, housse_100, and alassra2012 appear on the list of the 66, but few other ‘important jihadist’ accounts follow them.  The ranking (shown below) is based on frequency of being followed by the 66 ‘important’ accounts are also reflected in the eigenvector calculations for the network. The relationships between the 66 accounts are shown in the image below, and be explored in greater detail by clicking on the image, which will open the interactive version. When using the interactive image, clicking on a node will focus on the connections of that user, double click to open the twitter account of that user.

Please note that the interactive image works best in the Chrome Browser.

The network as a whole represents 958 relationships between the 66 ‘important jihadist’ users with a network diameter of 5 (the distance between the furthest two nodes calculated on the directed graph). The network density is 0.2 on the directed graph (1 would represent a complete graph, where all connections would exist).

Key nodes in the network

In our previous post, we emphasized “we are analyzing these accounts that are defined in this [Shumukh al-Islam] posting as most important for jihadi sympathizers, but it does not necessarily mean that the individual Twitter accounts are an integral part of this worldview.” In this follow-up work, however, we, perhaps not surprisingly, found that the majority of the connected accounts are hard core jihadi media activists. From the above listed, we shall have a look at some of the high-profile hard core jihadist Twitter accounts.

As we analysed JbhatALnusra previously (here, here),  let’s have a look at

@WaleedGaj2002

The account has over 45,000 followers while only following 387. Apparently this is the account of “former Guantanamo detainee and eyewitness of the Qila-e-Jangji massacre in Afghanistan” Walid [Muhammad] al-Hajj, from Sudan. According to his latest tweets, he still seems to be on the same page as the mainstream al-Qa’ida jihadis are, appraising Bin Laden and being cherished by other Twitter members for having known the shaykh personally. For further details, here is an interview with al-Jazeera. He was released in 2008. His leaked file is available via The New York Times.

@Strategyaffairs

This is a prolific and quite industrious jihadi media activists with over 100,000 followers and just over a little of 4,000 tweets. He is also active in most classical jihadist forums as ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad. Occasionally he has tweeted statements by the Yemeni AQAP prior to the ‘official’ broadcast within the forums and contextualized as well as posted the statements both within the forums and Twitter. Other Shumukh al-Islam members, for instance, used his Twitter-input to further the AQAP statements within the forum raising @Strategyaffairs status in general (example).

@EYADQUNAIBI

Doctor Iyad Qunaybi is somewhat of a rising star within the radical on- and offline scene. He is active on all social media outlets and his videotaped speeches are also transcribed and published within the jihadist forums. He rose to fame within this subculture in the past year and a half during the troubled times in Egypt and also responded to the jihadi affairs of life in general. By being included on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s database tawhed.ws, his standing was boosted. Few of his writings and audiobits are available on his author page on tawhed.ws under Iyad al-Qunaybi. His input is valued, re-tweeted and re-disseminated within the forums, on Facebook, and further published on sites such as justpaste.it, see here for example.

@as_ansar

This is the official Twitter account of the bi-lingual Shabakat al-Ansar al-Mujahideen. The main forum is in Arabic and down and out for some time now. The English forum works. With the main forum gone for the while being, this is a good example on how Twitter has become a tangible alternative to the media driven jihadists, for the Twitter accounts remain alive and very active with their over 26,000 followers, untouched by any disruptions of the forums. The YouTube link above is an “invitation to Muslims to visit the forum” and recommends and instructs the use of Tor to conceal one’s identity online.

@Al_nukhba

This account could be described as a jihadi media hub. The members, active on the forums for years, are highly committed and regularly produce transcriptions of jihadist media productions. This is naturally very helpful for any analyst but is also quite a service for the jihadi audience. Usually speeches of main leaders and ideologues as well as major video productions of as-Sahab, al-Malahem etc. are transcribed and can be conveniently downloaded as a PDF or Word document. For a first hand impression on the quantity and quality of this media department’s work, check out their contributions on the Shumukh al-Islam forum here.

On their main website data collections and videos can be downloaded and also searched for. It is a well built and maintained datawarehouse for extremist content that is first and foremost uploaded and disseminated via the classical forums. The Twitter account has about 6,000 followers, over 500 tweets, and is following no one.

This had been one of the pioneer jihadi Twitter accounts and advertised their social media passion as early as 2009. Perhaps the name nukhbat al-I’lami al-jihadi, “the Jihadi Media Elite”, stems from Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s “Message to the British and European Peoples and Governments regarding the Explosions in London”, July 2005, where he outlined the Internet as the most important medium to propagate and spread the jihadists demands and frame of reference in general. He referred to “the jihadi elite” residing in Europe to partake in this venture.

The ‘betweenness’ calculation highlights those users through which the shortest paths across the network most frequently pass. These users are often found near the centre of the network image. From the perspective of ‘betweenness’, in addition to some of the users mentioned above, also appear to have an important role bridging between different elements of the network.

To provide some additional insight in this, here is some basic information on

@Caucasusaffairs

The name of this account is program, everything related to the Caucasus, the Caucasus Emirate (analysis) with the focus on Chechnya is published here in mainly Arabic but also Russian. With over 44,000 followers while following over 400 and about 8,000 tweets this account is a valuable asset besides the main forums and their pertaining subsections. It mainly retweets the Arabic language media outlet “Echo of Caucasus” which is one of the main media hubs in Arabic for many years. You may note the four fingered black hand on the yellow background, a symbol to the Rabaa al-Adawiya protest camp whereby many pro-Mursi citizens were killed in Egypt recently. For more on this topic, check out the fantastic Closer blog here. The use of this icon in the Chechen context is yet another attempt by the media savvy jihadists to globalize their agenda and serves as proof for the repeated claim of the “war against Islam”. In the meantime this icon has been further ‘jihadised’ by adding the typical black banner, see here for example.

What does this tell us?

The density of the network has two results. First it creates mutually reinforcing clusters of information which can crowd out other perspectives and contribute to the development of a zeitgeist, or a new electronic propaganda frontier, as discussed in relation to activity of Jabhat al-Nusra.

Second, the density of the network tends to protect it against basic disruption strategies, for example the removal or suspension of individual accounts. As Paul Baran’s work On Distributed Communications has demonstrated only a small level of redundancy is required to build a communications systems to withstand heavy enemy attacks. Although this work was done in the context of the 1960s and was particularly focused on challenges faced in the 1970s, the insight provided by the study also relates to online activity and the need for more complex strategies to disrupt dense communication networks.

