Entries Tagged 'Syria' ↓

This Saturday evening, Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula issued a statement claiming the assassination attempt on Muhammad Bin Nayif (hat tip: Evan). See here for an automatic translation. By the way, Michael Dunn has a good roundup of Saudi media reports on the attack.

The statement identified the attacker as “Abu al-Khayr” alias Abdallah Hasan Tali’ Asiri, a Saudi national who was number 40 on the list of 85 wanted militants issued on 3 February 2009. The statement includes a picture of Asiri, who looks very young indeed. I don’t know much about him except the obvious, ie that he or is family is originally from the south, and that he is not a Guantanamo alumnus.

The statement says the operation was the result of “unique intelligence work”, and it insinuates that Asiri flew from Najran (near the Saudi-Yemen border) to Jidda to carry out the operation. This suggests that he may have been dispatched from QAP headquarters in Yemen.

If this is the case, I am somewhat relieved, because it would mean that a) the firepower of QAP HQ is smaller than I feared, and b) there still isn’t a significant organisation inside the Kingdom proper. But then again, the statement may be a deliberate attempt to deceive.

By the way the declaration also says the organization has uncovered a network of Saudi spies in Yemen operating without the knowledge of Yemeni authorities. More “interesting details” are to follow, the statement says. Let’s just hope we don’t have an Iraq-style “captured spy” scenario.

On 29 June 2009, the Jordanian journalist Murad Batal al-Shishani published an article in al-Hayat titled “Salafi–Jihadism: A New Face in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria’s Palestinian Camps.” The article talks about the new generation of “neo-Zarqawis” and the increasing radicalization of Palestinian refugees. This radicalisation, he argues, stems from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the deterioration of the PLO and its control over the refugee camps, the political ramifications of the Fatah-Hamas conflict, and rising poverty and unemployment. Al-Shishani states that attacks such as the 2008 incident in Jordan where Thaer al-Wahidi, a refugee from the al-Baq’ah refugee camp, assaulted a Lebanese classical music troupe, are emblematic of this phenomenon.

Al-Shishani argues that the Salafi-jihadi ideology in the refugee camps has come in three phases. The first was the establishment of the ideology in the mid-1980s. The establishment of ‘Usbat al-Ansar in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon was typical of this phase. According to al-Shishani, this period witnessed the beginning of nationalist groups using Islamic slogans and the establishment of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

Al-Shishani writes that the second phase was when the Salafi-jihadis started playing a larger role in sheltering and training non-Palestinian Salafi-jihadis. Al-Shishani cited the 2003 bombing of the McDonalds in Lebanon by the Yemeni Muammar al-Awami as an example of this development.

According to al-Shishani, the third phase is when the Salafi-jihadi ideology becomes the primary ideology for Palestinian youth in the camps. This phase is occurring now,  as individuals and small groups are increasingly taking up the ideology. Al-Shishani states that the members of this new generation “are described as ‘neo-Zarqawis,’” and are the legacy of the Levantine Salafi-jihadi current that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started in his Afghan training camp in 2000. They believe the route to Israel is through Iraq. Al-Shishani maintains that this trend is regional, centering on Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and it rejects the Salafi-jihadism of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (more on the al-Maqdisi dispute here and here).

In describing the Salafi-jihadi situation in Jordan, al-Shishani states that the refugee camp in Irbid has become a transit point for foreign fighters headed to Iraq and this is important because commentators normally associate Salafi-jihadism in Jordan with the cities of Zarqa, Salt, and Maan in addition to Palestinians not living in camps and East Jordanians. According to al-Shishani, Irbid is where the leader of al-Wahidi’s cell, Shakir ‘Umar al-Khatib, recruited al-Wahidi and called on Palestinians to join “the fighters in Iraq and Lebanon.”

For Lebanon, al-Shishani agrees with Omayma Abdel-Latif, a research associate at the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Center, that Lebanon is “fertile ground” for radical Salafi organizations. The lack of official Lebanese control over the camps, due to a previous agreement between Palestinian factions and the Lebanese government, compounds this threat.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of information, al-Shishani does not provide many details of the situation in Syria except to say that there have been clashes between militants in the Yarmuk refugee camp and the Syrian government.

