Entries Tagged 'Yemen' ↓

Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula has a published the eleventh issue of its magazine Sada al-Malahim. Naturally, Greg over at Waq al-Waq has it covered (see also here).

The 36th issue of Sada al-Jihad is also out, and it is as chunky and well-produced as ever. The front page reads “Hamas continues its war on the Sunni Mujahidin”, and judging from the table of contents, almost the entire issue is about the recent events in Gaza.

I have been busy the past two weeks, but the jihadis have been busier. Bin Ladin has issued two audio statements, one proposing practical steps to liberate Palestine and the other about the treacherous government in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri warned against the forthcoming Crusader attack on Sudan, while Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has addressed the people of Pakistan. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi has spoken about the US plan to withdraw from Iraq, but he does not seem to get the same attention from the online community as his colleagues in Afghanistan. Abu Qatada has issued a statement from prison about the decision to extradite him to Jordan. Fatah al-Islam sharia officer Abu Abdallah al-Maqdisi has been taking questions since Monday, but nobody is allowed to ask about Shakir al-Absi or Asad al-Jihad2 (hmm).

On the magazine front, Sumud 33  has been out for a little while. Fortunately Sada al-Malahim 8 came out on Sunday so now Greg can sleep again. Turkestan al-Islamiyya 3 came out earlier this week, adding to the past month’s increasing flow of Uighur jihadi propaganda.

We have also seen the publication of a couple of unusual videos featuring Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one with him delivering a funeral sermon in front of a crowd of several hundred people, and another showing him at a large wedding alongside half the jihadi community in Zarqa.  I suspect these videos are part of an attempt to bolster al-Maqdisi’s legitimacy by showing that he is enjoying freedom of movement and expression. By the way I highly recommend the 2-hour wedding video. It offers a fascinating inside look into the sociology of Islamism. It serves as a great illustration of a point I made in a recent article about Zarqa, namely that you cannot deradicalise entire communities. The film may depress you, but you might enjoy the songs.

I will be back soon with a report from the jihadi roundtable in Oslo.

Update (27 March): The Christian Science Monitor became the first Western newspaper to report on the Maqdisi controversy today - and Jihadica is mentioned.

Document (Arabic): 03-26-09-shouraa-mustafa-abu-al-yazid
Document (Arabic): 03-19-09-shouraa-abu-qatada-statement
Document (Arabic): 03-23-09-shamikh-abu-abdallah-al-maqdisi-qa
Document (Arabic): 03-22-09-shouraa-sada-al-malahim-8
Document (Arabic): 03-25-09-shouraa-turkestan-al-islamiyya-3
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-faloja-maqdisi-fima-kuntum
Document (Arabic): 03-12-09-ansar-maqdisi-wedding-video

As most Jihadica readers probably know, the jihadi internet is used for many things, but not for operational planning. I have yet to come across online discussions or instructions for concrete operations by professional militants. However, once in a while you see amateurs proposing specific operations – “prêt a porter plots” – for others to carry out.

One such bright idea was posted on Faloja yesterday by a member named Sabir, who proposes that al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) fire Katyusha rockets from the Saudi shore of the Gulf of Aqaba toward Sharm al-Sheikh, where international leaders are meeting today to raise money for the reconstruction of Gaza.

Sabir addresses his message “to Abu Basir [Nasir al-Wuhayshi], Emir of al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula” and humbly presents “a small and simple operation for three Islamic lions from the military corps under your command.” He notes that Ras al-Shaykh Hamid on the Saudi coast is only 7-8 kilometers away from Sharm al-Shaykh, while Katyusha rockets have a range of 10-22 kilometers. One could even use medium or heavy mortar shells, which have a range of 4.9-8.2km and 10 km respectively. Having done a certain amount of background research, Sabir includes maps, satellite pictures and photographs from the area to illustrate his point. Unconcerned about Muslim collateral damage, he concedes that one might not succeed in hitting the conference venue directly, but even striking nearby will send a strong signal, as did the failed mortar attack on UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon during the latter’s visit to Baghdad in March 2007. Sabir also admits that “you may not have time to do it today, but you have plenty of time in the coming days to acquire long-range missiles”.

