One of his essays, “Cold Terrorism,” examines the decision-making of groups choosing between killing for the sake of eliminating enemies without drawing attention to themselves (cold terrorism) vs. killing to provoke a response against themselves (hot terrorism). The following quotes are from a recent English translation:

* Can we afford not to take the responsibility of the operation?

* Does the safety of the performers take precedence over the attack or otherwise?

* The ease of performing the operation and the available means

* Are we ready to tackle the retaliation of the enemy or not?

If the aim is to get rid of the enemy without looking on to any other goal then it is preferred to use cold terror.

As for if the aim is to terrorize the enemy only, then it is preferred to use hot terror, even though the security situation and the safety of the performers currently calls for the cold terror as it gives the performers the chance to retreat and escape.

Faqir concludes with some aphorisms on where hot and cold terrorism fit into real and symbolic war:

In the actual war, cold terror is used, as it helps us in avoiding the retaliation of the enemy and enables the performers to withdraw safely.

In the symbolic war, hot terror is used because it causes more stir and more terror and is more effective in the media.

In the actual war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is getting rid of it.

In the symbolic war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is to terrorize it.

Document (English): 9-3-08-ekhlaas-real-war-vs-symbolic-war cold vs hot terrorism

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The message begins with an admission of bad judgment, stating that the mujahidin realized they had been too lenient on some of their fellow Ingush who were employed in the Republic’s security and military services. Allegedly there was an unwritten agreement between the mujahidin and local security forces. The agreement was that as long as Muslims and resistance fighters were left alone, the focus of mujahidin attacks would be on the Russians and that state employees would not be bothered. However in 2002, the Ingush collaborators began to target, detain, kill, rape and torture Muslims. Even after these transgressions, the mujahidin claimed that they approached the local authorities to stop such policies, but the abuses continued. The mujahidin then discontinued the gentlemen’s agreement and actively pursued all enemies, Russian and Ingush.

The Ingush mujahidin also state that what has been most effective for their operations is the establishment of special intelligence units, called Special Operation Groups (SOG), which were responsible for collecting information and infiltrating the Ingush security apparatus. One of the groups successful initiatives is that they have also started (or stolen) a database full of the names of collaborators who work with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Apparently these units have served their purpose so well that they have Ingush police and politicians shaking in their boots. The local forces are now reportedly resorting to bribing the mujahidin with money and information in order for guarantees of personal security.

Interestingly, the message also refers to a centralized “Mukharabat of the Caucasus Emirate.” It now appears that this is the central command for all intelligence units throughout the Emirate, but with each ‘state’ in charge of its own collection efforts.

What is striking about this message and others written recently is that all of elements of the Caucasus Front seem to be in-lock step with their “unity” message. Both the Chechen Front and the Dagestani Front (Jamaat Shariat) released similar messages last week, detailing support for Dokku Umarov’s declaration and highlighting the preparedness and high morale of their forces. It looks as if Umarov is really pushing to retool the Caucasus Emirate into a highly effective fighting force, at least in word.

Although Umarov’s upbeat prognosis of the Emirate needs to be taken with a dose of salt, it make you wonder if the FSB’s declaration of imminent “al-Qaeda” attacks is, perhaps, somewhat credible.

8-29-08-Ingush-Front-SOG-kavkaz-center

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It stated that it is a Salafi organization and that anyone raising partisan, nationalist, patriotic, socialist, secular, or democratic flags are infidels. Additionally, it claimed that anyone wishing to unify with the AI must publicly disavow such ideologies and pledge its loyalty to the jihadi, Islamic banner. The AI claimed that its dogma and actions are based on several factors:

1. Global jihad, the AI does not differentiate between jihad in the Palestinian Territories or outside of them

2. Jihad on the apostates, hypocrites, crusaders, Jews, and Shi’a inside and outside the Palestinian Territories

3. Achieving Shari’a law

4. The AI is a fighting organization and any unification will be established upon this and not on guidance and advice

5. The AI is not represented by one person [This is likely a response to criticisms that the AI is really an extension of the Dughmush clan. These criticisms were likely brought on because its late leader, Mumtaz Dughmush, was a member of this clan.] Only Abu Muhammad al-Ansari is allowed to speak on behalf of the AI. Additionally, only internet statements released by the Global Islamic Media Front are official AI statements