Filed Under: Ideological trends, Indoctrination, Jihadi media, social media, technology

Jihadi Twitter activism – Introduction

April 27, 2013 by Nico Prucha 9 Comments

Ali Fisher and I have recently exchanged thoughts and data regarding the increasing Jihadi use of Twitter. By taking an interdisciplinary approach of social-media analysis and cluster network assessment, we decided to start a series on Jihadica on the parts of the overall jihadi, primarily Arabic language propaganda resonating among the audiences online. We plan on delivering updates on the subject as we move along and kick-off the series with an overall introduction to the theme.

In future posts in the series, we will highlight and decipher some of the core content most often shared on Twitter, allowing conclusions to be drawn about the parts of jihadist propaganda which resonate with a wider audience (and hence shared over and over again).

Introducing the theme

The recent essay by Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili on the state of global online jihad (discussed here) lamented a general decline in participation in jihadi online forums. Furthermore, al-‘Amili issued a “Call (nida’) to the Soldiers of the Jihadi Media” demanding that they “return to their frontiers (thughur)” elevating their status. Al-‘Amili himself is one of the high-profile clerics, a “prolific “Internet Shaykh” (Lia) on the forums, but is also quite active on twitter (@al3aamili).

Two interrelated causes identified by Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili were the periods when forums were offline and the migration of users to social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook. This is exacerbated by the movement of “major [jihadi] writers and analysts” (kibar al-kuttab wa-l-muhallilin) from the forums to social media platforms. This has perhaps increased the momentum of members of tier-one jihad forums to expand onto twitter while twitter as a massive communication relay has become the basis for a new generation of sympathizers, posing another intersection. Twitter is a further medium of choice to (re-) disseminate propaganda material in general and is a platform where activists, sympathizers, and actual fighters upload audiovisual and other types into the jihadi hub.

Jihadists have aggressively expanded the use of twitter, in addition to Facebook and YouTube, especially since the outbreak of violence in Syria. During 2011 members of Jihadist forums issued media-strategies and advisory to fellow members prior, as for example is stated in this posting here of the al-Ansar forum. The posting, initiated by the member Istishhadiyya is basically a very elemental guide, comprehensive and for beginners, highlighting the effective and fast communication capability. The same posting was copy-and-pasted by Shumukh member Basha’ir shortly afterwards. A handbook, compiled by Twitter user @osamh ended up on the jihadi forums to further underline the importance of Twitter as well as its difference to Facebook, where jihadists already have a strong presence.

It took a while for jihadi activism to fully unravel on Twitter, and they have maintained a cohesive as well as detailed presence on this social media platform since the Syrian conflict turned violent in 2012.

Twitter, and as such social media in general, is in the meantime an integral part of jihadists’ media endeavors on the Internet, with the majority of jihadi forums having their official account advertised for on the main pages of the forums.

The role of the media activists, or in jihadist speak the “media mujahid” has since the death of Osama bin Laden in May of 2011 been promoted, highlighted and approved. AQ related documents have made this role model prominent. The role model of the “media martyr” any “media mujahid” can be become, is backed by the call to take the fight on a greater level on al channels online issued by al-Fajr in their response of the killing of bin Laden:

“The Internet is a battlefield for jihad, a place for missionary work, a field of confronting the enemies of God. It is upon any individual to consider himself as a media-mujahid, dedicating himself, his wealth and his time for God.” (Analysis here, Arabic original here)

At first, the strategies to promote Twitter among members of jihadi forums failed to develop substantial traction, but this changed drastically during 2012. When jihadists in and outside of Syria started to use and incorporate twitter as a medium to disseminate and re-post al-Qa’ida and other propaganda material.

Twitter activism and jihadi supporters

At first Syrian non-violent activists used, and continue to use, twitter as a medium to document human rights abuse and war crimes of the Assad regime, but jihadists quickly adapted that content and the platform for their propaganda.

Social-media smart and professional jihadists adopted this treasure grove for their propaganda. By rebranding and reframing the content created by civil society activists, jihadi propaganda used these grievances to support a key jihadist self-perception; the obligation to respond by force to defend and protect the Sunnites in Syria.

Due to the effect and success of the Syrian based Jihadi groups, other jihadi groups as well as the main forums are adopting the twitter activism, advertising official forum accounts on the main pages with users within the forums using twitter hashtags (#) or references to twitter users (for example: @al_nukhba). A list of “The most important jihadi and support sites for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter’” was recently posted on the Shumukh al-Islam forum, allowing users to identify key accounts they might wish to follow.

Individual sympathizers and all those feeling inclined to contribute to the media jihad re-disseminate authoritative files of al-Qa’ida on twitter on a larger scale. Now all major jihadi media departments, part of militant networks, have their own channels on Twitter, linking to content from the jihadi forums and other social media platforms, primarily YouTube, Facebook, and pictures in general.

Twitter has turned into a primary hub for the distribution of jihadi agitprop files. These Jihadi information sharing networks using Twitter coexist, autonomously, with the classical forums. These networks carry, for example, samples of the wide range of jihadi propaganda files, in some cases placed first on Twitter, posted via mobile phones from the front lines. As a brief overview, a few samples consisting of:

 

  • martyrs in general and martyrdom operatives (istishhadiyyun) announced and identified by their hashtag and Twitter account;
  • calls for donations with phone numbers and social media contact information; taking care of the orphans of the martyrs among other civil elements;
  • general material of incitement, and the impact of online attained propaganda files used offline are popular and gain plenty of traction,

What are they sharing?

In addition to disseminating their own propaganda, jihadi media activists repurpose content from social movements and non-jihadi groups for their own purposes, framing the non-jihadi actions or demonstrations as part of the global militant struggle. This has created another ‘grey area’ where analysts have to carefully monitor and decipher such content. The forum administrators and media-activists also are starting to incorporate and misuse Twitter for their purposes, in coordinated attempts to virtually infiltrate legitimate social movements by using the same hash tags and a similar rhetoric to create ideological cohesion – and placing extremist views and files in that virtual sphere while claiming to fight on the ground for the sake of the people.

To analyze jihadi media networks, their sympathizers and followers we have used a combined approach focused on a unique interdisciplinary analysis of the data acquired by technical means and the subsequent and immediate analytical process of its content.