There have been missile plots in Saudi Arabia in the past. In January 1998, Saudi security forces intercepted a shipment of missiles on the Yemeni-Saudi border intended for an al-Qaida attack on the US consulate in Jidda (see p 708 of this article). In May 2002, guards discovered empty missile tubes from a failed attack on planes taking off from the Prince Sultan Airbase. The missiles from the latter attack had been acquired in Yemen, and they were allegedly from the same batch as those used in the Mombasa attack later the same year.

Still, Sabir’s idea is completely off the wall. Katyushas have never been found on the Arabian Peninsula, the QAP is currently holed up in Yemen, and it takes more than a few days to plan an operation like this. Moreover, as other forum members dryly note in their comments, the idea is useless the moment you post it on online for all the intelligence services in the world to see.

The posting is nevertheless interesting, first of all because it is unusually specific and shows that we cannot completely dismiss the Internet’s potential as an arena for operational brainstorming. At the same time, it illustrates the lack of military know-how of many online jihadists. In much of the forum material, there is a spectacular disconnection between intention and capability. Unfortunately, the haute couture of terrorism is prepared behind closed doors.

Document (Arabic): 03-01-09-military-plan-for-qap

Update (6 March): This post not only prompted enthusiastic comments (see below), but was also discussed on Faloja itself. We wish our new readers a warm welcome.
Document (Arabic): 03-05-09-faloja-on-jihadica

Muhammad al-Awfi, one of the two former Saudi Gitmo detainees who appeared in the video by al-Qaida in Yemen on 19 January, has now been captured. Press reports and forum rumours this morning were confirmed this afternoon by the Yemeni embassy in Washington.

I owe the latter piece of information to a fantastic new blog that covers Islamism and security in Yemen. I strongly recommend it. Few people know more about jihadism in Yemen than Gregory Johnsen and Brian O’Neill. Welcome to the blogosphere, guys.

It is a shame, then, that there is not a single al-Qaida operative left in Yemen. Or so says the Yemeni Interior Minister, echoing past statements by his Saudi counterpart, who claimed in October 2001 that al-Qaida had no links to Saudi Arabia.
Back to al-Awfi. The official story is that he surrendered to Yemeni authorities. This is probably spin; if he did, it was at gunpoint. The question is why al-Awfi’s capture comes now, only weeks after he made headlines. This is especially interesting given Yemen’s very poor record of locating and arresting al-Qaida leaders. My guess is that Saudi intelligence has become more actively involved in Yemen. If true, this is a good sign, for the Saudis have become very good at counterterrorism.

The biggest question now is of course whether al-Awfi will lead investigators to the rest of the leadership of al-Qaida in Yemen. After six years in Guantanamo, he is no doubt used to interrogations. At the same time, he cannot claim ignorance of his comrades’ whereabouts, having appeared in a video with them just a few weeks ago. My guess is we will see more arrests in coming weeks, although probably not a dismantling of al-Qaida, who will have taken precautions by now.

I hope to write something about the Saudi list of 85 in the coming week. In the meantime you can read more on al-Awfi and the other ten escaped Saudi Gitmo detainees in this excellent new report by Evan Kohlmann.

Document (Arabic): 02-17-09-faloja-rumours-of-awfi-arrest

Earlier this week we learned that the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaida had formally merged. The release of Sada al-Malahim on Monday was accompanied by an extract from an interview with AQY leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, who said the Saudi mujahidin had pledged allegiance to him and agreed to form a united organization under the old name “al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula.” In another development, Friday’s New York Times reported the rise of former Saudi Guantanamo detainee Sa’id al-Shihri to the deputy leadership of al-Qaida in Yemen.