6. Any unity agreement must be based on a clear strategy that agrees with the global jihad

7. This statement represents the rules of the AI’s program

8. The AI will accept anyone meeting these requirements

9. The AI previously consulted with other organizations and Shaykhs when there was not a Salafi jihadi program in Gaza. Some blessed the program, but most were against the AI. Regardless, the AI raised its banner with aggression on it from near and far

The AI’s global view of jihad and its desire to be part of a global Islamic state represents a departure from Hamas’ nationalistic view that includes the formation of a Palestinian Islamic state encompassing the Palestinian Territories and Israel. This represents a direct challenge to Hamas’ ideology and rule. As a result, Hamas has harassed and attacked the AI since it seized control of Gaza in June 2007. Recently, it appears that Israel has also been fairly successful in eliminating AI members. It would not surprise me if Hamas operatives informed the Israeli military of the locations of AI members in order to let Israel do its dirty work.

The AI’s relative weakness to Hamas is a likely reason why it is willing to accept other terrorist organizations into its fold. However, by integrating like-minded organizations now, the AI may be attempting to lay the foundation for the arrival of al-Qaeda to the Palestinian Territories in the future. In the past year, several al-Qaeda leaders have hinted at this, including Assad-al-Jihad2. Regardless of the AI’s intent in unifying terrorist entities in the Palestinian Territories or of its success in doing so, it is likely that it will remain weak in comparison to Hamas, which would make it difficult to carry out its intended strategy.

Document (Arabic): 8-28-2008-Ek-ls.org-28AUG08-Message-from-AI

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Hussein is a Chechen with considerable fighting credentials, and his family has a long history of involvement in the resistance movement. During the last twelve years, he lost three brothers in the fighting, and had a sister kidnapped. His younger brother, Muslim Gakaev, is the Deputy Commander of the Shali sector. Prior to the formation of the Caucasus Emirate in late 2007, Amir Hussein was the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for several months.

The portion of the video transcribed had two main themes: one, that the mujahidin are unified, and two, that the services of the members of the so-called Chechen Government in-exile, which he calls the “London Criminal Group,” are no longer needed.

Amir Hussien states that after Dokku Umarov’s establishment of the Caucasus Emirate, rumors existed concerning dissension in the ranks of the mujahidin, which he categorically denies. He asserts that the mujhahidin are satisfied with this decision and will continue to support Umarov’s goals of establishing a unified Islamic Caliphate in the Caucasus. He reaffirms that Umarov made this decision according to the will of Allah, and therefore it is the path they must pursue.

Hussein also gives another reason why Umarov made the declaration: to unify the different units of mujahidin across all the republics of the Northern Caucasus. The mujahidin were fragmented and focused on their local struggles instead of consolidating their efforts across the whole region (reminiscent of the “Near” vs. “Far Enemy” strategy). There was no unity of command, and while they had successes, they were wasted in the bigger scheme of things. He then again tells us that “the mujahidin have accepted it [his decision] with great happiness.”

Amir Hussien then gives the Chechen Government in-exile, led by Ahmed Zakayev in London, a verbal thrashing. He warns them that there will be a cleaning of the ranks after the mujahidin victory. He then downplays their efforts at politics, calling them ineffective, and states that fighting is the only way to achieve their goals. Hussien also mocks them, calling them “actors” (clearly aimed at Zakayev, a former actor) and “window dressing.”

Perhaps they are re-issuing the transcript of the video for recruiting purposes or to assuage naysayers. Although judging from this article, it seems like they are reaching their numbers this summer.

Document (Russian): 8-27-08-amir-hussein-kavkaz-center

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Asia Times Online has posted two videos from the Pakistani Taliban today. Syed Saleem Shahzad has alluded to these in his recent posts. They’re both interesting videos and even though one they lack the polish seen in Al-Qaeda video, they are clearly influenced by these productions; the latter video even includes Arabic-language hymns. The first video (”Recruiting”) is a recruitment video with English subtitles in the first portion. It appears to have been produced in late 2007 and takes aim at the Pakistani government and military, portraying them as apostates and slaves of the United States while lauding the piety of militants. Such propaganda has been effective as demonstrated by reports of low morale among the largely Pashtun soldiers sent to fight Pashtun militants and continued opposition to attacks against militants among elements of the Pakistani populace.

