Entries Tagged 'Palestinian Territories' ↓

My brilliant friend and countryman Jacob Høigilt has just written an absolutely fascinating report on Islamism and Education in the Palestinian Territories. It’s fieldwork-based, rich  and nuanced, and it undermines widespread assumptions about the link between Islamic education and militancy.

While I am at it, I might as well mention my own completely unrelated CTC paper on the Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula has a published the eleventh issue of its magazine Sada al-Malahim. Naturally, Greg over at Waq al-Waq has it covered (see also here).

The 36th issue of Sada al-Jihad is also out, and it is as chunky and well-produced as ever. The front page reads “Hamas continues its war on the Sunni Mujahidin”, and judging from the table of contents, almost the entire issue is about the recent events in Gaza.

In the continuing salafi-jihadi media barrage against Hamas, the al-Sumud Media entity released its inaugural edition of the journal “Coveters of Paradise”. The cover is adorned with a photo of the battle-scarred Ibn Taymiya Mosque, which is where Hamas waged a battle against the salafi-jihadi group Jund Ansar Allah in August. The journal mainly consists of reprints of articles written by others.

The Table of contents listed the following articles:

· The Opening Article – by the Believer in God

· The Piercing Pen and the Candid Word – by Abu al-Hasan Ghuraib

· Comments on the Speech of Sheikh Osama bin Laden – by Sheikh Abi Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Masri

· Golden Advice for the Ismail Haniyah Government – by Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi

· Raising the Argument between the Martyred Sheikh Abi al-Nur al-Maqdisi and between Secular Hamas – by Sheikh Abi Ahmad Abd-al-Rahman al-Masri

· The 80 Year Old Ghost: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Condemnation of the Global Jihad – by the journalist Akram Hijazi

· You Kill a Man Who Says My Lord is God? Is there not Among You a Rightly Guided Man? – By Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

· Hamas Kills One Seeking Protection in the House of God – by Doctor Hani al-Sibai

· As If They Wanted to Say, “Sorry Abd al-Naser, We Wronged You”: A Reflection on the Gaza Events – by Walid Yusuf

· Take Refuge in the People’s Lord from the Evil of What Hamas Did – by Muhammad Asad Buyud al-Tamimi

· We Lead with the One God and We Excommunicate with International Legitimacy – by Abd al-Aziz bin Naser al-Jalil

· Do not Grieve, the Islamic United States is at the Gates – by Doctor John Boutros

· Western Education is Forbidden [al-Buku Haram] and the Crime of the Villans: Between Cataracts of Blood and Media Collusion – by The Eagle’s Banner [Rayat al-‘Uqab]

· The Art of Fighting from a Motorcycle

· Smuggling

The journal does not provide any other identifying information except its own transliteration of al-Janna (Paradise) into English, which is “elgana”. Using “g” instead of the “j” indicates either the Egyptian dialect or another Arabic dialect heavily influenced by Egypt such as Gaza. Given the journal’s heavy focus on Hamas and Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, I think it is reasonable to assume that whoever compiled this journal is in Gaza or of Gazan origins.

Salafi-jihadi anti-Hamas rhetoric has existed for some time, but it seems that the amount of it has increased since Hamas killed Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi. It will be interesting to see the effects, if any, this propaganda will have on Hamas, Gazans, international jihadis, and the West. I believe that Hamas will continue to oppose the salafi-jihadis, but if the organization weakens under international sanctions, will it attempt to appease the salafi-jihadis to maintain its Gaza power base? Again, I think it is unlikely, but what if Gazans, frustrated with Hamas, turn to salafi-jihadis and transform these jihadis into more than a marginal movement? Will international salafi-jihadis make a stronger effort to enter Gaza? Will these jihadis have a more receptive audience when they get there? Finally, how will Israel and the West react if its efforts against Hamas do manage to weaken the organization significantly and salafi-jihadis become more powerful?

