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chronicling the global jihad

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 5: The Jihadi Domino Theory

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Continuing…

  • Why did al-Qaeda attack the U.S.?  Was it to drive the U.S. out of the Middle East?  Or was it to strike the far enemy for the sake of destroying the near enemy (i.e. regimes in the Arab and Islamic world)?
  • Regardless of the intent of al-Qaeda’s leaders, the sequence of events gives weight to the second possibility, which could also be termed the Domino Scenario.
  • According to a 2007 article by George Friedman, Bin Laden saw a rare opportunity after the fall of the USSR to begin re-establishing the worldwide caliphate.  But, says Friedman, armed groups can’t establish empires.  They can, however, seize a state and use it to begin to establish an empire.  UBL realized that Afghanistan wasn’t the ideal place for this because of its geographical position and its weakness.
  • Based on Zawahiri’s pre-9/11 writings, Friedman believes that UBL wanted to topple local regimes and replace them with Islamic ones.  He was looking to do this in Egypt because it leads the Islamic world.
  • Friedman says the two goals of the attacks were 1) to prove to Muslims that the US could be attacked and suffer great harm, and 2) to provoke a U.S. response.  Whatever the U.S. chose to do in response, Muslims would win.  If the U.S. failed to respond, it would look weak.  If it attacked, it would be engaged in a crusade.
  • The authors of a report from Decision Supports Systems, Inc. written two months after 9/11 understood al-Qaeda’s intent.  The study says that before 9/11, AQ attacked three targets without sufficiently provoking the US: civil, diplomatic, and military.
  • Based on al-Qaeda’s statements before 9/11, DSSI wrote that al-Qaeda was trying to provoke the U.S. into a conflict with it.  After the 9/11 strikes, the U.S. responded in the manner planned by al-Qaeda.
  • According to DSSI, AQ wanted to provoke the U.S. into a large military invasion of the Middle East so AQ could destroy its military and upset the geopolitical balance of power.
  • The DSSI report argues that the greatest indicator that this was AQ’s strategy is the fact that its operatives assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the commander of the Northern Alliance.  AQ knew that when the US retaliated for 9/11, it would work through tribal proxies because the U.S. does not like to get its hands dirty.  Thus, AQ had to kill the most effective leader of those trbies.
  • As the DSSI study concludes, as long as the U.S. continues to behave in predicable ways, al-Qaeda can anticipate its responses and plan accordingly.
  • According to the DSSI study, there are three possibilities after 9/11.  1) The U.S. intervention in the Middle East provokes uncontrolable violence in the Middle East which will make it ungovernable in the long term.  2) The U.S. sends more troops to stabalize the situation but its presence polarizes Muslims and puts strain on its allies in the region, particularly the Gulf states and Pakistan.  The government of Pakistan could become unstable and AQ or its allies could get control of its nukes by infiltrating the security apparatus or overthrowing the government.   The collapse of these states will create security vaccuums that AQ or its allies will fill, giving them control of oil and nukes.  3) AQ could choose to destroy oil production in the MIddle East, forcing the U.S. to look elsewhere to meet its energy needs.

[Update: All of DSSI’s publications can be found here.]

Issue 2 of Qadaya Jihadiyya Released

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Like last month’s debut, the second issue of Qadaya Jihadiyya is slick.  It also has a lot of interesting material:

  • “Crisis of Terminology” discusses the contentious meanings of “Salafi” and “Jihadi.”
  • The strategic studies section has three articles: “Seven Years After September, Has al-Qaeda Achieved Its Goals?”, “Bin Laden and the Globalization of Jihad,” and “The Effect of the New York and Washington Attacks on Many Youth in Groups in Palestine.”
  • “The Jihadi Media Uncovers the Falseness of the American Empire.”  The article surveys the developments in jihadi media, particularly online, and Western responses.

In addition to the article above on Palestinian youth, there is an article on fasting in Gaza.  This, coupled with the pictures of slain Hamas leaders on the last page, indicate that the journal is being produced by someone in the Palestinian territories or Jordan.  Perhaps a younger member of the Qassam Brigades.

One final note: The article on the “Globalization of Jihad” is a reworked version of an article by the same title I summarized in May.  The authors’ names are different, but it’s the same piece of work.

