Entries Tagged 'terrorism' ↓

Of all the jihadis we’ve seen in recent years, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi must rank as one of the most violent. Nicknamed “the slaughtering sheikh” (al-shaykh al-dhabbah) by fellow militants, he is widely held responsible for killing hundreds of Shiites in Iraq and personally beheading the American hostage Nicolas Berg. It would therefore be interesting to know what went on in the mind of this man, who was killed in an American attack in 2006.

While several publications have tried to show us the man behind the myth, it would be even better if we could get a glimpse of what al-Zarqawi thought in his pre-Iraq years. Well, the time has come. About a week ago, a jihadi website posted a notebook allegedly used by al-Zarqawi while imprisoned in Jordan in the 1990s. The link on the website (the eleventh title from the top) is called Safahat min Daftar al-Shaykh Abi Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (Pages from Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s Notebook) and leads to an .exe file that actually allows you to flick through the man’s writings.

Some Jihadica readers may remember that Will McCants discussed this document two years ago (on 22 June 2008 to be exact). At the time, however, only a few pages were available and the links to the rest of the document didn’t work (or at least don’t work anymore). Some readers may also be familiar with the Jordanian journalist Fu’ad Husayn and his book Al-Zarqawi: Al-Jil al-Thani li-l-Qa’ida (Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of al-Qa’ida, available in English here), which also only showed a few of the notebook’s pages on pp. 21-23. Now, however, the full 77-page document is available in its original form, including even the blank pages.

Authenticity and timing

The document seems to be authentic. As Will noted at the time, the notebook is dedicated to several people, including Umm Qudama and Abu Qudama, who are respectively al-Zarqawi’s sister and brother-in-law, and al-Zarqawi was indeed in prison in 1998, when the document is said to have been written. This information could, of course, easily have been known by others but there is a third reason to believe this document is indeed the real deal. As mentioned, Will discussed some of these pages before when they appeared on a jihadi forum and so did the book by Fu’ad Husayn, who told me he had received the notes directly from al-Zarqawi’s family. Now that they appear on another jihadi website, it seems unlikely that three different sources keep recycling different pages of a notebook that was never written by al-Zarqawi, although one cannot be entirely sure of course.

As to why this document was posted now, one can only guess. The notebook wasn’t written or discovered recently and, considering al-Zarqawi has been dead for four years, nothing of interest seems to have happened to him that caused the document’s publication. Moreover, if it was posted on the website to commemorate some kind of anniversary (his death, his birth, his release from prison etc.), it would presumably have been announced with quite a bit of fanfare but it wasn’t. The most likely reason it was posted a week ago is that the website it appeared on, tawhed.ws, has posted several collections of jihadi writings as e-books over the past few weeks. These include Ayman al-Zawahiri’s writings, for example, but also those of Mustafa Abu l-Yazid. The posting of al-Zarqawi’s notebook may thus be part of a general effort by the people behind the website to release collections of writings, even of those that have been in their possession for a long time.

Religious texts

In any case, and as Will noted at the time, this is a great source for academics studying the backgrounds and inner workings of terrorists. Although this blog post is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the content, we can surely take a quick glance. The document is filled with religious texts that deal with various topics. There is Qur’anic exegesis, for example on p. 8, where al-Zarqawi cites the explanation of the verse “and be not as those who say, ‘We hear,’ and they hear not” (Q. 8: 21) by the mediaeval exegete al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), and on p. 20, by Ibn Kathir (1300-1373). It also contains several texts apparently copied from books by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350), for example on pp. 9-11 and 15-16. Although Ibn al-Qayyim is generally a favourite among radical Muslims for his uncompromising and strict views on various issues - like his teacher Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) - the fact that he was persecuted and imprisoned because of his ideas may also have inspired al-Zarqawi.