The second video (”Battlefield”) is especially interesting to long-time observers of such groups as it is published by Ummat Studios. Ummat appeared to have stopped publishing videos in 2005 after Nek Muhammad Wazir, a pro-Taliban militant from Waziristan, was killed following an insurgency in that region. The studio was thought to have been affiliated with him, and his death appeared to have ended its run. In the past, I have only seen two Urdu-language videos put out by this studio on the Internet, and I believe it published a number of Pashto-language videos.

Upon viewing the video, one might think it is old.  But during the second segment, the Urdu narrator (who sounds exactly like the narrator from older Ummat videos) mentions Baitullah Mehsud and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP was not officially formed until late 2007, and Mehsud did not become prominent until sometime in 2006. Mehsud also belongs to a tribe that rivals Nek Muhammad’s (despite the stated universal Islamic character of the Taliban, it remains a distinctly Pashtun entity, and internal Pashtun tribal differences remain an exploitable weakness).  In fact, Muhammad’s tribe appears to be now led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a pro-Taliban militant from North Waziristan, who has not joined the TTP and appears to have a personal rivalry with Mehsud).

The end of the video confirms its recent vintage and is dated to February 2008. Unlike the first video it has no English subtitles and most of the dialog is in Pashto, but it has some violent scenes of battles against Pakistani forces, apparently in early 2008 in various locales in Waziristan. The use of the Ummat Studio brand in the latter video means that it either never went out of business (perhaps it only stopped posting videos to the Internet) or it has been brought back to life by Mehsud.  Either way, it shows a growing media awareness among the Pakistani Taliban.

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1. Many United States government officials were forced to leave their posts after their failure to defeat al-Qaida
2. American historians have claimed that President Bush has been the worst president in American history
3. Al-Qaida weakened the most powerful country on Earth in “the Badr of the [21^st] century” (This is a reference to the 624CE Battle of Badr where approximately 300 Muslim soldiers defeated the much larger Meccan army of approximately 1000 soldiers. Muslims believe divine intervention granted them victory.)
4. Al-Qaida brought down the Spanish government after its 11 March 2004 attacks
5. Al-Qaida brought down the British government after its 7 July 2005 attacks
6. Al-Qaida defeated the Musharraf government after it attacked Islam

Assad al-Jihad2 (AJ2) did admit that after September 11^th, al-Qaida did not expect “the great betrayal of the Pakistani government” or “the betrayal of the scholars of evil.” (The scholars are likely prominent Salafi ideologues like Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl) or Salman al-‘Awda, who turned against al-Qaida’s bloody methods.) However, regardless of the supposed betrayals, he stated that today one can find al-Qaida in Iraq, North Africa, Somalia, Saudi Arabia(where he claimed that al-Qaida has huge human reserves), and Yemen. He also stated that the Palestinian Territories are merely in need of a “spark” for al-Qaida to show its presence there.

Normally I do not give much credence to such reports emanating from the forums, but this one is important for two reasons. First, it is possible that AJ2 is a military commander for al-Qaida. The blogger and Jordan University professor Akram Hijazi stated in a reference to one of AJ2’s statements, “It is not inconceivable that [AJ2] is one of al-Qaida’s military commanders.” (Hijazi is an al-Qaida supporter and his blogs are regularly posted on takfiri websites. He is the “senior researcher” at the Arab Researchers’ Center, which sells takfiri videos and statements that are otherwise free on the Internet. Fu’ad Husayn, who wrote a biography of al-Zarqawi and spent time with him in prison, runs the center. The website for the Arab Researchers’ Center is Arabresearchers.net.) Additionally, the fact that AJ2 often times posts through the al-Qaida-affiliated Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and Ekhlaas has given him the title of “innovative pen 1,” which is one of the highest titles one can achieve on Ekhlaas, adds credibility to Hijazi’s assertion.

Second, in a January 2008 statement, AJ2 stated that the Palestinian territories will be the primary front for terrorists graduating from Afghanistan and Iraq. He claimed that due to Hamas’ suppression of al-Qaida-inspired militants in Gaza, al-Qaida cannot announce its presence in the Palestinian Territories at this time. However, he added that al-Qaida will announce its presence sometime after the current US presidential cycle. He then mentioned that the battle with Israel will begin between 2010 and 2013. Finally, he claimed that al-Qaida has already begun preparing for war with Israel and he gave advice for how the Palestinians should prepare. In this context, AJ2’s recent remark about al-Qaida needing a spark to start operations in the Palestinian Territories takes on more significance. It is unclear what exactly this spark could be, but it does seem that AJ2 is again indicating that al-Qaida is preparing to engage Israel.

