Al-Qaida, however, has a problem in taking this pro-Hamas stand. This is that some of the key jihadi ideologues who have long supported al-Qaida, and who command a certain following within al-Qaida’s global network, are deeply uncomfortable with it. The most noteworthy of these is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), the Palestinian-Jordanian scholar whose many books, essays, and fatwas have profoundly shaped the ideological complexion of the jihadi movement, or “the jihadi current” (al-tayyar al-jihadi) as it is most commonly known in Arabic, going back to the 1980s. Al-Maqdisi has long served as something of the jihadi movement’s ideological standard-bearer, ensuring conformity with Salafi doctrinal principles that emphasize strict monotheism (tawhid) and condemnation and denunciation of all that goes again it, from supplicating saints at tombs to democracy and nationalism and failure to rule by God’s law.

Unlike in previous years when al-Maqdisi used social media accounts and wrote frequently online, over the past year or so his social media usage and his writing have been restricted by the Jordanian authorities. Even so, a number of his messages have appeared online since October 7, and for the most part these have comprised severe criticism of al-Qaida. While al-Maqdisi is not as categorically anti-Hamas as the Islamic State, he has no tolerance for what he sees as al-Qaida’s unprincipled stand of all-out support for the Palestinian militant group, a stand that he sees as representing al-Qaida’s ongoing ideological evolution toward a more generic kind of Islamism. These concerns of al-Maqdisi go to the heart of what al-Qaida is trying to become in the present moment as it repositions itself as the more “moderate” alternative to the Islamic State—and the challenge that this intended makeover entails.

Hamas between al-Qaida and al-Maqdisi

The Islamic State, to reiterate, has nothing positive to say about Hamas whatsoever. Back in January, the Islamic State’s official spokesman urged Hamas to “correct your path,” arguing that its “recent battle in Gaza” was not about “achieving the unity of God and making His word supreme” but rather about “the dirt and the land.” He went on to fault Hamas for failing to implement the Sharia in Gaza and for allying itself with Shiite Iran’s “axis of resistance,” noting that the “expansionary designs” of the “Rejectionists” (i.e., the Shia) are no less a threat to the Muslims than “the conspiracies and enmities of the Jews and the Crusaders.” The only way for Hamas to be worthy of the Islamic State’s support, in other words, was for it to abandon the resistance axis and transform itself into an extension of the Islamic State.

Al-Qaida has also in the past condemned Hamas, but never so severely and never to the point of outright excommunication (takfir). In 2006 al-Qaida’s approach turned negative when Hamas pivoted from being principally a terrorist militia to being a political group as well. That year Hamas participated in the Palestinian legislative elections, and al-Qaida responded by condemning it for participating in these “polytheistic assemblies” and effectively recognizing the Oslo Accords. In 2007 Osama bin Laden famously stated that Hamas had “forsaken their religion.”

Al-Maqdisi was even more critical of Hamas in this period, writing extensively about its perceived transgressions from its embrace of the “polytheistic” religion of democracy to its failure to implement the Sharia in Gaza (after Hamas’s takeover there in 2007) and the nationalism underlying its jihad, among other things. More broadly he critiqued Hamas for not adhering to the correct path or methodology (manhaj), meaning the ideological path associated with the jihadi movement, or Jihadi Salafism, with its emphasis on tawhid and its commitment to overthrowing the “apostate” rulers of the Islamic world.

It was in this context that al-Maqdisi came into conflict with the al-Qaida commander Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (d. 2010), who in a 2009 interview casually stated that “we and Hamas share the same thinking and the same manhaj.” Al-Maqdisi responded with a 20-page rebuttal setting out all the ways in which Hamas did not adhere to “the manhaj of the Jihadi Salafi current” (manhaj al-tayyar al-salafi al-jihadi). Abu al-Yazid duly issued a correction, explaining that he had misspoken (“the phrase was not precise”) and clarifying that al-Qaida’s position is one of distinguishing between the political wing of Hamas, which is deeply flawed, and Hamas’s military wing (i.e., the al-Qassam Brigades), which merits support as mujahidin fighting a shared enemy. Al-Maqdisi has sometimes indicated his agreement with this distinction between the political and the military wings of Hamas, though he has never been entirely comfortable with it. In any event, the episode with Abu al-Yazid demonstrated the kind of ideological authority that al-Maqdisi wielded within al-Qaida circles at this time. In recent years, however, this has changed, with al-Maqdisi finding himself critiquing what he sees as al-Qaida’s ideological drift and al-Qaida only drifting further.

In 2021, for instance, during an earlier round of conflict between Israel and Hamas, al-Maqdisi rebuked al-Qaida’s official media agency, al-Sahab, for its statement mourning the death of a Hamas senior military commander. He framed his criticism as though reflecting the concerns of a great many erstwhile supporters of al-Qaida. “Many mujahid brothers, shaykhs, and preachers,” he wrote,

were displeased by the al-Sahab statement’s exaltation of the al-Qassam leader who was killed in the recent war in Gaza, and they wondered astonishedly: “Are our brothers not aware of the deviation of Hamas and its leadership from the path of tawhid in favor of the path of democracy, and of their alignment with Hizb al-Lat [i.e., Hizbullah] and Bashar [al-Asad] and Iran?” … Has the manhaj changed?! Have the ranks of al-Qaida been penetrated by those who pay no heed to the purity of the manhaj?”

This was a major escalation in al-Maqdisi’s occasional criticism of al-Qaida, which had earlier included reprimanding the group for mourning the late President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt. For the first time, al-Maqdisi had accused al-Qaida of turning its back on the jihadi manhaj that he and others had worked so hard to construct. Al-Qaida was from his perspective trying to remake itself into a more pan-Islamist group that could appeal to the global Muslim community, or umma, more broadly, and this meant dispensing with the jihadi manhaj and all its ideological strictures. Since October 7, al-Maqdisi’s concerns about al-Qaida have only grown greater.

Early reactions

Al-Qaida would waste little time in publishing a statement of support for the Hamas operation. On October 13, the al-Qaida senior leadership, or “general command,” issued a statement titled “But Surely God’s Help is Nigh” (Q. 2:214) in which it hailed the October 7 attack as “one of the most courageous of heroic acts in Islam in this modern time,” and “one of the most important Islamic strides that will lead to the liberation of all the land of Palestine.” Addressing “the knights of Palestine,” the statement declared that “your brothers in al-Qaida, and all the righteous mujahidin worldwide, stand together with you in a single column, in the same trench of battle.” It further called on Muslims around the world to wage jihad against the Jews and their allies, announcing that “we are upon a great transformation in the path of global jihad.”

The October 13 statement was followed at the month’s end by the first essay in a series by Sayf al-‘Adl, al-Qaida’s presumptive leader since the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri in summer 2022. Writing under the pseudonym Salim al-Sharif, al-‘Adl heaped similar praise on the October 7 operation, portraying it as a strategic marvel that heralded the beginning of the end for the Jewish state. Despite the pain and destruction now being visited upon the people of Gaza, he wrote, the operation was nonetheless necessary in order to achieve the ultimate objective of driving the Jews from Palestine. It would further have the effect of lifting the morale of the umma and of the Muslims of the Middle East in particular, leading them “to revolt against their kings and emirs and presidents” who had done nothing over the years to restore Muslim rule in Palestine. With these two statements, al-Qaida was practically claiming October 7 as its own, portraying the attack as both a part of and in furtherance of al-Qaida’s jihad against the standing regimes of the Middle East.

Al-Maqdisi’s initial reaction was somewhat out of character. Rather than polemicizing against Hamas, he counseled restraint in condemning it at this sensitive time. In a comment relayed via Telegram on October 12, he expressed exasperation at receiving numerous inquiries about his earlier writings concerning Hamas. “I have been troubled by the brothers’ repeated questioning concerning our previous well-known statements about Hamas at this time,” he wrote, suggesting that this was not the moment for dredging up this material. At the present time, he continued, “it is obligatory to work to support Gaza and its people by any means possible, by the hand and by the tongue and by beseeching God to support the people of Gaza over the nations of unbelief who have rallied against them,” and it is further obligatory “to avoid all that might be seen as forsaking [the people of Gaza] at this time.” This moratorium on Hamas-bashing was bound to be brief.

Al-Maqdisi’s next comments on Hamas came in an issue of the jihadi magazine al-Mahajja, which appeared on November 6. In his article, titled “Proud Gaza and the al-Aqsa Flood: Studies and Lessons,” he began by praising October 7, saying that “there is no believer of true faith in this world who did not feel joy at the al-Aqsa Flood operation.” Yet this praise soon was shown to be backhanded, as in the very same paragraph al-Maqdisi described Hamas’s jihad as “marked by corruption” as he pondered “what would be the case were it a jihad in the path of God and in the path of applying His law on earth, as our Lord wishes and desires?” From here he proceeded to reaffirm his earlier criticisms “of the deviations of Hamas and its government,” saying that no military operation, no matter how great, can erase these transgressions. “The crime of neglecting the Sharia,” he wrote,

is not erased but by applying it; the sin of democracy is not erased but by dissociating from it; the veneration and adulation of the worst Rejectionist criminals and the showing of loyalty to the murderers of the Sunnis such as [Qasim] Sulaymani and his state and their satanic ayatollahs are not erased but by dissociating from them; and the praising and burnishing of Bashar [al-Asad], murderer of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, rapist of women, and destroyer of lands and persons, are not erased but by dissociating from him and his criminal regime.

Al-Maqdisi went on to note that it was the Hamas government that had instituted a “truce” with Israel in the first place, stifling the efforts of the smaller militant groups in Gaza, including the “Jihadi Salafi” ones, from making war on the Jewish state.

Here was al-Maqdisi returning to form. Whatever reservations he had about criticizing Hamas in the immediate aftermath of October 7 were gone. As al-Maqdisi announced of himself:

I am not one who is deceived by that which is not real, who goes out beating the drum for Hamas and dressing it up and beautifying it, with all its vices and faults, because of a raid it successfully carried out. In this way are people misled and their creed diluted. A great many shaykhs and groups have ridden the wave of this flood such that they have nearly drowned their followers in the misconceptions of innovative groups and ensnared them in contradictions! As if all the grave offenses that the Hamas government has committed and continues to commit are excused so long as it is fighting Jews! As if fighting Jews has become an impediment to condemnation and to takfir!

The criticism of certain unspecified “shaykhs” and “groups” here no doubt encompassed al-Qaida with its statement of unqualified pro-Hamas sentiment.  

Al-Maqdisi’s frustration with al-Qaida became even clearer in his next public remarks concerning Hamas. In this brief commentary, relayed via Telegram on November 15, he argued that there was a major difference between calling on God to support a flawed Islamic group such as Hamas and “misleading the umma” by endorsing it and exaggerating its merits. The former was perfectly in accordance with the Sharia, but the latter was not. Indeed, to take the latter course was “to destroy all that we have built before of doctrinal fortresses examining the deviation of those who fight in the path of democracy and rule by manmade laws.” “What the jihadi organizations and shaykhs are doing today,” he continued, naming al-Qaida, “is precisely this destruction and annihilation of the edifice that they had previously erected,” a structure that was built to show “the falsity of democracy and the blameworthiness of governments that refuse to apply the Sharia.” Al-Qaida and certain unnamed scholars, al-Maqdisi was thus saying, were “misleading the umma” and “destroying” the ideological edifice of Jihadi Salafism. This was heavy criticism indeed.

