chronicling the global jihad
So far, the Jihadi reaction to the strikes in Syria is not outrage against the U.S. but ridicule of Syria, who either colluded with the Americans (Hesbah) or is too weak to defend itself against external aggression (Faloja). I’ll let you know if I see anything else on the subject that’s interesting.
Document (Arabic): 10-27-08-hesbah-two-members-think-us-and-syria-coordinated-strike-in-syria
Document (Arabic): 10-26-08-faloja-reaction-to-us-strike-in-syria
Earlier this week, I noted that members of the Hesbah forum are increasingly pessimistic about Iraq. And in May I wrote about the death of Sulayman al-`Utaybi, an al-Qaeda leader in Iraq who had left for Afghanistan after his dismissal from his post. Here’s what I wrote at the time:
That he headed straight for Afghanistan makes me wonder if this is a sign of things to come as AQ gets squeezed out of Iraq.
Now the Washington Post gives us further evidence that Iraq is a sinking ship for al-Qaeda and Afghanistan is the lifeboat, at least for the senior leadership. Amit Paley has written a well-sourced article on the departure of Abu Ayyub al-Masri (aka Abu Hamza al-Muhajer), the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, for Afghanistan. Here’s what we learn from the article (sources in parentheses):
Foreign fighters
AQI Leadership
Route to Afghanistan
AQ Splinter Group
It’s not surprising that Iran is a transit point to Afghanistan (see my previous posts on the Harbi group from Kuwait) or that Masri is consulting with al-Qaeda Central (another nail in the “leaderless jihad” coffin). It’s also not surprising that AQI is losing support because its senior leadership decided to shit where it slept.
I am surprised that most of AQI’s material and human resources are so tightly coordinated by an AQ operative in Syria. The Sinjar data suggests that the flow is more decentralized.
What also stands out to me is that the AQI splinter group renounced suicide ops to distinguish itself from AQI, an interesting turn for those who see the adoption of suicide bombings as either a natural result of being a devout Muslim or the result of militant groups competing to outdo each other. In this case, competition is a factor, but it’s going the opposite direction.
In the final installment of the series, we’ll look at a piece of analysis from Ekhlaas member Abu Hamza 2005 titled, “A Modest Reading of al-Qaeda’s Strategy in the Levant [bilad al-sham]”. Abu Hamza begins by referring to Bin Laden’s 2007 statement, “To Our People in Iraq.” The statement, according to Abu Hamza, indicates that the Islamic State of Iraq is the nucleus of a future caliphate, but the caliphate will not be realized until the countries surrounding Iraq are defeated and Israel is destroyed. For this reason, Al-Qaeda “the Mother” (i.e. al-Qaeda Central) is very keen on expanding into the Levant and the other countries surrounding Israel. It also wants to establish branches in important global capitals, which can put pressure on foreign countries and scatter the focus of the enemy.
Abu Hamza says that he is certain that AQ cells are being created in the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Lebanon. Because of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s geographical proximity, ease of communication, and networks in these countries, it is in charge of overseeing the development of these cells. Abu Hamza also says that northern Sinai, in Egypt, is also very attractive for AQ, but he does not mention any links with AQI.
Abu Hamza argues that there have already been AQ ops in the countries surrounding Palestine:
– On 19 August 2005, 3 Katyusha rockets were launched from the Sinai toward Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba.
– On 28 December 2005, 10 rockets were launched from Lebanon at towns in northern Israel.
– On 20 February 2006, two Palestinians were charged with trying to carry out a suicide attack in the French Hill area of Jerusalem on behalf of the global jihad.
As for Lebanon, Abu Hamza believes that AQ Central would be silly to enter the Lebanese political game at this time. The Sunnis are not ready to support a group like al-Qaeda, as witnessed by the bad end of Fatah al-Islam in Nahir al-Barid. (Abu Hamza relates that some observers believe that Fatah al-Islam was seriously negotiating with AQ about becoming a formal affiliate before it was crushed.) Since the fight in Lebanon is part of a larger strategic conflict between US/Israel and Iran/Syria, an escalation of the conflict will ultimately benefit the local Sunni militants. So AQ will watch from afar until the situation in Lebanon escalates to the point that the local Sunni civilians militarize and incline toward AQ to protect themselves (à la Iraq). Until then, Iraq is AQ’s top priority because it is the key to liberating Palestine. Once the U.S. leaves Iraq, al-Qaeda will transfer its leadership there and shift its focus elsewhere.