Using these methods we have asked a range of questions, how have jihadi propagandists been able to gain traction and a foothold online? How do they disseminate propaganda content to a global, multilingual audience and what resonates most with that audience? What are the networks through which their content flows and what are the different roles users play within these networks? Ultimately do the different jihadi twitter accounts reach a range of different communities, or is it a small densely interconnected echo chamber?

 

Filed Under: Ideological trends, Jihadi media, social media

Are the Jihadi Forums Flagging? An Ideologue’s Lament

March 20, 2013 by Cole Bunzel 3 Comments

Last month prominent jihadi ideologue Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili published a critical essay on the state of online global jihad. Released by Fursan al-Balagh Media (@fursanalbalaagh) on February 17, the eight-page essay stirringly lamented a general decline in participation in jihadi online forums (websites such as Shumukh al-Islam and Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya) and pleaded with users to reinvigorate the forums as the proper centers of jihadi discussion and intellectual production online. (For the history of these forums and their important role in jihadi activity, including their ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, see here.)

While it is certainly a stretch to say that the forums are falling into desuetude, al-‘Amili’s lament ought to be taken seriously, if only on account of the author’s status in jihadi circles. The pseudonymous shaykh is a prolific jihadi presence online, with numerous essays and fatwas and even a collection of poetry to his name. Who al-‘Amili actually is remains a mystery. He has previously justified guarding his true identity—and any and all details of his background—out of security concerns, citing Qur‘an 74:31: “And none knows the soldiers of your Lord except He.”

His essay in question, “On the Languishing of the Jihadi Forums: Causes and Solutions,” is a passionate appeal to his fellow jihadi netizens. Al-‘Amili describes the forums as a “factory” whose workers ought to be participating in production but who apparently are not working very hard. He admonishes forum members for not honoring the “responsibilities” that forum membership entails, including guarding the forums’ “reputation,” “credibility,” and “preeminence” in the field of jihadi media.

The rest of the essay consists of two parts, the first enumerating the reasons behind the decline of the forums and the second providing suggestions for turning this situation around.

Why the forums are flagging

The first reason for the forums’ “languishing,” according to al-‘Amili, is the periodic disruptions to which they are subjected by “our enemies,” meaning Western governments. In spring of last year, for example, most of the major jihadi forums were shut down for a number of days or weeks. The result of such shutdowns, says the author, is that some forum members seek out temporary online alternatives, though most simply abandon their previous activity out of either fear or negligence.

The second reason is increasing fear of monitoring and tracking by state governments, which has resulted from these routine forum outages.

The third is the “departure into battle” (al-nafir) of forum members heading to theaters of jihad such as Syria. Al-‘Amili proudly notes that “the jihadi forums are universities graduating bands of ansar al-jihad” (supporters of jihad). These “departers” are not to be considered a loss to the forums, though their departure does result in decreased activity. (For a study that confirms the phenomenon of forum members moving to jihad fronts, see here.)

The fourth reason for the forums’ decline, and the one which al-‘Amili focuses on the most, is jihadis’ migration to social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook. Such movement was born out of necessity during the periods when the forums were shut down, he says. This bore fruit temporarily, but in the long run relying on social media is an error that will derogate from the centrality of the forums—“our protected strongholds.” The movement of “major [jihadi] writers and analysts” (kibar al-kuttab wa-l-muhallilin) to social networking sites is also part of this problem, as ordinary forum members have migrated with them in order to follow their writings.

The fifth and final reason for decline is a vicious circle problem following from the withdrawal of both major writers and ordinary members. When the former’s writings have received little attention on the forums from the latter, the major writers have been further discouraged from contributing directly to the forums. Thus the withdrawal of the one reinforces the withdrawal of the other.

How to reinvigorate the forums

The first of al-‘Amili’s “suggested solutions” to reversing the forums’ purported state of disrepair is reaffirming the importance of the forums “as a defensive, lethal weapon for confronting the enemies of the Islamic community.” As much as soldiering on the battlefield, actively participating on the forums ought to be considered jihad in the fullest sense of the word.

Second is for members to have more confidence in the forums’ security and in their own security as users. The forum administrators, he says, are more concerned with the general membership’s safety than with their own; they are utterly devoted to forum security and would never forsake “their soldiers.” It is simply unjustified, he says, to turn away from the forums out of fear that they have been compromised. Nor is it justified to turn away out of fear that participating will lead to being monitored. Members need only use the “identity-disguising programs” (baramij al-takhaffi) designed by “your technician brothers” on the forums to protect their online anonymity.

Third is for major jihadi writers to use the forums as the main outlet for their writings, thus drawing ordinary members back to the forums in tow. Here he directs a plea to “the major [jihadi] writers and shaykhs and analysts” to return to the forums. These latter ought to be “the main theater of your jihad and the principal point of departure for your guidance and your analysis.”

Fourth is to recognize the inadequacy of social media as an alternative to the forums, a point on which al-‘Amili is adamant. On social media, he says, we are only “guests,” for these sites are run by “our enemies.” Inevitably there will come a day when “they shut their doors in our faces.” What is more, relying on social media poses an inherent danger to jihadis as “the enemies” can use these sites against us at any time. If we preference social media we will be “duped” into diminishing and spoiling our efforts. The forums ought to be jihadis’ “base and foundation” online.

Fifth is to attract new technical experts, graphics designers, and translators to “jihadi media organizations”—which publicize on the forums—to improve the effectiveness of the media and messages posted there.

An effective prescription?

If al-‘Amili’s five stated reasons for decline are accurate, is it possible, following the author’s prescription, to reinvigorate the forums? The short answer seems to be no: periodic forum outages have been damaging and the attraction of social media is on the rise. But one must also consider that al-‘Amili is exaggerating the extent of whatever “languishing” is actually taking place. For one thing, jihadi participation in social media has not necessarily undermined the position of the forums.

Recently, Shumukh members posted long lists of jihadi Facebook and Twitter accounts suggested for following. Among the Twitter accounts listed was one belonging to a certain Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili (@al3aamili)—yes, the very author of this essay warning readers of the dangers of social media. Al-‘Amili, in fact, has tweeted quite often since December 2012.

Indeed, social media has probably benefited the state of online global jihad by exposing the jihadi message to more potential sympathizers and recruits. This has had the effect of decentralizing the online jihadi environment, leading to relatively less participation on the forums in the form of discussion and analysis. But the forums are hardly in a state of disrepair; comments and analyses are constantly being posted, often in a parallel effort with Facebook and Twitter jihadi accounts. This is very much the case with the “major writers” whom al-‘Amili mentions—and among whom al-‘Amili may be counted. Their writings tend to originate with independent jihadi media outlets that post to Twitter and Facebook, as well as to the forums.