“Don’t ride a wave that isn’t yours”

It was not till early January 2024 that al-Maqdisi’s next words concerning al-Qaida and Hamas appeared online. What seems to have prompted him to write at this stage was the release by al-Qaida the previous month of a short video featuring footage of Hamas fighters squaring off against Israeli forces. The video, based on an earlier newsletter from November, urged Muslims to join the battle alongside “the heroes” of October 7 by waging jihad against the “Zionist” Arab regimes of the Middle East, in particular “Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon.” Once again, al-Qaida was presenting Hamas’s war on Israel and the regional agenda of al-Qaida as part of the same general jihad. Another al-Qaida media product from December did even more to portray Hamas and al-Qaida as being in perfect alignment. This was a newsletter released at the end of the month presenting the “the blessed al-Aqsa Flood operation” as the successor to 9/11, and predicting that this “the second September 11” would inevitably lead to “the third September 11.” Notably, the newsletter suggested that the perpetrators of this third 9/11 might even be “non-Muslims,” given how widespread the anger at America in the West had become.

These attempts by al-Qaida to blur the distinction between Hamas’s and al-Qaida’s strategic agendas did not sit well with al-Maqdisi. In an essay published on Justpaste.it on January 8 and shared by followers on X and Telegram, he warned al-Qaida against trying to insert itself into a war it had no business being a part of. Hamas, he explained, “adheres to a Muslim Brotherhood, Islamo-democratic manhaj, it rules according to manmade laws, and it does not fight to establish God’s law!” Implicitly addressing al-Qaida, only later identified by name, he wrote, “You are simply not a part of its [Hamas’s] direction … [and] you haven’t the least participation or say in its vital decisions.” Indeed, Hamas could end this war at any time on the orders of its foreign patrons and without consulting you. The Hamas leadership “disagrees with you in the foundations of belief (usul), not just in the branches (furu‘). You and they are not aligned either in direction or in means or in objectives.” The “Rejectionists” of Iran and Hezbollah are the more natural allies of them. “Therefore,” he concluded, “your enthusiasm for them [Hamas], and your words and your statements about them, as though you are speaking on their behalf, is to be considered fake wailing. Truly, your drumbeating for them without concern for their methodology is a mixture of stupidity and naiveté and foolishness.”

It was at this point that al-Maqdisi finally mentioned al-Qaida by name, noting the fact that it

has begun to draw in its videos from the videos of Hamas’s fighters in order to talk about the global jihad that the Hamas of the Resistance dissociates from, and indeed considers to be terrorism, or to incite through the clips of the al-Qassam fighters against idolatrous rulers and regimes that Hamas is loyal to in the first place! … So long as you have wasted the milk in the summer and have not prepared for this day in terms of men and capabilities and damaging targets, then don’t ride a wave that isn’t yours, and don’t beat the drum and dance to songs that don’t suit you.

Not only was al-Maqdisi calling out al-Qaida’s “stupidity and naiveté and foolishness” in showering praise on Hamas and misrepresenting its loyalties and strategic aims, but he was also calling out al-Qaida’s irrelevance on the Palestinian scene, as an actor that had not mobilized and prepared for battle there. Simply put, this attempt at annexing Hamas’s war with Israel to al-Qaida’s global jihad was disingenuous nonsense.

This was not to say that the only appropriate course of action was for al-Qaida, or other jihadis, to sit the war in Gaza out. But to the extent that one participated, al-Maqdisi counseled, one ought to have a clear-eyed view of what Hamas is and where one fits within the Hamas-dominated battle. “In the event that you must participate,” he wrote, “then participate as one who has become involved in a battle over which one exercises no control, but in which one sees a benefit for the Muslims and through which one aspires to an awakening of the umma and an igniting of the burning coal of jihad.” In other words, participation in Hamas’s jihad against Israel was allowed, but only participation in a supporting role aimed at “an awakening of the umma.”

This was not the only comment by al-Maqdisi to appear on January 8. A second essay, titled “The Spittle of the Stricken One,” also circulated on Telegram that day, though initially without attribution to al-Maqdisi—indeed with a deliberate attempt to mislead as to his authorship by referring to him in the third person. The writing, however, was unmistakably al-Maqdisi’s, and the attribution was soon clarified when reposted by a follower days later. Here al-Maqdisi presented the current controversy surrounding Hamas as the third “tribulation” (fitna) to afflict the jihadi movement in a series of fitnas beginning with that of the Islamic State (too extreme) and that of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (too lax). He reminded readers of what Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had said about Hamas’s deviations and pointed to his own older statements as well, asserting that Hamas is still Hamas—“a deviant and innovative nationalist group.” “We can take pleasure in their fighting the Jews,” he wrote, “just as we take pleasure in any innovative group’s fighting the Jews, but without endorsing it and deceiving and misleading people concerning its manhaj.” Rehashing many of the criticisms in the previous essay from the same day, al-Maqdisi concluded with the following admonition: “Do not mislead the umma, do not forsake your principles, and do not turn away from your manhaj or corrupt your compass!” These words, one can safely assume, were directed first and foremost at al-Qaida.

Dr. Tariq and al-Qaida’s “end”

Since January, no new writings by al-Maqdisi have appeared online, even as al-Qaida has continued to release statements and essays supportive of Hamas. Al-Maqdisi’s criticisms of al-Qaida, however, continue to circulate and reverberate on jihadi Telegram, and other ideologues of his ilk have made similar al-Qaida-critical comments. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these is the Canadian-based Egyptian jihadi ideologue Tariq ‘Abd al-Halim (b. 1948).

In April, Tariq, who holds a Ph.D. in engineering from the University of Birmingham, called attentiom to a statement issued by al-Qaida on April 22 offering condolences for Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau in Qatar, on the death of several of his children and grandchildren in an Israeli strike in Gaza. This statement seemed to be a departure from al-Qaida’s previous stance of distinguishing between Hamas’s political and military wings, as here it was saluting Hamas’s political leader as “the honorable shaykh”—twice.

On April 24, Tariq re-published al-Maqdisi’s essay “The Spittle of the Stricken One” on his Telegram channel, preceded by the words “The statement of the Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” as if to suggest that this was a response to al-Qaida. Minutes later, Tariq offered some critical commentary of his own, lamenting al-Qaida’s descent into ideological disorder and organizational impotence. “There is no doubt that al-Qaida,” he wrote, “following the martyrdom of its two pioneers,” meaning Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, “has passed into a state of manifest instability, confusion, and waywardness, as is perhaps apparent in its recent statement concerning the family members of Ismail Haniyeh who were assassinated by the hand of Zionist treachery.” Without elaborating, he attributed this “drumbeating” by al-Qaida for Hamas to Sayf al-‘Adl’s father-in-law, Mustafa Hamid, whom he described as carrying on close relations with Iran (where he and al-‘Adl both reside) and as the one in control of the al-Sahab media agency. As for al-Qaida’s health as an organization with real-world influence, Tariq offered a grim prognosis: “Perhaps the organization’s role on the ground has come to an end with the demise of its two pioneers.”

Surely al-‘Adl and his colleagues in the al-Qaida leadership see things differently. For them it is the exclusivist ideology promoted by the likes of Tariq and al-Maqdisi that has run its course, not al-Qaida. In the present global environment, which is witnessing an unprecedented spike in anti-American sentiment driven by Washington’s continued support for Israel, the optimal course is to put exclusivist ideology aside and to unite the umma around al-Qaida’s strategy of attacking the United States as the source of the Islamic world’s ills.

Whether al-Qaida is wisely repositioning itself for future success, or whether its self-transformation reflects profound confusion and impotence, is a question that can only be answered in time. The U.S. intelligence community has been adamant that al-Qaida, at least in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is at its weakest point in decades and is unlikely to see a revival. That assessment would seem to support Tariq’s view that al-Qaida central may well have reached its end point as a force on the ground.

In any event, what is clear beyond doubt is that al-Qaida’s pan-Islamic turn has grown increasingly visible since October 7, alienating some of the organization’s big-name scholarly proponents as never before. The controversy over Hamas and al-Qaida points to a crisis of identity on the non-Islamic State side of the global jihadi movement.

During these months of negotiations, al-Libi had been in charge of carrying out the talks with al-Zarqawi and his group on behalf of al-Qa‘ida. Yet, al-Libi still had to report and answer to his two bosses, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Given that Bin Ladin was particularly difficult to contact at this time, al-Libi turned to al-Zawahiri for guidance during the process, even as he chose to ignore some of al-Zawahiri’s concerns, including the latter’s disapproval of al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda. However, the Libyan would eventually brief Bin Ladin about all the details of the negotiation, including the correspondence with al-Zarqawi’s group, in a message written a day after the merger was proclaimed.

Al-Libi’s letter to Bin Ladin, the most detailed account of the negotiation process that we have, was discussed in the first installment of this series. What remains to be addressed here is the subsequent reactions of the top two al-Qa‘ida leaders, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, to the merger. Once again, the Abbottabad files offer insights. On October 20, 2004, al-Zawahiri penned a missive to Bin Ladin—saved as “Risala li-l-Hizbar” (Letter to the Lion) in Bin Ladin’s archives—in which he provided his account of the merger and outlined the internal divisions al-Qa‘ida was facing as it came to terms with al-Zarqawi. Nearly two months later, on December 9, 2004, Bin Ladin responded to al-Libi’s and al-Zawahiri’s letters in a message to which he attached several other documents.

Al-Qa‘ida’s Internal Squabbles

In his message to Bin Ladin, Abu al-Faraj al-Libi was clearly concerned by the upcoming dispatch of al-Qa‘ida’s senior military leader, ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, to al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. Al-Libi portrayed al-Iraqi as a divisive figure at the heart of “the problems” al-Qa‘ida was going through at the time, noting that some within the Waziristan-based jihadi milieu pointed to al-Iraqi to justify not allying with Bin Ladin’s men. According to al-Libi, these internal tensions had “significantly decreased” with the Egyptian Khalid al-Habib taking over al-Qa‘ida’s military affairs portfolio from al-Iraqi and the popular field commander Abu al-Layth al-Libi joining forces with the organization in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Al-Zawahiri’s October 2004 letter to Bin Ladin substantiates al-Libi’s account about the organization’s internal squabbles, admitting that “some problems” were persisting within its senior ranks, including with al-Iraqi. “The affairs of ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi] have been in a state of struggle, as he has admitted to me”, al-Zawahiri writes, pointing to the “problems” and “conflict” between the Iraqi and Shaykh Sa‘id al-Misri (“al-Qari”), a founding member of al-Qa‘ida who would later become its general manager. “Each of them is complaining to me, but I am far away and all I can do is send letters at infrequent intervals”, al-Zawahiri laments. As is apparent from the letter, al-Iraqi was also quarreling with Hamza al-Jawfi, a senior Egyptian explosives trainer and weapons supplier whose strained relations with al-Iraqi had led him to stop working with al-Qa‘ida. Al-Jawfi, al-Zawahiri explained, “claimed that the problem was with ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi] and that he was waiting for his departure” before going back to the fold. With al-Iraqi’s demotion, al-Jawfi expressed “his commitment” to resuming his cooperation with al-Qa‘ida.

