Documenting the Global Jihad

[Scott Sanford] On 21 August 2008, the al-Qaida-affiliated Global Islamic Media Front released a statement written by Abu al-Harith al-Ansari concerning the conversion of Mosab Hassan Yousef from Islam to Christianity. This conversion is significant because Yousef’s father is a senior Hamas leader in an Israeli prison and Yousef himself allegedly was in a leadership position in Hamas’ youth movement. Ansari explains that he felt compelled to respond to Yousef’s conversion and he uses four points to frame the conversion. He then outlines a course of action Muslims should take in response. The following is a brief synopsis:

1. Further research must be done to ascertain the truth about whether or not Yousef converted and then pass judgment.

2. Yousef chose his own path and it is important to remember other noteworthy infidels, who also chose their own path, like Noah’s son and wife, Abraham’s father, and Muhammad’s paternal uncle.

3. The fate of infidels does not change. The previously mentioned notables are all in Hell.

4. “Islam is larger than men.” Yousef’s actions will not harm Islam.

Ansari then gives several pieces of advice to individual Muslims and Hamas:

1. Muslims must announce their disavowal from Yousef’s actions and ask for God’s forgiveness upon him.

2. Just like the United States is dangerous and attacks Islam, Christianity’s evangelical institutions are dangerous too. There are many Christian schools in Gaza where 90% of the students are Muslims. Hamas must be aware of this.

3. While Yousef’s criticisms of individuals are not related to Islam, his criticisms of Hamas’ leadership have merit. Hamas must review its actions and seek guidance from Islam in further decisions.

4. Due to his apostasy, Yousef is weak-minded. “What do [Hamas supporters] know of Islam except the name? We see their fanaticism for the movement as if it were fanaticism for religion.” Hamas must learn about Salafism and read the proper books from writers like al-Tahawi, Ibn Taymiyya, and the Najdi scholars.

5. Yousef went to the United States in search of work. However, the immigration of a Muslim to a non-Islamic country for work is forbidden.

6. Israeli and Hamas oppression in Gaza is probably the biggest reason for Yousef’s apostasy. This does not justify it, but it is possible that God will guide him back to Islam.

If he comes back to Islam great, but if he does not, his fate is as an infidel without honor. The prophet Muhammad said, “Whoever alters his religion, kill him [Ansari’s font changes].” He should not have proper burial rights and he should not be buried with Muslims.

This is his fate under God’s law. The situational laws and human legislation is what causes the spread of apostasy, allows infidel institutions, and protects these institutions.

Such attacks on Hamas are common by al-Qaida and its supporters because Hamas’ nationalistic and more pragmatic approach to Islam challenges al-Qaida’s dogmatically unchanging and global Islamic view. Al-Qaida supporters see Hamas as a direct threat to its hegemony in the Middle East and it is attempting to break Hamas by bringing its followers into al-Qaida’s fold. Ansari tries to do this through discrediting Hamas’ leadership by blaming Gaza’s problems on them and proposing al-Qaida’s ideology as a solution. This is a common al-Qaida tactic against Hamas.

Ansari is also able to connect the believed dangers from the United States and Christianity to Gaza. In doing so, he is attempting to frame the Palestinian conflict in al-Qaida’s Islamic narrative where almost everyone is an enemy. This is in contrast to Hamas’ Palestinian narrative that has much more grey area, depending on Hamas’ goals at a particular time, about who the enemy is and how to deal with the threat.

Ansari does not mention that one of Yousef’s stated criticisms of Islam are those who have an unwavering and rigid doctrinal view, such as Ansari’s view. Thus, Ansari’s solution to the so-called problems in Gaza is unlikely to alleviate any of his stated grievances. It will be interesting to monitor the standoff between al-Qaida and Hamas, but given Hamas’ current authority and popularity in Gaza, it is unlikely that al-Qaida will make much headway in its goal of splitting Hamas’ leadership from its rank and file.

Document (Arabic): 8-21-08-ekhlaas-GIMF-on-mosab-hassan-yousef

I’m temporarily adding three members to the Jihadica roster while I’m on vacation the next week and a half: Scott Sanford, Chipotle Mystery, and Mike Honcho.

