Entries Tagged 'Saudi Arabia' ↓

First, Thomas Hegghammer has written a very valuable article on the rise and fall of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (more properly, “al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula” or QAP).  Thomas’ study is valuable because he draws on a deep well of empirical research to challenge the three major explanatory models of Islamist militancy: ideological (as they believe, so shall they fight), structural (the system is pushing them to fight), or social movement (al-Qaeda is just the violent manifestation of a larger network of like-minded people).  Thomas argues instead that QAP’s material and human resources, organizational needs, and pan-Islamic orientation, coupled with the Saudi security environment in the early 2000s, were more determinative influences on the group’s behavior.  I’m interested to know what he makes of the latest round of militant activity and arrests in the kingdom.

Second, Steve Corman of the COMOPS Monitor has created a blog aggregation service for counterterrorism and public diplomacy.  It will be a one stop shop for CT reporting and analysis.  Membership is free and it has a voting feature (”flag it”), so the cream rises to the top.  This is going to save me a lot of mouse clicks.

In a new Jamestown article, Michael Scheuer has refined some of the arguments he made in May in response to the al-Qaeda-is-almost-defeated meme that has been going around since April. He and I had a brief exchange about it here (look in the comments), so I won’t reprise all of it.  But I do want to offer a counterpoint to his remarks on Saudi Arabia and Salafis.

In his new article, Scheuer asserts that the Western press has bought the idea that al-Qaeda is near defeat. Journalists, he says, have bought it because some Islamist ideologues who previously supported al-Qaeda have criticized the organization.  (Scheuer calls these criticisms “recantations,” but only a few of the people he mentions have recanted.) These criticisms, Scheuer says, “are part of a bigger project conducted by several Arab states–led by Saudi Arabia–to make the United States and its allies believe Islamism’s strength is ebbing.” This idea has been picked up by the Western media because people in the West “desperately wants to believe such claims.”

Why is Saudi Arabia conducting this campaign? To divert attention from the real problem, Salafism, which Scheuer calls “Saudi Arabia’s state religion.” The Saudis have even gone so far as to reach out to the pope and to consider the building of a church in the kingdom, all in the hopes that the West will forget that its religious ideology is the “engine of contemporary jihad.”

The West has a lot to be worried about, Scheuer says (quoting an al-Ahram article by Khalil El-Anani), because Salafism is gaining ground:

• Salafis won a majority of parliamentary seats in Kuwait
• A Salafi is the head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
• Salafis are running the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
• Hamas hawks have more power than Hamas pragmatists

Al-Qaeda will be defeated, Scheuer concludes, when Salafism is removed “from schools and missionary activities.”

As I said in my earlier exchange with Scheuer, I agree with him that al-Qaeda is not near defeat, but I don’t think the al-Qaeda-is-near-defeat meme is a bad thing. The U.S. wins against al-Qaeda when it is no longer able to recruit or when the morale of its members becomes too low. One of the ways to achieve this is to create the public perception that al-Qaeda is losing. As long as the analytical community does not let this public perception cloud its judgment, I’m all for it. (Incidentally, I do think 2007 and 2008 have been rotten years for al-Qaeda in the Middle East proper.)

Scheuer’s assertion that the Saudis are leading a “project” to push this idea and to distract the West from its support for Salafism is too conspiratorial. The U.S. stands to gain as much as the Saudis do from exposing al-Qaeda setbacks to public view. Moreover, I would look a little closer to home for the idea’s origin. Finally, what in the world is wrong with Saudi leaders reaching out to the pope and considering the building of a church in the kingdom?

As for Salafism and its spread, there is less coherence to the movement than Scheuer makes out. Salafism is an ecumenical, originalist, Protestant-like movement in Sunni Islam whose followers reject adherence to the four traditional schools of law. But under this wide rubric, you find a great deal of variety. Wahhabis (a better term for the followers of the official religious ideology of the Saudi state) and the Ahl-e Hadith in Pakistan are Salafis under my definition, but they have very different attitudes toward politics. And it’s the attitude toward politics that should concern analysts the most.

A further problem with the label “Salafi” is that it says little about a group’s beliefs or political orientation.  Many Sunni groups call themselves “Salafi” because the word signals that their beliefs are derived from Islam’s “pious founders” (Ar. salaf).  But that’s almost like of a Sunni calling himself an “authentic Muslim,” which doesn’t give you a good idea of his religious or political attitudes (Thomas Hegghammer has made this point elsewhere).  Take the Muslim Brothers in Kuwait for example.  They sometimes call themselves Salafis, but they are usually at odds with self-described Salafi political parties in that country.