For al-Zawahiri, however, it was al-Libi, not al-Iraqi, who was the primary troublemaker in al-Qa‘ida’s hierarchy. “Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi] has been reckless and has exposed himself to hazards repeatedly”, al-Zawahiri wrote to Bin Ladin, adding that al-Libi had “caused a large problem with his continued absence that is nearly constant” as the Libyan “moves about frequently”. Over the past year, al-Libi had been mainly based in Abbottabad inside Pakistan while al-Iraqi and the bulk of al-Qa‘ida’s leaders operated from South Waziristan in Pakistan’s tribal areas. “I emphasized to Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi] that he must stick close to the location of ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi]”, al-Zawahiri stated, “because his leaving is dangerous and could lead to numerous problems”. Yet, “neither giving advice nor giving direct orders has diverted him from his path”, he complained. The Libyan’s “continued absence” ended up leaving “affairs and responsibilities unclear” and “things proceeding in an undisciplined manner” inside al-Qa’ida, notably causing the “conflict” between al-Iraqi and Shaykh Sa‘id. “I have exhausted all avenues with Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi]”, al-Zawahiri lamented, urging Bin Ladin to “issue a clear order to him [i.e., al-Libi] that he keep to a reliable location, such as the locations of ‘Abd al-Hadi, and leave the cities”, as staying inside urban Pakistani areas was deemed too dangerous.

Mindful of his lieutenants’ grievances, Bin Ladin authored a seven-page document saved as “al-Shura” (Consultation), which he attached to his December 2004 letter. An updated version of a missive written “a long time ago”, the “al-Shura” document aimed at resolving al-Qa‘ida’s internal turmoil by charting a framework regulating command-and-control and duties within the organization. In setting all this out, Bin Ladin firmly stood by his decision to appoint al-Libi as al-Qa‘ida’s “general manager” and reaffirmed his confidence in his young Libyan commander. “I consider you apt to manage the work under these circumstances”, Bin Ladin assured al-Libi, adding that the latter should not be “embarrassed because of the other brothers who had previous experience in the jihad or are older than he is”. Well-aware of the criticism around al-Libi’s leadership, Bin Ladin wanted to make very clear to the “senior brothers” in the Af-Pak region that “the author of these lines [i.e., Bin Ladin] is the one who appointed Tawfiq [i.e., al-Libi] as the overall head for all the al-Qa‘ida brothers”, thereby making al-Libi “the most senior official in the [Af-Pak] area”.

On the other hand, Bin Ladin took al-Zawahiri’s admonishment of al-Libi’s operational security recklessness very seriously. Consequently, the leader of al-Qa‘ida, in one of the attachments to his main letter, directed al-Libi to undertake his activities “using letters and very few couriers” and to “refrain from moving around unless there is a dire need [to do so]”, underlining that this was “an obligatory order and is not subject to discussion”. Further, in his “al-Shura” document, Bin Ladin reminded his Libyan lieutenant that his critics were not nobodies, advising him to “always remember that the respected brothers whose names were mentioned have good past experiences in the jihad”. The al-Qa‘ida leader went on to praise al-Zawahiri as “the cream of the crop of what was left from the mujahidin during these past decades” and instructed al-Libi to “increase your consultation with him and take his opinion, in addition to the fact that he is the deputy of the overall emir”. As for the “virtuous” Shaykh Sa‘id, another player in the group’s discord, Bin Ladin suggested that, “if possible”, al-Libi should “make friends with him, without him trespassing your privileges”. In sum, Bin Ladin wanted al-Libi to play ball for the organization’s sake by getting along with the other leaders. At the same time, Bin Ladin instructed him, “go forward and do not look back and do not hesitate, even if some people would talk [negatively] about you”.

With regard to the contentious case of al al-Iraqi, Bin Ladin weighed in in favor of his detractors, headed by al-Libi, whose complaints had been voiced in the Libyan’s October 2004 letter. First, Bin Ladin validated al-Libi’s decision to demote al-Iraqi as al-Qa‘ida’s military leader. He initially considered replacing the Iraqi with Abu ‘Ubayda al-Misri, a veteran military figure who was then leading al-Qa‘ida’s operations in Kunar, as he was “proven [in our eyes]”, while Khalid al-Habib would become “a trainer or an administrator, assuring the preparations of the brothers”. Eventually though, “we learned you had appointed brother Khalid al-Habib [as] the military emir”, Bin Ladin wrote to al-Libi, essentially endorsing the Libyan’s choice by confirming al-Habib as the new military leader “for a period of a year from his being given the assignment”.

Also, Bin Ladin sided with al-Libi regarding al-Iraqi’s relocation to Iraq. As we saw in the first article in this series, the leader of al-Qa‘ida initially favored dispatching al-Iraqi to Iraq. Yet, he changed his mind after learning that this move was causing concerns and was opposed by numerous top al-Qa‘ida figures, including al-Libi and al-Habib. As a result, Bin Ladin recommended in his December 2004 letter that al-Iraqi “delay his travel at this stage”. Instead, the Iraqi commander should “be assigned the file of al-Tanbul [the short] if that is possible, or whatever you see fit”. “Al-Tanbul” possibly refers to al-Zarqawi, especially given that al-Iraqi continued to work as a liaison to al-Qa‘ida in Iraq after 2004 (more on this in the next installment in this series). 

The Al-Rabi‘a-Al-Zarqawi Nexus

Besides backing al-Libi on the al-Iraqi issue, Bin Ladin also rallied behind the Libyan’s proposal concerning al-Qa‘ida’s external operations. Earlier, al-Libi had recommended to Bin Ladin that the group “transfer the external work department to Iraq” by sending there Hamza al-Rabi‘a, the external wing’s head, or Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, al-Qa‘ida’s best bombmaker, “or both of them”. In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin sanctioned the “transfer” of al-Rabi‘a to Iraq. He noted that “it is fine for him to travel alone”, hence implying that he did not see the presence of al-Muhajir as necessary.

Bin Ladin further advised that before traveling al-Rabi‘a should first reach out to and coordinate with al-Zarqawi to obtain “reassurance regarding the security of the road” between Pakistan and Iraq. The leader of al-Qa‘ida also wanted al-Rabi‘a to explain to al-Zarqawi the purpose of the mission at hand, namely to “form an independent apparatus to carry out external operations” from Iraq so as to capitalize on the numerous foreign fighters there who could easily travel abroad to mount these attacks. Al-Rabi‘a was also told that before setting off he ought to brief al-Zarqawi on external operations by sending the latter a message “comprising [information on] our previous experiences in this work”, with a focus on the “conditions necessary to be met” for would-be operatives. In doing so, Bin Ladin reasoned, al-Rabi‘a would not be starting from scratch if he managed to get to Iraq as al-Zarqawi would already be working on global attacks; on the other hand, if al-Rabi‘a were unable to travel, then external plotting would still continue from Iraq.

Bin Ladin attached a document to his December 2004 letter specifying the joint mission on which al-Rabi‘a and al-Zarqawi ought to cooperate. In it, the leader of al-Qa‘ida stipulated that, among their top priorities, the two should focus on planning attacks in the U.S., especially in “the states which elected [George W.] Bush, starting with Florida and Ohio and Texas”. Indeed, Bin Ladin seemed inclined to spare the states that did not vote for Bush, stipulating that there should be “some kind of security [guarantee] for them” and that al-Qa’ida should “issue a special message clarifying their status”. This echoes the conclusion of a public video by Bin Ladin released earlier in October 2004 in which he stated that “every [American] state that doesn’t play with our security has automatically guaranteed its own security”.

Another Abbottabad file indicates that Bin Ladin’s instructions were then communicated to al-Zarqawi. In a draft of a statement entitled “The America Speech”, Bin Ladin refuted the notion that al-Qa‘ida’s international attacks had waned and gloated that the war in Iraq had even strengthened the organization’s “military wing responsible for operations against America”. To further his point, he announced that “we have asked our brother … Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to establish another wing there [i.e., in Iraq], for recruiting those energies qualified to operate against America and its allies”. He went on to threaten that “the best witness of the success of this wing will be the operations undertaken in the capitals of Europe”, mentioning the 7/7 London bombings as the wing’s latest success. Lastly, while Bin Ladin acknowledged that “no operations have occurred in America recently”, he claimed that it was not because of the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts but the “result of some mistakes committed by some of the brothers in Pakistan [who] were discovered by … the apostate Pervez [Musharraf]”. The al-Qa‘ida leader nonetheless warned the U.S.: “what will come to you all is the most bitter thing you will have tasted … And the results will come … when the preparations are completed”.

It is worth noting that Bin Ladin’s December 2004 letter, the attached document threatening the states that voted for Bush and “The America Speech” all corroborate claims by U.S. intelligence back in 2007 that the leader of al-Qa‘ida had asked al-Rabi‘a “to send Zarqawi a briefing on al Qaeda’s external operations, including information about operations against the American homeland”. The same intelligence sources reported that Bin Ladin had also “tasked [al-Zarqawi] with forming a cell to conduct terrorist attacks outside of Iraq” and that he had “emphasized that America should be Zarqawi’s number one priority in terms of foreign attacks”. It is most likely that al-Libi was the one who transmitted Bin Ladin’s directives to al-Zarqawi, as the Libyan is reported to have called on al-Zarqawi “to target U.S. interests outside of Iraq”. The same U.S. intelligence sources added that al-Zarqawi had “welcomed this direction and claimed he had already come up with some good proposals”.

On January 19, 2006, al-Jazira broadcasted a new audio statement from Bin Ladin, who had not been heard in the media for a year. Entitled “A Message to the American People: The Way to End the War”, this message was a heavily edited version of “The America Speech” in which the leader of al-Qa‘ida was far less candid about his group’s planning for international attacks. The public address made no mention of the “external wing” or the nexus with al-Zarqawi in Iraq and instead remarked that “Iraq has become a point of attraction and recruitment for qualified forces”. Bin Ladin also chose not to evoke the “mistakes … of the brothers in Pakistan” to explain al-Qa‘ida’s failure to strike inside the U.S., rephrasing the passage as follows: “As for the delay in the occurrence of similar operations in America, it is not because of the impossibility of penetrating your security arrangements, but rather, operations are in preparation and you shall see them on your own soil when they are completed”. Finally, Bin Ladin did not issue threats against Europe, contenting himself to celebrate the achievements of “the mujahidin … as evidenced by what you have seen in terms of bombings in the capitals of the most important European States”, referring to the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005.