The “Department of Documents and Research” from the “Jihadi Media Elite,” a jihadi media production entity, has recently announced its “Series for God and then for History” publications. These productions are intended to “document the important events” in the jihadi world “that are considered historical turning points in the Ummah’s path and in the circle of conflict between truth and falsehood.”

The first installment is a book titled, “The Ibn-Taymiyyah Mosque Incident.” It deals with the violent August 2009 clash in Gaza between Hamas and Jund Ansar Allah, a group espousing salafi-jihadi ideology. The book is divided into several sections including jihadi “Statements” and “Hamas Statements” about the attack, “Articles Justifying Hamas’s Crime,” “Articles Regarding the Event,” “Photos,” and “Video.”

The book is a salafi-jihadi attempt to capitalise on the event and ensure the jihadi storyline of events is the dominant version. Including the statements from Hamas and various other pro-Hamas commentators is an effort to make the jihadi version more objective and credible, which would strengthen salafi-jihadi arguments against Hamas.

Due to current time restrictions, I will be reading the book in its entirety once this semester concludes. If I glean any useful information or analyses, I will share them at that time.

The Global Islamic Media Front, in cooperation with the Faloja Forums, has announced, “The Media Incursion of the Imam and Martyr Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.” It has five goals:

1. Expose the truth about Hamas’s “crime” and “lies,” i.e. the recent attack on Jund Ansar Allah (JAA).
2. Expose the truth about Hamas today and how it has “strayed” from its foundational roots.
3. Let Muslims know that the money they give Hamas equates to “bullets in Muslims’ chests.”
4. “Support the monotheistic mujahidin, who fight for the word of God and for the rule of God’s absent law.”
5. “Distribute the legacy of the Imam Shaykh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi.”

Thus far, the effort consists of a new forum dedicated to Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi on Faloja. There are not many posts yet, but several appear to be interesting, such as a photo list of JAA members killed in the battle with Hamas. Other posts include: “Two Imams of Truth: The Red Mosque and the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque. What is the difference?”; “Was Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi one of the Khawarij or a Tyrant?”; “Dangerous Speech: Hasan al-Banna – Hamas is not Islamic and it Claimed That”; “A Resounding Scandal: A Voice Recording Confirming the Execution of Wounded Mujahedin by Hamas During their Ride to the Hospital”; and “Hamas’s Crime in Rafah.”

This makes the split between Hamas and the salafi-jihadi movement plainly obvious. As the attack against JAA and last year’s attack on the Army of Islam indicate, Hamas is currently powerful enough to deal with these fringe elements. However, if conditions in Gaza continue to worsen or Hamas’s position becomes more perilous, these groups may gain more momentum and power, complicating any reconciliation with Fatah or Palestinian agreements with Israel.

The “Followers of Monotheism and Jihad” in Palestine released a statement on 31 August 2009 that lambasted Hamas for its narrow interests and the killing of Salafis (Part 1 and Part 2). They claimed that Hamas continues to arrest and harass members of the Salafi movement in Gaza and that “a long beard and Sunni clothes have become an accusation to be arrested for.”

They stated that they carry weapons and train only to “fight the apes and pigs.” They maintained that if Hamas were to implement Sharia law, if only gradually, they would serve Hamas, but Hamas “fights anyone who threatens its position.” They continued, “[Hamas] is forcing us to use our weapons to defend ourselves after [they] severed every method of settling differences.”

Therefore, they announced that on 29 August 2009, they had attacked a Hamas governmental compound, the Security and Protection HQ, and the Internal Security HQ using “sound charges as a message to you [Hamas] to stop your crimes against the sons of monotheism and jihad, and the adherents to Salafism in Gaza.” They stated that they did not intend to spill any pious blood and they disavowed any responsibility of that happening during their attacks.