Document (Arabic): 9-22-08-shamikh-new-issue-of-qadaya-jihadiyya

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 4: The Strategy of Laudable Terrorism

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Continuing…

  • The meaning of “terrorism” is extremely contentious.
  • Terrorism is a type of political violence.  Western researchers say that political violence is of four types: violence between states, state violence against its citizens, violence between individuals, and the violence of citizens against the state.
  • State violence against citizens is of two kinds: violence to compel obedience to laws and extrajudicial violence to compel political opponents to submit.
  • The most common form of violence between citizens is criminal acts that have no political motive.  Other types can be social or political, like ethnic or ideological violence.
  • The violence of citizens against a state can be organized or spontaneous.  The latter may not have political goals.  But organized violence against the state is classified as a rebellion that aims to overthrow the government.  The forms that these rebellions take reflect different strategies.
  • Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are usually used synonymously because they both have similar goals.  The difference is that guerrilla warfare tries to control territory, even if it’s partial control, whereas terrorism does not.
  • Terrorism as a strategy depends on psychologically influencing the target audience.  It lacks the material elements of guerrilla warfare.
  • Another difference is the desired effect.  When terrorists attack, they do not intend to remove a government but rather increase the government’s repression, which will alienate the wider population and increase support for the rebellion.
  • Then there is the strategy of chaos.  When a government is unable to confront terrorism, it demonstrates the government’s inability to impose law and order.
  • There is also the strategy of attrition.  Some rebel movements think terrorism is one such strategy.  But if terrorist groups use terrorism as their major strategy, they won’t take power as long as the state security apparatus retains control.
  • In some cases, terrorism is an emotional response without strategic goals.
  • Although terrorism is not essential in guerrilla warfare, some guerrilla groups use it.
  • Terrorism is not different from other kinds of war that target civilians.  But terrorism is more violent and it systematically violates Western rules of war.  There is a consensus in the West that terrorism is the action of groups, not states.
  • There is also an academic consensus that there is no definition of terrorism because it is impossible to criminalize the violence of groups without condemning the violence of states, which are more capable of harming societies.
  • Ariel Merari, in “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” acknowledges that the three common elements in definitions of terrorism–1) using violence 2) for political aims 3) by spreading fear in targeted societies–are not enough to formulate a single definition.  Merari observes that if the term can equally apply to conventional war and guerrilla war, then the term loses any useful meaning.  It is just a synonym for violent intimidation in a political framework.  If that’s so, then there’s no such thing as good terrorism or bad terrorism.
  • Although terrorism has a long history, the modern use of the term has been influenced by events in the 18th and 19th centuries.  Terrorism first emerged as a term in during the French Revolution in which the state used violence to maintain its revolutionary government.  In the second half of the 19th century, the meaning of terrorism shifted in the hands of anarchists and, later, nationalist groups.  It was used to push for social and political change and usually entailed the assassination of government officials.  Terrorism again became the tool of state repression in the first half of the twentieth century (e.g. Nazis and Soviets).  In the second half of the 20th century, it was taken up by anti-colonialists and separatists.  These latter groups disassociated themselves from the term because of its growing negative connotations.
  • After 9/11, people said that al-Qaeda attacked because its members came from poor countries.  But academics have found that the poorest countries produce few terrorists.
  • David Kilcullen reformulated the U.S. response to the Jihadi Movement.  He argues it should be treated as a counterinsurgency, not as a conventional police response to terrorism.  But he also notes that classical counterinsurgency strategy was designed to deal with an insurgency in a single country, whereas the new threat requires a comprehensive strategy. [Abu al-Fadl is citing Kilcullen’s “Countering Global Insurgency.”]

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 3: Striking the Enemy at the Center of Gravity

