Entries Tagged 'Motivations' ↓

Tim has a nice summary of a recent conversation between him, me, and Aaron about online recruitment.  Tim and I agree and I think Aaron does too, but he wants more rigorous metrics.  Fair enough.

Aaron observes that there are three things involved with radicalization:

• Motivation (I’m willing to fight)
• Association (I want people to fight alongside, both to steel my resolve and to help me carry out attacks)
• Opportunity (I need places and means for carrying out an attack)

(Tim glosses these as Psychological, Social, and Organizational factors, which is helpful.)

Aaron goes on to say:

When we see so-called Internet jihadis who become active in real-world plots, they frequently come from the ranks of the forum activists, the guys who are more than just part of the Allahu Akbar chorus. It is through their online associations and the opportunities that the Internet provides that they are able to begin actually participating in the jihad.

Three thoughts:

1. I agree that the Internet is a good tool for motivating people to fight.  But they are being motivated elsewhere (e.g. video links posted to mainstream forums).  By the time they join the Jihadi forums, they are already members of the Allah Akbar choir.
2. The Jihadi forums are a terrible place to associate and find opportunities because no one trusts anyone else.  Take, for example, Abu al-Haytham’s meeting with another forum member.  A lot of distrust had to be overcome to make it happen.  And face-to-face contact was a necessity.
3. Many (most?) of those who get involved in real-world plots were already supporting or engaging in operations before they joined the forums.

I wonder: Are there examples of people who were motivated solely through the Internet and found associates and opportunities solely through the Internet?  I know I’ve seen a few, but I couldn’t dig up any when asked recently.  I even re-read Petter Nesser’s compendious survey of all Jihadi arrests and attacks in Europe since the 1994 (due out soon in SCT) and still no luck.

Secondly, if there are examples, are they representative or exceptional?  None of these are rhetorical questions and I’m open to opining and anecdotal evidence.

Jihadica reader Jallen asks some good questions about the pessimism of Jihadis regarding Iraq:

How long have forum members been pessimistic over Iraq? Is the pessimism widespread or just a few members in one forum? Is pessimism over Iraq matched by increased optimism over Afghanistan or are these independent?

It depends which forum you read. On Hesbah, there is a more frank discussion of the fortunes of al-Qaeda in Iraq (at least judging from the posts that leak out). This is probably because Hesbah is a closed forum full of old Jihadi hands, so members don’t have to be so guarded. The opposite is true on Ekhlaas, where newbies take turns one-upping each other with paeans to al-Qaeda. No one wants to be a downer.

But since the end of 2007, I’ve noticed a steady increase in posts on Ekhlaas that say, “Just wait, a major victory is right around the corner!” You wouldn’t write that unless you were worried that things weren’t going so well at the moment.

To give you a sense of the genre, here’s a summary of a post from a few days ago by forum member Murabit Muwahhid (Monotheist Frontier Fighter):

• Everyone is in a state of anticipation these days.
• There have been consecutive announcements of the martyrdoms of first and second tier al-Qaeda leaders.
• People in Europe fear martyrdom operations there.
• There have been a series of attacks on the Islamic State of Iraq and attempts to break its power.
• There have been victories for the mujahids in Somalia and Yemen.
• “Are we living in difficult days or are we and the world waiting for (even more) difficult days?”
• Will the coming days be marked by more of our leaders dying, such that the U.S. will proclaim victory over terrorism?
• Or will these victories be followed by major setbacks that will put the lie to their proclamations?
• It looks like the coming days will be difficult for everyone.

The post has a more defiant tone:  We may be down, but we’re not out.  It is also ambivalent about the fortunes of the Jihadi community.  (And for those convinced that Jihadis are indifferent to news of their leaders’ deaths, take note.)

The morale of the forum fighters is the lowest I’ve seen it, at least among Jihadis who live in the Middle East. Afghanistan is a bright spot, but it doesn’t seem to offset the despair of Arab Jihadis, who can’t understand why al-Qaeda hasn’t gained traction in the Middle East.

The bleaker things look for the Islamic State in Iraq–the embryo of the new caliphal order–and the longer al-Qaeda goes without a major attack in Israel, the U.S., or its closely-allied countries, the more anticipation builds that al-Qaeda will do something spectacular. When it fails to deliver, morale wanes.

The al-Qaeda narrative that has developed since 9/11 is that it tricked the U.S. into invading the Middle East, where it got bogged down and bled dry.  Once the U.S. leaves and the Islamic State in Iraq is secure, al-Qaeda will move into Syria and Lebanon, and from there stage attacks on Israel.