The study of Salafi-jihadism in the Levant often takes a backseat to that of Iraq and AfPak, and to that of Hamas and Hezbollah, but, as al-Shishani indicates, the ideology does have a persistent and dangerous following in the region. If the modicum of stability that Iraq currently enjoys holds after the US withdrawal, the next logical endpoint for the neo-Zarqawis would be the Palestinian Territories, where they could act as spoilers to any possible peace initiatives.

A post by an unknown author titled, “Fatah al-Islam between Asad al-Jihad2 and al-Maqdisi / Lessons and Considerations,” has been making its rounds through the various forums. The author offered a scathing critique of Fatah al-Islam (FI) and of recent comments by FI’s Sharia Officer, Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi (not to be confused with the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi). Using statements from Asad al-Jihad2 (AJ2), who is a possible al-Qaida (AQ) leader, the author argued that FI’s leadership lacked clarity in its mission and was too afraid to attack Israel.

In considering al-Maqdisi’s statements, the author concluded that al-Maqdisi:

1. Is not in Lebanon
2. Is not aware of the complex relationship between the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees living in the camps
3. Is not aware of the “sectarian balances” in Lebanon
4. Is not aware of the extent of Hezbollah’s state building in Lebanon

He also criticized FI for not having Lebanese Sunni priorities when the organization started in 2006. He claimed, “The Sunni aspired to reach a balance with Hezbollah and were not looking to the Israeli danger.” These accusations echoed statements by AJ2, who the author claimed grasped the full picture of the various battles in Lebanon. AJ2 stated that when FI entered Lebanon, it quickly lost Sunni support because it “began provoking and targeting the weakest party in Lebanon, which was the Sunnis in the army and internal security. It lost the support of all the Sunni at the same time because of the slaughter that took place on elements of the army, who were sleeping or separated from their weapons.”

According to AJ2, at this point, FI had two choices. 1) Eliminate its Sunni enemies and establish an emirate in Tripoli before starting clashes with Hezbollah, which controls access to Israel. 2) Transform the Sunnis into a potent fighting force supported by a wide majority. However, AJ2 reported that FI did not have the opportunity to make any choice because it clashed with security forces too soon, causing the Nahr al-Bared siege. He claimed that the other jihadi groups in Lebanon did not support FI because it had lost popular support.

AJ2 also maintained that Syria is highly active in penetrating and disrupting jihadi cells in the Levant. He claimed that Hashim Minqara, the leader of the Islamic Unification Movement, and Najib Miqati, a former prime minister of Lebanon, gave former FI leader Shakir al-’Absi to the Syrians. He singled out Minqara alleging that he not only helped capture al-Absi, but also helped Syria penetrate the jihadi groups to further Syrian relations with the Hariri family and to gather information to sell to the US and France. He stated that Syria had unsuccessfully tried similar operations with the Islamic State of Iraq.

According to the author, al-Maqdisi’s story largely confirmed that of AJ2, but al-Maqdisi also tried “to confirm the role of Fatah al-Islam in the leadership of al-Qaida in the Levant.” However, AJ2 stated that there were no organizational links between FI and al-Qaida in the Levant (AQL).

The author then offered lessons learned from al-Maqdisi’s statements and criticisms of these lessons. The first was the limitation for recruitment from secular Palestinian organizations that are close to Syria. Al-Maqdisi claimed that after al-’Absi was released from prison in Syria, he contacted “the brothers” and “decided to carry out the plan” and “exploit” Fatah al-Intifada, the precursor to FI. He convinced members of Fatah al-Intifada to prepare for operations against Israel from Lebanon. Accepting all nationalities, he wanted to “transform the conflict with the Jews from a Jewish-Palestinian conflict to a conflict between the Ummah and the Jews.”

The author criticized this, stating “How could have al-’Absi expected to establish all of these complicated operations, and include Arab mujahidin, without the attention of Syrian spies, or without Syrian intelligence attempting to plant its spies within the organization?”

The second lesson was the loss of FI’s priorities. The author stated that FI started training and sending fighters to Iraq, which represented a diversion from FI’s stated aims of attacking Israel. He then mentioned a FI desire to target the entire Levant. Finally, he stated that the last FI goal was establishing an Islamic emirate in northern Lebanon. He quoted al-Maqdisi, “After easily controlling the camp and gaining the loyalty of some of the Islamic groups, there was the idea of establishing an Islamic emirate in Tripoli as the key in the battle with the Jews and to assist their brothers in Iraq. It would also attract the downtrodden Sunni in Lebanon, who raced behind Hariri the apostate. Additionally, it would be for the sake of attracting Sunnis to Syria because the tyranny of the Baath Party forced them to fear themselves.”