Rather than languishing, the forums have succeeded in retaining their special position as an unusually private setting for exclusive discussion, which sometimes leads to collaborative efforts. Furthermore, as the main conduits for conveying official al-Qaeda media to the online jihadi community, they continue to enjoy a vaunted status as semi-official websites for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. They may be suffering somewhat, but the jihadi forums are hardly on the down and out.

Filed Under: Better Know a Forum, Jihadi media

Al-Qaeda Advises the Syrian Revolution: Shumukh al-Islam’s “Comprehensive Strategy” for Syria

February 25, 2013 by Cole Bunzel 9 Comments

Three weeks ago members of Shumukh al-Islam, al-Qaeda’s premier online forum, began collaboration on a “comprehensive strategy” for the ongoing Syrian jihad. In a thread started by a certain “Handasat al-Qaeda,” several dozen members of the access-restricted site set down a plethora of observations and recommendations.

A week later, on February 9, the same member to initiate the thread condensed these contributions into a single strategic document, intended to represent the forum membership’s thinking as a whole. The author identified the document as sensitive and not to be shared except via email with jihadis lacking access to Shumukh. (The Shumukh forum, which has direct ties to al-Qaeda, is password-protected and does not readily register new users.) In the spirit of transparency, I have taken the liberty of translating the document in its entirety (see below).

In all likelihood, Shumuk’s so-called “comprehensive strategy” for Syria has less value for jihadis on the battlefield as actionable strategy than it does for researchers as a window into how important jihadi thinkers are processing the unending Syrian civil war. In this regard, the document is particularly revealing in two respects.

First, contrary to the triumphalist tone of much Syrian jihadi media, the Shumukh members are not upbeat in their description of ongoing and anticipated events. For the present, there is hope mixed with desperation and fear; for the future, a strong sense that the jihadis will suffer strangulation from all sides. In their worldview, some form of Western intervention to stymie jihadi success is all but assured; the West, with its Israeli and Iranian allies, will seal Syria’s borders and proceed to eliminate the jihadi threat, carving up Syria and elevating the “Islamists” to power.

Second, Shumukh’s recommendations presuppose a very long war in Syria. These include such things as rapidly increasing the number of recruits before the borders are sealed, making sure to take control of the regime’s heavy and unconventional weapons, establishing a unified media organization for more effective propaganda, and refraining, at all costs, from allying with “Islamists” such as the Muslim Brotherhood, no matter how attractive this might seem.

Read in full, Shumukh’s “comprehensive strategy” for Syria presents an unmistakably grim prognostication for jihadism’s future in Syria—indeed a grim prognostication for Syria’s future in general. It is an attempt to think realistically about the challenges to true jihadi success in Syria in the coming months and years.

Translation of Shumukh al-Islam’s “comprehensive strategy” for Syria:

As you know, brothers, the intention of this thread is to bring together the greatest possible number of strategic ideas and proposals from which our mujahidin brothers and their supporters, especially those on the fighting front in Syria and its surrounding areas, may benefit. We would like here for our forums, in addition to their traditional role of support, publication, mobilization, and exhortation, to be centers for research and sophisticated studies that issue reports and advisory recommendations by which we may progress, by firm and well-studied steps on our path toward the virtuous caliphate, and arrive by God’s help and support at the desired objective in the quickest time possible and at the lowest possible cost. This is just as our enemies have centers for research and advisory studies, directed by contemptuous experts and thinkers, constantly issuing recommendations and reports which their countries’ governments act upon.

Here we will combine what we managed to summarize of previous and other entries, reducing them to a number of important and all-inclusive strategic points. These will give us, and our brothers in Syria and its environs, a clear picture of what our enemies are planning for us and what we must do to resist them, nay what we must do to take charge of our present and future activities and to compel our enemies to respond to what we—not they—are planning.

First, there are two points which constitute red lines and on which there can be no debate with anyone, whether in Syria or elsewhere. The first is ruling on the basis of the Islamic Shari‘ah, that is, striving to establish an Islamic state that rules according to the book of God and the normative practice of His Prophet, peace and prayers be upon him, in accordance with the understanding of the pious forefathers of this [Islamic] community and the interpretation of their pious successors. The second is non-recognition of any Sykes-Picot boundaries between our Islamic countries, near or distant, except insofar as Islamic activity may require harmless formalities, like the requirements of travel and logistical cooperation, on account of what this serves us in gathering soldiers and support and the like.

In light of the foregoing points, here we will set down certain recommendations, as well as [describe] certain events anticipated—by God’s will—to transpire.

Events anticipated and ongoing:

First, most of our thinkers expect the struggle in Syria to endure for a long time, and it is necessary therefore to make the needed provisions for this.

Second, there is currently an ongoing race, and there will be Crusader-Israeli-Iranian efforts, to wrest control of or destroy the chemical weapons facilities within Syria before they come under the control of those whom this criminal alliance believes are a danger to it: namely, the jihadis or Hezbollah[i] from the perspective of the Jews and the Crusaders, and the jihadis from the perspective of the Iranian Zoroastrians and the Crusaders.[ii]

Third, a Crusader power will, inevitably, arrive on Syrian territory, using multiple pretexts such as “preserving peace” or “protecting the Jews” or “protecting the poor and innocent Alawite community!!!!”

Fourth, there will be efforts to partition Syrian territory—or partition will be imposed upon it—with a view to protecting the Alawite sect so that the latter may serve as a Crusader-Jewish-Zoroastrian nail in the throat of the Sunnis in greater Syria. This is an outcome which must be guarded against no matter how many Islamists engage in the conspiracy, either as clients cognizant of the conspiracy, or as fools ignorant of it.

Fifth, the revolution and the mujahidin are currently being besieged in an effort to prevent their acquiring arms, while at the same time military, logistical, and financial support are being provided to the Alawite regime. There are, of course, a number of reasons for this, all of them being interests of the alliance mentioned above:

  • prolonging the war until the desired arrangement of cards and puppets can emerge;
  • bleeding the financial reserves of the regime and sucking dry everything in this foolish Alawite’s possession;
  • transforming those financial reserves into arms and weapons stocks for the regime, that it might use them against its people in bombarding and destroying them, or that they might fall as booty into the hands of the revolution’s fighting units;
  • exploiting the revolutionaries’ seizure of the regime’s weapons in order to destroy what remains of it [the regime].