The two stories came together in a fascinating video released on the forums yesterday. The video, entitled “From here we begin and in Jerusalem we will meet”, featured Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi and Muhammad al-Awfi seated side by side, each giving a 4-minute statement. The video served at least three purposes. The first was to tap into popular outrage over Gaza. The speakers presented their campaign as part of the struggle to liberate Palestine, since Israel and the Crusaders are one. They also cited the famous hadith according to which “an army of 12000 men will come out of Abyan to help God and his messenger”, and showed footage from a training camp as if to suggest that al-Qaida is currently building that army. (Incidentally, President Salih allegedly also proposed training volunteers for combat in Gaza). The second purpose was to display the union between the Saudi and Yemeni mujahidin. The seating arrangement (Yemeni-Saudi-Yemeni-Saudi) and mutual praise signalled a happy marriage. The third aim was to humiliate Saudi authorities, who have let al-Shihri and al-Awfi, both former Guantanamo detainees (ISN# 372 and 333 respectively) and graduates of the famous rehabilitation program, slip away. Unless al-Shihri and al-Awfi are agents (which I doubt), their appearance is indeed extremely embarrassing for Saudi authorities.

The video provides several clues about the background for the merger and the state of al-Qaida on the Peninsula. It seems clear that the unification was prompted by the arrival of al-Shihri and al-Awfi in Yemen. They must have arrived relatively recently, because they were only repatriated from Guantanamo on 10 November 2007 and spent at least a few months in the rehabilitation programme. There have been several indications in the past year that Saudi al-Qaida has withdrawn to Yemen. Why does the formal merger come now? One reason is that AQY has consolidated itself. Another reason is that al-Shihri and al-Awfi are the most senior Saudi jihadists to make it across the border so far. Previous Saudis in al-Wuhayshi’s ranks, such as Nayif al-Qahtani, have probably been considered too junior to represent the Saudi branch.

It is unlikely, though, that al-Awfi and al-Shihri represent anybody but themselves. They were in Guantanamo during the Saudi insurgency and did not spend much time in the Kingdom before leaving for Yemen. This is probably why they were so busy namedropping legendary Saudi jihadists in the video (I counted no less than fifteen names). They also showed a passage from the old QAP film Badr al-Riyadh from January 2004 featuring al-Muhayya compound bomber Ali Ma‘badi al-Harbi. The two fugitives clearly wanted to convey the impression that they had been part of the inner circles of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia.

The merger speaks volumes about the weakness of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia. Here you have the alleged leadership running away from home and submitting to a Yemeni emir. Add to this the deafening silence from al-Qaida in the Kingdom itself in the past couple of years, and it seems clear there is little substantial organizational infrastructure left.

Since al-Awfi and al-Shiri are not bringing a big fighting force to the table, the merger is probably not going to have any immediate consequences for al-Qaida’s capability. However, it does say something about intentions: it basically removes all doubt that al-Qaida now intends to use Yemen as a launching pad for operations in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf.

A point on personalities: The video offers the first live images of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, and I must say he comes across as surprisingly weak and uncharismatic, especially compared to Sa’id al-Shihri. I suspect al-Shihri will have considerable influence in the new organization, which further increases the likelyhood of operations in Saudi Arabia.

In the short term, though, most operations will probably focus on Yemen, where the group is clearly thriving, despite clashes earlier this week. The current state of AQY is reminiscent of that of Saudi al-Qaida in 2003, except that AQY enjoys an even more secure environment. Media production continues and increases in sophistication (as it did in Saudi).  Open-air training with over 20 individuals is or has recently taken place  - this did not happen in Saudi after February 2003. Journalists are able to conduct interviews with the leadership - this never happened in Saudi. Foreign fugitives well known to Saudi and US intelligence are able to find and join the top leadership - this didn’t happen in Saudi after May 2003. Finally, the top leaders have been around for three years - contrast with the short lifespan of Saudi leaders in 2003-2004. We will undoubtely hear more from al-Qaida in Yemen in the coming months, so stay tuned.

Update (26 January): In response to the video, Saudi authorities rearrested nine Guantanamo returnees yesterday, while al-Shihri’s father publicly disowned his son and provided interesting details on the latter’s recent trajectory.

Al-Qaida in Yemen (AQY) has released the seventh issue of its magazine Sada al-Malahim (SM), adding to the mounting evidence that the group is thriving. The slick 44-page publication contains no less than 30 articles by 23 different pen names. Many of the latter are no doubt invented, but the issue must be the work of a well-run media cell of a certain size. An undated picture on p. 16 showing 20 people training in the desert, as well as note on p. 12 inviting readers to submit questions to the journal’s gmail address, suggest that AQY is not about to collapse any time soon.