Dedication

While the notebook does not have a single topic or message, most of the texts mentioned seem somehow related to what I would call “dedication” to the cause. The passage explained by al-Qurtubi mentioned above seems to serve as a reminder to stay pious and focused, for example. Al-Zarqawi also discusses jihad (p. 12) and cites a hadith (tradition on the life of Muhammad) about not having to fear if one trusts in God (p. 13). He continues by mentioning the various types of consolation to the believers (p. 15). Al-Zarqawi sometimes also writes short pieces that he seems to have made up himself. One of them (p. 25) mentions the close connection one should maintain with God, while one should break with the tawaghit (idols, used here probably to refer to “un-Islamic” rulers). The rest of the notebook is similarly filled with poems, religious texts and exhortations to remain patient and to keep one’s faith.

What all this adds up to is a collection of short pieces that seems to portray a man dedicated to his faith who uses religious texts to get him through the tough times he is facing. Considering the fact that he was in prison when he wrote this and would go on to become one of the world’s best-known jihadis, this makes a lot of sense, of course. I will leave it to others to decipher all of the notebook, which contains a lot of blank pages after p. 34 but also shows some nice drawings (for example on pp. 70-71). It should be clear, however, that any scholar seriously dealing with al-Zarqawi cannot afford to ignore this source.

In the previous two parts of this short series (here and here), we saw that the Jordanian radical ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and his website, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, have been closely involved in efforts to support the mujahidun in the Caucasus by offering advice, translating books into Russian and encouraging and praising their efforts. We still don’t know why this is the case, however. In this final part of the series, we will try to answer that question.

The Shari’a Committee

To understand why al-Maqdisi and his website are so interested in the mujahidun in the Caucasus, we need to go back a few years to an interview that al-Maqdisi gave to the Jordanian newspaper Al-‘Arab al-Yawm, which was published on 5 July 2005. As regular Jihadica readers know, al-Maqdisi used his week-long release from prison in that year to criticise his former pupil Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and to scold other jihadis for their – in his view – extremist and sometimes plain stupid actions in conflicts that they could never win anyway. He also mentioned that he wanted to set up a committee of religious scholars that could guide jihadi youngsters all over the world by giving them advice and fatwas. Although this latter piece of information was not widely reported at the time and was not acted upon by al-Maqdisi - he was quickly rearrested in 2005 and not released until 2008 - it is nevertheless highly interesting because he seems to have realised this goal of setting up such a committee in 2009.

Since September last year, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad has had a forum on which readers can ask al-Maqdisi and ten other scholars all kinds of questions related to Islam. Although many of these questions (collected in ten volumes so far) are about issues that have nothing to do with jihad, such as wearing trousers (vol. 5, p. 25) or determining the first day of Ramadan (vol. 2, pp. 5-6), many of them do deal with fighting and violence. Considering the context given above (i.e. that this forum was perhaps partly meant to prevent young jihadis from using too much violence), it is not surprising that several of these fatwas actually discourage questioners from using force. A question on Hamas’ Qassam Brigades in the Gaza Strip is answered with the advice to radical jihadis to remain patient and not to seek any confrontation with Hamas (vol. 1, pp. 1-2), notwithstanding the Shari’a Council’s strong disagreements with that movement. Another reply to a Belgian group called Shariah4Belgium advises that group’s members to support jihad elsewhere, but to refrain from using violence in their own country because of their weakness there.

So what is the Minbar doing in Moscow then?

The Minbar’s communique about the subway bombings in Moscow earlier this year, its interest in the Caucasus and its efforts to translate certain books into Russian should probably be seen as part of this wider plan by al-Maqdisi and certain like-minded scholars to support and encourage mujahidun who try to wage a “clean” jihad and to advise others on how to do that. In fact, if one were to take a look at the communique with which this series started as well as al-Maqdisi’s epistle about the Islamic Emirate in the Caucasus, it is striking that so much of these texts is spent praising the mujahidun for their eagerness to obtain knowledge, their supposed purity of arms, the situation in which they allegedly had no other choice than to use violence, their correct choice of victims etc., while hardly any attention is paid to their military prowess. The praise, in other words, seems to be caused not by the mujahidun’s firepower but by their careful and considered use of violence and appears to be directed not just at the mujahidun in the Caucasus but also at other aspiring jihadis as if to tell them: “Take a good look guys, this is how you wage a proper jihad.”