With time, everyone will be exhausted, all weapons in Syria will be destroyed, and all signs of civilization will be obliterated and cast back to what existed before the Stone Age. Thus will the path be paved for direct and indirect military intervention in Syria, and for redrawing the map in accordance with the wishes of the Zionist-Crusader-Zoroastrian alliance.

Sixth, different forms of intervention will multiply in Syria, which will become filled with contradictory ideas leading to major disagreements among opposition forces, as well as among the independent fighting units of foreign origin fighting on the battlefield in league with these forces.

Seventh, and with the transformation of the revolution’s course into an “Islamist” one, “drawing on the support of God and intending to establish His rule on the ground,” it is the “secular Islamists” who will be brought to power, power being their main objective. In this they will be encouraged by the forces of the international conspiracy, but on the condition that they [the Islamists] oppose with all their might this jihadi Islamic tide aspiring to the virtuous caliphate. What will happen, in other words, is that pseudo-Muslims will be attacking Muslims, thus sparing the infidel powers the evil of fighting themselves. Of course, this group (i.e., the secularist pseudo-Muslims) is that which will be provisioned with weapons from now on, so that instead of against the Alawites they [the weapons] may be used against the [conspiracy’s] real enemy, which is those who wish to implement the rule of the Islamic Shari‘ah.

Eighth, after the exhaustion or downfall of the regime, the Zionist-Crusader-Zoroastrian alliance and its allies in Syria will, if possible, reorient its compass in a new direction, sealing off all borders to forestall an influx of jihadi recruits and any kind of logistical support for them. This will be with a view to besieging them [the jihadis] and beginning a confrontation with those of them present inside the country.

Ninth, the shared interests [in besieging the jihadis] mentioned in point eight will expand to encompass the Brotherhood government in Turkey, the client Son of the Crusaders in Jordan and his Brotherhood friends, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Safavid government in Iraq, the hypocrite government in the Hijaz, the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, and others who are clearly with them.

Tenth, in sum, perhaps it will be that our brothers in Syria are exposed to extraordinary pressure, assault, forced retreat, ignominy, and many, many other things. But all of this, God permitting, will be of a piece with the greatness of the trial and the test, and the greatness of the responsibility assumed for pushing the community of one and a half billion Muslims toward salvation. And few are those, unfortunately, deserving of such credit.

As for the recommendations that are advised:

First, patience…and more patience, and trust in God alone in all things, and dependence upon Him, be He praised and exalted. For He is the Bringer of success and the All-Knowing about His servants.

Second, keeping in our eyes the principal objective at all times no matter what the challenges. This is: the annihilation of the Alawites, then the establishment of God’s law in the land of Syria—in preparation for erecting the larger virtuous caliphate on all of the earth—and removing all obstacles standing in the way.

Third, making the necessary provisions and taking the necessary measures for what will follow the fall or toppling of the regime. In fact, these are of greater concern to us than the ongoing war, be one a mujahid inside Syria or a supporter somewhere around the world.

Fourth, collecting the greatest possible amount of heavy and unconventional weapons and guarding them in full security, as there will be great need for them in the future.

Fifth, increasing recruitment [of mujahidin] extensively and securely—securely meaning the possibility of recruiting large fighting units for service with Jabhat al-Nusrah while instructing individuals in the correct [Islamic] creed and path, periodically polishing them [in this way], and selecting those whose credibility has been established for dependable battalions…and things such as this—as well as establishing links and alliances, insofar as these do not contravene God’s law, with the many influential forces in Syria, such as other Islamic organizations, tribal shaykhs, and others.

Sixth, working to increase greatly the inflow of recruits to Syria, both because of what need the brothers have there and because the openness of these borders will not persist; rather the borders will soon be closed. But this inflow need not require emptying other [jihad] fronts of the fighters and young men who are needed there; rather [the latter should spare only] what they have above and beyond their local need and in proportion to the need of our brothers in Syria if it be greater.

Seventh, all forces of Ansar al-Shari‘ah throughout the world (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and even in Europe) must take concerted action in two ways:

  • First, work to increase the number of lectures and activities relating to preaching, consciousness raising, and communications—with regard to the media, there is today a concerted media war against the brothers in Syria and especially from the channel “al-Jazeera,” for recently this lying channel has attributed all the various operations and activities in Syria to the “Free Syrian Army”; this is a criminal and programmatic effort to brainwash the viewers and render the past and future of the revolution empty of any activity or space for Islamic fighters—and work to inform the Islamic community of the truth of the struggle [in Syria], of its nature as global and not merely limited to Syria, or as merely opposing oppressive regimes, but rather as opposing the murderous Alawites, those of the Zoroastrians standing in the background holding imperial Persian dreams, and a Crusader-Jewish alliance that provides unlimited support to anyone wishing to destroy the community of Islam.
  • Second, work to gather contributions and support for our brothers in Syria and ensure that they reach them, as well as working via the proper mechanism to sustain necessary recruitment activity and engaging in demonstrations highlighting the extent of the interconnectedness of our interests around the world. For we are a single community, not divided by geographical or other boundaries. All must know that the issue of Syria is a pivotal issue for us, and that no participant in a conspiracy against the brothers there will ever be spared, no matter how far away he may be.

Eighth, the military and civilian units of global jihad supporters in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine must be fully prepared for mobilization if that is required. What this means is that there first be peaceful activities, as we have indicated [in point seven], but that they be accompanied by the threat of plunging the entire region into a vast war if our brothers in Syria are besieged or conspired against whether [by elements] from beyond Syria or by the brothers of the revolution itself. The interests of anyone participating in such a conspiracy would be targeted. Fingers should be on the trigger. Indeed, this point is most important for establishing a balance of fear that allows the brothers in Syria the support necessary to be able to concentrate on their activities within the country.

In this vein, the brothers from the Islamic State of Iraq, may god strengthen them, who are the true strategic depth for the brothers in Syria, must work to prevent the Safavids from having any presence on the eastern Syrian border. They must ensure sustained logistical support and prevent the Safavids from partaking in any effort to besiege the brothers in Syria in the future, as well as stop overland support and other things that would diminish pressure on the Alawites in the west of Syria.