I think Abu Hamza’s piece is appropriately titled since his estimation of AQ’s chances in the Levant are much more modest than the previous two items in the series. In this, he seems to be more in sync with Zawahiri, who has tried to play down expectations of an attack on Israel.
As for the bit about AQ branches being established in important global capitals, it supports the argument that AQ attacks in Europe and the U.S. are meant support the mother organization’s goals in the Middle East.
Document (Arabic): 5-18-08-ekhlaas-modest-reading-of-aq-strategy-in-levant
If you read Ekhlaas’ sign-in page that I posted yesterday, you already know that Bin Laden has released a new message. Like his message last week, the new one is inspired by the 60th anniversary of Israel, but this time it is directed to the Muslim community, not the West. Here’s a summary:
Muslims, Bin Laden argues, will only reclaim Palestine from the Jews by fighting, not compromising, since the only law that matters today is “the law of the predator.” To fight a wolf, you have to be a wolf.
Before the twentieth century, the Ottoman empire protected Palestine from the rapacious Crusaders, but then Arab leaders like Sharif Husayn and Abd al-Aziz Al al-Saud worked with the British to destroy the empire, which removed Palestine’s protection. Since then, Western proxies in the region have prevented Muslims from reclaiming Palestine.
To reverse this situation, Muslims need to follow the example of Saladin. He obeyed the Qur’anic command to fight against disbelievers; he consulted with religious scholars on the subject of jihad; he fought against local Muslim rulers who worked with the Crusaders; and finally, he did not get permission from his opponent to fight him.
In contrast, Arab leaders are removing the Qur’anic verses on fighting from academic curricula; they have co-opted the ulama and only allow them access to the media to denounce jihad against the U.S. and its allies; they collaborate with the Crusaders and call those who fight them “excommunicating Kharijites;” and finally, the religious scholars in Saudi, led by a former revivalist leader, have made jihad conditional on the permission of the Saudi government.
To those who object to Bin Laden’s thesis by asserting that Hezbollah is fighting the good fight, Bin Laden hints that Hezbollah’s leader, Nasrallah, is beholden to the Iranians; otherwise, why didn’t Hezbollah liberate Palestine in its war with Israel two years ago? It was merely a war of self-defense. The fact that Nasrallah allows Crusader forces (UN peacekeepers) to protect the Jews indicates that he is not serious.
Others might object that there have been several wars fought against Israel to liberate Palestine. Bin Laden counters that none of the past wars were serious, except for the ’73 war; even then, Sadat only wanted to recapture the Sinai from the Israelis, not liberate Palestine.
Today, Israel is weak and only survives by the support of the West and its surrogates in the region. If Israel had to face what the Soviets faced in Afghanistan against the mujahids, it would completely crumble. But since it is surrounded by surrogates of the West, there is no way to get to Palestine without fighting against them, whether they be governments or parties. This will involve killing people who profess to be Muslims, just as Saladin did in order to liberate Jerusalem.
Several interesting things to note: First, Bin Laden is very bothered by the recent counter-ideology campaign of Arab governments in the Middle East, which consists of curricula reform, criticism by prominent religious scholars, condemnatory religious labels, and former Jihadi clerics in Saudi giving the right to declare jihad to the Saudi government. This last is an allusion to Salman al-Awda, who blasted Bin Laden in an open letter last Ramadan for bringing harm to the Muslim world.
Second, Bin Laden’s complaints about the media giving a platform to his clerical critics are part of a larger beef that Jihadis are having with the Arab media. Bin Laden echoes a popular sentiment in Jihadi circles when he says that the media is deliberately “trying to disfigure (the image of) the mujahids and weaken them.”
Third, the declaration that the Jihadis must fight their way through the surrounding countries to get to the occupied territories tallies with what Zawahiri said in a private letter to Zarqawi: expel the U.S. from Iraq, set up an emirate there, move to the neighboring countries, and then finally attack Israel. This puts Lebanon and Syria high on the list of new Jihadi theaters after the U.S. leaves Iraq.
Fourth, Bin Laden’s dismissal of Nasrallh and Hezbollah plays well to his Jihadi base, which hates the Shia, but it is poor politics given how popular Hezbollah and Nasrallah are in the region.
Document (Arabic): 5-18-08-ekhlaas-bin-laden-message