Entries Tagged 'U.K.' ↓

Anwar al-Awlaki, the Infidel

[Editor's note: I am extremely happy to present a new ad-hoc contributor. He should be known to most Jihadica readers: Brian Fishman is a former director of research at West Point's Combating Terrorism Center and the author of several landmark studies on al-Qaida in Iraq, several of which are available here. He brings us quite a story today.]

 

Since the awful shootings at Fort Hood, media attention has focused on MAJ Nidal Hasan’s relationship with Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born salafi preacher now in Yemen. Less well known, however, is that al-Awlaki was once declared kafir (infidel) by then London-based jihadi Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal.

The Jamaica-born al-Faisal, himself a convert, was a key figure in late 1990s and early 2000s “Londonistan”; he was imprisoned in 2003 for soliciting murder and eventually deported from the UK in May 2007 for his links to 7/7 bomber Germaine Lindsey. Indeed it is al-Faisal, not al-Awlaki, who is the most prominent English-speaking jihadi preacher. The lesson here is certainly not that Anwar al-Awlaki is a moderate, but that the world of jihadi ideologues is never as simple as it seems. 

Al-Awlaki began his religious preaching at the Rabat Mosque in San Diego. Sometime in 2001, Awlaki moved to Virginia; he spent time in the UK in 2002 before returning to Virginia, and finally he moved to Yemen in 2004.

The date is unclear, but at some point prior to al-Awlaki’s move to Virginia one of his lectures came to the attention of al-Faisal, who was so furious over its content that he devoted one of his own sermons to refuting al-Awlaki and ultimately declared him a kafir—or no longer a Muslim, which meant that he could be killed as a non-believer. One of al-Faisal’s followers can be heard in the recording suggesting that al-Awlaki should be killed.

Al-Faisal’s lecture on al-Awlaki is listed as “CIA Islam – Sheikh Faisal’s Takfeer of Anwar Awlaki” on www.archive.org. On the recording, Faisal explains that his lecture is about a preacher named “Anwar” from the Masjid al-Rabat in San Diego. He then proceeds to play sections of Awlaki’s lecture for his audience before refuting its points. The voice on the tape seems to be that of Anwar al-Awlaki.

Al-Faisal’s complaint about al-Awlaki is basically twofold: First, that al-Awlaki’s criteria for declaring takfir was overly restrictive—someone would have to directly refute the Quran or blatantly denounce central tenets of Islam in order to receive that designation.  And, second, that al-Awlaki argued that only God should judge Muslims. Al-Faisal argues that this non-judgmental understanding of Islam is pushed by the CIA in order to limit violent activism.

The issue of judgment resonates deeply for al-Faisal. After playing a portion of the lecture in which al-Awlaki declares, “we do not judge the people…we leave that for Allah,” al-Faisal pointedly asks his audience, “Do you agree with that, brothers?” 

After the audience grumbles in response, Faisal prompts them again, “I can’t hear you!” and then asks, “What should we do with him?” Referring to al-Awlaki, someone in the audience replies, “Kill him, brother, kill him.” To hammer home the point, al-Faisal affirms, “The brother said ‘kill him.”

Later, speaking rhetorically to al-Awlaki, al-Faisal exclaims, “Did you realize that when you opened your mouth and said ‘we are not here to judge’ you became worse than the kuffar?… You have become the lowest of the low.”

Al-Faisal’s reactions to al-Awlaki are typical of jihadi critiques of Muslims that do not join their cause. Indeed, al-Awlaki’s ideological arguments in the San Diego recording are at odds with the most virulent contemporary jihadi ideology.  It certainly did not meet al-Faisal’s standards. 

The available snippets of al-Awlaki’s San Diego tape, al-Faisal’s reaction to it, and al-Awlaki’s more recent statements about violence suggest that al-Awlaki went through a radicalization process of his own. Al-Awlaki’s statements in a February 13, 2004 interview with National Public Radio illustrate the tension that ultimately seems to have led Nidal Hasan to violence. Pressed about the role of Muslims in the West after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, al-Awlaki condemned 9/11 strongly but explained that “after the bombing (the invasion of Iraq)…the conversation shifted…Muslims are torn between solidarity with their religious fellowmen and their fellow citizens.”