The author countered, “What are the priorities of the organization? Fighting the Jews, combating the Syrian regime and besieging it, or supporting the mujahidin in Iraq with trained men?” He also asked how FI thought it could fight Israel, when it was trying to open a front with Syria. He added that if the goal was to train fighters and send them to Iraq, then why cause trouble with Syria. According to the author, regardless of what FI’s goal was, it was not taking a course of action that could have achieved any goal.

The third lesson was the danger of miscalculations. According to the author al-Maqdisi said, “The Fatah al-Islam leadership did not expect the Army to enter the [Nahr] al-Bared camp. It calculated politically that the clashes would last for two days or more and then there would be calm like what happened in Ain al-Hilweh.” He claimed that that the decision to enter the camps was taken internationally because they are linked to the UN. He also thought that Lebanon’s complicated politics would forestall the Army from entering the camp and that the US hastened the decision to enter because it learned about FI’s presence in the camp, and its strategy and future goals.

The author responded with a question about why FI did not fear the repercussions of a Lebanese Army attack, but feared what would happen if they carried out an alleged plan to abduct Israelis, which essentially states that FI was too scared to attack Israel.

Finally, al-Maqdisi supposedly claimed that it is best if a group does not announce its responsibility for terrorist attacks because the enemy does not know where to respond. The author thought that the idea was bad because anyone could use the group’s name for bloody acts.

Two developments from this story will be interesting to watch in the coming months. The first is the criticism of FI, which may evolve into another incidence of jihadis bickering amongst themselves. The second is the supposed announcement of AQL. AQ has long attempted to establish a presence in the Levant and many groups have claimed to be AQ syndicates. Over a year ago, AJ2 warned that AQ would announce its presence in the Levant after the US presidential elections and it would begin attacking Israel by 2010. It appears that he is keeping his word. However, I will believe AQ is an actual presence in the Levant when I see it due to the multitude of groups in the past claiming to be AQ and the difficult operating environment in the Levant, which is largely due to the lack of ungoverned spaces on the border with Israel. Nevertheless, al-Zarqawi managed attacks in Jordan and launched rockets into Israel, so an attack is not completely out of the question.

In part 8, Sayyid Imam continues to hammer al-Qaeda for bringing disaster to the Middle East and for the hypocrisy of its leaders.  He

• puts forward the odd claim that AQ lied to the U.S. about WMD in Iraq and about AQ ties with Iraq to push the U.S. to invade
• observes that Iran and Syria have been the primary beneficiaries of AQ’s antics in Iraq
• notes what any observer of the region already knows but rarely says: bashing the U.S. and Israel and talking about the Palestinian issue is great PR
• offers an excellent explanation as to why AQ will not get a foothold in the Palestinian territories
• claims that Bin Laden gave Saudi donations for jihad to Nawaz Sharif in support of his candidacy against Benazir Bhutto

Continuing…

Z claims that only the mujahids have thrawted the plans of the U.S.  That’s like Gamal Abdel Nasser’s slogan after the ‘67 defeat that “no voice rises above the voice of battle” in order to silence his critics.

AQ brought the U.S. into the region and caused it to occupy Iraq and Afghanistan.  It gave the U.S. false information about WMD in Iraq and tying Iraq to al-Qaeda to give the U.S. the excuse to invade Iraq.  They did this to lure the U.S. into a battlefield where it could be destroyed.  But AQ killed far more Iraqis than it killed Americans.  It brought the U.S. in and excommunicated the people of Iraq solely to fulfill its desire to fight America.

Z claims that AQ thwarted the plans of the U.S. but the truth is the opposite.  Wherever AQ goes, it brings destruction to Muslims.