Regardless of AJ2’s views, I remain skeptical that al-Qaida will be able to gain a significant presence in Gaza and then maintain that presence. After Hamas forced the al-Qaida-inspired Army of Islam (AI) to release BBC reporter Alan Johnston, the two organizations have been at loggerheads, which has been at the detriment of AI. If an indigenous group of terrorists with backing from a prominent Gazan clan, the Dughmush, cannot operate relatively freely in Gaza, I doubt a group of foreign al-Qaida operatives will do much better.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ek-ls.org-AJ2-After-the-Fall-of-Pervez

Document (Arabic): 2-18-2008-Ek-ls.org-Akram-Hijazi-Blog

Document (English): 8-27-2008-Arabresearchers.net-about-the-Arab-Researchers-Center

Document (English): 8-27-2008-Arabresearchers.net-Research-by-the-Arab-Researchers-Center

Document (Arabic): 29-01-2008-Ek-ls.org-AJ2-GIMF-Statement

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Quick background: The FATA serves as a sanctuary for various Taliban-affiliated groups, notably the “Pakistani Taliban” led by Baitullah Mehsud who has been blamed for Ms. Bhutto’s assassination. The FATA may also house Al-Qaeda leaders, and Bajaur in particular has often been speculated as serving as a hiding place for Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has been the target of a number of air strikes in the area in recent years.

With this “raising of the temperature” by the Pakistani military, lead by Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani since late 2007, the Pakistani Taliban and its cohorts appear to be returning to their time-tested tactic of spreading terror in order to persuade the government to return to the status quo: reduced Pakistani military interference in the FATA in exchange for a termination of terrorist attacks. This dance has played out regularly in the past, seeing the army launching offensives, only to sign peace deals and retreat, allowing militants a relatively free-hand along the Afghan border. Understandably, such maneuvers by Pakistan have been criticized by Afghanistan and NATO for allowing militants to increasingly target forces in Afghanistan.

Amidst this apparent repetition of history is an interesting report from a Pakistani journalist, Syed Saleem Shahzad, claiming that the Pakistan has decided to pursue an all-out offensive against militants. Before delving into the report, I should point out that Shahzad’s own background is murky: He often reports exclusives on the Taliban and appears to have an unprecedented amount of access and information about militant activities in the frontier regions. He has been alleged to be everything from an Indian intelligence agent (by some Pakistani extremist groups) to an affiliate of Pakistani intelligence. I would bet the later is true to some degree as some of his previous reports have come true, while others haven’t panned out (maybe he serves to spread disinformation for intelligence?). The fact that he has had so much apparent access to militants along the Pak-Afghan border indicates that he has some sort of protection, as journalists sniffing around in the area have regularly died on the job.

Shahzad’s claims are notable as he claims that Pakistan will not just confront Mehsud, who poses a real threat to Pakistan, but members of other Taliban and pro-Taliban groups. This includes the leadership of the Afghan Taliban, led by the faceless Mullah Omar, and militants under the command of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a famed Afghan warrior who made his name fighting the Soviets. Both of these factions have not pursuing attacks against Pakistan or its military, and in fact have historic links with Pakistani intelligence. A number of reports in the Pakistani media earlier in the year, claimed that Omar had removed Mehsud from his position of power due to the latter’s willingness to pursue confrontation with Pakistan. It is very difficult to know if such reports are true, but it makes sense if Omar is really hiding in Quetta as has been alleged. At the same time, as if often the case when discussing the Taliban, it could be a ruse to separate Omar from being blamed for Mehsud’s actions (the degree of coordination between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban remains unknown, but they surely maintain some level of links). Omar and other Afghan Taliban leaders may also be loathe to provoke Pakistan due to the possible continued existence of links between Pakistani intelligence and the Afghan Taliban, maintained due in part to Pakistani strategic concerns, an allegation that has been forth in the media after last month’s attack in Kabul on the Indian Embassy.