The Shari’a Committee is only less than a year old and consists of relatively unknown scholars (apart from al-Maqdisi) and it remains to be seen whether its fatwas actually have the kind of influence that its authors want them to have. Still, throughout the past year, several new scholars have been added to the committee - sometimes with much fanfare - and if others (perhaps Abu Basir al-Tartusi?) join too, al-Maqdisi’s and the Minbar’s efforts to stem the extremist tides of unlimited violence could pay off and have the potential to become an influential ideological force.

In part 1 of this short series of posts, we saw that the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad website published a communique by the leader of the Islamic Emirate in the Caucasus, Dokku ‘Umarov, claiming responsibility for the attacks in Moscow on 29 March 2010. This was slightly odd since the Minbar mostly publishes books, articles and fatwas, not claims of responsibility for attacks committed anywhere. Although a quick glance at the website may give the impression that this is indeed an exception, a more detailed look reveals that it is part of a broader trend.

It appears that the Minbar has been involved in the conflict between Russia and the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus for some time. For instance, the Jordanian owner of the website, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, has written an epistle in support of the mujahidin in the Caucasus. In it, al-Maqdisi praises the supposed ideological purity, leadership and righteousness of the fighters in the Caucasus and writes that this group can serve as an example for other jihadi groups in the Muslim world. He speaks highly of their acts but especially of what he describes as their knowledge, their carefulness in applying takfir (excommunication of Muslims) and their unwillingness to deviate from tawhid (the unity of God) and compares them favourably with Hamas, another group fighting a non-Muslim enemy.

Advice

The group’s qadi (judge), Abu ‘Imran Anzur b. Aldar, has also asked al-Maqdisi for advice about Muslims working for the Russian government and to what extent the fighters in the Caucasus are allowed to co-operate with them. Abu ‘Imran observes that some Muslims are not very pious or fear for their lives but nevertheless sympathize with the fighters in the Caucasus and therefore use their positions in the Russian army or governmental circles, which Abu ‘Imran believes to be forces of unbelief, to secretly help the Islamic Emirate and wants to know how he should deal with this phenomenon. Al-Maqdisi’s rather general answer is that Muslims should show their true faith to others but their unwillingness to do so because they are weak or scared should not automatically lead to their excommunication. In fact, he maintains that these Muslims may be able to help further the cause of Islam as a whole and that this could be a good thing in certain situations.

The “mujahid leader” Abu ‘Imran also asked al-Maqdisi for advice about Muslim participation in the Olympic Games or the football World Cup. Interestingly, his question does not deal with the tight shirts and short trunks that athletes wear but concentrates on whether it is allowed to participate in sports while wearing clothes that prominently display the word “Russia” as well as Russian symbols. He also wonders whether the pagan Greek origins of the Olympic Games are acceptable in this respect and complains about youngsters who refuse to wear Nike clothes because that brand derives its name from a Greek goddess but who have no problem wearing shirts with the name of the “false god” Russia on it. One may wonder how relevant this question is for people who are busy waging a war against Russian troops, but al-Maqdisi treats it as a serious matter. He states that while participation in sports is not wrong in itself, it is in this context, although he is again careful not to brand those who do participate in the Olympic Games as infidels.

Russian

These two questions mentioned above are reportedly not the only times Abu ‘Imran asked al-Maqdisi for advice since he is said to been in touch with him about other things and has also asked for the latter’s books to be translated into Russian (see here). The Minbar’s involvement with the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus is not limited to al-Maqdisi, however, since those running the website have been busy translating not just some of al-Maqdisi’s books but also some by ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and others into Russian.

So now we know that the communique about the Moscow bombings was not an exception but was actually part of a greater involvement by the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in the Caucasus. This still leaves one question: why?