Al-Awlaki’s old statements raise more questions than answers. They hint at a personal ideological evolution and the frustrations that led to violence. They should leave us wondering how al-Awlaki recovered from such a denunciation to build a good reputation in the jihadi community. And did al-Awlaki and al-Faisal ever meet during al-Awlaki’s stint in the UK? Was al-Awlaki intimidated into more radical positions? Or did he hold them all along? 

Al-Faisal’s denunciation of al-Awlaki does not mean that he is—or even was—a good guy. But it does mean that even the relatively small English-speaking jihadi movement has its divisions over ideology and leadership. That should be one of the lessons that comes out of the terrible tragedy at Fort Hood—not just that we need to identify the Nidal Hasans of the world (which we do), but that the Anwar al-Awlakis of the world face ideological and personal crises of their own.  When jihadis make enemies of one another, that’s when it is time for counterterrorism professionals to make allies.

Q&A With Abu Qatada

Abu Qatada, often called “al-Qaeda’s ambassador to Europe” by the press, has been interviewed by his fellow inmate, `Adil `Abd al-Majid.  A transcript of the lengthy, wide-ranging interview has been posted on the Shumukh forum.  Second only to Maqdisi as an ideologue among Jihadis, Abu Qatada has been in and out of detention in the U.K. since 9/11 (he’s in again).  This interview gives us a snapshot of where he stands intellectually after seven years.  Particularly of note are his remarks on the Muslim Brotherhood,  Alan Johnston (the BBC reporter held hostage in Gaza), and dialogue with the British government.  Here’s a summary of some of the interesting bits (direct translations are in quotes):

  • Opinion on Saudi Shaykhs - Bin Baz: No one alive today is his equal, but he made the mistake of obeying the Saudi regime, which brought great harm to the umma.  Safar al-Hawali: He’s good, but couldn’t reach the summit of Islam [jihad].  He stopped or back peddled before he reached the top.  The same goes for Salman al-`Awda.  Both men talk the talk, but don’t go the next step.
  • Muslim Brothers - There is some good in them.  But over time, they became more concerned with protecting their organizational gains.  You can see their opportunism in the past.  Sayyaf `Abd al-Rasul, a Muslim Brother in Afghanistan, worked with the U.S. against the Taliban.  The Muslim Brotherhood operates as the Islamic Party in Iraq and works with the Americans.  Officials in the Iraqi government have been Muslim Brothers, such as Tariq al-Hashimi (a vice president).  I love the MB when it is oppressed because it focuses on education and jihad.  But when it is allowed greater freedom, it loses motivation and becomes a pragmatic political party.  Hamas is a good case in point.  Look at its recent decision not to declare itself an Islamic emirate like the Taliban.
  • Revisionists - The revisionists are criminals.  “It’s wrong to think that we will behave like seminary students, changing our minds because they want us to.”
  • Women - “Women are the internal fortress and jihad is the external fortress.”
  • Alan Johnston - When the U.K. Foreign Office learned that the brothers in Gaza wanted to exchange Johnston for me, they asked my lawyer to ask me if I would intervene on his behalf and secure his release.  I demanded that the Guantanamo prisoners who have families in the U.K. be brought home and tried and that others not be extradited to America.  This request was refused.  I offered to lead a delegation to go to Gaza and talk to the Army of Islam (which was holding Johnson), but this was not allowed.  I considered making a plea purely on humanitarian grounds, but the other brothers in detention discouraged me [presumably because Abu Qatada wasn't getting anything in return.]  The British government used my non-compliance against me in court when I requested to be released on bail after the court of cassation rejected the decision of the high court to extradite me to Jordan.
  • Dialogue with British Government - I told a British security officer that there was a pseudo-agreement among the British Jihadi groups not to engage in armed activity in the U.K.  I am open to dialogue with the government, even though some of the brothers are against it.  I’ve been accused of many things, but I can live with myself.

Document (Arabic): 12-22-08-shamikh-recent-q-and-a-with-abu-qatada-in-prison