With that said if Shahzad is correct, this indicates a major paradigm shift by the Pakistani government. It means that the government has either decided to attempt to eradicate militancy, which is unlikely if only due to the nature of militancy; or the government has been received some major incentives or pressure to take such action by an outside power. It could also be that the military (Pakistani intelligence is part of the military structure) has decided to clamp down on militants in the interests of its own preservation, or no longer finds them useful for its strategic objectives.

Ultimately, whether or not Shahzad’s report is prophetic; the changing situation in Pakistan bears watching as it will have an effect on both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and South Asia at large, especially in light of worsening tensions between Pakistan and India. The removal of Musharraf, infighting in the government, increased international scrutiny and a renewed terrorist campaign could make things very hot in the coming weeks. This may also be portended by Zawahiri’s recent video focused exclusively on addressing Pakistanis, where he spoke English for the first time, perhaps serving as a warning before the launch of an Al-Qaeda campaign to coincide with the upcoming holy Islamic month of Ramadan.

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Abu Hurayra 2’s last post was on 14 August 2008 where he provided photos of militants supposedly engaging in combat and he reassured readers that operations were increasing by the day.  He also gave a cryptic message saying, “I give you these new photos.  They are the last for me before my departure from you because I will be absent for a long time.”  It is unclear exactly what this means, but it appears that he may have been preparing for his death or arrest.

Abu Kandahar claimed that he received a letter informing him of Abu Hurayra 2’s death and that Abu Hurayra 2 fought some soldiers trying to arrest him.  Abu Hurayra 2 allegedly engaged the soldiers with a pistol killing two and wounding one.  He also reported that Abu Hurayra 2 restored the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) media operations in Ninawa province.  If true, coalition forces may have dealt the ISI a major blow as far as its media arm is concerned.  However, if Abu Hurayra 2 was expecting his demise, it is possible that he trained someone else to fulfill his role making his death less of a blow to the ISI.

Document (Arabic): 8-23-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-killed

Document (Arabic): 8-14-2008-Ekhlaas-ah2-last-post

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Udugov starts by stating that all sides in the conflict made serious miscalculations, with Georgia and the West making larger errors in judgment than the Russians. The West was fooled into thinking that because of its non-interference in matters concerning the Russian republics of the Northern Caucasus that Russia would not meddle in the affairs of the sovereign Southern Caucasus nations. Additionally, the West’s approval of the Russian campaign of terror against Muslims in the Northern Caucasus within the context of the “War on Islam,” combined with Russia’s newfound energy revenue, re-awakened the “imperial instinct” of Moscow’s leadership.

In fact, he claims the Chechen government (the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria at the time), warned Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1999 and 2000 that after Russia liquidated the sovereignty of Ichkeria, it will surely go after theirs. The Republics of the Northern Caucasus were a shield that protected Georgia and Azerbaijan. He also adds that the fighting by the mujahidin gave Baku and Tblisi time to strengthen their respective nations.

Georgia and Azerbaijan then showed their gratitude by initiating anti-Muslim and anti-mujahidin policies. Ugodov is particularly critical of Georgia and its treatment of Chechens in the Pankisi Gorge, where instead of granting the mujahidin refugee and a legalized status, Georgia forced them out. He strongly believes that without the withdrawal of Russian troops from lands of the Caucasus Emirate, the question of stability and security in the region will remain unsolved.

The conflict also demonstrated that the storming of Tskinvali on 8 August was unexpected by the Kremlin. However as a result of Russia’s overwhelming military response, NATO will speed up the process of naming Georgia and Ukraine members of the organization, an event which Moscow was seriously trying to prevent.

Towards the end of his statement, he summarizes with a list of conclusions:

1. The Western Alliance received a classic “Russian lesson:” you can’t trust any regime that occupies the Kremlin.

2. The configuration of forces and the political situation in the Caucasus has changed once more. The final arrangement of forces and political priorities for all participants of the conflict will become clearer in the near future.

3. Even with all of its blood lust and aggressiveness, Russia demonstrated weakness: they didn’t “ finish the enemy.”

4. The decisiveness and opportunism of Moscow will be directly proportional to the indecisiveness and alienation of the West.

5. There is no clear winner yet.

Document (Russian): 8-18-08 Kavkaz-Center-Udugov

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