To be continued…

A new RAND report by Brian Jenkins provides a much-needed overview of jihadi radicalization cases and terrorism plots in the United States since 2001. The study pairs up very nicely with Petter Nesser’s equally indispensable overview of plots in Europe. Apart from offering a comprehensive list of cases, Jenkins makes a number of very pertinent observations, not least regarding the scale of the problem. How many of you knew that 1970s America saw 15 to 20 times as many terrorist incidents as the post 9/11 period?

Although I’m awfully late in paying attention to it, there is an interesting dimension to the Moscow metro attacks that occurred just over a month ago that is relevant for jihad watchers but has not been dealt with in the media or blogs as far as I know.

While attention has obviously focused on the attacks themselves and on the video claim of responsibility by the leader of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, Dokku ‘Umarov, I have not seen any references to a written statement by the same man posted on the online jihadi library Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad).

This statement – and particularly the fact that it was posted on the Minbar, the largest jihadi online library – is interesting. It indicates a development of potentially great significance to the future of jihadi ideological production. This post is the first in a short series of posts I intend to write on this subject for Jihadica. First, let’s look at a translation of the communiqué itself, which is preceded by a statement by the Minbar:

Communiqué by the leader of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus Dokku Abu ‘Uthman about the Moscow Explosions

In the name of God, praise belongs to God and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.

In support of our mujahidin brothers in the Caucasus, we publish this communiqué of which news agencies and satellite channels have not spread anything except that the mujahidin accepted responsibility for the operations. The reasons and justifications the mujahidin mention for perpetrating these operations – the most important of which is the massacre that the Russian intelligence apparatuses have committed with regard to the poor civilians in Chechnya, who do not have anything to feed themselves with nor earn anything except some wild garlic from the woods, where the criminals of the intelligence apparatuses executed a number of them with knives, abusing, maiming and disfiguring their corpses without [their having committed any] offence or crime – all of this and more of the crimes of the Russian regime that the media have not mentioned in the news on the Moscow explosions nor have been mentioned in the communiqué of the emirate [are reasons and justifications for the Moscow attacks]. On the contrary, [the media] were certainly content with the acknowledgement of the explosions by the mujahidin and avoided the justifications [given by the mujahidin] that reveal the crimes of the Putin regime.

That’s why we at the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad see it as our duty to spread this translation [from the original Russian] of the communiqué by the leader of the mujahidin of the Caucasus, Dokku Abu ‘Uthman – may God protect him.

And God prevails in his purpose, but most people do not realise it [Q. 12: 21]

The Shari‘a Committee of the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad

16 Rabi‘ II 1431 AH [1 April 2010 AD]

————————————————————————————–

Praise belongs to God, the lord of all being, prayers and peace upon our Prophet Muhammad, on his family and his companions and on those who follow his right guidance to judgement day.

Peace to all the mujahidin who wage jihad to establish the shari‘a of God in this world.

I am the leader of the mujahidin of the Emirate of the Caucasus, Dokku [Abu ‘Uthman] ‘Umarov. I announce this communiqué on 29 March 2010.

Everyone knows that on 29 March 2010 two operations took place in Moscow. They led to ruin for the unbelievers and they were a special message to the Russian intelligence.

These two operations were done on my specific order and – God willing – they are not the last operations.

With regard to these operations, I want to make clear why we did it:

As we all know, on 11 February, intelligence troops in Chechnya – more specifically, in the district of the village of Arshti – annihilated Muslims from among the poorest and weakest who were gathering wild garlic to keep themselves barely alive and to feed their families, where the criminal special forces of the FSB [the Russian Federal Security Service] killed these innocent civilians with knives and subsequently disfigured their corpses.

These people were indiscriminately annihilated by the Russian intelligence troops, maiming, abusing and ridiculing their slain bodies.

I believe that the operation that was done on my order was not committed against the poor and the weak of the unbelievers because they lived in the heart of Moscow.

