Entries Tagged 'tactics' ↓

Hesbah pundit `Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir has been writing a series of essays he collectively calls “Real War vs. Symbolic War.” The point of the essays is to explain the difference between terrorist attacks (symbolic war) and other types of military violence (real war).

One of his essays, “Cold Terrorism,” examines the decision-making of groups choosing between killing for the sake of eliminating enemies without drawing attention to themselves (cold terrorism) vs. killing to provoke a response against themselves (hot terrorism). The following quotes are from a recent English translation:

* Can we afford not to take the responsibility of the operation?

* Does the safety of the performers take precedence over the attack or otherwise?

* The ease of performing the operation and the available means

* Are we ready to tackle the retaliation of the enemy or not?

If the aim is to get rid of the enemy without looking on to any other goal then it is preferred to use cold terror.

As for if the aim is to terrorize the enemy only, then it is preferred to use hot terror, even though the security situation and the safety of the performers currently calls for the cold terror as it gives the performers the chance to retreat and escape.

Faqir concludes with some aphorisms on where hot and cold terrorism fit into real and symbolic war:

In the actual war, cold terror is used, as it helps us in avoiding the retaliation of the enemy and enables the performers to withdraw safely.

In the symbolic war, hot terror is used because it causes more stir and more terror and is more effective in the media.

In the actual war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is getting rid of it.

In the symbolic war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is to terrorize it.

Document (English): 9-3-08-ekhlaas-real-war-vs-symbolic-war cold vs hot terrorism

This one is for all those who believe that Jihadis act strictly according to the Qur’an and the Sunna.  It’s a detailed study by Abu al-Harith al-Ansari of the various types of warfare and the prophetic precedents for each.  There are 41 kinds in all, including “media warfare,” “economic warfare,” “secret warfare,” “war of attrition,” and so forth.  If you’ve ever needed to make the argument that Islamic scripture determines Jihadi behavior, this 278-page book is for you.

Of course, you’d still have a hard time explaining why a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq recently broke with the organization and renounced suicide attacks.

abu-al-harith-al-ansari-irshad-al-saul-ila-hurub-al-rasul إرشاد السؤول إلى حروب الرسول

Periodically, Ekhlaas members poll the forum. Usually, the questions are inane (”How much do you love the Islamic State of Iraq?”). But a recent poll posted two months ago caught my eye. The voting seems to be coming to an end, so I’m posting the results.

The question is, “After you arrive in the theaters of jihad (God willing), where will you find yourself?” The respondents can choose from the following (quoting):

1. in a martyrdom operation
2. in the field of battle fighting the Crusaders [direct fighting]
3. producing sophisticated weapons [traditional and non-traditional]
4. in leadership positions [company commander - group commander]
5. teaching a course on the Sharia
6. in the media division
7. something else

75 people responded, but only 46 directly answered the question. Some had multiple answers, so I only counted their first choices. Here’s how the results break down:

15 Martyrdom, 22 Fight, 3 Weapons, 3 Leadership, 0 Teaching, 1 Media, 2 Other. Some of the respondents couldn’t choose one and answered with a prioritized list. Others felt they could do several of things at once. For example, one said he could fight during the day and teach religious classes at night.

It’s interesting that so few of the respondents aspire to leadership positions or want to play supporting roles. Perhaps it’s because they are doing that now as forum fighters and feel that when they travel to the front, it’s time to fight. Or perhaps it’s peer pressure: no one wants to appear arrogant by claiming leadership or cowardly by choosing a non-violent option.

Document (Arabic): 6-28-08-ekhlaas-what-service-do-you-want-to-perform-in-theaters-of-jihad

(This is only the first page of the six pages of responses. Follow the numbered links at the bottom for the rest.)

I’ve been collecting news stories on the terror suspects arrested in Saudi Arabia. Much of the reporting relies on Saudi security personnel and the Interior Ministry’s statement last week, so it should be read with due skepticism.

There’s a lot to discuss, but I’ll save my comments for later. For the moment it’s worth noting that, as of today, the Saudis are now injecting a new piece of information into the story: the network was taking orders and receiving money from someone in Iran:

• The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Below is my summary of all the data points I’ve been able to find (sources at the bottom):

The Network

• Five networks have been captured. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Of the 701 people arrested (181 of whom have been released), more than 50% are Saudi citizens. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• In the new batch of arrests, the demographic has shifted to Mauritania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. In the past, non-Saudi militants active in the Kingdom came from mainly from Yemen, then Chad, Morocco, and Kuwait. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were pursuing advanced degrees. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The seven Mauritanians had a “special driver” visa that enabled them to move around the country freely. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The Afghans arrested were from Waziristan. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• There were Yemenis and Iraqis in the “oil cell”. The number of Yemenis was higher than those of other nationalities in the cell. The number of Saudis in the cell is equivalent to that of the other nationalities in the cell. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Only 50% of those in cell were Saudis. The rest came during pilgrimage season and did not go home. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)
• Most of the foreigners in the cell were recruited by imams in their home countries, or through the Internet. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)