These types of groups come and go in Gaza and it is unclear if the Followers of Monotheism and Jihad in Palestine are an actual jihadi group backed by a cleric, like Jund Ansar Allah, which was backed by Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, or merely a group of thugs. The fact that their statement was not distributed by an established media production company like the Global Islamic Media Front suggests the latter, but time will tell. However, the document does clearly indicate the stark division between Hamas, which is attempting to assert its authority, and the Salafi-jihadis (or at least poser Salafi-jihadis), who are trying to usurp the “un-Islamic” elements of Hamas.

On 30 August 2009, Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published a new article in al-Hayat where he asserts that an Islamist’s clothes are often political statements and can indicate his precise type of Islamist orientation.

Al-Shishani states that during the 1980s, the Salafi style of “short clothing” (a likely reference to the ankle-high pants Salafis commonly wear) became prominent along with “Afghan clothing,” which is the shalwar kameez and which represented solidarity with the Afghan-Arab Mujahidin. Today, he claims that someone with a beard is often described as one of the “brotherhood.”

He writes that two prominent differences in clothing currently exist. The first is the contention between those who follow Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the “neo-Zarqawis,” who consider themselves as the legacy of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. The second is between Hamas and the jihadi groups in Gaza.

In the al-Maqdisi—neo-Zarqawi split, al-Shishani states that the neo-Zarqawis wear a black skullcap, which some consider a representation of the Salafi-jihadis.  Al-Maqdisi himself said the black skullcap, or any color skullcap for that matter, did not accurately represent someone’s religious tilt. Rather, he claimed, to know someone’s religious affiliations one should look into someone’s heart and actions. However, he did acknowledge that “some simple and novice youth” recognize the black skullcap as a Salafi-jihadi symbol.

As for the Hamas—Salafi-jihadi split, Abd al-Latif Musa, AKA Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, a former preacher for Jund Ansar Allah stated on 15 February 2009 that the Salafi-jihadi wears dark-colored Pakistani clothes with “a military jacket” that is a bit larger than the person so he can “hide his personal weapon or radio under it. He wears a small black hat that resembles the hat Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi … [wore]. Some of them allow their hair to grow to their shoulders covering it was a piece of cloth called a hatteh or a shaleh.”

Al-Shishani provides a practical guide on the type of clothes one could expect a jihadi to wear. However, he warns that in the case of Salafi-jihadis, they will not likely wear their typical jihadi clothes during an operational mission because doing so could garner unwanted attention.

(In case anyone is interested, the article reminded me of this unrelated piece about the Qubaisiyat, a secretive female Islamic group in Syria.)

On 24 August 2009, Falluja Forum member Abu Yahya al-Mu’tasim issued a statement titled “A Jund Ansar Allah Clarification Regarding the Events of Rafah.” He claimed the statement is Jund Ansar Allah’s (JAA) newest, but forum comments to the post expressed doubts over its authenticity, referring to the fact that Hamas arrested JAA’s normal Internet spokesman after the “slaughter.” In the statement, JAA denounced several media allegations against the group and provided some clues to the make-up and outlook of the group.

According to the statement, fifteen of the JAA casualities in the Hamas attack were former members of Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades. These included Ibn Shaqiq Musa Abu Marzuq, a supposed former deputy to Khaled Mash’al, and a former leader in a “manufacturing unit” for the Qassam Brigades. It also alleged that JAA leader Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir “was very close to the Qassam leaders and participated in Qassam combat training.”

The statement claimed that Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi’s announcement of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian Territories was “symbolic.” It maintained that al-Maqdisi was aware of a possible Hamas strike and “wanted to illustrate to Muslims that Hamas actually rejects the idea of the Islamic emirate and fights the idea militarily.” The statement alleged that in al-Maqdisi’s final sermon, he dismissed many of the accusations levelled against the JAA, such as bombing merchants, declaring takfir on Hamas, and having connections to secular powers. The statement clarified that JAA did not join al-Qaida, and that it is not seeking revenge on Hamas. The declaration also denied that Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi preached Khawarij teachings or that he blew himself up during the Hamas raid.