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Continuing…

  • It is no accident that the World Trade Center was the main object of the 9/11 attacks since it was the symbol of U.S. economic hegemony. Bear in mind that the attacks had been planned in the ’90s during the height of U.S. economic power.
  • The strikes were meant to polarize Muslims as well as the enemy’s population. They were also intended to push the U.S. into overreacting and committing errors.
  • Why didn’t all four strikes on 9/11 hit the Pentagon alone? Why did al-Qaeda attack civilians and the WTC? We need a new strategic framework to understand its reasoning. Three things needs to be considered.
  • First, when the U.S. attacks a country, it abides by the principle of the ends justify the means. This is one of the foundational principles of American pragmatism. Studies that came out after 9/11 really brought this mindset to the fore. But, according to a principle of international relations, it is the right of oppressed people to respond in kind. Al-Qaeda decided that there was no difference between civilian and soldier among the enemy, especially since is a democracy. Since U.S. citizens vote, they are responsible for U.S. policies and thus subject to terrorism. This was the first strategic breakthrough of AQ.
  • Second, although the U.S. is militarily superior to everyone else, it sometimes uses asymmetrical warfare against its enemies. In response, AQ decided to make use of it as well. Asymmetrical warfare is part of guerrilla warfare and AQ added terrorism to its asymmetrical toolkit.
  • Third, the U.S. began promoting fourth generation warfare in ’89 after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Fourth generation warfare means that there is no longer a battlefield; rather, the society of the enemy is the theater of conflict. 4GW puts emphasis on small, flexible forces. The goal is to destroy the enemy from within and the list of targets iss expanded to include the enemy’s culture and popular support for the war.
  • For fourth generation warfare to succeed, it is necessary to correctly identify the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. In this type of warfare, there is no delineation between war and peace and no clear battlefields. In these circumstances, differences between civilian and soldier are erased.
  • The idea of the center of gravity has changed the conceptual framework of warfare. In any war, you identify the enemy and identify the point on which you’ll concentrate all your effort to achieve victory with the least amount of effort and losses. This point is called the center of gravity.
  • In traditional warfare, the center of gravity was the opposing army. If a country lost its military strength, it was unable to continue fighting and consequently lost the war. But the development of weapons and the growing complexity of the means of control in modern societies means that the center of gravity is now more flexible and elusive. It’s not just material power. The U.S. won all its battles in Vietnam but lost the war because public opinion turned against the war. “In other words, America lost the political will to pay the costs of the war and did not consider the hypothetical return on investment commensurate with the expected loses.”
  • The center of gravity is certainly not the enemy’s point of weakness such that a strike at it will end everything. Clausewitz, who invented the term “center of gravity,” had difficulty defining it, as do contemporary American military theorists. The meaning slides between an enemy’s point of weakness or its point of strength. In Clausewitz’s work, it is evident that the concept is not confined to a place, a potentiality, or a fixed source of power. Rather, it is the point of equilibrium from which the enemy derives the potentialities of power and the will to fight.
  • Identifying the enemy’s correct center of gravity is half the battle according to the American colonel, Antulio Echevarria. He believes that the center of gravity in Clausewitz’s original text is judged according to its impact on the whole, not according to its potentialities and capabilities. In other words, it is the specific point that, if struck sufficiently, will have a decisive impact on the whole body. On this basis, Echevarria suggests redefining the term as focal points which inhere to the combatant’s complete structural order and which bring it strength from several sources and give it purpose and direction. [To quote directly from Echevarria: “A center of gravity is the one element within a combatant’s entire structure or system that has the necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together.”] He also believes that an enemy’s center of gravity should be continually reassessed due to its temporary and transitory nature.
  • In total wars, the strategic center of gravity is a combatant’s economic-industrial potential.  In limited wars, it is the military-security potential.  National leaders are not centers of gravity because they themselves do no have the potential to defeat the enemy.  They are only catalysts.
  • Now to return to the strikes on the U.S. center of gravity.  Firstly, the center of gravity for the U.S. during WWII was its industrial complex.
  • Secondly, In the past two decades, U.S. financial centers seemed to be its center of gravity.  They absorbed the liquidity of the world and its interest.
  • Thirdly, the U.S.’s primary means of attracting funds is its capacity to impose its will through force on other countries and its belief that it can’t be defeated because of its geographical and geopolitical protection (it’s surrounded by oceans) and its military dominance.
  • Fourthly, hitting the U.S. homeland, despite all the strengths we mentioned, demonstrated the country’s brittleness, which gave reassurance to the U.S.’s enemies, especially in the Islamic world.
  • Fifthly, the strike on the WTC was not enough to destroy the world’s confidence in the U.S., even though it shook one of the pillars of its control of the world.
  • Does all of this mean that AQ committed the mistake of Japan in WWII, creating its own Peal Harbor?  In other words, did it provoke the giant without finishing it off and now it must bear the consequences?
  • There is a difference in both cases.  Japan was a small, isolated, maritime nation that had no resources or raw materials.  Since Japan fought a traditional war, its defeat was certain given that it could not match or destroy the U.S.’s center of gravity [its industrial base].  AQ, on the other hand, stretches over continents and its resources are from the umma; these resources have been barely affected.  AQ’s mode of fighting is new and not one to which the U.S. is accustomed.