The front page story, “Gaza under siege by Arab rulers”, is quite interesting. The article hardly mentions Israel and America, but instead lashes out at the Arab regimes and government clerics for facilitating the siege by repressing the mujahidin. “[The rulers] incriminated anyone who merely thinks about liberating the holy sites, which can only be liberated by toppling these governments” [my emphasis] (p. 4). Heard this before? This is basically the good old “near enemy first” argument of the kind found in Ayman al-Zawahiri’s classic article “The road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo”. The statement adds to a number of other indications that AQY is considerably more regime-critical (and thus less pan-Islamist) than its Saudi counterpart al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula.

At the same time, AQY also advocates direct confrontation with the far enemy. In the text accompanying the magazine release, the Emir of AQY, Abu Basir, is quoted as saying “we are preparing to open training camps to send you [Palestinians] a generation of reinforcements.” There is in other words a tension in AQY’s ideological production between two strategies: one advocating confrontation with the near enemy and the other with the far enemy. A similar ambiguity, or hedging of bets, is also found in their operations, which have targeted both Westerners and the government. This lack of ideological clarity makes the group less predictable in the short run. But it may also constitute a liability in the long run, as it leaves prospective recruits in the dark as to what AQY is actually fighting for.

Here’s the table of contents (excluding poetry and purely theological pieces):

• Gaza under siege by Arab rulers
• Seven years of Crusader wars
• The ruling on the soldiers and helpers of the Pharaoh of our time
• The ruling on escaping from the tyrant’s prison and its persecution
• The ruling on fighting the occupier
• A dialogue among the deaf (who is debating whom?!) [on interreligious dialogue]
• Stances on judges
• How to reach [us]
• The duty to confront or flee
• Three years since the escape
• The power is in firing [on firearms]
• A word from sheikh Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri
• The departure of Bush and the arrival of Obama
• North Africa and the coming hope
• The message of Shafiq Ahmad Zayd “Abdallah al-Yamani”
• The Lion of Jawf: Amir Huraydan
• Victory over the investigators
• The Mujahid sheikh Nassar al-Marsad
• Al-Tayammum [Dry ablution] [on life in prison]
• I would behave if let out of prison
• Letter from the daughter of a mujahid
• Preventing and treating colds
• Letters from the readers

Document (Arabic): 01-19-09-faloja-sada-al-salahim-7

Since July al-Qaeda in Yemen has not released its monthly journal, Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Glorious Battles).  This period of silence included the September attack on the U.S. embassy, which made it hard to confirm if al-Qaeda in Yemen had carried it out.

Now the group has published issues 5 and 6 of Sada al-Malahim with apologies for the delay “due to technical matters.”  Issue 5 includes the following titles:

• “Exclusive Interview With Brother Ghrayb al-Taizi”
• “Call To Assist Somalia”
• “Lessons From The Tarim Operation”

[Gregory D. Johnsen] Details are still coming in about this morning’s attack on the US Embassy in Yemen, and it will likely be a couple of days before a complete and accurate picture of the attack can be drawn. But in my conversations very early this morning what seems to be clear is that the attack involved at least two separate car bombs and came very close to succeeding on a much more spectacular level.

Even at this early stage it is important to note a couple of things. The attack, while shocking, was not necessarily unexpected. On August 19, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: The Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen posted its 13^th statement to al-Ikhlas. The statement threatened attacks in retaliation for the death of Hamza al-Q‘uyati, who was killed along with four of his comrades in a raid on an al-Qaeda safe house in the eastern city of Tarim on August 11. The proof, the statement said in a common Islamist phrase, “will be in what you see and not what you hear.” The group has been silent since. However, on September 9, a teaser was posted to al-Ikhlas indicating that the fifth issue of Sada al-Malahim was due to be released in the coming days. Sada al-Malahim is the journal of al-Qaeda in the South of the Arabian Peninsula. The combination of these two indicators should have triggered warnings in Yemen, as over the past year al-Qaeda has developed a pattern of linking its attacks to its rhetoric. That is to say, an attack usually follows the release of a statement, journal or video.