The statement maintained that Hamas is waging a campaign against the Salafi-jihadis. As evidence it cited the Hamas attack on the Army of Islam last year, recent arrests of Jaysh al-Ummah members, and the attack on JAA. It concluded, “We believe that Hamas does not want anyone to fight Jews unless it is under Hamas’s banner. Hamas sees that the Salafis who leave Hamas are the best fighters and most pious.”

This statement, regardless of its veracity, is an excellent example of the rhetorical war between Hamas and the Salafi-jihadis. The Salafi-jihadis depict Hamas as a power hungry entity that is not actually interested in Islam nor fighting Israel, while the Salafi-jihadis are pious and actively engaging Israel militarily. At the same time, they are careful not to insult rank-and-file members of Hamas. Given JAA’s allegation that fifteen of its recently deceased members were former Qassam members, and given Hamas’s need to confront the group militarily, it appears that this tactic is having some effect on Hamas’s members and that the leadership is taking notice.

In several instances, the statement denied that JAA were Khawarij, showing the Salafi-jihadi sensitivity to such names. The remarks denying al-Maqdisi’s suicide death may be an indication that suicide bombings, at least within Gaza, are taboo and another source of sensitivity for Salafi-jihadis. Finally, the statement made clear that JAA was not using takfir, making a distinction between itself and al-Qaida. Forum comments to the JAA statement took issue with this aspect of the statement and demanded further clarification. This would suggest that the Salafi-jihadism that is gaining ground in Gaza is not necessarily identical to that of al-Qaida. Moreover, On another level, it is yet an indication that the brand name al-Qaida is losing some of its appeal in the Muslim world.

The forums are ablaze with postings regarding the 14 August 2009 Hamas attack on the Ibn Taymiya Mosque that Jund Ansar Allah (JAA), a group espousing Salafi-jihadi ideology, controlled.  Hamas assaulted the mosque in response to JAA leader Abd al-Latif Musa, AKA Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, declaring an Islamic emirate in Gaza and general JAA criminal activity. Not surprisingly, commentators are condemning Hamas’s actions and linking these actions to a larger Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian conspiracy to combat Salafi-jihadis.

Akram Hijazi claimed that Hamas has distorted the facts surrounding Salafi-jihadi groups. He maintained that through its violent targeting of Salafi-jihadis like the Army of Islam, whom Hamas also largely destroyed in September 2008, and now the JAA, Hamas is effectively practicing takfir against its fellow Muslims. In regards to the declared Islamic emirate, Hijazi stated that anyone who “read the emirate announcement well” knows that it was very general, for all of Palestine, and did not threaten Hamas’s authority. Hijazi exonerated JAA from any accusations Hamas has made against the group and he declared Hamas as the real criminal group in Gaza.

Hijazi also railed against Hamas in a second article stating that the Salafi-jihadis are not against pious Hamas members, but rather they are against Hamas hypocrites and liars. He used Ahmad Yassin and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, both former Hamas leaders who Israel assassinated in 2004, as examples of good Hamas members. He went on to claim that the Salafi-jihadis were the first to attack former Fatah chief in Gaza Muhammad Dahlan, the Oslo Accords, and Mahmud Abbas.

These assertions are important because Hamas members consider Yassin and al-Rantisi good leaders, but now Hijazi is linking these leaders with the Salafi-jihadi movement, of which Yassin and al-Rantisi were not a part. In short, Hijazi is attempting to hijack the legacy of these leaders from Hamas to the Salafi-jihadi cause, giving latter more credibility. His comments about Dahlan, Oslo, and Abbas reiterate this point because Hamas is famous for its opposition to these Fatah symbols, not the Salafi-jihadis who played a minor, if any, role in opposing Fatah and its goals.

Hijazi was not the only commentator who attempted to lure rank-and-file Hamas members towards Salafi-jihadism. Hani Siba’i, a radical preacher in the UK, claimed the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have strayed from the right path and true Islam. He encouraged ordinary Hamas members to turn against the group by adjusting its slogan of “death in the path of God” to “death in the path of the man-made parliament.”