Recruitment

• Because of Saudi security measures, the militants altered their methods of recruitment and their procurement of equipment. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• In Saudi Arabia, the main tool of recruitment is the Internet. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• The Eastern Province cell recruited illegal African residents to find jobs in the oil sector. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• The recruiter network carried out organized efforts to target youth and to send them for training outside Saudi Arabia. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Leadership

• There is no single leader for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• A mobile phone that belonged to a member of the Eastern Province cell had a voice message from Zawahiri on it. This is the second recent message from Zawahiri that has been found recently on a terror suspect’s phone in Saudi. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were in graduate school. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Funding

• The new batch of militants are well funded. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• The Yanbu cell forged coupons for sacrificial livestock and sold them at pilgrimage [presumably to raise capital]. (al-Sharq al-Awsat,” 520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)
• Cells planned to raise funds and send them outside the Kingdom. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The financing of AQ in Saudi came from one particular direction, especially when AQ was being rebuilt. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Preparation

• The weapons and money caches were professionally sealed for long-term storage. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• Much of the money, weapons, and equipment were buried in remote desert areas. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Media

• The media cell was responsible for defaming clerics, raising doubts, and excommunicating other Muslims, all online. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Targets and Tactics

• The cells are following the strategy outlined by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.
• One of the five cells, the “oil cell,” planned to penetrate the secret police adminstrative building in Khafji with car bombs and to blow up oil installations in the Eastern region. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Cell members intended to attack oil installations in Gulf states. They were going to use boats to attack some installations. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• Cell members had maps and pictures of hotels in many Gulf countries that foreigners stay in. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• Cell members plotted to attack boats in the Gulf. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• The plan of attack was to hit a variety of places while making sure that the cell’s base of operations was far away from the targets. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)

Sources

Mashari al-Dhaydi, “Features of the New al-Qaeda,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

Muhammad al-Malfi, “A High-Level Security Source: The Africans Are Actually from Mauritania and the Asians Are Afghans from Waziristan,” al-Watan, 26 June 2008.

“520 Arrested, Planned to Attack Oil and Security Installations and Spread the Takfir Methodology on the Internet,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

“Saudi: Oil Cell Planned to Storm the Building of Secret Police of al-Khafji with Car Bombs,” al-Qabas, 29 June 2008.

“Oil Installations in Gulf Countries Intended Targets,” al-Qabas 27 June 2008.

“Saudi Arabia: Terror Cell Received Orders from al-Qaeda Deputy,” Adnkronos.com, 26 June 2008.

Algihadya, an Egyptian Jihadi blogger, has posted an essay by Zadi al-Taqwa titled “Al-Qaeda and the Battle for Oil.” I don’t know where Zadi usually hangs his electronic hat, but his essay is making the rounds on the forums. Zadi argues that AQ has focused on attacking U.S. oil interests since its inception in 1998 because it understands that oil is vital to the U.S. economy, which it wants to damage. This is one of the main reasons it went into Iraq, where it could thwart U.S. plains to obtain cheap oil and where it could damage the oil infrastructure of a major oil producer. There is no mention of religious justifications or Prophetic precedents for attacking oil; it’s purely economic in Zadi’s analysis.

According to Zadi, the price of oil is sky high today because of a variety of factors (quoting):

1) Reduction of the level of oil production in the United States of America

2) Reduction of the level of oil production in Iraq because of the war

3) Rising level of demand for oil in China and India, which are expanding economically

4) Reduction of the dollar’s buying power and rising levels of inflation

5) Many countries and their central banks are decoupling their currencies from the dollar and seeking refuge in currency baskets.

6) The strength of the Euro as a currency led to the decline of the value of the dollar; moreover, the value of renminbi, the currency of China, is rising.

AQ will continue to attack oil infrastrure and the price of oil will continue to rise. For example, on May 30 2008 AQ in Yemen launched an attack on a refinery in Aden, which AQ Central officially embraced. After this date, the price of oil went up to $122.80 per barrel of oil.

Document (Arabic): aq-and-the-battle-for-oil (القاعدة ومعركة النفط)

An English-speaking woman, Umm Saad, has been translating some documents for the members of Ekhlaas. One of them is a story recounted by `Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir, a popular member of al-Hesbah. Faqir argues that what sets al-Qaeda apart from other insurgents is its obedience to Islamic law, even during warfare. To prove his point, he tells the story of an al-Qaeda commander (perhaps in Iraq) who schools a new recruit on the operational restrictions that Jihadis have to abide by.

Of course, this doesn’t often happen on the ground, which is while al-Qaeda has been taking a public relations beating lately and why Faqir relates his story.

Document (English): 6-11-2008-ekhlaas-abd-al-rahman-al-faqir-ethics-of-war-followed-by-al-qaeda

Ekhlaas member `Abd al-Wahhab alleges that the programmers of Grand Theft Auto 4 have been inspired by al-Qaeda. To prove his point, he posts a series of links to clips from the game in which al-Qaeda’s terrorist tactics are employed.  `Abd al-Wahhab then asks: “Is the West preparing its next generation in the mode of  Muslim fighting?”

The post is in Arabic, but the links are easy to make out: 6-3-2008-ekhlaas-grand-theft-auto-tactics