Al-Zawahiri’s “Glad Tidings”

In his October 2004 letter, al-Zawahiri recounted to Bin Ladin that two days earlier, he had heard “the glad tidings” in the media: al-Zarqawi had declared his allegiance to Bin Ladin and “urged the umma to unite against the Crusaders and the Jews”. The news had been reported by newspapers such as al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Hayat, al-Quds and Radio America (in Pashto) but was “completely ignored” by the BBC, despite the latter “filling its bulletins with a lot of rubbish!!”, al-Zawahiri fumed.

Al-Zawahiri went on to narrate the negotiation process between al-Qa‘ida and al-Zarqawi’s group, citing details that largely match those of al-Libi’s version. Before the merger, al-Zawahiri wrote, al-Libi had “sent [me] a message about the conditions of Iraq”. The main points of this message were that the “mujahidin” were thriving as they “controlled large areas” of Iraq, were well-resourced and had “hundreds” of recruits coming “from the neighboring countries”; that they were “about to form a unified group” that would include “most of those working on behalf of the jihad”; that they were planning “large-scale operations in neighboring countries”; that they had begun targeting the Shi‘a only after the Badr Corps started attacking “the Sunnis and their scholars”; and that after they had asked to swear allegiance to Bin Ladin, al-Libi told them to go ahead with the oath of allegiance, saying he would reach out to al-Zawahiri “to speed up the matter”. Al-Libi then “requested the approval of Abu Fatima [i.e., al-Zawahiri] with brief directives”, which would be followed by more detailed guidance at a later time.

It is worth noting here that al-Zawahiri’s letter helps to clarify al-Zarqawi’s rationale for joining al-Qa’ida, something which was missing in al-Libi’s letter. In discussing al-Zarqawi’s eagerness to pledge allegiance, al-Zawahiri specified that the Jordanian’s group initially showed “some hesitancy as concerns [Bin Ladin’s] forbearing from fighting the client rulers” but that Bin Ladin’s most recent message had “reassured” them. Although not more explicit, this passage echoes the account of a member of al-Zarqawi’s group who related that al-Zarqawi used to see al-Qa‘ida as “soft” on “the apostate rulers – especially the Saudis – and their armies” and had thus refused to join al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, Bin Ladin “explicitly declared the obligation to fight [the Saudi regime] in some of his addresses” and “the obstacles preventing the unification … were thereby removed”. It thus appears that it was the post-911 takfiri friendly agenda embraced by al-Qa‘ida that “reassured” al-Zarqawi and prompted him to join forces with an organization he saw as previously not adhering to the “correct” methodology.

Based on his understanding of Bin Ladin’s policy, al-Zawahiri sent a response to al-Libi urging al-Zarqawi’s group to “prepare immediately to announce the bay‘a”. He added that the oath “should not be in the name of a person”, namely al-Zarqawi, but rather on behalf “of the collectivity of the mujahidin in Iraq”. Al-Zawahiri’s message also addressed the scope of jihad for al-Zarqawi’s group: the Jordanian’s men should “stop working against the Shi‘a” and “postpone activity against the client rulers at the present time, so that their efforts are not scattered across two fronts given that we are now in the stage of mobilizing the umma for jihad”. Nonetheless, he added, “confronting the client rulers will eventually come, God willing, and victory will not be achieved without it”. As mentioned earlier, al-Libi withheld some of these instructions from al-Zarqawi’s group. While al-Libi notified Bin Ladin about this, none of the files I’ve reviewed indicates that al-Zawahiri was informed about this.

Bin Ladin’s Guidelines

In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin rejoiced over the news of al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a, saying that it pleased him greatly and describing it as “great and promising”. The leader of al-Qa‘ida urged al-Zawahiri and al-Libi to “pay close attention to this event” as it was “a major step toward unifying the efforts of the mujahidin … not only in Iraq, but in the whole region”. In view of the fact that unity among Muslims is “one of the most obligatory of legal duties”, Bin Ladin wanted his two lieutenants “to ask the brother Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to urge the other mujahid groups in Iraq and its environs to unite their efforts with him”, adding that al-Zawahiri and Abu al-Layth al-Libi should issue public messages calling for unity among the elements of the Iraqi insurgency. Bin Ladin also suggested publicizing the additions to al-Zarqawi’s group, even the “small” ones, as doing so would “raise the morale of Muslims and increase their interest and support for the mujahidin”. Bin Ladin commented on the rest of the Iraqi insurgency by stating that the Islamic Party and Ansar al-Sunna “should be encouraged and supported” in their operations.

As explained in the first installment in this series, al-Zarqawi and al-Libi wanted Bin Ladin to deliver a public pronouncement endorsing the Jordanian’s group, inciting the militants in Iraq and the Levant to rally behind it and “encourag[ing] the youth there” as they were in the midst of heavy military pressure from the U.S. in Fallujah. Following al-Libi’s and al-Zarqawi’s advice, Bin Ladin recorded an audio addressed to “the Muslim brothers in Iraq in particular and the umma in general” in which he lauded “the free people in the land of al-Anbar, particularly the residents of the heroic city of al-Fallujah” who were giving “an example of steadfastness for others in the face of U.S. barbarism”.

More importantly, the statement formally sanctioned the bay‘a of “the dignified brother” al-Zarqawi and his group. “We, in the al-Qa‘ida organization, warmly welcome their union with us”, Bin Ladin said, emphasizing that “this is a great step toward rendering successful the efforts of the mujahidin to establish [an Islamic state]”. He further stressed that “it should be known that the mujahid brother Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi is the emir of al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Two Rivers [i.e., al-Qa‘ida in Iraq]” and that “the brothers in the group there should heed his orders and obey him”. Bin Ladin also encouraged others in the jihadi landscape in Iraq to come together under al-Zarqawi’s leadership, stating that “the mujahid groups [there] ought to coordinate amongst themselves in order to unite their ranks under one banner”.

Bin Ladin’s audio advocated broad mobilization for fighting in Iraq and elsewhere in the Islamic world where “the Crusader-Zionist coalition” was seeking to subjugate the umma, including Afghanistan and Palestine. “The most important and serious issue today,” he explained, “is this Third World War”. In these circumstances, jihad was an “individual duty” (fard ‘ayn) on every member of the Muslim umma, who “are required to devote of their resources, sons and wealth what is sufficient for fighting the unbelievers and driving them out of their lands”. Adopting a more takfiri rhetoric more in tune with al-Zarqawi’s thinking, Bin Ladin also touched on “a number of the most important and serious legal judgments” concerning those who refrain from supporting this jihad. The first pertained to “those who support the unbelievers against the Muslims”. According to Bin Ladin, “giving support to America or [Ayad] Allawi’s apostate government … in any way whatsoever … is greater unbelief that expels one from the community”. This included “the owners of companies and the workers who transport fuel, ammunition, food supplies and any other needs”. All these “have apostatized from the religion and it is necessary to fight them”. In the same vein, he stated that “those Iraqis … who belong to Allawi’s apostate government, such as members of the Army, the security agencies and the National Guard … their blood is licit”. The second issue was about “participation in the upcoming elections” in Iraq. Given that the Iraqi constitution was “a constitution of unbelief” and that the elections “will be held upon America’s orders”, Bin Ladin maintained that “if anyone participates in [these elections] knowingly and willingly, he will have rejected God”.

In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin had advised that al-Zarqawi’s men “focus [their] operations against the Americans, their allies and the apostate government of Allawi”, arguing that “undoubtedly, they have the right to defend themselves and their brothers against any force wanting to harm them”. Similarly, the audio praised al-Zarqawi’s jihad in Iraq, highlighting the “daring operations against the Americans and Allawi’s apostate government”. Yet, the leader of al-Qa‘ida also argued that the “mujahidin” should “beware the shedding of innocent blood, except for what the law permits, such as in the case of people being used as shields (tatarrus), without going to excess”, a likely reference to the numerous Iraqi civilians killed in jihadi bombings in Iraq. In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin also recommended that al-Zarqawi’s group “avoid opening fronts that could be delayed”, which is almost certainly a reference to delaying an all-out war against the Shi‘a in Iraq.

Epilogue

In addition to the one on Iraq, Bin Ladin would record an additional audio statement in late 2004 focusing on the Arabian Peninsula. These two files as well as the other documents cited in this article, including Bin Ladin’s operational security directives to al-Libi, were all supposed to be sent together as a response to al-Libi’s and al-Zawahiri’s messages from October 2004. But as another document from the Abbottabad files suggests, Bin Ladin’s effort to reach out to his two deputies failed, at least initially.

This document is a letter addressed to al-Libi (“Wakil Sahib”) signed by a certain “Jaragh al-Din”. Clues from this missive and from al-Libi’s October 2004 letter to Bin Ladin indicate that Jaragh al-Din was part of Bin Ladin’s inner circle, living with or in close proximity to the leader of al-Qa‘ida in Haripur and transmitting the latter’s messages to his aides. In his October 2004 letter, al-Libi asked Bin Ladin “to permit brother Ahmad … to meet with us” so that “we can introduce him to at least one or two new brothers … so that you might benefit from us regarding sending communications”. Al-Libi also told Bin Ladin that “we can take advantage of the meeting to teach the brother some of the new means of encryption that we have”. In his letter to al-Libi, Jaragh al-Din wrote: “as for your request to meet with me, I would love to see you … but the Professor [i.e., Bin Ladin] would like us to arrange the meeting at a later time and also would like the study of encryption … to take place via correspondence”. These excerpts show that Jaragh al-Din and Ahmad were one and the same and that he was part of Bin Ladin’s courier network. Given his profile, it is possible that “Ahmad” is just short for the infamous Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who would end up being killed along with “the Professor” during the Abbottabad raid.

In any event, Jaragh al-Din’s letter to al-Libi reveals that the files Bin Ladin produced in late 2004, from the “al-Shura” document to the audio statements on Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, “were lost with Salih”. Together with a certain “Hassan”, Salih was one of “the two current lines” in al-Qa‘ida’s courier network on the receiving end of the correspondence from Bin Ladin at the time. Although the circumstances of the losses were not explained, in his letter to Bin Ladin al-Libi had warned that “the two current lines” were “overstretched” and “not safe on account of the extent of the demand on them” inside the organization.

Eventually though, Bin Ladin’s files reached their intended recipients. In his December 2004 letter, he notified al-Libi that he wanted the audio about the Arabian Peninsula to be released first, either on December 14 or 15, as there was an unspecified “interest related to this date”. If that was not possible, he continued, then the Iraq audio should be released before the Arabian Peninsula speech. Jaragh al-Din instructed al-Libi to “find a secure path” for “the two audio messages” to be released on “the internet” as “we do not think they will be published in their entirety in the media”. He asked the Libyan to “give a copy of them to al-Zarqawi’s representative if he visits you” so that the “important legal judgments” contained in these “messages” could be disseminated in Iraq.

