There is a well-worn rut of thinking which holds that Islamic doctrines of warfare determine Jihadis’ violent behavior. The doctrine functions like software on a computer: if you can identify the doctrines/software, you can predict behavior.

Raymond Ibrahim has posted a version of this argument at the MESH blog. Ibrahim is right to say that Jihadis of the Salafi stripe take the medieval Islamic teachings on warfare seriously (sometimes to their detriment, as Brynjar Lia has argued in a recent article).  But he is wrong to argue that studying these doctrines helps us understand, much less anticipate, the actions of Jihadis. I say this for five reasons:

1. The classical tradition Jihadis draw on is very contradictory. (I see that Bernard Haykel has already made this point in a comment on Ibrahim’s post.)  Which of the contradictory rulings is operative?

2. Cost-benefit analysis is an integral part of medieval Islamic thinking about warfare. For example, in medieval discussions of suicidal attacks, the majority says that although they are permissible, they may not be wise in a given circumstance (e.g. they will hurt the Muslim community, they will not result in any benefit to the Muslim armies). If this analysis is built in, then any doctrine of warfare is subject to curtailment.

3. Contemporary Jihadis disagree on tactics. For example, Zarqawi used to reject suicide ops against noncombatants until a mentor in Afghanistan changed his mind. If all Jihadis are running on the same software, why isn’t there consensus on this issue?

4. Academics who have studied specific instances of Jihadi violence have found that organizational imperatives, local politics, etc. strongly shape violent behavior (see, for example, Hafez’s Suicide Bombers in Iraq, or Hegghammer’s dissertation).

5. Most Jihadis accept the idea of “do unto your enemy as he does unto you,” so everything is on the table. If that’s the case, then it doesn’t matter whether the classical tradition sanctions an act or not.

6. Even if we say the tradition puts constraints on mujahids (which I think it does), its hard to see where these constraints are for Jihadis. They have maximally defined the scope of warfare, all the way out to WMD. With such wide latitude, why would learning the finer points of suicidal attacks help us understand their behavior?

All of this is not to say that doctrine doesn’t matter. Doctrine does play a great role in dehumanizing outsiders (which Ibrahim rightly alludes to), defining end goals (Islamic states), and prolonging violence (see Mike Horowitz’s work). I’m just arguing that it is not determinative in tactical or strategic matters.

Studying medieval Islamic doctrines of warfare does have one massive payoff:  If we can identify the rulings that contradict what the Jihadis are saying or doing, we can use them in information operations to paint Jihadis as illegitimate and outside of mainstream Islam. Of course, the Qur’an-is-software types will argue that the Jihadis are behaving like perfectly good Muslims.  But this opinion (which I sometimes share) does not help us discredit the Jihadis, which is one of the keys to destroying Jihadism; rather it makes their argument for them and alienates Muslims who might otherwise be well wishers.

One final point:  Ibrahim is outraged that deceit and an acceptance of collateral damage are acceptable in medieval Islamic doctrines of warfare.  Why is this outrageous?

  1. al-Muqanna says:

    I agree with your analysis that the study of Islamic warfighting doctrine does not help us anticipate the actions of terrorists, because pretty much anything and everything is on the table. I also agree that the main benefit from such a study is to learn how to effectively contradict terrorist tactics, we have a lot to learn from Dr. Fadl and other prominent Islamic thinkers questioning al-Qaeda’s tactics. However, I do not think that the classical tradition is all that contradictory. As Ibrahim pointed out in his response to Haykel, many of the contradictions about killing non-combatants or the proportionality of conducting an attack are discussions about certain interpretations of the Sunna and the Quran, not doctrine.

    A few hours of research in the Hadith and the Quran allowed me to fairly easily justify killing women and children in the Islamic tradition. Ibrahim points some of these verses out in his reply to Haykel.

    Additionally, the cost-benefit analysis you touch on is also extremely subjective. During the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, I asked a professor at the Abu Nour mosque in Syria about how Hezbollah could possibly justify its war with Israel when the damage against Lebanon was so disproportional. I even mentioned that Muhammad sent Muslims to Ethiopia partly to ensure they were not all killed. He said that unless every Muslim in the world faced annihilation this argument is not applicable. Thus, the damage in Lebanon is acceptable. I am sure others have far different opinions and that this professor would have had a different opinion if it was Syria instead of Lebanon being leveled by Israeli bombs, but it makes my point about the subjectivity of the matter.