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 2: Provoking the Tyrant of the Sea & Air

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Continuing:

  • The main strategic question of the ’80s was how to mobilize Muslim youth to fight the Soviet incursion into the Islamic world while local conflicts were distracting the youths’ attention.
  • After the fall of the USSR the question became, why provoke the sole remaining superpower?  Is the US comparable to the USSR?  After all, the latter was attacked in Afghanistan at the nadir of its power.
  • Even more sensitive questions have been raised, like what was the Sharia basis for defying the Taliban emirate and suddenly attacking the US?  Was it worth ignoring the interests of the Taliban for the sake of a frivolous war?  Did Palestinians benefit from 9/11 when Sharon exploited it as a pretext to use excessive force in the Palestinian territories?  Did it help Iraqis?
  • The most troubling question has been: was the strike an attempt to escape the jihad’s setbacks that came in Egypt, Algeria, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Somalia at the end of the ’90s?  By provoking the enemy, was the intent to reunify the mujahids and mobilize the Muslim masses, as was done against the Soviets?
  • Most of these questions don’t matter anymore in light of revelations that the US wanted to invade Afghanistan and Iraq before 9/11 and that it wanted to do away with the Oslo Accords.
  • What can be said is that 9/11 forced the U.S. to use the worst means to carry out its pre-9/11 plans.
  • The purpose of this section is to examine the strategic motives for the 9/11 attack.
  • The USSR was the superior land power and the US was the superior naval power.  Similarly, in early Islamic times, Persia was the dominant land power and Byzantium was the dominant naval power.  Muslims defeated the Persians and the Byzantines because the two empires were exhausted from fighting each other.  Muslims ruled both the land and the sea for centuries until the Mongols invaded, controlling the land, and the crusaders invaded, controlling the seas.  Consequently, the caliphate in Baghdad was lost.  In modern times, naval and land powers also combined to defeat the Ottomans, destroying its caliphate.  When the mujahids helped defeated the USSR’s land power, the US moved in to fill the strategic gap and Muslims were not strong enough to stop them.
  • The US sought to control Eurasia to prevent a Russian resurgence and to maintain their global dominance (cites Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard and a statement by Halford Mackinder on the importance of controlling Eurasia).
  • During the breakup of the USSR, Muslims were used as a new tool to thwart post-communist Russia so that it couldn’t return to regional ascendancy.  It fell to the mujahids to confront the global power imbalance.  They had not liberated Afghanistan to see one hegemon be replaced by another.
  • This does not mean that al-Qaeda wants to fight all enemies at the same time.  They wish to neutralize some enemies before others.
  • The essence of the US’s problem is that it arrived at its global dominance prematurely, before it was capable of handling it, as the geographer Jamal Hamdan has argued.  Its body developed before its brain was capable of handling its new capabilities.
  • In the two years before 9/11, the US realized that it was becoming too economically dependent on the rest of the world.  But because it cut its military budget in the ’90s it did not have enough forces to protect its imperial economic interests.  Moreover, it had lost its ideological appeal in the eyes of other nations. (For these points, Abu al-Fadl cites Emmanuel Todd’s After the Empire.)
  • It is at this propitious moment that the planes struck in New York and Washington, revealing the face of American fascism when the US’s terrible retaliation began.
  • What happened on 9/11 was not an attempt to hurt the US economy, even if the strike caused enormous damage.  It was a symbolic, ideological strike that has accelerated the decline of America.

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 1: America & the World Before the Strike

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To continue the series, here’s my summary of part 1 of Abu al-Fadl’s study:

  • American strategy experts overlook the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan as the decisive event that ended the Cold War. Instead, they focus on the USSR’s and Eastern Europe’s attraction to Western culture. The myth promulgated by these experts is that soft power defeated the USSR without firing a single bullet. This is the myth of Western values that produce miracles.
  • This myth doesn’t explain the reason for putting nukes in Europe for half a century; the star wars program under Reagan; Brzezinski’s ingenious idea to destroy the USSR from the inside by breathing life into oppressed Islamic peoples; or why Reagan praised Afghan militants as freedom fighters.
  • As one of the preeminent neo-realists in American foreign policy, Stephen Walt, said, the Soviet withdrawal from the arena of conflict in the ’80s left the U.S. in a position of power unequaled since the days of Rome [quotes Walt’s 1999 article “Musclebound: The Limits of U.S. Power”]. But Walt also said that like the previous empires, the U.S. has found it difficult to manage so many local conflicts (Yugoslavia, Palestinian territories, etc).
  • In the ’90s, there was a debate over how to manage the world. Was it to be unipolar, with the U.S. imposing its will on everyone, or multi-polar, with countries ruling according to the logic of consensus, securing the interests of the many at the expense of the few.
  • Clinton faced “challenges of managing destructive chaos” after small fires ignited in what was called the “arc of crisis” and beyond. The Middle East was no longer considered the sole source of tension and unrest. The former USSR and Yugoslavia were also volatile.
  • China adopted a unique path by retaining communism but allying with the U.S. against the USSR. Rather than fighting the U.S., China flooded U.S. markets with cheap goods. Now it is one of America’s chief financiers.
  • Europeans moved toward greater political and economic integration, which also challenged the U.S. But the explosion in Yugoslavia reminded the European Union of its fragility.
  • Since the fall of the USSR, the Arab world has been totally dependent on the U.S. Consequently, Israel is now in a better position to cut deals with its neighbors.
  • After the descent of Afghanistan into chaos following the Soviet withdrawal, the U.S. and regional governments agreed to channel the Afghan Arabs toward more desirable arenas, like Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, and other countries that were experiencing difficulties in transitioning from one era to another; the one exception is Palestine, which is the international and Arab red line. In other words, the Afghan theater was not enough to annihilate the rebels fighting against regimes in the Arab and Islamic world [so they were sent to die elsewhere].
  • As for the Jihadi Movement that `Abd Allah `Azzam built in Afghanistan, it now revolves around a new star, Bin Laden. In 1996, he returned to Afghanistan and declared jihad on Americans.
  • His announcement came after a failed experiment in Sudan and that country’s collapse in the international arena; the destruction of the Salvation Front in Algeria because it was infiltrated; the Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s suspension of violence in Egypt; and the reconsiderations [i.e. renunciation of revolutionary violence] by some of the the historical leaders of the Islamic Group in Egypt. At this time, an ingenious idea was conceived: strike the remote enemy so that the near enemy would collapse since the far enemy [the U.S.] supported the near enemies [local regimes].
  • At this troubled time, full of dangers and opportunities, the foundation of the nucleus of jihad was reestablished and a strategic program was put in place for it.
  • U.S. public opinion relaxed considerably after the absence of an external enemy [the Soviets]. Not even Bush Sr. could convince people of the need to maintain a high level of spending on the military to deal with problems like North Korea and Yugoslavia. Thus, Clinton won in 1992 on the campaign slogan of “It’s the economy, stupid.”
  • To summarize, Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. used hard power–military power–to coerce the U.S.’s enemies and to frighten the rest. Clinton, on the other hand, believed in soft power, which is the extension of U.S. power through the non-violent mechanisms of globalization. Clinton’s preference for soft power explains his reluctance to get involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-1995. He withdrew from Somalia after an ambush on U.S. troops in Mogadishu. He resorted to bombing Iraq in Desert Fox; he did the same in Afghanistan and the Sudan in answer for the embassy bombings in 1998. After the Cole bombing in 2000, he did nothing. Finally, Clinton only used air power in 1999 under the banner of NATO to solve the Kosovo crisis.
  • In response to the softness of Clinton, the neocons put forward a study in Sept. 2000 called “Rebuilding America’s Defenses.” The basic idea was that the U.S. should use its unprecedented power to maintain its status as the lone superpower. The document recommended increasing the size of the army; preparing it to handle multiple conventional wars at a single time; modernizing and strengthening the U.S. nuclear arsenal to deal with different possibilities; preventing the spread of nuclear technology; and reviving star wars.
  • When Bush Jr. was narrowly elected, he and the neocons were on the verge of augmenting U.S. soft power with hard power in order to control the world. These were the circumstances before the attacks of 9/11.

Cold vs. Hot Terrorism

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Hesbah pundit `Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir has been writing a series of essays he collectively calls “Real War vs. Symbolic War.” The point of the essays is to explain the difference between terrorist attacks (symbolic war) and other types of military violence (real war).

One of his essays, “Cold Terrorism,” examines the decision-making of groups choosing between killing for the sake of eliminating enemies without drawing attention to themselves (cold terrorism) vs. killing to provoke a response against themselves (hot terrorism). The following quotes are from a recent English translation:

* Can we afford not to take the responsibility of the operation?

* Does the safety of the performers take precedence over the attack or otherwise?

* The ease of performing the operation and the available means

* Are we ready to tackle the retaliation of the enemy or not?