Unfortunately, on a side note, the al-Ikhlas website was taken off-line, most likely by hackers, before the fifth issue of Sada al-Malahim could be posted in what I can only imagine was a counterproductive attempt to disrupt al-Qaeda’s statements. This means that analysts are now flying blind in the sense that they no longer know what al-Qaeda in Yemen is saying either in its journals or statements. This will make predicting and analyzing the group that much more difficult.

On the issue of responsibility I have seen reports both in English and in Arabic that a group calling itself the Islamic Jihad in Yemen has claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement signed by someone calling himself Abu Ghayth al-Yamani. Personally, I have strong reservations about the veracity of this claim. This typically happens in Yemen following a suicide attack, but is rarely true. What usually happens is that some individual such as Abu Ghayth al-Yamani hears the news and dashes off a fax, and then a day or two later the group responsible posts an official statement claiming responsibility. Unfortunately, with al-Ikhlas being down getting access to this statement will be difficult (see above paragraph).

There are two other things to note from the August 11 raid – neither of which have been well reported – that killed al-Q‘uyati, who spent time in Afghanistan in the late 1990s before escaping from a Yemeni prison in February 2006. First, his cell was extremely localized. Of the seven individuals involved in the fighting – five of who were killed and two were captured – five of them were from al-Mukalla while the other two came from the neighboring towns of al-Qatn and Shabwa. This should have given a number of people pause; most of whom were proclaiming victory in the war against al-Qaeda in Yemen. The localized nature of the cell, I believe, indicates a diffusion of strength that should have worried Yemen as well as the US and the UK, which both relaxed their travel restrictions to Yemen following the death of al-Q‘uyati. I attempted to articulate this in a conference in DC at the end of August, but I don’t believe I was particularly successful.

The second important point to note from the August 11 raid is that it was precipitated by a local tip. One of the worrying trends in Yemen has been the lack of a strong public outcry against al-Qaeda attacks in the country, which have killed many more Yemenis than they have westerners. In order to truly defeat al-Qaeda in Yemen, something similar to what happened in Saudi Arabia in late 2003 and 2004 needs to take place. This has yet to happen, but there have been signs throughout the summer that the tide could be turning. One can only hope that this attack, coming as it did during Ramadan, and killing only Yemenis and other non-westerners will further enrage popular opinion within Yemen.

For those interested in reading more, see the article appended below.

Document: gregory-johnson-on-recent-aq-attacks-in-yemen

Issue 4 of Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Glorious Battles), the main organ of al-Qaeda in Yemen, is out. One article caught my eye: “Somalia…The Forgotten Land.”

Issue 27 of Sada al-Jihad (The Echo of Jihad) is also out. SJ is produced by the Global Islamic Media Front. A few articles look interesting: “Al-Qaeda Is a Stone’s Throw From Palestine,” “Apostates Are More Dangerous Than the Enemy,” and “Interrogation (Methods and Phases).”

Finally, the Ansar Media Institute published issue 50 of Hassad* al-Mujahidin (Harvester of the Mujahids). The periodical focuses mainly on Iraq and most of this issue is about various attacks and prison breaks. There is one article worth noting: “The Camera: A Weapon Without Bullets.”

* Note: Hisad (”harvest”) seems to make more sense than Hassad (”harvester”) for the title, but that’s how the .pdf file is vocalized, so I’m going with it.

Document (Arabic): 7-13-08-ekhlaas-issue-4-of-sada-al-malahim

Document (Arabic): 7-10-08-ekhlaas-issue-27-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 7-14-08-ekhlaas-issue-50-of-hassad-al-mujahidin

I’ve been collecting news stories on the terror suspects arrested in Saudi Arabia. Much of the reporting relies on Saudi security personnel and the Interior Ministry’s statement last week, so it should be read with due skepticism.