On December 16, Bin Ladin’s Arabian Peninsula audio address was released on jihadi forums, the same day that anti-monarchy protests were planned in Riyadh and Jeddah at the initiative of the Saudi Islamist Sa‘d al-Faqih. Eleven days later, on December 27, the Iraq audio was released.

Reflections

When al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a to Bin Ladin was announced on October 17, 2004, the communiqué noted that “our most generous brothers in al-Qa‘ida came to understand the strategy of [our group], and their hearts warmed to its methodology”. Here, al-Zarqawi was signaling that, while nominally under Bin Ladin’s leadership, it was his “strategy” and “methodology” that Bin Ladin was agreeing to sign up for, and not the other way around.

The Abbottabad files studied in this series lend credence to the communiqué’s claim. As noted earlier, al-Zarqawi’s willingness to come under Bin Ladin’s leadership appears to have been facilitated, at least in part, by the more avowedly anti-regime stance adopted by al-Qa‘ida in the wake of 9/11. Indeed, it was only when al-Qa‘ida moved away from its “attack the West only” program to include a local component closer to al-Zarqawi’s line of thinking that he agreed to join forces. He likely reasoned that if he were to subordinate himself to al-Qa‘ida, he would not be encumbered by what was before 9/11 al-Qa‘ida’s exclusive focus on the far enemy.

Besides the positive signals in the form of Bin Ladin’s more takfiri statements, al-Zarqawi must have felt even more vindicated when, behind the scenes, al-Libi commended his strategy in Iraq, telling the Jordanian’s envoy that “what al-Zarqawi is doing, i.e., striking the Americans in Iraq and all the apostates who help them” while using “the Iraqi theater to make preparations for neighboring countries in terms of training and arrangements”, was “absolutely correct”. After the meeting where al-Zarqawi’s emissary outlined his group’s vision for Iraq and the region to al-Libi, the latter sent a message to his counterpart in Iraq announcing that al-Zawahiri had accepted the bay‘a and asking al-Zarqawi to present the bay‘a in public.

With all this in mind, it is easy to see why al-Zarqawi would think he had succeeded in bringing al-Qa‘ida on board with his strategic vision. However, the Abbottabad files also show that, despite the positive signals, al-Qa‘ida’s top leaders were not in full agreement with the Jordanian when his bay‘a was first accepted by al-Libi. Bin Ladin was originally keen on keeping al-Zarqawi in check by dispatching a senior figure, al-Iraqi, to Iraq in order to uphold al-Qa‘ida’s true agenda there, namely “the escalation in the resistance to the occupying forces” and “the prevention of the opening of other secondary fronts, such as [against] the Shi’ites”. Al-Zawahiri, for his part, wanted al-Zarqawi’s group to “stop working against the Shi‘a” and to “postpone activity against the client rulers”, which was to form a later stage of jihad. Likewise, al-Libi had notified al-Zarqawi’s emissary that Bin Ladin considered jihad against the Arab regimes “an advanced stage” and that the current priority was “the stage of fighting the greater unbelief (the Americans)”.The Libyan also appeared concerned by the mass-casualty attacks against Iraq’s Shi‘a community.

Nevertheless, al-Qa‘ida—or al-Qa‘ida central, as it would soon come to be known—was in no position to strong-arm al-Zarqawi into following its preferred path in Iraq. From the start, al-Zarqawi had made clear that it was up to al-Qa‘ida to embrace his program, telling Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri that “if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your readied soldiers, working under your banner”. In the aftermath of the first battle of Fallujah, the Jordanian had the upper hand in the negotiation as he had become the leading figure in the most important battleground for jihad. By contrast, letters from al-Libi and al-Zawahiri highlight that al-Qa‘ida was then enduring intense military and security pressure in Pakistan as well as internal rifts. The level of strain was such that the planning of external operations had “practically halted” and Bin Ladin had to write a guidance document (the “al-Shura” letter) focused entirely on bringing harmony to the ranks. In this precarious context, the prospect of a merger with al-Zarqawi appeared particularly attractive to al-Qa‘ida, which viewed Iraq as a new El Dorado which could reverse the organization’s fortunes, especially in terms of planning international attacks.

Hence, the concerns of al-Qa‘ida’s leadership, and its divergences, were transmitted in attenuated form or even hidden from al-Zarqawi altogether. The one “warning” to al-Zarqawi against “excess” contained in Bin Ladin’s audio about Iraq was only briefly expressed and came very late in what was otherwise a speech endorsing the Jordanian’s actions. Bin Ladin was not much more assertive in private. He eventually gave up on trying to rein in al-Zarqawi, instructing al-Iraqi to “delay” his journey to Iraq and, instead of confronting the Shi‘a elephant in the room head-on, merely shared his view in his letter to al-Libi and al-Zawahiri that al-Zarqawi’s group should “avoid opening fronts that could be delayed”. Even then, he made sure to qualify his subtle criticism with the expression “the witness sees what the absent one does not see”, in deference to al-Zarqawi and his team. It is telling that while Bin Ladin devoted an entire missive to resolving al-Qa‘ida’s internal disputes (the “al-Shura” letter), his strategic instructions to al-Qa‘ida in Iraq were limited to a six-line paragraph shorter than the one discussing wedding arrangements for his son Khalid”. This somewhat lax approach on the part of Bin Ladin would later be confirmed by al-Zawahiri, who stated in 2006 that while Bin Ladin had instructed the “brothers in Iraq” to “focus their efforts on the Americans and neutralize the rest of the powers as best as they could”, he had still given “them some freedom of movement, telling them that the witness sees what the absent one does not see.”

With regard to al-Zawahiri, although he was the bluntest in criticizing al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda internally, his disapproval was purposely concealed from the Jordanian by al-Qa‘ida’s general manager, al-Libi. From the Abbottabad files, the Libyan emerges as the most driven and ambitious of al-Qa‘ida’s top officials in brokering a deal in Iraq, as illustrated by his Iraq-focused October 2004 letter that provided detailed guidance on the topic. Bin Ladin’s and al-Zawahiri’s messages on the matter were rather laconic by contrast. It can be argued that al-Libi’s influence in forging the merger was more significant than either of his two bosses’. Besides his role in brokering the deal with al-Zarqawi’s group, he was also instrumental in convincing Bin Ladin to “delay” the dispatch of al-Iraqi, who was supposed to maintain al-Qa‘ida’s interests in Iraq. Furthermore, determined as he was to expedite the negotiation process and remove any remaining impediments, al-Libi, of his own initiative, accepted al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a on behalf of his bosses even as he withheld some of al-Zawahiri’s opinions from al-Zarqawi.

Although al-Libi’s resourcefulness likely facilitated the positive outcome of the negotiation, it also put al-Qa‘ida central in a precarious position in its relationship with its brand new subsidiary and helped to sow the seeds of the coming discord between the two sides. A union had been proclaimed, but strategic divergences had not been fully resolved—let alone conveyed to Zarqawi’s side. Before the announcement of the bay‘a, al-Libi had asked al-Zarqawi for a “detailed report on your situation”, which al-Libi intended to send to his bosses so that they could make well-informed decisions regarding the course of the Iraqi jihad. The files I have archived do not tell if this “report” was ever sent. In any case, the unresolved issues hidden by al-Libi and ignored by Bin Ladin would remain, proving an enduring source of tension as illustrated by al-Qa‘ida’s endless attempts over the years to “rectify” the policies of its affiliate behind the scenes.

Ultimately, al-Qa‘ida came to fully grasp the negative impact of the leeway granted to its Iraqi subsidiary from the outset. At least al-Zawahiri did. In a letter written to Bin Ladin in January 2011, the Egyptian was still arguing over issues that had been preoccupying him ever since the merger, including attacks against Iraq’s Shi‘a and “opening new fronts, whether inside or outside Iraq”. Another issue was the arrival of a new leader named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose presence was further eroding the already strained relations between al-Qa‘ida central and the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qa‘ida in Iraq’s latest incarnation. Particularly vocal in his opposition to the Islamic State’s conduct, al-Zawahiri urged Bin Ladin to restrain al-Baghdadi’s men by sending them a message detailing the policies to follow in Iraq. In the past, al-Qa‘ida’s top leadership had postured diplomatically when questioning the actions of its troublesome affiliate, stating, in the case of Bin Ladin, “the witness sees what the absent one does not see,” and, in the case of al-Zawahiri, “I see the picture from afar, and … you see what we do not see”. Now, the same al-Zawahiri was telling Bin Ladin that “I hope that you do not conclude your message with sayings like … ‘the witness sees what the absent one does not see’, as these sayings nullify every directive preceding them”. As the coming divorce between the two groups later showed, al-Zawahiri’s plea for a more assertive approach was too little, too late—if it ever stood a chance in the first place.

The advice, or nasiha, was not received well in al-Qaida circles. Several critics of the nasiha wrote at length against it, castigating its author as an ignoramus and dismissing his arguments as unfounded. Two of these authors purport to be members of al-Qaida. The exchange is worth considering, as Abu Mariya is no stranger to the inner workings of al-Qaida—he belonged to it for more than a decade—and the advice he offered clearly struck a nerve. It may well shed light on the still murky future of the group after al-Zawahiri.

Abu Mariya’s journey

Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, whose real name is Muyassar ibn ‘Ali al-Juburi, was born in the town of al-Rasif outside Mosul, Iraq in June 1976, and soon after moved to the nearby town of Harara, where he grew up (hence the occasional nickname al-Harari). His studies ultimately took him to the University of Baghdad, where he obtained a diploma in management and bachelor’s degree in Islamic law. While it has been said that he served in the Iraqi police and volunteered in the Fedayeen Saddam, he has denied these claims as enemy propaganda. What is clear, at any rate, is that Abu Mariya has been a committed jihadi since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and that his religious education prepared him for senior positions in the insurgency and beyond.

According to what appears to be the most reliable biography of the man, upon the U.S. invasion, Abu Mariya did not hesitate to join the jihadi opposition, fighting in the ranks of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaida in Iraq in its first incarnation as Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad. After participating in battles in Falluja, Tal ‘Afar, Mosul, and elsewhere, he was injured in a U.S. raid outside Mosul in 2004, and thereafter was imprisoned for a year and a half. After his release in 2006, he was appointed al-Qaida in Iraq’s general Shari‘a official for the western Mosul area and the chief official for tribal relations. Following the announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006, he became the head of the ministry of commanding right and forbidding wrong and a member of the Shari‘a council of Nineveh Province. The next year, in 2007, he was captured again during a U.S. raid in west Mosul, and this time was sentenced to four years in prison.