Those who have benefitted from the killing in Iraq are first Iran, then Syria.  Is Syria facilitating those who seek to fight in Iraq out its love for jihad, for the Iraqis, or for its own self interest?  Aren’t some of the leaders of AQ who are encouraging others to fight in Iraq located in Iran, particularly the son of UBL?  Is fighting for the interests of Syria and Iran a jihad?  Hasn’t Z previously paid his brothers to fight in Egypt in service of Sudanese intel?  Isn’t killing the Iraqis and demolishing their homes exactly what Jews are doing to Palestinians?  Is this jihad or even thwarting the plans of America?  Wasn’t Iraq part of the Abode of Islam under Saddam before the American occupation?  Didn’t al-Qaeda, at the hands of Zarqawi, trigger a sectarian civil war in Iraq by killing the Shia en masse?  Haven’t the Sunnis paid the ultimate price for this?  Killing the Iraqi Shia only strengthened their ties to Iran and facilitated Iranian involvement in Iraq, whereas it did nothing but weaken the Sunni position in Iraq.

Does the mentality that lost an actual Islamic state in Afghanistan really believe that an Islamic state will be established in Iraq and not just on the Internet?  Are the Islamic peoples to be test animals for Bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s experiment?

No one is more pleased with al-Qaeda today than Iran and Syria.  All they have to do is turn a blind eye to the fighters who travel through their countries to blow themselves up, which serves Iranian and Syrian interests.

One of Z’s ignorant beliefs is that he proves the truth of what he says by pointing to the number of his followers.

Z says I heaped abuse on Bin Laden, but then he asks which of us has better understood reality and affected more of Muslim youth and masses? (Exoneration, p. 10)

The truth is known by its agreement with the Sharia, not by the number of its followers.

I have not called on anyone to follow me.  I am only relaying what I think is right according to the Sharia. 

Aren’t those who extol Bin Laden the same people that previously extolled Saddam Hussein?

Z’s words [ie the truth of what you say is proven by the number of your followers] indicate a fundamental aspect of his character: he has always been looking for fame and he is willing to get it by killing the innocent.

* One of the deceptions of Z is his trading on the Palestinian question

It is well-known that the fastest way to gain popularity among the Arab and Muslim masses is to bash the United States and Israel and talk a great deal about the Palestinian issue.  Nasser did it, Saddam did it, Ahmadinejad does it, as do others.  However, these people have actually done something for Palestinians, particularly Nasser, whereas Bin Laden and Z just talk.  Z even says in his Exoneration that “the slogan which the masses of the Muslim umma have understood and responded to well for 50 years is the slogan of calling for jihad against Israel.  Moreover, in this decade the umma is mobilized by the American presence in the heart of the Islamic world.” [I think this quote is from Knights but haven't checked it yet]

Z and Bin Laden talk about Palestinian children being hurt but not about the death they bring to the children of Afghanistan.

* Why doesn’t al-Qaeda undertake operations in Palestine?

If Al-Qaeda is so interested in the Palestinian question, why hasn’t it undertaken operations against the Jews there?  There are two reasons.  First, killing Jews is not one of Bin Laden’s priorities.  Second, al-Qaeda is an organization without a state; wherever it is, it is a stranger.  One can’t carry out operations in a country without the help of some of the people in that country. 

Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with any of the Palestinian organizations for four reasons:

1) Palestinian organizations don’t trust Bin Laden.  There’s no room to explain here, but it is an old matter from the days of the Afghan jihad.

2) Al-Qaeda has nothing to offer Palestinian groups militarily since the latter are far more advanced.  Indeed, Al-Qaeda relied on the cadres of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad trained by the Palestinian groups in Lebanon from 1990 to 1992.

3) Different tactics with respect to the use of force.  Bin Laden uses blind force to kill as many people as possible, even if it leads to the destruction of his organization–“organizational suicide.”  Palestinian organizations, on the other hand, use limited force to make gains against the enemy while ensuring the survival of their organization.  They follow the traditional principles of guerrilla war, the “war of the flea and the dog.”  Bin Laden’s new way is the war of the elephant, which makes mass killing the goal.

4) Palestinian organizations don’t need Bin Laden’s money since they have their own resources, just as they are more politically sophisticated than Bin Laden.

This is why Al-Qaeda has failed to ally with Palestinian groups and failed to gain a foothold in Palestine.  That’s why Z in his recent statement called for the Bedouin of Sinai to engage in jihad in Palestine.  It’s just propaganda.

When the Palestinian organizations rebuffed al-Qaeda, Z started criticizing them. Z accused Hamas of killing Jewish children with their missiles.  Is this a rational person?  What about the innocents al-Qaeda has killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, and elsewhere?  Is what is permitted for Al-Qaeda forbidden for Hamas?  Z is sad for Jewish children but kills Muslim children.