There’s a lot to discuss, but I’ll save my comments for later. For the moment it’s worth noting that, as of today, the Saudis are now injecting a new piece of information into the story: the network was taking orders and receiving money from someone in Iran:

• The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Below is my summary of all the data points I’ve been able to find (sources at the bottom):

The Network

• Five networks have been captured. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Of the 701 people arrested (181 of whom have been released), more than 50% are Saudi citizens. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• In the new batch of arrests, the demographic has shifted to Mauritania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. In the past, non-Saudi militants active in the Kingdom came from mainly from Yemen, then Chad, Morocco, and Kuwait. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were pursuing advanced degrees. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The seven Mauritanians had a “special driver” visa that enabled them to move around the country freely. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The Afghans arrested were from Waziristan. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• There were Yemenis and Iraqis in the “oil cell”. The number of Yemenis was higher than those of other nationalities in the cell. The number of Saudis in the cell is equivalent to that of the other nationalities in the cell. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Only 50% of those in cell were Saudis. The rest came during pilgrimage season and did not go home. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)
• Most of the foreigners in the cell were recruited by imams in their home countries, or through the Internet. (Adnkronos, “Terror Cell”)

Recruitment

• Because of Saudi security measures, the militants altered their methods of recruitment and their procurement of equipment. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• In Saudi Arabia, the main tool of recruitment is the Internet. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• The Eastern Province cell recruited illegal African residents to find jobs in the oil sector. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• The recruiter network carried out organized efforts to target youth and to send them for training outside Saudi Arabia. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Leadership

• There is no single leader for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• A mobile phone that belonged to a member of the Eastern Province cell had a voice message from Zawahiri on it. This is the second recent message from Zawahiri that has been found recently on a terror suspect’s phone in Saudi. (Malifi, “Africans”)
• The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• 7 Mauritanians were among those in the “oil cell.” They were in graduate school. One had a Master’s degree. The youngest was 35 and all of them played leadership roles. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Instructions for the cells came from the same major country in the region in which leaders of AQ sought refuge, like the Egyptian Sayf al-Adl who is currently living there. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Funding

• The new batch of militants are well funded. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• The Yanbu cell forged coupons for sacrificial livestock and sold them at pilgrimage [presumably to raise capital]. (al-Sharq al-Awsat,” 520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)
• Cells planned to raise funds and send them outside the Kingdom. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• The leader of one cell had a message from Zawahiri instructing him to gather money and promising to send people from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Africa to target the oil infrastructure and fight security forces. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”)
• The funding for the AQ cells in Saudi came from one of the major countries in the region in the form of Euros. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• The financing of AQ in Saudi came from one particular direction, especially when AQ was being rebuilt. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Preparation

• The weapons and money caches were professionally sealed for long-term storage. (Dhaydi, “Features”)
• Much of the money, weapons, and equipment were buried in remote desert areas. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)

Media

• The media cell was responsible for defaming clerics, raising doubts, and excommunicating other Muslims, all online. (al-Sharq al-Awsat, “520 Arrested”; Malifi, “Africans”)

Targets and Tactics

• The cells are following the strategy outlined by Abu Bakr Naji in his Management of Savagery.
• One of the five cells, the “oil cell,” planned to penetrate the secret police adminstrative building in Khafji with car bombs and to blow up oil installations in the Eastern region. (al-Qabas, “Oil Cell”)
• Cell members intended to attack oil installations in Gulf states. They were going to use boats to attack some installations. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• Cell members had maps and pictures of hotels in many Gulf countries that foreigners stay in. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• Cell members plotted to attack boats in the Gulf. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)
• The plan of attack was to hit a variety of places while making sure that the cell’s base of operations was far away from the targets. (al-Qabas, “Oil Installations”)

Sources

Mashari al-Dhaydi, “Features of the New al-Qaeda,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

Muhammad al-Malfi, “A High-Level Security Source: The Africans Are Actually from Mauritania and the Asians Are Afghans from Waziristan,” al-Watan, 26 June 2008.

“520 Arrested, Planned to Attack Oil and Security Installations and Spread the Takfir Methodology on the Internet,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.

“Saudi: Oil Cell Planned to Storm the Building of Secret Police of al-Khafji with Car Bombs,” al-Qabas, 29 June 2008.

“Oil Installations in Gulf Countries Intended Targets,” al-Qabas 27 June 2008.

“Saudi Arabia: Terror Cell Received Orders from al-Qaeda Deputy,” Adnkronos.com, 26 June 2008.