Upon his second release, in 2011, he was offered senior positions with the Islamic State of Iraq, but instead chose to head to Syria, seeking to bolster the opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Asad. He soon linked up with Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, a Syrian commander in the Islamic State of Iraq whom Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had sent to Syria to form an Islamic State of Iraq cell that became known as Jabhat al-Nusra. (According to other accounts, Abu Mariya went to Syria together with al-Jawlani.) With the approval of the leadership back in Iraq, Abu Mariya quickly became a key leader in the new Syrian group. Al-Jawlani appointed him Jabhat al-Nusra’s general Shari‘a official and gave him command of the group’s operations in the eastern provinces of Raqqa, Deir al-Zour, and al-Hasaka. During this time he was involved in the kidnapping and ransoming of American hostages, including the journalist Theo Padnos. In later 2014, he would cede the position of chief Shari‘a official to the Jordanian Sami al-‘Uraydi and relocate to Dar‘a in southern Syria. From there he eventually made his way to Idlib, joining the rest of Jabhat al-Nusra’s leadership in its northwestern stronghold. He stayed with the group all the way through its transformation into HTS, and remains one of al-Jawlani’s top lieutenants.

Abu Mariya is often presented by HTS’s followers as a religious scholar (‘alim, shaykh), but first and foremost he is a commander and operator—more man of action than scholar, and certainly not a poet. That being said, in the period between 2014 and 2015, he played a leading role as an ideologue making the case against the “extremists” of the Islamic State. So instrumental was he in this role that he earned the moniker “subduer of the Kharijites” (qahir al-khawarij). In numerous essays and audio statements, he cast the Islamic State as “the Kharijites of this age,” aggressively attacking the group for pronouncing takfir on Muslims and spilling Muslim blood. The only way to liberate Syria from the yoke of the “criminal Nusayri regime,” he said in one address in 2014, is first “to excise this evil sickness … to uproot the wicked tree of extremism,” and that could only be done by the sword. In a subsequent essay, he faulted certain unnamed jihadi leaders and scholars for failing to condemn extremists and their criminal acts, such as mass casualty bombings in markets and excess in takfir. For his role in ceaselessly condemning the Islamic State, the group’s “al-Khayr” province in Deir al-Zour released a video in 2017 showing him unmasked. The description reads: “the traitor apostate Muyassar al-Harari.”

While appearing as a loyal member of al-Qaida in these messages, Abu Mariya did not shy away from criticizing al-Qaida and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In a series of tweets in April 2015, for instance, he urged al-Zawahiri to take a harder line on the Islamic State, calling on him to carry out “your duty to save your people in al-Sham” by condemning the extremists who had sullied al-Qaida’s name. In a subsequent Twitter thread, in September 2015, he complained that al-Zawahiri was sowing confusion by seeming to portray the Islamic State as mujahidin, not Kharijites. “Among the group’s mistakes,” he wrote in another series of tweets in June 2015, speaking of al-Qaida, “is that it did not dissociate from extremists … people who do not espouse the thought of al-Qaida and Shaykh ‘Atiyya,” referring to ‘Atiyyatallah al-Libi, a senior al-Qaida commander and scholar who was killed in Waziristan in 2011. Abu Mariya was indeed fond of ‘Atiyya, considering him the repository of al-Qaida’s true manhaj, or methodology, one that embraced the principles of pragmatism and restraint in takfir. As he wrote in an introduction to ‘Atiyya’s four volumes of collected works, published in 2015, “the school of Shaykh ‘Atiyyatallah al-Libi is the true school and the true thought of the Qa‘idat al-Jihad organization,” a school and a thought completely at odds with “the Iraqi ISIS school that has produced extremism and ignorance … and has destroyed all the theaters of jihad.”

One can perhaps see in Abu Mariya’s early frustrations with al-Qaida’s leadership the seeds of his later conclusion that the group’s time has passed. Abu Mariya was among the leaders most adamant that Jabhat al-Nusra separate from al-Qaida, as it did between 2016 and 2017, eventually becoming HTS. As early as April 2015, he defended the idea of breaking ties as a theoretical possibility. After the separation was completed, in early 2017, an unnamed Shari‘a official in HTS commented on the development to an Arabic news outlet, saying that al-Qaida’s days were numbered. “Sayf al-‘Adl is a prisoner in Iran,” he said, “and al-Zawahiri is in another world” (i.e., in a world of his own). “Al-Qaida has come to an end,” he concluded. According to one source, the unnamed official was Abu Mariya al-Qahtani. There is every reason to believe it was.

Abu Mariya’s nasiha

While Abu Mariya may have told a journalist that “al-Qaida is over” back in 2017, he would refrain from publicly criticizing the group for the next several years, even as he led the charge against the al-Qaida loyalists who remained in Syria. The death of al-Zawahiri last month appears to have changed his calculus, prompting him to write the controversial nasiha.

Abu Mariya’s nasiha appeared on his Telegram channel (which has more than 100,000 followers) on August 15, two weeks after al-Zawahiri’s death. The nasiha has two parts The first is a brief note to the membership of Muslim Brotherhood, calling on them to dissolve the organization given its history of disappointment and failure. The second, which is much longer, is directed to the branches of al-Qaida (see my full translation below). “[M]y advice to the branches of al-Qaida,” he wrote in this second part, “is to dissolve the al-Qaida organization and to remove the pretext for the states that have come to treat al-Qaida as a scapegoat.” In what follows, Abu Mariya develops two principal arguments for why this step is necessary. The first relates to the problem of succession, the second to general strategy.

The main challenge with regard to succession, according to Abu Mariya, is that Sayf al-‘Adl, the presumptive next in line, is based in Iran. In fact, Abu Mariya claims, al-‘Adl is “imprisoned” there, living “under confinement and coercion.” “How can Sayf al-‘Adl,” he writes, “who is a man imprisoned, manage the affiliates of al-Qaida?!!” “The idea of giving command to one who is impotent is untenable,” he continues. “Has our condition became like that of the Rejectionists who give allegiance (bay‘a) to one who is absent? We seek refuge in God from ignorance and disappointment.” Even if al-‘Adl were able to succeed al-Zawahiri, there remained the question of his track record as a leader. In Abu Mariya’s view, al-‘Adl’s record in trying to influence events in Syria was abysmal: “We witnessed in al-Sham what Sayf al-‘Adl achieved in terms of tribulations and affairs whose victims could not have imagined the outcome.”

The second reason for dissolving al-Qaida has to do with what Abu Mariya sees as the optimal strategy for jihadi groups in the “stage through which the umma and its peoples are passing.” For Abu Mariya, this is a stage that requires greater cooperation with neighboring states and peoples in the Arab Middle East, particularly Sunni Arab states and peoples, so as to be able confront the growing threat of Iran. “The Islamic umma,” he writes,“must stand together and form an alliance against the Iranian occupation that has taken hold of a number of Arab Muslim capitals and is threatening others.” The affiliates’ connection to al-Qaida stands in the way of this, providing these states with a “pretext” for attacking them and making cooperation impossible. He highlights in particular the case of the affiliate in Yemen, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which he says ought to “concentrate on confronting the Iranian project, announce the sundering of their ties to foreign entities, revise their internal and external polices, address the world and the people of Yemen in a new way, and save our Sunni people in Yemen who have been exhausted by wars and afflicted by the firepower of Iran.” Yet if “they continue to have an association with al-Qaida, it will weaken their position against the Houthis who are one of the arms of Iran—where Sayf al-‘Adl is living under confinement.”

While Abu Mariya refrains from saying so here, the path that he proposes is largely the path taken by HTS, which cut ties with al-Qaida in 2016-17 and has since increased its cooperation with neighboring states, particularly Turkey. What Abu Mariya is calling for, in other words, is for the affiliates of al-Qaida to heed the HTS model.

Reactions to the nasiha

The response to Abu Mariya’s nasiha from members and supporters of al-Qaida was swift and severe. On Twitter, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Palestinian-Jordanian scholar with a wide following in pro-al-Qaida circles, emphasized that these proposals were coming from “a senior personality in HTS,” which made clear that HTS’s breaking of ties with al-Qaida was no mere organizational dispute but rather a sign of ideological backsliding. No comment was forthcoming from al-Maqdisi’s ideological rival, Abu Qatada al-Filastini, a fellow Palestinian-Jordanian scholar known for his support for HTS and its strategy of appealing to the broader umma, though one of Abu Qatada’s students, the London-based Abu Mahmud al-Filastini, was quick to chime in. In a Telegram post, Abu Mahmud praised the nasiha, noting that he had been calling for the same thing for more than two years. “Al-Qaida is not Islam,” he wrote, “and therefore parting ways from al-Qaida, either organizationally or ideologically, is not unbelief or deviation. Indeed, whosoever contemplates reality and truly seeks to support Muslims will find that parting with the name [of al-Qaida] and severing ties [with it] are a binding obligation.”

With the exception of Abu Mahmud, the loudest and most vociferous voices have been those keen on defending al-Qaida. Three refutations of the nasiha in particular may be noted here. All are by pseudonymous authors and were disseminated on Telegram channels associated with al-Qaida.

The first, published the same day as the nasiha and titled “Advice to a Deceived Adviser,” is signed by a certain ‘Adil Amin, who identifies himself as “a soldier from the army of al-Qaida.” The gist of the refutation is that Abu Mariya is someone with a questionable past who is totally unqualified to advise the mujahidin of al-Qaida’s branches, and that the advice he proffers—rescinding the bay‘a to al-Qaida and instead drawing close to the idolatrous rulers (tawaghit) of regional states—is based on “ignorance and malice.” The key to everything Abu Mariya proposes, Amin states, is the distinction between two methodologies (manhajayn): the manhaj of al-Qaida, “firm and unwavering”, and the manhaj of Abu Mariya’s HTS, “updated and pragmatic.” Abu Mariya is effectively calling on the branches of al-Qaida to follow the HTS model of abandoning global jihad and collaborating with secular states such as Turkey, even though this model has not proved successful and could blow up at any moment. Amin mentions recent reports of a potential rapprochement between Turkey and Damascus as evidence that the HTS project is vulnerable. Contrary to what Abu Mariya supposes, Amin continues, al-Qaida is not in decline but rather is “spreading and becoming stronger.” The notion “that al-Qaida has been weakened” is refuted by “Western analytical reports themselves … [which] recognize that the disbanding of al-Qaida has become impossible, as it is firmly established and is more dangerous than ISIS.” For all these reasons, Amin concludes, the bay‘a to al-Qaida is “a badge of honor.” It is “the pragmatists,” not al-Qaida, who ought to be dispensed with. Amin plays down the issue of Sayf al-‘Adl’s presence in Iran, noting that al-Zawahiri’s death has not yet been confirmed.

The second refutation, which appeared on Telegram on August 16, was written by a certain Jalal ibn Hamdan, who reveals himself to be a member of AQAP. Ibn Hamdan makes many of the same points as Amin, including that the success of HTS’s “true model” is illusory. The HTS project, he notes, has involved internecine warfare and the shameful hosting of Turkish and Russian security patrols. Furthermore, the area under HTS control is miniscule compared to the area controlled by al-Shabaab in Somalia, a loyal al-Qaida affiliate. Then there is the matter of the about-face Abu Mariya is calling for. How, Ibn Hamdan asks, can a group like AQAP, which has warned against the tawaghit and foreign powers for years, suddenly change course and endorse collaboration with them? To do so would be “the epitome of hypocrisy.” Abu Mariya’s nasiha is an appeal to “abandon values and principles in order to achieve imaginary benefits.” As far as Yemen is concerned, Ibn Hamdan goes on, Abu Mariya knows not of what he speaks, as certain Yemeni groups have adopted the approach he is advocating only to be used and betrayed. As regards Sayf al-‘Adl, Ibn Hamdan relates with pride how his group took hostage an Iranian diplomat and (in 2015) brokered a prisoner exchange resulting in al-‘Adl being freed (at least from detention/house arrest). Praising al-‘Adl’s decades-long record of commitment to jihad, Ibn Hamdan affirms that were he chosen as the next leader of al-Qaida, “then by the might of God they will see from us only listening and obeying.”

