chronicling the global jihad
A member of the Faloja Forum, Abu Muhammad al-Rafhawi, has posted pictures of anti-Shia graffiti from Gaza that he claims was written by youth in the Qassam Brigades and the internal security forces. I don’t know if this sort of graffiti is typical or if it reflects rising hostility toward Hezbollah and Iran among younger Hamas members, but it’s interesting nonetheless.
Document (Arabic): 10-24-08-faloja-anti-shia-graffiti-in-gaza
Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary:
Despite the excessive focus on dissimulation (which also plagues Western analyses of Shia politics) and the Iran-wants-to-rule-Sunnis argument (does it really want to rule Indonesia?), this is a good primer on Iran’s realpolitik in the Middle East and dovetails well with the findings of an excellent new book, The Limits of Culture. That `Atiyyat Allah has to chastise his fellow Jihadis for their conspiracy thinking and their overemphasis on cultural motives when analyzing state behavior shows that they are problems for the Jihadi analytical community. Same could be said for us.
Today we continue our look at a Kuwaiti cell and how its members transitioned from forum fighters to foreign fighters.
When we left off, Badr al-Harbi and Bawasil had returned to Kuwait from the front in Afghanistan via Iran, entrusted with a special mission by Abu al-Layth al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda leader. They were delayed in carrying out their task by Iranian, and then Kuwaiti, security forces. The latter, according to al-Furqan al-Junubi’s account, had tortured them and confiscated their passports.
After being released, Harbi and Bawasil stayed in Kuwait a full year to complete their special mission: gathering money, clothes, and food for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. In this, they relied on their network of friends, many of whom were already committed to the cause. Yet Harbi and Bawasil’s efforts aroused the suspicions of other Jihadis, who wrote the brothers in Afghanistan and told them that they were spies. They even made films that portrayed Harbi and Bawasil in a negative light.
Upon completing their task, Harbi and Bawasil wanted to return to the front in Afghanistan, but their passports had been confiscated. Nevertheless, they were both able to get new passports. Harbi and Bawasil then went with their families to Mecca and returned without incident.
After returning to Kuwait, Harbi and Bawasil asked the Jihadis in Afghanistan about the route to the front. The Jihadis told them that it was “broken,” but this, al-Furqan al-Junubi comments, was only because they had believed the bad rumors that had been spread about Harbi and Bawasil.
Harbi suggested the two travel to Iraq instead, but he was hesitant to go because he was not sure he would be guaranteed a martyrdom operation. Harbi and Bawasil soon met a coordinator and obtained a guarantee of safe passage from him, but they did not end up using him.
At this time, Harbi decided he wanted to marry for the second time, but wasn’t sure it was right to do so as a mujahid. Bawasil assured him it was, and so he did.
One month after Harbi’s marriage, a message came from Abu al-Layth al-Libi vouching for the integrity of Harbi and Bawasil. This meant the two could now travel to Afghanistan. But personal circumstances prevented Harbi from traveling to Afghanistan with Bawasil, who was anxious to leave because the government was pursuing him.
Bawasil first went to the United Arab Emirates with one of his close cousins (on his mother’s side). The Jihadis (it is unclear if they were in the Emirates or Afghanistan) told Bawasil that they only wanted him and not his cousin, so the latter returned to Kuwait.
Bawasil had to wait four days in the airport because of snow in Iran (indicating that Iran again served as his transit point for Afghanistan). Bawasil succeeded in finding the brothers (presumably in Iran) and soon found a coordinator, but they had stopped using the old route.
Harbi waited four months to find new way to Afghanistan, but failed. It was around this time that Harbi met a Jihadi from Algeria who told him how to go to Iraq.
(To be continued….)
Some thoughts:
As I said last post, none of this is a big revelation (with the exception of Iran). But it really adds texture to the recent abstract debates about terror networks and helps to weigh their relative merits.