That’s why any politician, journalist or person who accuses me of terrorism today because of this act stirs up disapproval and ridicule because I have never heard – not even once – that they accused Putin of terrorism, of killing innocent people and of other crimes like those that took place on 11 February.

I assure all Russians who send their troops into the Caucasus and support the security services that perpetrate bloodbaths that these operations will not be the last.

These operations will continue on your land.

We also declare that another operation will take place in answer to the killing of a group of mujahidin, also on 11 February. God willing, you will hear and see that soon.

That will be done in a different way and on a different scale, God willing.

That’s why I’m letting you know that the war will not be limited, nor will it continue to be watched quietly on your television screens, secluded from the crimes your troops led by Putin have committed on the land of the Caucasus. On the contrary, I am warning you that the war will reach your streets. You will feel it in your lives, in your families, in your spirits and in your skins, God willing.

God is great

The question that arises after reading this communiqué is: why is the Minbar posting a claim of responsibility about metro attacks in Moscow? In fact, why is it posting this statement at all? Isn’t this usually done on jihad forums? To be sure, the Minbar posts communiqués sometimes about various issues, such as statements eulogising “martyrs” (including Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), but posting claims of responsibility is not the site’s specialty at all. What is going on?

To be continued…

People are now speculating that the tragic Air France Flight 447 accident may have been a terrorist incident. French authorities say two names on the passenger list match those of known al-Qaida affiliates, and intelligence agents are in Brazil to find out more. (see also here, here and here).

I have looked around on the forums for claims of responsibility, but I couldn’t find anything. On the contrary, the few posts devoted to the issue suggest the grassroot jihadis themselves doubt an al-Qaida connection. In one discussion on Faloja, most of the seventeen contributors were skeptical. Some suggested the rumours were a ploy to tarnish the image of Muslims, or a way to draw attention away from technical problems that would affect Air France’s reputation. Several considered it a plot by the Zionist French press.

It is obviously too early to exclude terrorism, but in the absence of a claim of responsibility and technical evidence, I am sceptical too.

Document (Arabic): 06-10-09-falloja-france-accuses-al-qaida

Longtime Jihadica friend Clint Watts recently published an article at the Small Wars Journal titled, “Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut.” This article is the third in a series he has authored using data from the Sinjar records (Part 1 and Part 2 of the series). He concluded, “The key to success for future CT strategies will be the disruption of terrorist recruitment in foreign fighter source countries using a mixture of cost effective, soft power tactics to engage local, social-familial-religious networks in flashpoint cities – cities that produce a disproportionately high number of foreign fighters with respect to their overall population.” It is a good analysis and is definitely recommended reading.