But the failure of AQ in Iraq, the inability of AQ to strike in Europe and the U.S., and its lack of traction in the Middle East are interfering with the narrative and a new one has not emerged, at least not one that excites Arab Jihadis.  Like Murabit Muwahhid hints, it will take a major attack to reaffirm the narrative.

But circumstances at the moment allow the U.S. to create a counter narrative: al-Qaeda started in Afghanistan and it will end in Afghanistan.  With the death of the top leadership that ordered the attacks on America, the cycle will be complete.

Document (Arabic): 8-4-08-ekhlaas-are-the-coming-days-difficult

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:

• It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4
• Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5
• Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic Islamic state, which fills a void left by the absent caliphate. p.12-14
• Inwardly, Shia sincerely believe in Islam, but it is an Islam of their own making, not true Islam; they believe they are the only true Muslims; and they are seeking to dominate the Islamic world. p.15-16
• “The hostility between the Rejectionists [the Shia], America, and Israel is real hostility.” p.19
• Those who believe there is no real hostility between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other have bought into conspiracy theories, which are a regrettable flaw in our culture. p.19
• The hostility of Iran toward the U.S. and Israel is partly religious, in that Shi`ism retains the religious hostility toward Christians and Jews found in the true religion, Sunnism. It is also due to Iran’s desire for power. p.19
• Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq because of its self-interest–the U.S. eliminated two of its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. This is a good example of the opportunistic and circumstantial nature of Shia politics. p.21
• The Shia make these kind of decisions because their greatest enemy is the Sunnis. They can live with Jews and Christians, but not Sunnis. Look how Iran treats its Sunni minorities, how Hezbollah behaves toward Sunnis, and how the Shia government in Iraq has dealt with Sunni Iraqis. p.21, 24
• Contrary to what many Jihadis say, Hezbollah is not Israel’s collaborator. But Hezbollah will talk to Israel and work with it on a limited basis if it suits Hezbollah’s interests. p.22-3
• The Shia are pragmatic. They are willing to work with anyone regardless of their stated beliefs. This includes working with Wahhabis. p.23
• Hezbollah supports Palestinian militants to achieve the wider aims of Iran. It has adopted a popular cause to increase its popularity. It is also filling a leadership vacuum left by other Arab states who have failed to step up. p.32-3
• Hezbollah is a tool of both Iran and Syria. It serves their interests and policies. p.36
• Hezbollah prevents any Sunni resistance from setting up on the Lebanese border with Israel. It has cut deals with Syria, the U.S., and even Israel to retain its control of the area. p.36

Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.

abu-abd-al-rahman-atiyyat-allah-ruya-kashifa رؤية كاشفة

Periodically, Ekhlaas members poll the forum. Usually, the questions are inane (”How much do you love the Islamic State of Iraq?”). But a recent poll posted two months ago caught my eye. The voting seems to be coming to an end, so I’m posting the results.

The question is, “After you arrive in the theaters of jihad (God willing), where will you find yourself?” The respondents can choose from the following (quoting):

1. in a martyrdom operation
2. in the field of battle fighting the Crusaders [direct fighting]
3. producing sophisticated weapons [traditional and non-traditional]
4. in leadership positions [company commander - group commander]
5. teaching a course on the Sharia
6. in the media division
7. something else

75 people responded, but only 46 directly answered the question. Some had multiple answers, so I only counted their first choices. Here’s how the results break down:

15 Martyrdom, 22 Fight, 3 Weapons, 3 Leadership, 0 Teaching, 1 Media, 2 Other. Some of the respondents couldn’t choose one and answered with a prioritized list. Others felt they could do several of things at once. For example, one said he could fight during the day and teach religious classes at night.

It’s interesting that so few of the respondents aspire to leadership positions or want to play supporting roles. Perhaps it’s because they are doing that now as forum fighters and feel that when they travel to the front, it’s time to fight. Or perhaps it’s peer pressure: no one wants to appear arrogant by claiming leadership or cowardly by choosing a non-violent option.

Document (Arabic): 6-28-08-ekhlaas-what-service-do-you-want-to-perform-in-theaters-of-jihad

(This is only the first page of the six pages of responses. Follow the numbered links at the bottom for the rest.)

Ekhlaas member Abu al-Bara’ al-Shami uploaded this video as proof that sincere Muslim youth are fighting solely to protect their religion and coreligionists in Tripoli.  I don’t think it proves his point at all.  In fact, the video suggests something else: the young men are relishing a chance to play superhero.  That doesn’t mean they aren’t sincere, but it’s hard to believe that there’s not a little bit of this going on.  You be the judge:

Video: rpg-attack-in-bab-al-tabbana-tripoli