ji·had·ica

Maqdisi Composes Elegy for Zarqawi

Zarqawi’s spiritual mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, composed an elegy for his deceased disciple soon after his death.  Although the two fell out over Zarqawi’s brutal tactics in Iraq, Maqdisi still has a soft spot for him.  The elegy, “The Dove Cried and the Swords Wept,” is recited by Maqdisi and has been released online for the first time via the Shumukh forum. For those of you that don’t know Maqdisi, he rated as the most-cited Jihadi alive in the study I conducted for West Point. Document (Arabic): 9-20-08-shamikh-abu-muhammad-maqdisi-elegy-for-zarqawi

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The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 5: The Jihadi Domino Theory

Continuing… Why did al-Qaeda attack the U.S.?  Was it to drive the U.S. out of the Middle East?  Or was it to strike the far enemy for the sake of destroying the near enemy (i.e. regimes in the Arab and Islamic world)? Regardless of the intent of al-Qaeda’s leaders, the sequence of events gives weight to the second possibility, which could also be termed the Domino Scenario. According to a 2007 article by George Friedman, Bin Laden saw a rare opportunity after the fall of the USSR to begin re-establishing the worldwide caliphate.  But, says Friedman, armed groups can’t establish empires.  They can, however, seize a state and use it to begin to establish an empire.  UBL realized that Afghanistan wasn’t the ideal place for this because of its geographical position and its weakness. Based on Zawahiri’s pre-9/11 writings, Friedman believes that UBL wanted to topple local regimes and replace

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Issue 2 of Qadaya Jihadiyya Released

Like last month’s debut, the second issue of Qadaya Jihadiyya is slick.  It also has a lot of interesting material: “Crisis of Terminology” discusses the contentious meanings of “Salafi” and “Jihadi.” The strategic studies section has three articles: “Seven Years After September, Has al-Qaeda Achieved Its Goals?”, “Bin Laden and the Globalization of Jihad,” and “The Effect of the New York and Washington Attacks on Many Youth in Groups in Palestine.” “The Jihadi Media Uncovers the Falseness of the American Empire.”  The article surveys the developments in jihadi media, particularly online, and Western responses. In addition to the article above on Palestinian youth, there is an article on fasting in Gaza.  This, coupled with the pictures of slain Hamas leaders on the last page, indicate that the journal is being produced by someone in the Palestinian territories or Jordan.  Perhaps a younger member of the Qassam Brigades. One final note:

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Closure of Forums Breeds Paranoia, Carpetbaggers

The online Jihadi community continues to roil after some of its most prominent forums were shut down (still no word on who did it).  The most important of them, Ekhlaas, has totally evaporated and pleas for new links go unanswered. The closure of the forums has understandably bred paranoia among the membership, who are filling less-trafficked forums to await news of Ekhlaas’ reopening.  Members of one of these forums, Faloja, were overjoyed several days ago when someone posted an Ekhlaas link that worked.  But problems with the sign-in page led to speculation that the new site is a trap.  Wiser members are counseling others to wait until links are posted on Hesbah, the most exclusive of the JIhadi sites. Some Jihadis see the site closures as an opportunity to recruit members for their own forums.  One, Khalid al-`Asqalani (also of Faloja), has repeatedly interrupted discussions of Ekhlaas’ demise to post

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How Online Recruitment Works

In a feeble attempt to live up to Jihadica’s new billing as the “most dangerous” website monitoring Jihadis online, I thought I’d post some thoughts on what role Jihadi forums play in recruitment and radicalization. The usual characterization of online recruitment goes like this: some hapless Sunni Muslim starts poking around online, discovers Jihadi propaganda, and upon watching or reading it becomes radicalized and ready to fight. It is certainly the case that some Sunni Muslims see or read online Jihadi propaganda about Muslim suffering at the hands of the West and decide they need to do something about it.  Why some respond and not others is a complicated issue that I won’t deal with here.  What I’m interested in is the mechanics of the propaganda’s delivery and how its effects are sustained. Firstly, we don’t have a lot of examples of Muslims who were radicalized online and remained radicalized