If the aim is to get rid of the enemy without looking on to any other goal then it is preferred to use cold terror.

As for if the aim is to terrorize the enemy only, then it is preferred to use hot terror, even though the security situation and the safety of the performers currently calls for the cold terror as it gives the performers the chance to retreat and escape.

Faqir concludes with some aphorisms on where hot and cold terrorism fit into real and symbolic war:

In the actual war, cold terror is used, as it helps us in avoiding the retaliation of the enemy and enables the performers to withdraw safely.

In the symbolic war, hot terror is used because it causes more stir and more terror and is more effective in the media.

In the actual war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is getting rid of it.

In the symbolic war, the reason behind attacking the enemy is to terrorize it.

Document (English): 9-3-08-ekhlaas-real-war-vs-symbolic-war cold vs hot terrorism

Training for the Lone Jihadi

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Ekhlaas member Dir` li-Man Wahada (Armor for One Who Was Alone) has written a brief guide for the Jihadi initiate to consult in preparation for the coming al-Qaeda strikes.  His purpose, he says, is to enumerate the general strategic framework of al-Qaeda so the initiate will be able to implement the organization’s vision locally, either by himself or in a small group.

The initiate must prepare himself in three respects: religiously, intellectually, and physically.

For the religious aspect, he must read:

  • تنبيه الراحل إلى أهم ما يحتاجه من المسائل (Informing the Traveler of the Most Important Issues He Needs to Know) by `Izz al-Din al-Maqdisi
  • حقيقة الحرب الصليبية الجديدة (The Reality of the New Crusader War) by Yusuf `Uyayri (or `Ayiri–have we decided yet?)
  • الباحث في حكم قتل أفراد وضباط المباحث (An Inquiry Into the Ruling of Death upon Soldiers and Officers of the Security Forces) by Faris Al al-Shuwayl al-Zahrani

For the intellectual and security aspect, he must read:

  • موسوعة أبي زبيدة الأمنية (The Security Encyclopedia of Abu Zubayda)
  • دعوة المقاومة الإسلامية العالمية (Call for the Global Islamic Resistance) by Abu Mus`ab al-Suri.  (“Reading the book will fill several weeks.  Don’t fail to complete it and don’t skip sections.”)

For physical preparation, the individual should at least do the following:

  • Exercise no less than three times a week for at least half an hour.  Beginners should join sports clubs.
  • Run outdoors at least once a week.
  • For those who can, swim on the days you are not exercising.
  • Avoid difficult exercises in the first few weeks to avoid injury.
  • Exercise less during Ramadan.

Dir` cautions those who take up this program to keep their Jihadi interests to themselves.  Dir` also acknowledges that some of the Jihadis think reading these books takes too much time; he counters that if they don’t know why they are fighting, they will merely be brigands.

This curriculum is similar in some respects to one we looked at in June.

Document (Arabic): 8-17-08-ekhlaas-how-individual-can-prepare-for-coming-jihadi-stages

New Issues of Two Jihadi Journals

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Issue 28 of Sada al-Jihad is out.  Articles include, “Hamas Responds Negatively to the Invitation of Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri” and “The Intellectual Pollution of the Followers of the Salafi-Jihadi Method.”

A new journal, Qadaya Jihadiyya (Jihadi Issues), has also be released.  The production quality is better than most of the Jihadi journals and the articles look interesting.  There is a “Strategic Issues” section, reminding me of Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi’s column in the Ansar journal.  It has two articles: “The Islamic State of Iraq and Early Signs of American Failure” and “Regional Alliances and the Path of Jihad.”  Another section, “Thoughts of a Mujahid,” has the memoir of someone who attended the al-Faruq training camp.

Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-faloja-issue-28-of-sada-al-jihad

Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-issue-1-of-qadaya-jihadiyya

Prophetic Precedents for Various Types of Warfare

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This one is for all those who believe that Jihadis act strictly according to the Qur’an and the Sunna.  It’s a detailed study by Abu al-Harith al-Ansari of the various types of warfare and the prophetic precedents for each.  There are 41 kinds in all, including “media warfare,” “economic warfare,” “secret warfare,” “war of attrition,” and so forth.  If you’ve ever needed to make the argument that Islamic scripture determines Jihadi behavior, this 278-page book is for you.

Of course, you’d still have a hard time explaining why a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq recently broke with the organization and renounced suicide attacks.

abu-al-harith-al-ansari-irshad-al-saul-ila-hurub-al-rasul إرشاد السؤول إلى حروب الرسول