On Monday, we looked at the case of al-Miskin al-Muhajir/asdasd99, who finally made his way to Afghanistan. Miskin had hoped to go to Iraq in April with a group from Kuwait, but unnamed obstacles stood in his way. We don’t yet know the fate of Miskin, but we do know what happened to this earlier group.
The story begins with Abu `Umar Badr al-Harbi, 36, from Kuwait. According to a friend of his, al-Furqan al-Junubi, Harbi was the oldest of his brothers and very close to his mother. He became “committed to the path (of jihad)” at the age of 14.
During his military service in Kuwait, Harbi met his best friend, al-Bawasil. Bawasil was at the beginning of his commitment to jihad when 9/11 happened. Both men rejoiced at the attack and were impressed that someone had been able to strike so deep inside the U.S.
One day, Harbi came to Bawasil and convinced him of the duty to undertake jihad. By 2004, both men were encouraging others to also take up arms. Many people said they were being foolish or accused them of being spies; others said there was no permanent jihad or banner to fight under.
In 2005, Harbi and Bawasil met the followers of Shaykh `Amir Khalif, the co-leader of a militant network in Kuwait, but they didn’t get to meet him before he died.
Soon after meeting Khalif’s followers, they learned of a way to go to Afghanistan through Iran. Both men were worried that it was a trap. Bawasil went first to make sure the way was secure. After arriving safely, he spent two weeks in Afghanistan with the mujahids before returning to Kuwait.
Upon Bawasil’s return, he told Harbi of the glories that awaited him on the front. The two then began preparing for to go to Afghanistan for a longer period of time. They trained themselves physically and psychologically, studied some Islamic legal subjects pertaining to their endeavors, and gathered money.
Together with their friend Abu Khalid al-Kuwaiti, Bawasil and Harbi went to Iran by airplane and then made their way to Afghanistian. They stayed there three months training and guarding the front line.
While there, Abu Layth al-Libi (a high-ranking, now-deceased al-Qaeda member) entrusted them with a special mission in Kuwait. The mission was so secret that not even Abu Nasir al-Qahtani, another high-ranking AQ member, knew of it and was puzzled when the men refused his request for them to stay.
Harbi and Bawasil tried to return to Kuwait via Iran, but Iranian security forces imprisoned them for several days because they had lost their passports. They were finally released and returned to Kuwait, but the Kuwaiti security forces imprisoned them for twelve days, tortured them, and took their passports.
To be continued…..
In part 3 we’ll look at Harbi and Bawasil’s special mission and their preparations for another trip to the front. Some of the details already sound familiar if you’re read up on the foreign fighter literature. What stands out to me is the role that Iran plays as a transit point between Kuwait and Afghanistan. A few days ago, I noted that the Saudis are claiming that a Jihadi in Iran is directing a large network of militants in the Kingdom. By itself, this doesn’t mean much given the source. But here we have an insider remarking that Iran is a transit point for Jihadis going to fight in Afghanistan. That’s worrying.
There’s been a lot of talk about Syria’s role as a transit point, but it’s still unclear from the open source materials if it’s ignorance, benign neglect, or something more sinister. It looks like Iran presents the same puzzle.
I’ve been collecting news stories on the terror suspects arrested in Saudi Arabia. Much of the reporting relies on Saudi security personnel and the Interior Ministry’s statement last week, so it should be read with due skepticism.
There’s a lot to discuss, but I’ll save my comments for later. For the moment it’s worth noting that, as of today, the Saudis are now injecting a new piece of information into the story: the network was taking orders and receiving money from someone in Iran:
Below is my summary of all the data points I’ve been able to find (sources at the bottom):
The Network
Recruitment
Leadership
Funding
Preparation
Media
Targets and Tactics
Sources
Mashari al-Dhaydi, “Features of the New al-Qaeda,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.
Muhammad al-Malfi, “A High-Level Security Source: The Africans Are Actually from Mauritania and the Asians Are Afghans from Waziristan,” al-Watan, 26 June 2008.