The third refutation, which appeared several days later, on August 20, is signed by a certain Abu ‘Ali al-Qahtani, who echoes most of the arguments made in the previous two refutations. Al-Qahtani focuses on three issues. The first is the matter of the proposed breaking of ties with al-Qaida, which al-Qahtani says would require invalidating the bay‘a to the group. “As for voiding [the bay‘a] without the permission of the emir,” he writes, “as was done by the leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, that is prohibited and is not allowed.” And what good did this do HTS anyway? The group’s gambit caused internal strife and bloodletting, and HTS has not liberated any territory since announcing itself as such. “Will victory be achieved by dissolving the bay‘a?” he asks. “No. Victory will not be achieved through sin.” The second issue he brings up is the question of Sayf al-‘Adl’s succession to al-Zawahiri. After praising al-‘Adl as a veteran jihadi leader, al-Qahtani draws attention to the prisoner exchange mentioned by the second refuter. He notes that while al-‘Adl was freed, he was prohibited from leaving Iran as part of “an effort by the enemies to restrict his activities.” Whether al-‘Adl is in a position to assume command of al-Qaida or not, al-Qahtani does not say, but he does assert that al-‘Adl has more autonomy in Iran than HTS does in Syria. For HTS does not even have the power to open small battlefronts should it wish (presumably because of the influence of Turkey). The third issue broached by al-Qahtani is the proposed strategy of focusing all efforts on “the Iranian project.” While agreeing with Abu Mariya on the significance of the threat, he notes that HTS has done nothing to stop the Iranian project in Syria from advancing and has even prevented mujahidin from taking action against it. He also contends that “the Crusader project” is more threatening than the Iranian one, which it supports. In any event, HTS is in no position to confront either of these projects. “The truth,” he says, addressing Abu Mariya, “is that you and your group are contributing to the bitter reality that the Islamic umma is enduring.” In other words, the HTS model is part of the problem, not the solution.

The end of al-Qaida?

The question raised by Abu Mariya al-Qahtani’s nasiha is of course whether any of the al-Qaida affiliates will take it up. Are they really interested in dissolving al-Qaida and forging relationships with regional states? Judging by the responses reviewed above, the answer appears to be no. For one thing, Abu Mariya is not viewed favorably in al-Qaida circles. He has a reputation for persecuting al-Qaida loyalists in Syria, and some have even accused him of assisting in the assassination of Abu al-Qassam al-Urduni. Then there is the issue of the HTS model’s appeal. Abu Mariya may see exemplary accomplishments in northwest Syria, but his opponents see an enfeebled organization dependent for its survival on treacherous foreign powers.

Yet while the al-Qaida branches are unlikely to embrace Abu Mariya’s proposals, it is also the case that al-Qaida finds itself in a precarious position today. How the organization’s branches will respond to the situation is unclear. Sayf al-‘Adl’s location in Iran is indeed a problem. Only one of the refuters noted above affirmed that he would give bay‘a to al-‘Adl in Iran without hesitation; the others dodged the issue. The relationship with the Taliban also raises uncomfortable issues for al-Qaida. One of al-Zawahiri’s last addresses was an implicit critique of the Taliban for seeking a seat at the United Nations, a body seen by al-Zawahiri as a den of polytheism. There is also the question of how much support the Taliban is willing to offer al-Qaida. The Haqqani network may be unswervingly loyal to the group, but there also appear to be restrictions on its activities in Afghanistan.

Whether al-Qaida will even name a successor to al-Zawahiri remains to be seen. One can imagine a scenario in which the affiliates do not “dissolve” al-Qaida, as Abu Mariya advises, but do allow it to die a quiet death. In Islamic law, the bay‘a is given to an individual, not a group. If no new leader is proposed, and no new bay‘a is given, then that would effectively mean al-Qaida’s end. Such an outcome could potentially free the affiliates to pursue strategies more in line with what Abu Mariya is advocating.

This, of course, is only one possible scenario. One could also see Sayf al-‘Adl, or some other leader, assuming power and at least ensuring al-Qaida’s continuity. The new leader would likely keep a lower profile than al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden, seeking to advise the affiliates from behind the scenes. In this case, the organization would persist, but with the same deficiencies and contradictions as before—namely, a leadership whose priorities are out of step with those of the affiliates, an ideology at odds with that of the Taliban, and a problematic relationship with Iran.

Translation of Abu Mariya al-Qahtani’s nasiha:

Likewise, my advice to the affiliates of al-Qaida is to dissolve the al-Qaida organization and to remove the pretext for the states that have come to treat al-Qaida as a scapegoat. We have not forgotten that Sayf al-‘Adl is living in Iran and is directing the affiliates while under confinement and coercion. We witnessed in al-Sham what Sayf al-‘Adl achieved in terms of tribulations and affairs whose victims could not have imagined the outcome.

My advice to the affiliate in Yemen is thus that they concentrate on confronting the Iranian project, announce the sundering of their ties to foreign entities, revise their internal and external polices, address the world and the people of Yemen in a new way, and save our Sunni people in Yemen who have been exhausted by wars and afflicted by the firepower of Iran. The Islamic umma must stand together and form an alliance against the Iranian occupation that has taken hold of a number of Arab Muslim capitals and is threatening others, as it must strive to form regional alliances with the states neighboring Yemen to break Iran’s power, dislodge its arms, and drive its evil from the region.

Ibn Hazm, among other scholars, related that our lord ‘Umar said, “A man is not safe or free from fear if he can be restrained, tortured, or bound.”[1] Being restrained and being threatened are indicative of coercion, so how can Sayf al-‘Adl, who is a man imprisoned, manage the affiliates of al-Qaida?!! This is contrary to the meaning of the Prophet’s words, “The imam is a shield that guards.” The idea of giving command to one who is impotent is untenable. Has our condition became like that of the Rejectionists who give allegiance (bay‘a)to one who is absent? We seek refuge in God from ignorance and disappointment.

The people of Yemen must come to an agreement to defend against the criminal Houthis and put their internal differences aside. Yemen must turn the page of the past, and its people must drive away the arms of Iran. If they continue to have an association with al-Qaida, it will weaken their position against the Houthis who are one of the arms of Iran—where Sayf al-‘Adl is living under confinement—and it will weaken the position of those who seek to aid the suffering people of Yemen from the nearby states in the region.

I hope for the rest of the branches of al-Qaida to consider this note of mine carefully and not to allow my disagreement with and harsh criticism of their leadership to prevent them from accepting my words. For the truth ought to be followed even if it comes from an enemy or an adversary or an opponent. God knows that these words of mine are intended only as advice to and compassion for our Sunni people in all places. The stage through which the umma and its peoples are passing requires relations with states and peoples. It is unreasonable that Iran should occupy our capitals and declare war on others.

The present state of the Islamic umma is bitter, and we must reflect and consider the condition of our people who have been afflicted by the firepower of Iran. Sufficient for us is God, and He is the best Disposer of affairs. O God, repair our condition, heal our fragmentation, and give us victory over those who have wronged us and shown us enmity. O God, forgive us, grant us pardon, and return us to the truth and return us in a good way. O God, arrange our affairs, for we do not do it well. Praise belongs to God, Lord of the worlds.

Abu Mariya al-Qahtani 17 Muharram [August 15, 2022]

[1] The paraphrased quotation appears to belong to the scholar al-Razi (d. 1209) in his tafsir, not ‘Umar.

In April, when we reviewed the potential of various story possibilities on AQ, Ayman al-Zawahiri did not even make it to our shortlist of top AQ personalities to storify. Our team and the extremism experts who regularly contribute to our output have agreed that the most compelling stories could be about the AQ senior leaders living under controlled circumstances in Iran. They were operationally active, their relationship with Iran had big question marks, and, significantly, we found that AQ supporters on social media appeared to be uninformed about them. 

Our decision not to invest in Zawahiri stories was based on several factors, including his increasing detachment from the realities on the ground. We kept analyzing his numerous speeches only to wonder why he was not addressing the key issues that mattered to AQ members and affiliates. After the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Zawahiri’s messages seemed to lack any substance of practical importance. 

Even Zawahiri-related issues were best addressed to others. Thus, we pressed Taliban representatives on the subject of Zawahiri’s bay‘a (oath of allegiance) to the Taliban leader. Spokesman Suhail Shaheen answered us with a clear “There is no bay‘a,” seemingly clinching Zawahiri’s growing irrelevance. All of Zawahiri’s efforts to portray the Taliban emir as his supreme leader were thus publicly undermined.

We closely monitored Zawahiri’s productions, but focusing on the AQ Tehran group’s story was much more rewarding. Unlike Zawahiri’s largely void lectures, we found compelling insights in the writings of Mustafa Hamid, the ideological ally and father-in-law of Saif al-Adl, the heir apparent to Zawahiri. We found clues that led us to argue that the AQ remnants in Iran must be suffering from “Tehran Syndrome,” the title of our upcoming documentary series. 

Was Zawahiri aware of how the senior leaders in Tehran were diverging from the operations and the ideology of Zawahiri’s AQ? 

In his last messages, Zawahiri was showing signs of ideological flexibility, to the extent that some of us felt he was trying to embrace the Muslim Brotherhood, something unthinkable until recently. In contrast, Mustafa Hamid offered a different worldview for Salafi-jihadis, proposing to align with Iran. That, taken together with Saif al Adl’s influence on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the latter’s murky dealings with pro-Iran militias, was too much to be a coincidence. 

The Taliban’s return as the rulers of Afghanistan also undercut Zawahiri while improving the standing of Mustafa Hamid. Unlike Zawahiri, Hamid maintained excellent links with the Taliban without being a direct liability.

Zawahiri had his protectors in the intensely fragmented Taliban system. However, in essence, the Taliban’s victory represented a counterexample to the AQ model, a case of what could be possible for locally focused jihadis if only they abandoned AQ’s failed global jihad. In Syria, another locally focused jihadi group under Abu Muhammad al-Jolani survived by distancing itself from global jihad. Jolani appeared to have saved his neck while the remnants of AQ were being hunted in airstrikes.

That was the overall context when the news of Zawahiri’s death in Kabul came, and the media scene was flooded with analyses and opinions on his career and leadership.

What kind of a leader had he been, and what did he demonstrably achieve before meeting his end in Kabul? 

I’m befuddled by some of the research and academic-oriented perspectives that regard Zawahiri as a successful leader. 