As an aside, Salafis in Kuwait did not win a majority of seats in that country’s recent parliamentary elections, as Scheuer’s al-Ahram source asserts. They took 7 seats by my count.

Scheuer took this point and several others from op-eds written by Arab secularists. For someone who berates the Western media for accepting ideas from Arabs who have agendas, he might view his own sources with a little more skepticism. Lumping every Islamist into the same Salafi stew may make a complex phenomenon more digestible or satiate the reading public’s appetite for ubiquitous doom, but it is neither analytically accurate nor politically useful.

I’ve been collecting news stories on the terror suspects arrested in Saudi Arabia. Much of the reporting relies on Saudi security personnel and the Interior Ministry’s statement last week, so it should be read with due skepticism.

There’s a lot to discuss, but I’ll save my comments for later. For the moment it’s worth noting that, as of today, the Saudis are now injecting a new piece of information into the story: the network was taking orders and receiving money from someone in Iran:

• The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Below is my summary of all the data points I’ve been able to find (sources at the bottom):

The Network

• Five networks have been captured. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Of the 701 people arrested (181 of whom have been released), more than 50% are Saudi citizens. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• In the new batch of arrests, the demographic has shifted to Mauritania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. In the past, non-Saudi militants active in the Kingdom came from mainly from Yemen, then Chad, Morocco, and Kuwait. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were pursuing advanced degrees. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The seven Mauritanians had a “special driver” visa that enabled them to move around the country freely. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The Afghans arrested were from Waziristan. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• There were Yemenis and Iraqis in the “oil cell”. The number of Yemenis was higher than those of other nationalities in the cell. The number of Saudis in the cell is equivalent to that of the other nationalities in the cell. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Only 50% of those in cell were Saudis. The rest came during pilgrimage season and did not go home. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)
• Most of the foreigners in the cell were recruited by imams in their home countries, or through the Internet. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)

Recruitment

• Because of Saudi security measures, the militants altered their methods of recruitment and their procurement of equipment. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• In Saudi Arabia, the main tool of recruitment is the Internet. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• The Eastern Province cell recruited illegal African residents to find jobs in the oil sector. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• The recruiter network carried out organized efforts to target youth and to send them for training outside Saudi Arabia. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Leadership

• There is no single leader for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• A mobile phone that belonged to a member of the Eastern Province cell had a voice message from Zawahiri on it. This is the second recent message from Zawahiri that has been found recently on a terror suspect’s phone in Saudi. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were in graduate school. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Funding

• The new batch of militants are well funded. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• The Yanbu cell forged coupons for sacrificial livestock and sold them at pilgrimage [presumably to raise capital]. (al-Sharq al-Awsat,” 520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)
• Cells planned to raise funds and send them outside the Kingdom. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The financing of AQ in Saudi came from one particular direction, especially when AQ was being rebuilt. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Preparation

• The weapons and money caches were professionally sealed for long-term storage. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• Much of the money, weapons, and equipment were buried in remote desert areas. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Media

• The media cell was responsible for defaming clerics, raising doubts, and excommunicating other Muslims, all online. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Targets and Tactics

• The cells are following the strategy outlined by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.
• One of the five cells, the “oil cell,” planned to penetrate the secret police adminstrative building in Khafji with car bombs and to blow up oil installations in the Eastern region. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Cell members intended to attack oil installations in Gulf states. They were going to use boats to attack some installations. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• Cell members had maps and pictures of hotels in many Gulf countries that foreigners stay in. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• Cell members plotted to attack boats in the Gulf. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• The plan of attack was to hit a variety of places while making sure that the cell’s base of operations was far away from the targets. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)

Sources

Mashari al-Dhaydi, “Features of the New al-Qaeda,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

Muhammad al-Malfi, “A High-Level Security Source: The Africans Are Actually from Mauritania and the Asians Are Afghans from Waziristan,” al-Watan, 26 June 2008.

“520 Arrested, Planned to Attack Oil and Security Installations and Spread the Takfir Methodology on the Internet,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

“Saudi: Oil Cell Planned to Storm the Building of Secret Police of al-Khafji with Car Bombs,” al-Qabas, 29 June 2008.

“Oil Installations in Gulf Countries Intended Targets,” al-Qabas 27 June 2008.

“Saudi Arabia: Terror Cell Received Orders from al-Qaeda Deputy,” Adnkronos.com, 26 June 2008.

In the news surrounding the Saudi statement on its capture of suspected terrorists over the past six months (see Marisa’s links here and here and here), one thing stood out: 40 Mauritanians were arrested in Saudi’s oil-rich Eastern Province, some (all?) of whom were part of a cell that planned to attack oil installations in the province.