    But I guess my ramblings kind of prove your point as well. Since everything is so subjective, it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to use past Islamic warfighting doctrine as a guide to how terrorists will act in the future. The same subjectivity also makes it easy to Islamicly contradict what the terrorists are doing and saying, sometimes with the same Islamic verses they are using.

    In my opinion, if we want to understand how terrorists in Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere are going to act and react, we should study the same military training manuals as they do. From what I can tell, US Army manuals are very popular on terrorist websites today. Additionally, while al-Qaeda types may take every chance they get to discredit Hamas and Hezbollah, they also take notice of their tactics. We should too.

  2. admin says:

    Hi Muq, I addressed some of your points over at the MESH blog. Michael Horowitz also has some insightful comments. I particularly liked his discussion of the Sun Tzu literature and his distinction between religion shaping behavior and religion determining behavior.

  3. Bengazi al Kasumak says:

    What if. . .
    Mexican troops invade the USA looking for weapons of mass destruction. They can’t find any but they set up bases in the US anyway.
    On a daily basis, US Citizens are harassed, have their front doors kicked down and their young sons zip-tied and taken to torture factories.
    I agree that Iraq is better off without Sadam Housein.
    Although I believe there are Al-Queda elements in Iraq, I feel stronger that most of the attacks are pissed-off, Iraqi citizens tired of all the mierda de toro.

  4. haha says:

    the real problem is that “occidental white (world)”
    is taking advises from a strongly inhuman people
    who had been executed for centurys trough the
    human history for making always the bad.
    these greedy (about money and lives) people are
    pushing others into troubles in staying far behind
    theyr plans are every time discovered to bring them
    to suffering and extermination, for the humanity to be
    able to breath, until their next generation come.
    so please be aware and dont forget they call you
    a”goy”.

  5. haha says:

    also, before sending your poor kids over there,
    please keep in mind that, if you dont care to kill
    childrens and old people in blind war,your “opponents”
    dont care to get killed because for them is the true
    “born again” factor, and those fighters will do nothing
    to avoid it, in contrary they are praying every day (5)
    for it, this is the mind-blowing without doubt.
    you are fighting for “live” they are fighting for “death”.
    good luck.

  6. ar razi says:

    Disagree with the idea of unpredictability. Brigadier S. K. Khan’s book ‘The Quranic Concept of War’ should be re-read by all jihad researchers: ‘We must aim at creating a wholesome respect for our Cause and our will and determination to attain it, in the minds of the enemy. So spirited, zealous, complete and thorough should be our preparation for war that we should enter upon the ‘war of muscles’ having already won the ‘war of will’.

    The terror war against civilian transporation targets aims at weakening the will of civilians to support war against terror. However, attacking civilian targets in the US and Europe no doubt inspires both Americans and Europeans to support the war against jihad.

    Until the jihadists figure out they are actually strengthening opposition by targeting civilians, we should expect continued attacks on civilian transportation. They will also continue to target liberalizing politicians in Islamic countries (e.g. Bhutto), thus alienating large numbers in those countries who increasingly desire democratization (60%).

    Analysis is, naturally, on-going and never complete, but only so many options are open to jihadists.

  7. swdldlbh says:

    there is a fundamental fact which is not being realized, osama bin laden has put forth certain grievances that muslims preponderantly agree on i.e support for israel, presence of infidels on arab lands propping up of apostate regimes destruction of the ottoman caliphate etc. since almost all other factions of islam advocate non violent means to rectify these ills and he is the pioneer of violent means to address the same ills a natural corollary of this is that the methodology that would be adopted by those who have been inspired by him would be predicated on his philosophy ergo the methodology of the people engaged in transnational global jihad would invariably be his methodology(which does sanction the killing of non muslim “civilians” ), so the only thing that needs studying in this respect are his writings and words. as far as those movements which use jihad to justify their nationalistic agenda like hizbollah and to a certain extent the taliban their methodology might not be completely aligned with his.in the above article point 3 states that zarqawi initially rejected suicide attacks against non combatants and later adopted this method. i think over here the term civilian is more appropriate since osama bin laden defines non combatants not only as those who are not directly participating in the battle but also as those who do not support the fighters in any way verbally physically financially etc and i have a feeling that the “non combatants” zarqawi wanted to eliminate were engaged in this. finally i would just say i have not doubt that people inspired by bin laden will grow at a slow but sure pace because their grievances will not be removed by any method other than his. a bloodbath awaits american civilian combatants, the us army will be eroded slowly but surely the us economy will falter and in the end victory awaits the forces of jihad