Ninth, the fighting units of Jabhat al-Nusrah, may God grant them victory, and their allies should turn their fire and missiles in the direction of Alawite cities with great intensity. For such will work to upset their security and encourage them to flee, particularly those possessing wealth, thus leading to the collapse of the regime’s bases of support. The latter consist of the finances provided by Alawite businessmen, and which is necessary for funding the different groups of the shabiha.

Tenth, the fighting units of Jabhat al-Nusrah and their allies should work to establish a broad and unified shura council and to create an executive committee for carrying out the work of governance, in order to fill the void and manage people’s affairs in the areas under our control. In this way services and other forms of aid may be rendered, people may be educated and enlightened about the creed and Islam, and they may be informed about the international conspiracy against them.

Eleventh, establishing an office or large media organization that would work around the clock for Jabhat al-Nusrah and the fighting units in Syria allied with it, providing the people with the necessary facts. For the media in this generation are equivalent to half the army, and sometimes international wars are led by means of the media alone. This [proposed] office can produce local broadcasts, ensuring that these reach every home in Syria and thus allowing the true, undistorted voice of the mujahidin access to the ears of the people.

Twelfth, it is incumbent upon all preachers and religious scholars to bear their legal responsibilities to guide and enlighten the [Islamic] community. For your brothers in Syria, in the coming days, will be in the utmost need of what you can do [for them].

Thirteenth, establishing a professional intelligence apparatus to carry out special operations: that is, to clean up anything dirtying the path to the creation of an Islamic state.

Fourteenth, urging our brothers in Jabhat al-Nusrah to seize control of geographically strategic areas; also urging them to seize barracks containing heavy weaponry so as to increase the conventional weapons stocks that will be of the greatest importance in the future.

[Finally,] a notice: Personally, I do not at the present time advise striking what is referred to as “Israel.” Doing so would widen the circle of enemies and [war] fronts around our brothers while they are in an inflexible state of full exertion. [I would only advise it] in the event [“Israel”] immediately join the battles alongside the Alawites against the mujahidin, or if we were responding to Israeli tests of our determination, which they will carry out once the mujahidin have or are nearing complete control of Syria.

This is what was possible for us to bring together of points and recommendations. We ask God Almighty to grant us success by means of them, to grant our brothers in Syria success by means of them, to grant them victory, and to establish for them the virtuous caliphate, by the permission of Him—be He exalted.


[i] In a typical play on words, Hezbollah is rendered in this document Ḥizb al-Lāt, meaning the “party” not of God but rather of a well-known pre-Islamic pagan deity.

[ii] The author has a very confused understanding of Middle Eastern alliance politics, a common feature of jihadi writings.

Filed Under: AQ in Iraq, Jihadi media, Strategy, Syria

Al-Qaida advises the Arab Spring: Syria

November 19, 2011 by Joas Wagemakers 15 Comments

With the Arab Spring going strong in several countries, al-Qaida (in a broad sense, so including ideologues and scholars supportive of the organisation) still finds it necessary to comment on what is happening. In a series of posts, I will deal with the advice al-Qaida is giving the people of several countries, starting with Syria.

Praise

One of the men “advising” the Syrians currently revolting against the regime of President al-Asad is Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaida. In an epistle meant solely to greet, encourage and heap praise on the people he is addressing, al-Zawahiri spends one of the first paragraphs of his letter saying “salamun ‘alaykum” to his audience no fewer than eight times. He addresses them as “the mujahidun who command good and forbid evil”. This seems to be an attempt to claim that al-Qaida-like people are the ones trying to overthrow the Syrian regime, which is a good thing from his point of view because it allows him to create the idea that his organisation is alive and kicking and busy overthrowing “infidel” rulers, as it should be. From the Syrian people’s point of view, however, it is doubtful whether this is going to do them any good. As radical scholar Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti pointed out in a fatwa that I wrote about in a previous post, it may actually be more advisable for Syrian jihadis to lay low, not giving the regime any extra excuse to crack down on them with the argument that the demonstrators are, in fact, terrorists. Al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to realise this, urging his audience to tell President al-Asad that he is “a partner in the war on Islam in the name of terrorism and a protector of the borders of Israel”. Even more explicitly – in a phrase that sounds better in Arabic than it does in English – he tells them to say to al-Asad: “We have broken the shackles of fear and smashed the prison of weakness. The free [men] of Syria and its mujahidun have decided that they will live as honourable people and die as martyrs (ya’ishu a’izza’ wa-yamutu shuhada’).”

Al-Zawahiri also keeps going on about the supposedly strong American ties to the Syrian regime. He states that “America, which has co-operated with Bashar al-Asad throughout his reign, now claims that it is on your side”. He advises the Syrian protestors to say to the U.S. and President Obama that “we are the sons of the conquerors, the offspring of the mujahidun and the heirs of the murabitun (fighters operating from garrison cities).” The battle fought against the Syrian regime, al-Zawahiri claims, will obviously continue until “we raise the banners of victorious jihad” over Jerusalem. How exactly this is to be achieved in the face of a brutal regime that is not afraid to kill thousands of its own people is not entirely clear.

Syrian sectarianism

A more rational and level-headed approach is taken in another document, this one by Abu Basir al-Tartusi, a scholar living in London who is in no way part of the core leadership of al-Qaida but is one of the major thinkers reponsible for the organisation’s ideology. The originally-Syrian Abu Basir is churning out writings on Syria faster than you can say “the people want to topple the regime”, which may force me to dedicate another post to this country. In any case, Abu Basir wouldn’t be a true Salafi if he didn’t start by criticising the sect of the al-Asad family, the ‘Alawites, which Salafis (and, to a lesser extent, Sunnis in general) view as deviant or even infidel. He claims that they – among other things – are batinis (i.e. people who believe the Qur’an has an inner, esoteric meaning apart from its outer, exoteric meaning), idol worshippers and people who claim that caliph ‘Ali b. Abi Talib is God.

These ‘Alawites, Abu Basir claims, do not care about their homeland, or about its citizens. They have never amounted to anything and have never given any thought to what the people need. Abu Basir claims that the Syrian sectarian system is largely to blame for this, probably because the large number of sects and the differences between them encourage their members to act only on behalf of their own group, at the expense of loyalty to the country and the people as a whole. As a result, this regime has only brought awful things such as destruction, division and poverty. Surprisingly, however, given Abu Basir’s views of ‘Alawites in general, his approach is nuanced enough to distinguish between ‘Alawites who are part of the governing circle of President al-Asad and the majority of ‘Alawites, who suffer from poverty just like other Syrians. His wrath is therefore directed towards the regime and he thus advises the Syrian people to unite and express only one demand: the fall of the regime. Raising any other demand, Abu Basir claims, would be quite unwise, presumably because he realises that Syrians are not united enough to form a coalition on the basis of any demand other than the fall of the regime.