• Scott is an Arabic speaker who covers the forums and specializes in Lebanon, Palestinian territories, and Syria, so expect a lot of good stuff on Jihadi activity in the Levant.
• Chipotle Mystery is an Urdu speaker who works on al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan.  He reads tons of fascinating stuff but never writes about it because he believes (wrongly) that it’s already common knowledge.  You’ll have to bait him.
• Mike Honcho knows Russian and other languages with funny alphabets.  He’ll be keeping us posted on what’s going on in the Caucasus.

Muhami al-Dawla (”Defender of the State”) has written an essay on Ekhlaas titled, “The Connection between the State of Islam and the Taliban is the Strategy of the ‘Chameleon.’”  His argument is that the Taliban’s recent successful surge in Afghanistan is the result of using “chameleon cells,” which are small, well-organized, armed bands that 1) blend into the population, 2) do not take orders from a commander, and 3) have penetrated the state security apparatus.

Muhami claims that the Taliban borrowed the strategy from the Islamic State of Iraq, which used it after the tribal Awakenings.  The chameleon groups in Iraq are able to carry out attacks on Awakening leaders because of their infiltration of the Awakening security forces.  Moreover, their presence in these forces means that they can undertake attacks for which the Awakening leaders get blamed.

Muhami argues that the Taliban has adopted this strategy because it is working so well in Iraq (is it?).  The group’s successful use of the strategy in Afghanistan is linked to its increased proficiency at gathering intelligence.

Document (Arabic): 8-19-08-ekhlaas-the-connection-bn-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-taliban-is-strategy-of-chameleon

Ekhlaas member Dir` li-Man Wahada (Armor for One Who Was Alone) has written a brief guide for the Jihadi initiate to consult in preparation for the coming al-Qaeda strikes.  His purpose, he says, is to enumerate the general strategic framework of al-Qaeda so the initiate will be able to implement the organization’s vision locally, either by himself or in a small group.

The initiate must prepare himself in three respects: religiously, intellectually, and physically.

For the religious aspect, he must read:

• تنبيه الراحل إلى أهم ما يحتاجه من المسائل (Informing the Traveler of the Most Important Issues He Needs to Know) by `Izz al-Din al-Maqdisi
• حقيقة الحرب الصليبية الجديدة (The Reality of the New Crusader War) by Yusuf `Uyayri (or `Ayiri–have we decided yet?)
• الباحث في حكم قتل أفراد وضباط المباحث (An Inquiry Into the Ruling of Death upon Soldiers and Officers of the Security Forces) by Faris Al al-Shuwayl al-Zahrani

For the intellectual and security aspect, he must read:

• موسوعة أبي زبيدة الأمنية (The Security Encyclopedia of Abu Zubayda)
• دعوة المقاومة الإسلامية العالمية (Call for the Global Islamic Resistance) by Abu Mus`ab al-Suri.  (”Reading the book will fill several weeks.  Don’t fail to complete it and don’t skip sections.”)

For physical preparation, the individual should at least do the following:

• Exercise no less than three times a week for at least half an hour.  Beginners should join sports clubs.
• Run outdoors at least once a week.
• For those who can, swim on the days you are not exercising.
• Avoid difficult exercises in the first few weeks to avoid injury.
• Exercise less during Ramadan.

Dir` cautions those who take up this program to keep their Jihadi interests to themselves.  Dir` also acknowledges that some of the Jihadis think reading these books takes too much time; he counters that if they don’t know why they are fighting, they will merely be brigands.

This curriculum is similar in some respects to one we looked at in June.

Document (Arabic): 8-17-08-ekhlaas-how-individual-can-prepare-for-coming-jihadi-stages

That’s the claim of Zamjari, which Ekhlaas ranks as “a major author” on the forum.  He writes:

We proclaim to the supporters of the mujahids everywhere that our beloved shaykh is alive, prosperous, fighting, moving about freely, and leading battalions of mujahids.  Martyrdom has not yet been decreed for him.

That’s quite a claim for a major forum member to make given that al-Qaeda could release a statement that would prove him wrong.   Since there’s been no such statement, I’m inclined to give this unofficial proclamation some weight.