Z accuses Hamas of participating in elections on the basis of a secular constitution.  Why does Z criticize Hamas only?  Why not also criticize his shaykh Bin Laden?  Bin Laden paid a lot of money in support of Nawaz Sharif in parliamentary elections in Pakistan against Benazir Bhutto.  This was money for jihad that Saudis had give Bin Laden.  When I found out about this in 1992, I said to Abu Hafs al-Masri, who was the one who gave the money to Nawaz Sharif, “Abu Hafs! By God, Bin Laden is leading you to Hell!”

Document (Arabic): 11-27-08-al-masry-al-youm-denudation-part-8

So far, the Jihadi reaction to the strikes in Syria is not outrage against the U.S. but ridicule of Syria, who either colluded with the Americans (Hesbah) or is too weak to defend itself against external aggression (Faloja).  I’ll let you know if I see anything else on the subject that’s interesting.

Document (Arabic): 10-27-08-hesbah-two-members-think-us-and-syria-coordinated-strike-in-syria

Document (Arabic): 10-26-08-faloja-reaction-to-us-strike-in-syria

Earlier this week, I noted that members of the Hesbah forum are increasingly pessimistic about Iraq. And in May I wrote about the death of Sulayman al-`Utaybi, an al-Qaeda leader in Iraq who had left for Afghanistan after his dismissal from his post. Here’s what I wrote at the time:

That he headed straight for Afghanistan makes me wonder if this is a sign of things to come as AQ gets squeezed out of Iraq.

Now the Washington Post gives us further evidence that Iraq is a sinking ship for al-Qaeda and Afghanistan is the lifeboat, at least for the senior leadership. Amit Paley has written a well-sourced article on the departure of Abu Ayyub al-Masri (aka Abu Hamza al-Muhajer), the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, for Afghanistan. Here’s what we learn from the article (sources in parentheses):

Foreign fighters

• AQ is diverting new recruits to Afghanistan and Iraq. (U.S. officials)
• The number of foreign fighters going to Iraq a year ago was 110/mo. Earlier this year it was 50/mo. Now it is 20/mo. (senior U.S. intel analyst)
• The flow of most of AQI’s foreign fighters, money, and weapons is controlled by Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih (aka Abu Ghadiya), a Mosul native who is based in Syria. (U.S. intel officials)

AQI Leadership

• Masri designated Abu Khalil al-Souri to run AQI when he left for Afghanistan. Souri came to Iraq in 2003. (Ansari, AQI leader in Fallujah)
• Souri is one of 33 fighters, known as “the first line,” who came with Zarqawi in 2003. (Milehmi, senior AQI leader north of Fallujah)
• Souri’s name is attached to a July 10 AQI communique, a document usually signed by Masri.
• Masri has gone to Afghanistan twice before to meet with Jihadis and come back. (Milehmi, senior AQI leader north of Fallujah)
• Masri went to Afghanistan to review situation of AQI with Bin Laden. (Qaisi, commander of AQI recruitment unit)

Route to Afghanistan

• Masri went to Afghanistan through Iran (Ansari, AQI leader in Fallujah)
• Masri and two others went into Iran on June 12 through border town of Zorbatia (Col. Abdullah, Iraqi intel official in Ramadi)
• Masri went through Iran with 15 leaders (captured AQI member Abu Abeer al-Muhajer via an Iraqi police officer)

AQ Splinter Group

• Abu Taha al-Lihebi is leader of an AQI group in eastern Anbar. He and his group split from AQI because Masri condoned attacks on the Awakening movement and on civilians, which lost the group support. (Abu Taha al-Lihebi)
• Lihebi’s group disavows suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI. (Abu Taha al-Lihebi)

It’s not surprising that Iran is a transit point to Afghanistan (see my previous posts on the Harbi group from Kuwait) or that Masri is consulting with al-Qaeda Central (another nail in the “leaderless jihad” coffin).  It’s also not surprising that AQI is losing support because its senior leadership decided to shit where it slept.

I am surprised that most of AQI’s material and human resources are so tightly coordinated by an AQ operative in Syria.  The Sinjar data suggests that the flow is more decentralized.

What also stands out to me is that the AQI splinter group renounced suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI, an interesting turn for those who see the adoption of suicide bombings as either a natural result of being a devout Muslim or the result of militant groups competing to outdo each other.  In this case, competition is a factor, but it’s going the opposite direction.