I’ve written before on the repeated blipping of Mauritania on my radar screen and Alle has helped me understand (here and here) the rise of Islamist militancy in that country. But why are so many involved in militancy in faraway places like Saudi and Afghanistan/Pakistan? Why not just join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?

(Picture of one of the Mauritanians arrested in Saudi)

In the past six months, Saudi Arabia has arrested around 700 suspected terrorists.  Yesterday, the Interior Ministry released a statement which claimed that many of those arrested were trying to implement the blueprint laid out by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.

Naji argues that if Jihadis want to take power, they need to abandon the idea of overthrowing governments in the Middle East.  Instead, they should focus on creating security vacuums.  They can do this by striking  a country’s crucial industries, like oil and tourism.  The government will respond by pulling in its security forces to protect the infrastructure.  This will open up the desired security vacuums (”regions of savagery” as he calls them) that Jihadis can move into and set up rudimentary governments.  These vacuums can be as small as city blocks or as large as a province.  Once they have gained control, the Jihadis can then network with other “administrations of savagery” and proceed to more complicated forms of government.

According to the Saudis, many of the people they arrested wished to carry out this plan, based on Naji’s book:

(The intention of these groups is to) plan, recruit, and equip themselves in order to revive criminal activities in all regions of the Kingdom in an attempt to change the internal security situation into a stage that resembles the situation in other unsettled regions since perverse groups like these are not able to intellectually find a place for themselves in societies that are stable. This (plan) is clearly evident from the confiscation of numerous documents in their possession, including a study they call The Management of Savagery, which articulates their sick dreams and hateful visions.

Since The Management of Savagery is still an obscure book in the Middle East, there were several articles published in Arabic newspapers today that explain its contents.  There are two good articles, one in al-Sharq al-Awsat and one in al-Watan. Strikingly, there are two bad articles in the same papers. First the good ones:

Mashari al-Dhaydi in al-Sharq al-Awsat:

• Dhaydi classes Management among the most important texts shaping the Jihadi Movement, along with Qutb’s Milestones, Faraj’s Neglected Duty, Juhayman al-`Utaybi’s writings, Zawahiri’s Knights, Sayyid Imam/Dr. Fadl’s three books, Suri’s “Syrian Experience,” and three books by Maqdisi.
• Management is odd because it does not have a traditional flavor or a title that rhymes in Arabic (which is usually the case for classically-oriented Islamic books). It is also strange in that it uses terms that are common in the media but not in traditional religious texts.
• He observes that an American (me) translated the book several years ago. [Like some other reporters, he wrongly attributes the sponsorship of the translation to West Point's CTC. The Olin Institute at Harvard actually funded it; both Olin and the CTC host a copy online.]
• Dhaydi quotes a Saudi security expert who says that the most dangerous parts of the book deal with how to vex (nikaya) the government and obtain power (shawka).
• The same expert thinks the book was written by a committee. Dhaydi notes that some people online say it is Sayf al-`Adl. Others say it is an unknown person.

Shakir Abu Talib in Watan:

• Shakir interviews Faris b. Hazzam, a journalist who specializes in terrorist groups. Faris relates that some people think the author of Management is Abu Qatada (recently released from a UK prison).
• He notes that someone at West Point translated the document and that the U.S. has already been studying it for two years.

Now for the two bad articles. The first is by `Ali al-Qahtani for Watan. He reports that Naji was one of those captured by Saudi security forces yesterday, which is very wrong. Next he quotes Salih b. Sa`d al-Luhaydan, an adviser for the World Association for Mental Health, who says that he has never heard of the book before. The author, Luhaydan says, has nothing new to say; he is irrational and puts emotion before reason; and he is obviously suffering from an early childhood psychological trauma. An anonymous article in al-Sharq al-Awsat is equally derisive, ridiculing the author as irrational.

If you’ve read Naji, you know that he is anything but irrational or emotional. Those who dismiss him as deranged might make themselves feel better, but they severely underestimate the cunning of him and his ilk–always a bad idea.

I’m relieved that the same papers that published such pap also published serious analyses. I’m also grateful that the latter highlighted my translation and that they acknowledged that the U.S. is well advanced in studying Naji’s work.  The U.S. government deserves a lot of the lumps it gets for cultural ignorance, but many would be surprised how far ahead of its Arab counterparts it is in understanding Jihadism.

As for the question of Naji’s identity, I am pretty sure that he is dead–a major Jihadi insider, Husayn b. Mahmud, said so online. So that would eliminate Abu Qatada and Sayf al-`Adl.