“520 Arrested, Planned to Attack Oil and Security Installations and Spread the Takfir Methodology on the Internet,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 June 2008.
“Saudi: Oil Cell Planned to Storm the Building of Secret Police of al-Khafji with Car Bombs,” al-Qabas, 29 June 2008.
“Oil Installations in Gulf Countries Intended Targets,” al-Qabas 27 June 2008.
“Saudi Arabia: Terror Cell Received Orders from al-Qaeda Deputy,” Adnkronos.com, 26 June 2008.
In the final installment of the series, we’ll look at a piece of analysis from Ekhlaas member Abu Hamza 2005 titled, “A Modest Reading of al-Qaeda’s Strategy in the Levant [bilad al-sham]”. Abu Hamza begins by referring to Bin Laden’s 2007 statement, “To Our People in Iraq.” The statement, according to Abu Hamza, indicates that the Islamic State of Iraq is the nucleus of a future caliphate, but the caliphate will not be realized until the countries surrounding Iraq are defeated and Israel is destroyed. For this reason, Al-Qaeda “the Mother” (i.e. al-Qaeda Central) is very keen on expanding into the Levant and the other countries surrounding Israel. It also wants to establish branches in important global capitals, which can put pressure on foreign countries and scatter the focus of the enemy.
Abu Hamza says that he is certain that AQ cells are being created in the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Lebanon. Because of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s geographical proximity, ease of communication, and networks in these countries, it is in charge of overseeing the development of these cells. Abu Hamza also says that northern Sinai, in Egypt, is also very attractive for AQ, but he does not mention any links with AQI.
Abu Hamza argues that there have already been AQ ops in the countries surrounding Palestine:
– On 19 August 2005, 3 Katyusha rockets were launched from the Sinai toward Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba.
– On 28 December 2005, 10 rockets were launched from Lebanon at towns in northern Israel.
– On 20 February 2006, two Palestinians were charged with trying to carry out a suicide attack in the French Hill area of Jerusalem on behalf of the global jihad.
As for Lebanon, Abu Hamza believes that AQ Central would be silly to enter the Lebanese political game at this time. The Sunnis are not ready to support a group like al-Qaeda, as witnessed by the bad end of Fatah al-Islam in Nahir al-Barid. (Abu Hamza relates that some observers believe that Fatah al-Islam was seriously negotiating with AQ about becoming a formal affiliate before it was crushed.) Since the fight in Lebanon is part of a larger strategic conflict between US/Israel and Iran/Syria, an escalation of the conflict will ultimately benefit the local Sunni militants. So AQ will watch from afar until the situation in Lebanon escalates to the point that the local Sunni civilians militarize and incline toward AQ to protect themselves (à la Iraq). Until then, Iraq is AQ’s top priority because it is the key to liberating Palestine. Once the U.S. leaves Iraq, al-Qaeda will transfer its leadership there and shift its focus elsewhere.
I think Abu Hamza’s piece is appropriately titled since his estimation of AQ’s chances in the Levant are much more modest than the previous two items in the series. In this, he seems to be more in sync with Zawahiri, who has tried to play down expectations of an attack on Israel.
As for the bit about AQ branches being established in important global capitals, it supports the argument that AQ attacks in Europe and the U.S. are meant support the mother organization’s goals in the Middle East.
Document (Arabic): 5-18-08-ekhlaas-modest-reading-of-aq-strategy-in-levant
Trita Parsi’s new book, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. is the subject of a long post on Ekhlaas. 
The poster uses it to prove his thesis that Iran is secretly working with the U.S. and Israel against the Sunnis. Many Jihadis maintain that the Shia, with Iran at their head, are allied with Israel. To bolster their claim, they will often point out that `Abd Allah b. Saba, a Jewish convert to Islam, originated the Shia practice of excessively venerating `Ali. Thus, it is natural that the Shia would work with a Jewish nation–it’s in their spiritual DNA. Never mind that `Ali rejected his excessive veneration and most Shia don’t believe he even existed.