Continuing…

• The meaning of “terrorism” is extremely contentious.
• Terrorism is a type of political violence.  Western researchers say that political violence is of four types: violence between states, state violence against its citizens, violence between individuals, and the violence of citizens against the state.
• State violence against citizens is of two kinds: violence to compel obedience to laws and extrajudicial violence to compel political opponents to submit.
• The most common form of violence between citizens is criminal acts that have no political motive.  Other types can be social or political, like ethnic or ideological violence.
• The violence of citizens against a state can be organized or spontaneous.  The latter may not have political goals.  But organized violence against the state is classified as a rebellion that aims to overthrow the government.  The forms that these rebellions take reflect different strategies.
• Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are usually used synonymously because they both have similar goals.  The difference is that guerrilla warfare tries to control territory, even if it’s partial control, whereas terrorism does not.
• Terrorism as a strategy depends on psychologically influencing the target audience.  It lacks the material elements of guerrilla warfare.
• Another difference is the desired effect.  When terrorists attack, they do not intend to remove a government but rather increase the government’s repression, which will alienate the wider population and increase support for the rebellion.
• Then there is the strategy of chaos.  When a government is unable to confront terrorism, it demonstrates the government’s inability to impose law and order.
• There is also the strategy of attrition.  Some rebel movements think terrorism is one such strategy.  But if terrorist groups use terrorism as their major strategy, they won’t take power as long as the state security apparatus retains control.
• In some cases, terrorism is an emotional response without strategic goals.
• Although terrorism is not essential in guerrilla warfare, some guerrilla groups use it.
• Terrorism is not different from other kinds of war that target civilians.  But terrorism is more violent and it systematically violates Western rules of war.  There is a consensus in the West that terrorism is the action of groups, not states.
• There is also an academic consensus that there is no definition of terrorism because it is impossible to criminalize the violence of groups without condemning the violence of states, which are more capable of harming societies.
• Ariel Merari, in “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” acknowledges that the three common elements in definitions of terrorism–1) using violence 2) for political aims 3) by spreading fear in targeted societies–are not enough to formulate a single definition.  Merari observes that if the term can equally apply to conventional war and guerrilla war, then the term loses any useful meaning.  It is just a synonym for violent intimidation in a political framework.  If that’s so, then there’s no such thing as good terrorism or bad terrorism.
• Although terrorism has a long history, the modern use of the term has been influenced by events in the 18th and 19th centuries.  Terrorism first emerged as a term in during the French Revolution in which the state used violence to maintain its revolutionary government.  In the second half of the 19th century, the meaning of terrorism shifted in the hands of anarchists and, later, nationalist groups.  It was used to push for social and political change and usually entailed the assassination of government officials.  Terrorism again became the tool of state repression in the first half of the twentieth century (e.g. Nazis and Soviets).  In the second half of the 20th century, it was taken up by anti-colonialists and separatists.  These latter groups disassociated themselves from the term because of its growing negative connotations.
• After 9/11, people said that al-Qaeda attacked because its members came from poor countries.  But academics have found that the poorest countries produce few terrorists.
• David Kilcullen reformulated the U.S. response to the Jihadi Movement.  He argues it should be treated as a counterinsurgency, not as a conventional police response to terrorism.  But he also notes that classical counterinsurgency strategy was designed to deal with an insurgency in a single country, whereas the new threat requires a comprehensive strategy. [Abu al-Fadl is citing Kilcullen's "Countering Global Insurgency."]

Hesbah pundit `Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir has been writing a series of essays he collectively calls “Real War vs. Symbolic War.” The point of the essays is to explain the difference between terrorist attacks (symbolic war) and other types of military violence (real war).

One of his essays, “Cold Terrorism,” examines the decision-making of groups choosing between killing for the sake of eliminating enemies without drawing attention to themselves (cold terrorism) vs. killing to provoke a response against themselves (hot terrorism). The following quotes are from a recent English translation:

* Can we afford not to take the responsibility of the operation?

* Does the safety of the performers take precedence over the attack or otherwise?

* The ease of performing the operation and the available means

* Are we ready to tackle the retaliation of the enemy or not?

If the aim is to get rid of the enemy without looking on to any other goal then it is preferred to use cold terror.

As for if the aim is to terrorize the enemy only, then it is preferred to use hot terror, even though the security situation and the safety of the performers currently calls for the cold terror as it gives the performers the chance to retreat and escape.

Faqir concludes with some aphorisms on where hot and cold terrorism fit into real and symbolic war:

In the actual war, cold terror is used, as it helps us in avoiding the retaliation of the enemy and enables the performers to withdraw safely.

In the symbolic war, hot terror is used because it causes more stir and more terror and is more effective in the media.

In the actual war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is getting rid of it.

In the symbolic war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is to terrorize it.

Document (English): 9-3-08-ekhlaas-real-war-vs-symbolic-war cold vs hot terrorism

Ekhlaas member `Abd al-Wahhab alleges that the programmers of Grand Theft Auto 4 have been inspired by al-Qaeda. To prove his point, he posts a series of links to clips from the game in which al-Qaeda’s terrorist tactics are employed.  `Abd al-Wahhab then asks: “Is the West preparing its next generation in the mode of  Muslim fighting?”

The post is in Arabic, but the links are easy to make out: 6-3-2008-ekhlaas-grand-theft-auto-tactics