Practical advice

In two other writings (here and here), Abu Basir continues about the situation in Syria and stresses the need for peaceful resistance but also the legitimacy of self-defence. The regime, he says, has killed or wounded tens of thousands of people and the latter should therefore learn how to protect themselves by setting up security committees that can defend the protestors. These committees, he states, should not participate in demonstrations or in any peaceful activities, so as not to give the regime an extra reason to crack down on protestors. Abu Basir also wants “the noble free officers” (i.e. the ones that abandoned the regime’s army) to increase in number, expand their military activities and co-ordinate them with the aforementioned security committees.

Apart from advising the Syrian people on using non-peaceful methods, he tries to convince them that violence is justified. While he keeps stressing that peaceful resistance is good and commendable, he fails to see its use after so much bloodshed and scolds Syrians for refusing even to take violent means into consideration after it has become clear that sit-ins and other peaceful means have proved useless. He encourages the people to obtain arms and even quotes a verse from the Qur’an about military preparedness to underline the legitimacy of the use of violence. After having compared the Syrian regime with the French colonialism of the past, he wonders what the difference between the two of them really is and calls on the remnants of the army to fear God and take their responsibility towards Syria and its people by defending them and their honour “against the imperialism of the sectarian regime of al-Asad”.

If and how this advice is accepted by Syrians in general and jihadis in particular is unclear. What is clear from Abu Basir’s writings, however, is that he obviously cares about Syria. The tone of his work here is not one of fighting against “infidel” rulers who fail to apply the shari’a but much more one of concern for his native land, which he even refers to as “the beloved Syria”. Whether this is also the case with other commentators “advising” demonstrators in other countries is something I intend to explore in future posts.

Filed Under: AQ Central, AQ Leadership, Jihadi media, Syria, Zawahiri

No New Bin Ladens

May 8, 2011 by Will McCants 2 Comments

The title is both a prediction and a plea.  The prediction is that Bin Laden is sui generis and none of his successors will combine in one person the man’s organizational skills, media savvy, and personal charisma.

The plea is that experts on al-Qaeda resist the temptation to answer the media’s question, “Who Will Be the Next Bin Laden?”  Putting forward a name risks misunderstanding Bin Laden’s unique role and capabilities, which are not likely to be replicated in a single person.  It also risks elevating the global stature of others who might otherwise fail to win the international following that Bin Laden won.

Note that answering this question is different from answering the perfectly innocuous question, “Who Will Run al-Qaeda?”  That’s a question about an organizational role, not a person.  Leah has provided the best answer so far.

Readers may wonder why I am harping on experts and not the media. It is because the media relies on experts, who should resist the temptation to feed fear for the sake of fortune or advance a name to advance their own career.  In recent years, both impulses have led to a strange symbiosis in which AQ ideologues and Western experts feed off one another’s attention.  Watching the Watchers indeed.

Lest anyone think me holier than thou, I confess I am as susceptible to this temptation as the rest and I have not always resisted it well.  But I do try, particularly in this time of peril for AQ.  I don’t want to give the organization an assist.

To end on a high note, here’s a good example of how some AQ experts are doing the right thing.  And tomorrow I promise no more righteous finger but rather a post on some new Sayf al-`Adl letters.

Filed Under: AQ Central, Jihadi media

Why Don’t Jihadi Orgs Tweet?

April 30, 2011 by Will McCants 5 Comments

I’ve been thinking for awhile about 1) why the social media of choice for jihadi orgs and media outlets is discussion forums and 2) why few to no jihadi orgs and media outlets have a Twitter or Facebook account (recent exception here).   (Marc Lynch first noted this phenomenon some time ago but I can’t find his post.)  Since Shaun Waterman raises the issue in a recent column, I thought I’d take a stab at explaining why.  Here are two hypotheses:

  1. Vulnerability:  Accounts on Twitter and Facebook are too easy to shut down.  You can flag an account to the administrators and they will remove it.  Jihadi orgs could set up new accounts but then they’d have to let their followers know where to find them.  By the time they do, the admins will be hip to the problem and move to close the accounts down again.  Compare this with the forums, which have multiple addresses and jihadis control membership.
  2. If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It:  Jihadis jumped on forums around 2005 and have perfected their use for pushing propaganda and building communities.  The system still works well for them, so why bother changing it (h/t Daniel Kimmage, who is now in ghayba).  Recent forum closures may make them question this inertia.

I know AaronW and others will have different takes, and I look forward to hearing them.  Just want to get the ball rolling.  Note that this is about organizations and not individuals supporters, many of whom have accounts on Twitter and Facebook.

Caveat lector: I am a complete Twitter neophyte and have managed to withstand the ridicule from friends and family for not having a Facebook page.

Update: The Translation Brigades on Ansar forum have translated Shaun’s article into Arabic (jihadi site). H/T Aaron Zelin.

Filed Under: Jihadi media, propaganda, social media

Entering a new dimension – Jihad via Bluetooth (Part 2)

March 22, 2011 by Nico Prucha 4 Comments

In the first part we examined the structure of the data provided by the “Mobile Detachment” (Fariq jawwal al-ansar, FJA) media department of the Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum. As stated, in the second part we will take a closer look at the ‘mission statement‘ to understand the ambition of (re-) publishing indoctrinating jihadist materials with the intention of users being able to consume and disseminate this content by the means of one’s personal smart phone. One intention perhaps is the fact that your smart/mobile phone certainly is a highly personal gadget, which is rarely shared – unlike family household computers. The content on your mobile phone has a more private nature and allows you to quickly navigate and read through the jihadist materials without anyone noticing. The downside for jihadis, however, is an upside for the police, as the sympathizers are inspired to store incriminating content on their personal phones. That is probably the reason for including encryption software in the first data-package.