Document (Arabic): 8-16-08-ekhlaas-major-forum-member-says-mustafa-abu-al-yazid-still-alive

A few days ago, ARY (a Pakistani network) ran an extremely truncated version of a lengthy audio tape of Zawahiri addressing Pakistanis in English.  Yesterday, Sahab (the media production arm of al-Qaeda) released the full audio recording online (open the .pdf below for links).  Here are the interesting bits:

• Zawahiri says at the beginning that he wants to address Pakistanis in Urdu, but he can’t speak the language.  He is speaking English to communicate with them, even though it is the language of the enemy.
• Zawahiri’s attachment to Pakistan began in his childhood.  His grandfather was the first to translate the poetry of Muhammad Iqbal into Arabic.
• Musharraf is a tool of the U.S.
• Pakistan made a “strategic blunder’ when it allowed the U.S. to install Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan since Karzai is friendly to India.  Now, Pakistan has no “strategic depth” in the mountains of Afghanistan, which would be useful in a war with India.
• How can military officers and soldiers not be bothered by Musharraf’s strategic blunders?  How can they not be bothered by killing fellow Muslims and Pakistanis?  How can they not be troubled by their defeats at the hands of the mujahids?
• Until the mujahids in Kashmir free themselves of ISI influence, they won’t be able to liberate it.
• The new head of the Pakistani army, Kiyani, is also an enemy of Islam like his predecessor.
• Officers and soldiers in the Pakistani army are apostates if they fight against fellow mujahids.  Zawahiri belabors this point a great deal.
• There are historical examples of Muslim resistance to British rule in the region, such as `Abd al-`Aziz, Ahmad Shahid, Isma`il Shahid, Shah `Abd al-Hayy, Shaykh al-Hind Mahmud al-Hasan, and his student Sayyid Husayn Ahmad Madani.
• Zawahiri invites Pakistanis to join the jihad.  If they don’t rise up, Pakistan will become part of Greater Hindustan.

It may not come across in the summary, but Zawahiri directs a lot of his remarks to Pakistani military personnel to explain why they will have to be killed if they don’t disobey orders.  Perhaps this is a prelude to an increase of violence in Pakistan against military installations and personnel outside the tribal regions.   I better understand now why ARY cut most of the video.

If you’re interested in watching it, open the .pdf below and download it from one of the first two sections of links (the links below these are for an Urdu translation).  The password is the long string of letters and numbers above the links.

Document (Arabic): 8-16-08-ekhlaas-complete-zawahiri-english-message-to-pakistan

On August 9, a member of the Islamic State of Iraq announced–via an intermediary on the Ekhlaas forum–the death of Sinam al-Ramadi. Sinam was an al-Qaeda member who operated in Ramadi and who participated on a number of forums, including Faloja.

On the day of the announcement, an Ekhlaas member named Halima posted an eyewitness account of Sinam’s capture. The account is interesting for the light it sheds on al-Qaeda’s activities in Anbar province and for what it tells us about the hectic lives of forum fighters–Jihadi forum members who are also active militants.

Halima writes that on Thursday, August 7 a certain Dr. Khattab `Ali al-Hayani was arrested in Haqlaniya, near Haditha. U.S. troops and Iraqi police had discovered evidence in Hayani’s home proving that he was Sinam al-Ramadi, one of the members of al-Qaeda in Ramadi. Sinam had left Ramadi for Kirkuk, Diyala, Bayji, and finally Haditha, where he was “considered one of the al-Qaeda returnees to the regions of western Anbar.” (I think this means that he was an al-Qaeda member in Anbar who had fled following the success of the tribal Awakening and later returned.) It was already known that Sinam had created al-Qaeda cells living in the environs of Haditha and that he had a death sentence passed against him for killing a Christian clergyman in Mosul.

Sinam was arrested after being followed by an American spy plane, which had spotted him after an Iraqi Hummer exploded between Barwana and Bayji. Sinam was stopped near the Haditha dam and badly wounded after he and his comrades resisted arrest. Halima relates that an American general said to him, “Are you the one who hassled us so much on the Internet?” Sinam couldn’t have been more than 24 years old, according to Halima.

There’s some things in Halima’s account that don’t make sense. It’s hard to believe that a U.S. general was involved in Sinam’s capture or that Halima overheard their conversation. And Halima does not write of Sinam’s martyrdom, which was being celebrated on the forums, but rather his bloody capture. (The title of Halima’s post does suggest that Sinam was executed later for killing the clergyman.)

Still, Halima’s details about Sinam’s route fit with what we know of al-Qaeda’s recent migration out of Anbar. And her story of Sinam’s arrest also dovetails with recent news about the al-Qaeda cell operating in Haqlaniya.