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Attacks in Yemen: Claimant May Be Lying

[Gregory D. Johnsen] Details are still coming in about this morning’s attack on the US Embassy in Yemen, and it will likely be a couple of days before a complete and accurate picture of the attack can be drawn. But in my conversations very early this morning what seems to be clear is that the attack involved at least two separate car bombs and came very close to succeeding on a much more spectacular level. Even at this early stage it is important to note a couple of things. The attack, while shocking, was not necessarily unexpected. On August 19, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: The Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen posted its 13th statement to al-Ikhlas. The statement threatened attacks in retaliation for the death of Hamza al-Q‘uyati, who was killed along with four of his comrades in a raid on an al-Qaeda safe house in the eastern city of

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Cyber attack and Ineptitude Delay Release of al-Qaeda 9/11 Video

Major Jihadi forums have been down for almost a week now, which ruined al-Qaeda’s release of its 9/11 anniversary video.  The video is now out, but those who prepared it for distribution included the wrong password and it probably won’t be until tomorrow that the problem is corrected.  Even when it finally sees the light of day, viewing it will be very anticlimactic. My hat off to whomever succeeded in removing Ekhlaas, et al.   The usual suspects (the good Doctor and the Haganaut) have denied involvement and I believe them.  Still, whoever did it knew what they were doing, beyond technical proficiency–they targeted the right forums at the right time.  As a gauge of the attack’s effectiveness, look at how many days it’s taken to get the message out and how clumsily it’s been distributed.   If these attacks continue, al-Qaeda will have to find other means of distribution or stop

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The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 4: The Strategy of Laudable Terrorism

Continuing… The meaning of “terrorism” is extremely contentious. Terrorism is a type of political violence.  Western researchers say that political violence is of four types: violence between states, state violence against its citizens, violence between individuals, and the violence of citizens against the state. State violence against citizens is of two kinds: violence to compel obedience to laws and extrajudicial violence to compel political opponents to submit. The most common form of violence between citizens is criminal acts that have no political motive.  Other types can be social or political, like ethnic or ideological violence. The violence of citizens against a state can be organized or spontaneous.  The latter may not have political goals.  But organized violence against the state is classified as a rebellion that aims to overthrow the government.  The forms that these rebellions take reflect different strategies. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are usually used synonymously because they

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Issue 53 of Jannat Released

Issue 53 of Jannat is out. Most of the articles are screeds against Hamas, but there is some news from Jihadi fronts like Afghanistan, Iraq, Daghistan, and Somalia. Like previous issues of Jannat, the layout is horrible. Below is a picture of Jihadis from the Caucasus that graces this issue. If I’d seen it without the Arabic, I would have sworn it was a group of guys from my home state of South Carolina (if the bearded one on the left makes you doubt my assertion, you haven’t attended a college in South Carolina). Document (Arabic): 9-8-08-shamikh-issue-53-of-jannat-announced

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The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 3: Striking the Enemy at the Center of Gravity

Continuing… It is no accident that the World Trade Center was the main object of the 9/11 attacks since it was the symbol of U.S. economic hegemony. Bear in mind that the attacks had been planned in the ’90s during the height of U.S. economic power. The strikes were meant to polarize Muslims as well as the enemy’s population. They were also intended to push the U.S. into overreacting and committing errors. Why didn’t all four strikes on 9/11 hit the Pentagon alone? Why did al-Qaeda attack civilians and the WTC? We need a new strategic framework to understand its reasoning. Three things needs to be considered. First, when the U.S. attacks a country, it abides by the principle of the ends justify the means. This is one of the foundational principles of American pragmatism. Studies that came out after 9/11 really brought this mindset to the fore. But, according

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