The Mission Statement

The FJA defines four sub-detachments in a posting that can be understood as a ‘mission statement’. A regular posting announced a “specialized detachment / unit (fariq) in the crafting and dissemination of all content, intended to run on mobile phones. The content [includes] knowledge (‘ilm), incitement (tahrid) and missionary work (da’wa) issued under the sponsorship of the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum’s administration.” The basic line is brokered into four simple categories, with the call of seeking support by any capable sympathizer within the forum:

1. “The fariq of audio-engineering: Engineering and dissemination of audio fragments of speeches and sermons given by the scholars and leaders. This includes recitations [of the Quran], poems, songs and other formats.

2. The fariq for transcripts: Selection, transcribing and publication of jihadist magazines, affecting stories, unique articles and the most important statements in a visible format or by any format that mobile phones support.

3. The fariq for designing propaganda pictures [‘Photoshop-Jihad’, examples here]: The design and dissemination of jihadi pictures and unique styling of any format supported by mobile phones.

4. The fariq of conversion and upload: The conversion of jihadist movies into any format supported by mobile phones [mostly 3GP] and by uploading parts [of the conversed videos].”

With the mobile phone turned to Jihad, each and any sympathizer can assume an active role in trying to disseminate jihadi content via Bluetooth to other devices. The goal is clearly described as “disseminating the jihadis’ mindset by the means of mobile phones (…) as well as developing the propaganda.” The fundamental principle of the FJA is to simply promote and spread chosen materials of jihad by all means. In this case, the modus operandi is sought that sympathizers are enabled by these data-packages to check their individual surrounding for Bluetooth enabled devices and hence blindly send out these catchy materials to unwary (primarily Arab) users. In some Arab countries, due to the harsh enforced segregation of the sexes, communicating and setting up  ‘secret dates’ has mainly turned to the use of modern technology. AQ in its never-ending endeavor is also always keen to capitalize on newest technology.

As described in the mission statement, “the jihadi forums rise up for the firebrand assaults and oppose the enemies of God, of His messenger, and of the believers with their hopeless attempt to wage war [against us] with our judiciary efforts by such means. These have progressed – slowly but surely –, all praise be God, with the development of the propaganda and by technical aspects. And this is the benefit of God. That’s what the brigades and media groups are about, who convey the methodology (manhaj) and the fundamentals of faith (aqida) of the pious Salafists.”

The FJA considers itself as yet another platform to disseminate, proselytize and hence protect the true version of religion. “What else are these projects than an answer to our noble scholars, stressing the need to develop the jihadi media.” The FJA concludes with the call to “thus help your brothers by whatever means you can” in order to counter any attempts of countering the jihadi narratives and by using every possibility.

Filed Under: AQ Central, Indoctrination, Jihad culture, Jihadi media

Entering a new dimension – Jihad via Bluetooth (Part 1)

January 24, 2011 by Nico Prucha 2 Comments

In October 2009 the Arabic “al-Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum” offered a special data-package designed for mobile phones. Published by a newly created “Mobile Detachment“ the contents are aimed at sympathizers and adherents of jihadist principles. Provided with a special software the mobile users can access the documents or watch videos on their portable device while being able to send out these highly indoctrinating and radicalizing sources via Bluetooth to other, unwary, Bluetooth enabled devices. The data offered in these conveniently administrated packages provides nearly everything of the grand-genre of jihadist materials.

For the first part, a overview of these data-packages is provided, while for the future parts a closer look will be taken at specific documents and the “mission statement”. A total of five packages has been published up to date, with each remaining loyal to the same layout, logo and coherent file structure consisting of the following:

Programs: In this folder the program Symbian Blog is available to install on your Bluetooth capable mobile phone, including a Quran and a encryption software. By incorporating a specially designed operating system, these agitprop packages can be transferred to a mobile phone for re-dissemination via Bluetooth.

Audio: This section has three subfolders a) anashid, b) recitation of the Quran, c) speeches. The mix consists of indoctrinating politico-religious notions such as the “interview with Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Suri”, the “Biographies of the martyrs”, “There is nothing like Falluja”, or “Various Speeches by Shaykh Osama”.

Pictures: Here a great number of pictures are available for the user. Most pictures depict renown figures such as Jordanian Mujahideen commander Khattab in Chechnya, the 9/11 attacks or simply show various logos and in general the iconography of Jihad groups worldwide.

Videos: All the videos in this folder have been converted into the 3gp format, a playable version specially designated for mobile phones. For several years now, the jihad-videos are disseminated in multiple sizes and formats, one being 3gp. These include a video from the al-Malahim Media group by the Yemen based AQ branch. Videos also consist of “A martyr eulogizing another martyr” by the Somalia based Harakat al-shabab al-mujahideen, or al-Sahab videos showing the martyrdom operation against the Danish embassy in Pakistan.

Texts: The Arabic writings are offered in three formats: a) MS-WORD, b) Adobe Acrobat, c) Text-format. This guarantees that these texts can be read and made available via any mobile phone or computer by a simple standard text editor. The texts include all genres of the flourishing jihad literature. Predominantly the stories of slain Mujahideen and the testimonies of martyrdom operations are sought as a main driver of radicalization and indoctrination of these appealing role-models. Literature is offered telling the stories, once again, of outstanding and prominent jihadist figures and leaders from all over the world. This includes the biography and renown operations of Chechen commander Shamil Basayev, the architect of the Moscow theatre siege as well as the Beslan school massacre. The focus was clearly evident, as the case of the 5th data-package shows, which re-disseminated the martyrs biographies of fighters of the “Islamic State of Iraq”. Also complete electronic magazines are found in some data-packages, such as the Arabic language al-Sumud (“Resistance”) published by the Afghan branch of the Taliban or the Sada (“Echo”) of Jihad”. Another main element are the various statements, such as declarations and memorandum of the AQ offshoot in Africa, AQIM, or statements made by ISI claiming highly diverse attacks, military operations or simply refuting “lies made by the government of the Green Zone”. Handpicked books, transcribed sermons and interviews are, however, also among the files, which are deemed of great importance. These writings include ideological titles written by Hammud bin ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi, “How to Prepare for your Afterlife” by newcomer-ideologue Khalid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Husaynan or older documents such as “And Incite the Believers” by Saudi first-Generation AQAP member ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud.

The content of all data-packages is well chosen and partially comprises of new, up-to-date materials, but also capitalizes on older fundamental documents that are of ultimate importance in the jihadists’ mindset. The general aim by these packages are described in a “mission statement” that includes a invitation to join the endeavor of spreading jihadist materials and to “develop the jihadist media”.

 

Filed Under: AQ Central, Indoctrination, Jihad culture, Jihadi media

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