It is not surprising that jihadi commentators are condemning Hamas for its attack against the JAA. However, their attempts to exploit this event to their advantage by luring Hamas members away from the movement are interesting. To do this, propagandists are linking Hamas symbolism and achievements to Salafi-jihadism and reaching out to rank-and-file members. As long as Hamas remains in control of Gaza, this attempt will not likely achieve many results. However, if Hamas starts to lose control, either physically or ideologically, Salafi-jihadis may see a boon in recruitment, which will mean more violence in Gaza and against Israel.  

On 29 June 2009, the Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published an article in al-Hayat titled “Salafi–Jihadism: A New Face in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria’s Palestinian Camps.” The article talks about the new generation of “neo-Zarqawis” and the increasing radicalization of Palestinian refugees. This radicalisation, he argues, stems from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the deterioration of the PLO and its control over the refugee camps, the political ramifications of the Fatah-Hamas conflict, and rising poverty and unemployment. Al-Shishani states that attacks such as the 2008 incident in Jordan where Thaer al-Wahidi, a refugee from the al-Baq’ah refugee camp, assaulted a Lebanese classical music troupe, are emblematic of this phenomenon.

Al-Shishani argues that the Salafi-jihadi ideology in the refugee camps has come in three phases. The first was the establishment of the ideology in the mid-1980s. The establishment of ‘Usbat al-Ansar in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon was typical of this phase. According to al-Shishani, this period witnessed the beginning of nationalist groups using Islamic slogans and the establishment of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Al-Shishani writes that the second phase was when the Salafi-jihadis started playing a larger role in sheltering and training non-Palestinian Salafi-jihadis. Al-Shishani cited the 2003 bombing of the McDonalds in Lebanon by the Yemeni Muammar al-Awami as an example of this development.

According to al-Shishani, the third phase is when the Salafi-jihadi ideology becomes the primary ideology for Palestinian youth in the camps. This phase is occurring now,  as individuals and small groups are increasingly taking up the ideology. Al-Shishani states that the members of this new generation “are described as ‘neo-Zarqawis,’” and are the legacy of the Levantine Salafi-jihadi current that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started in his Afghan training camp in 2000. They believe the route to Israel is through Iraq. Al-Shishani maintains that this trend is regional, centering on Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and it rejects the Salafi-jihadism of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (more on the al-Maqdisi dispute here and here).

In describing the Salafi-jihadi situation in Jordan, al-Shishani states that the refugee camp in Irbid has become a transit point for foreign fighters headed to Iraq and this is important because commentators normally associate Salafi-jihadism in Jordan with the cities of Zarqa, Salt, and Maan in addition to Palestinians not living in camps and East Jordanians. According to al-Shishani, Irbid is where the leader of al-Wahidi’s cell, Shakir ‘Umar al-Khatib, recruited al-Wahidi and called on Palestinians to join “the fighters in Iraq and Lebanon.”

For Lebanon, al-Shishani agrees with Omayma Abdel-Latif, a research associate at the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Center, that Lebanon is “fertile ground” for radical Salafi organizations. The lack of official Lebanese control over the camps, due to a previous agreement between Palestinian factions and the Lebanese government, compounds this threat.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of information, al-Shishani does not provide many details of the situation in Syria except to say that there have been clashes between militants in the Yarmuk refugee camp and the Syrian government.

The study of Salafi-jihadism in the Levant often takes a backseat to that of Iraq and AfPak, and to that of Hamas and Hezbollah, but, as al-Shishani indicates, the ideology does have a persistent and dangerous following in the region. If the modicum of stability that Iraq currently enjoys holds after the US withdrawal, the next logical endpoint for the neo-Zarqawis would be the Palestinian Territories, where they could act as spoilers to any possible peace initiatives.