Document (Arabic): 8-9-08-ekhlaas-post-regarding-death-of-sinam-al-ramadi

Document (Arabic): 8-9-08-ekhlaas-biography-of-sinam-al-ramadi

Issue 28 of Sada al-Jihad is out.  Articles include, “Hamas Responds Negatively to the Invitation of Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri” and “The Intellectual Pollution of the Followers of the Salafi-Jihadi Method.”

A new journal, Qadaya Jihadiyya (Jihadi Issues), has also be released.  The production quality is better than most of the Jihadi journals and the articles look interesting.  There is a “Strategic Issues” section, reminding me of Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi’s column in the Ansar journal.  It has two articles: “The Islamic State of Iraq and Early Signs of American Failure” and “Regional Alliances and the Path of Jihad.”  Another section, “Thoughts of a Mujahid,” has the memoir of someone who attended the al-Faruq training camp.

Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-faloja-issue-28-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-issue-1-of-qadaya-jihadiyya

More evidence that the failure of the Islamic State of Iraq is severely demoralizing Jihadis, at least in the Arabic-speaking world.

Asad al-Jihad2, a popular commentator, has written a new booklet, “The State of Islam Remains Defiant.” In it, he seeks to assuage growing doubts about the viability of the Islamic State of Iraq:

Upon reflection, some may say, “The Islamic State of Iraq is still in the right. So why are things becoming so difficult for it, its enemies joining against it from all sides?” (p.7)

The answer is that God is testing the resolve of the mujahids in Iraq, the same answer Yaman Mukhaddab gave in July to dispel the pessimism of the Hesbah forum members.

On the Faloja forum, Hafid al-Husayn has a similarly defiant title for his post: “The State of Islam Remains, Despite the Tricks of the Tricksters.” Hafid acknowledges that things are not going well, but he blames the U.S. and its dirty tricks, which include the following:

• Spreading lies about the Islamic State of Iraq to turn the public against it. It wrongfully accuses the ISI of targeting civilians and sectarian killings.
• Using Arabic channels to spread these lies
• Seeking the publication of fatwas by religious clerics against the ISI
• Secretly co-opting Iraqi resistance groups and turning them against the ISI

Jihadi uberpundit Husayn b. Mahmud believes the tricks are working, turning insurgent groups against one another. He chastises his fellow mujahids:

So great is the contempt that your enemy has for you that he announces his plan and guides you to the hole he has dug for you. Then you walk to the hole and throw yourselves in voluntarily!!

Abu Osama1 on Firdaws is similarly clear eyed in his assessment of the ISI’s predicament, but he is more optimistic. He acknowledges that the number of explosions has decreased and the number of civilian deaths has gone down, but he argues that al-Qaeda is just playing dead and biding its time.

None of the authors can bring themselves to say that the condition of the Islamic State in Iraq is terminal, but that’s the barely-concealed prognosis.

Document (Arabic): asad-al-jihad2-the-state-of-islam-remains-proud

Document (Arabic): 8-13-08-faloja-describing-recent-success-of-us-io-campaigns-against-isi

Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-husayn-b-mahmud-angry-about-success-of-us-dividing-jihadi-groups

Document (Arabic): 8-13-08-firdaws-aq-just-playing-dead-in-iraq1

Reuters reports, on the authority of a Pakistani security official, that an “Abu Saeed al-Masri” was killed.  The official said Masri is “among the top leadership of al Qaeda.”  The identity of Masri is unknown, but the news media is claiming that it’s Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, a close Egyptian friend of Zawahiri’s from the Sadat assassination days (Long War and CT Blog have good summaries of the news).

If true, it is horrible news for al-Qaeda.  Abu al-Yazid is the head of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and one of the few public faces of the organization (he sometimes gets the job of announcing the death of AQ operatives killed in Afghanistan).  Moreover, it comes after a string of successful strikes on high-profile al-Qaeda leaders this year: Abu Layth al-Libi, Abu Sulayman al-Jaza’iri, and Abu Khabab.  Of course, there are other capable leaders waiting in the wings, but don’t underestimate the damage these deaths cause.  It is sending AQ Central back to 2003.

To get a spatial and chronological sense of what is happening, I’ve put together a map of the 2008 killings based on Bill Roggio’s nice summary of the information.  The marks for al-Jaza’iri and Abu Khabab are accurate since we know where they died; for Libi and Abu al-Yazid (if dead), all we know is the province.