For starters, he was a divisive and vengeful character. To really feel it, take a good look at the 1982 video showing his Sayyid Qutb-inspired angry outburst behind bars in Egypt. That was the man he was. 

Under Bin Laden, Zawahiri undermined internal rivals to the organization’s detriment. His leadership style evolved but did not fundamentally change over the years. 

In “What Leadership Type will Succeed Al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri?” Tricia Bacon and Elizabeth Grimm wrote last month: 

While at the helm of al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri represents a clear-cut caretaker of bin Laden’s legacy. He has had missteps as a leader tha[t] bin Laden was unlikely to make—for example, his failure to prevent the split with the Islamic State—but he has continued the how and the why established by bin Laden.

Based on his actions, Zawahiri was not a visionary or a fixer. He wasn’t a great caretaker either, having done little more than shepherd his organization’s continuous decline toward irrelevance and eventual demise. Given how his life ended, perhaps he fit the profile of a “figurehead” better than anything else. 

Isn’t that the net balance of Zawahiri’s tenure as the leader of AQ? His most memorable achievement will be to have overseen the vanishing of AQ while not missing opportunities to harm the foundations of the jihadi camp. Credit where credit is due: Zawahiri’s leadership had a critical part to play in the emergence of ISIS from the womb of AQ. 

ISIS is not just the archenemy of AQ, but it is also the illegitimate child of it. From the perspective of the young men who might be attracted to extremist causes, all the violence ISIS unleashed on the world must be counted toward Zawahiri’s and AQ’s failures column as well, given the organization’s stated goal of making jihadism less bloody. 

Zawahiri is said to have grown the affiliate network of AQ. In the big picture, he lost perhaps the most crucial affiliate in Syria as Jolani broke away from AQ without abandoning its ideology. Then Jolani embarked on a campaign of arresting and eliminating the AQ remnants in Syria. 

Zawahiri allowed, or at least could not stop, AQAP from straying out of his command and practically joining the side of pro-Iran forces in Yemen. All because he declined or was unable to arbitrate between squabbling seniors. What is left of the responsibilities of a leader if he shrinks from such moments?

The rupture between AQ central and AQAP resulted in significant defections, making it easier for the pro-Iran clique to clean up the leadership and the rank-and-file so the remnants could align with the Houthis increasingly more brazenly. 

Some affiliates did expand during Zawahiri’s time. That’s not to say Zawahiri deserves credit for it. Many groups adopted or simply continued to use the AQ brand for convenience rather than out of any organic link they had with or benefit they drew from AQ. 

ISIS’s extreme brutality is a top reason why many Salafi-jihadi groups wanted to emphasize alignment with AQ’s ideology, a ploy for acceptability among potential recruits, funders, and supporters. They used the AQ brand as a descriptive reference rather than out of genuine attachment or belonging. That did not require or show any success on the part of Zawahiri.

While Zawahiri kept producing ideological videos, many affiliates realized he was out of touch with the realities on the ground, leading them to pursue locally focused agendas. Who is left as “real” AQ other than Ahmed Diriye in Somalia and a handful of Hurras al-Din in Syria? How long before they also discover that localizing their struggles might save them and their organizations for another day? 

We can go on and on. To focus on the fundamentals, we must ask: Isn’t it a historic blow in itself that Zawahiri was found and killed in Kabul? He sought refuge under the Taliban’s wings and pledged them bay‘a, which the Taliban kept denying it had acknowledged. Would Zawahiri himself consider this a success? 

The implications of the way he died are disastrous for AQ. While protected by the Haqqanis, Zawahiri was despised by many other Taliban leaders. 

Anba’ Jasim, a source who broke the Abu Muhammad Al-Masri killing in Tehran in August 2020, recently cited jihadi sources saying Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul “was a Haqqani top secret project.”

Zawahiri’s death in a high-security district of Kabul is costly for the Taliban for many reasons. For months, they have allowed Zawahiri to produce and disseminate threats and incitement to violence from the soil of Afghanistan, directly violating the Doha accords.

Those arguing that this activity did not violate the accords risk missing the point. Irrespective of the semantics and technicalities, Zawahiri’s activities in Kabul were detrimental to the interests of the Taliban movement, its government, and the Afghan people.

What was the role of the senior Taliban leadership, apart from the Haqqanis, in Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul? They either approved it, or they didn’t know. Both possibilities make Taliban senior leadership look terrible. They cannot but take harsh measures against those involved internally and on the AQ side.

What happened makes the Taliban emirate’s need and desire to get international recognition and aid much more complicated than before. That will anger the Taliban government and exacerbate strife within the broader movement. In Afghanistan’s complex ethnic, tribal, and regional fabric of a thousand splendid patches, imagine the tensions that must now be brewing within the Taliban. 

This comes at a time when the Taliban is finding out what a huge responsibility and burden it is to govern and what heartbreakingly poor shape the country is in. Seeing their top priorities ruined by a bunch of irresponsible adventurers will make the Taliban furious.

For the sake of one man, AQ has shown it don’t care about the Taliban or the Afghan people. All the talk of how AQ members living in Afghanistan were heeding the Taliban’s conditions and authority has been exposed as futility. The Taliban will now have to look at every AQ member with distrust.

Zawahiri thus left the scene with explosive tension between AQ and the Taliban. In the most likely scenario, the Taliban will now be extremely tough with AQ remnants, giving them little choice between total obedience and expulsion.

In his last breath, Zawahiri destroyed AQ’s primary and vital safe haven irreversibly. It’s befitting of a leader known for prioritizing the narrow interests of his racist clique.

Under Taliban pressure, it won’t be surprising to see some AQ remnants joining Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP), which has become a magnet for extremists who have fallen out with the Taliban. The Taliban will now have to allocate meager resources to rein in AQ militants more closely.

Finally, isn’t the ultimate measure of success for a leader what kind of organization he leaves behind? Some say jokingly that Zawahiri reduced AQ to nothing but a boring podcast. That has a grain of truth to it.

Zawahiri leaves behind an organization with no clear succession plan. Some of the most likely candidates are in Iran, seemingly attracted to the worldview of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). They will have serious legitimacy issues as they will be seen as either co-opted by or willing collaborators of the Iranians.

AQ fanboys quickly moved from denial of Zawahiri’s death to celebrating his “martyrdom.” If they opened their eyes and hearts, they might see a different reality: Ayman al Zawahiri was not in Kabul seeking a glorious end. On the contrary, he was there looking out for the interests of himself and his family, just as he had always done. He certainly did not rush headlong toward martyrdom. 

In 1981, Zawahiri’s comrades killed Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, a hero of peace. That’s the root Zawahiri stems from, and after more than 40 years, his true legacy is about stealing hope from and wasting the energies of several generations of young Muslims, and harming countless other innocents.

None of this looks like success to me—or “a good sealing,” for that matter. 

Within Jihadi propaganda, terrorism in the West against ‘the crusaders’ or ‘the infidels’ features prominently. The AQAP-produced magazine Inspire specialized in calling for action and advising al-Qaida supporters on how to attack in addition to providing religious justification. The latest issue of Inspire was published in summer 2017, and since then a string of new magazines and supporter organizations calling for terrorist attacks has emerged. One such example is the Wolves of Manhattan magazine that has so far published three issues. 

In February 2022, another new magazine started to be shared on encrypted platforms carrying the title ‘O Mujahideen in the West’. Until now, the group behind the magazine, Hurras al-Tawheed, has published six issues and a Ramadan special issue.

Initially, the magazine did not stand out for its calls for jihad in the West. What really caught my attention was how it positioned itself within the Jihadi current and its way of communicating. Although disseminated through well-known al-Qaida channels and praising al-Qaida pioneers, it made it explicit that its objective was to unify al-Qaida and Islamic State sympathizers in the West, to settle their internal differences and animosity to enable a unified covert military front threatening Western security. 

With regard to communication, its format and style of writing was short and concise, and the editor even explained why. Since it was addressed to the youth, it should not be long, dry and boring since no youth would ever read it. Instead, it should offer brief justifications for attacks and simple recipes for how to conduct them.

These emphases of the magazine were intriguing, and they prompted me to make contact with Hurras al-Tawheed, which agreed to an email interview telling me more about itself, its propaganda, and its raison d’être. I should add that Hurras al-Tawheed responded to every single one of my questions, providing long and seemingly honest answers.

Besides elaborating on the above issues, the interview offers exciting insights into al-Qaida’s online ecosystem, the state of Jihadi supporters in the West, and not least the origin and structure of Hurras al-Tawheed.

Below you find the entire interview.

Question: To begin with can you tell me about the origins of Hurras al-Tawheed? It first appeared online on Rocket.Chat in mid-February. Was this the beginning of the group?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed was established before February but was a closed group online, it did not have have any online presence and kept everything between close brothers only. The step towards going online was due to the members thinking that we should try to invite other Muslims to Jihad before seeking our martyrdom, because Allah says:

“So fight, [O Muhammad], in the cause of Allah ; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And encourage the believers [to join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the [military] might of those who disbelieve. And Allah is greater in might and stronger in [exemplary] punishment.” 

[sūrat l-nisāa (The Women) Verse 84]

That is why in February we took our first leap into “Al-Qaeda rocket chat”.

Question: Is it exclusively a media unit or is it better understood as a group with a structure and a political objective?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed started as something really humble and small, however after the release of our first magazine, our inboxes where full of supporters in the West filled with excitement and joy over the magazine. Even though the magazine was really primitive at first, but it still manage to garner people from the West and Alhamdulillah to the East. Because of this, we were motivated to try making another magazine and see how it is received, and by the grace of Allah, many brothers and sisters came to us with joy and happiness. 

In the midst of this excitement, an Al-Qaeda media worker contacted us and asked us to explain who we are and if we are the one who makes the magazine or not, which we said that his claim was positive, and gave us advice in how to further structure our group, and we followed their example and showed our gratitude for their advice.

It is narrated on the authority of Tamim ad-Dari that the Prophet (ﷺ) said:
“The Religion is sincerity.” We said, “To whom?” He said “To Allah, to His Book, To His Messenger, and to the leaders of the Muslims and their masses.”

[Sahih Muslim 55a]

By the grace of Allah, we were bombarded with positive comments and saw the joy of the believers, and decided to start gathering people for the sake of Allah. We never planned it to go this far, but by the will of Allah, we saw many people wishing to help in any way they could, from seniors and majority from the youth, sick and strong. The Structure of Hurras Al-Tawheed became established, and here it is:

Hurras Al-Tawheed, with the help from Allah have 3 departments:

1. Al-Hijra
2. Al-Jihad
3. The Media

Al-Hijra: This department has the task of guiding the Muhajireen to their destination, giving them tips and guidance in how to reach their destination as safe as possible, and try to establish a network in these different countries with different groups to accept the Muhajireen we send. All praise is due to Allah, we have sent many Muhajireen to their destination and we ask Allah to grant us more chances to be a service for the Ummah. As this is the second most neglected duty of a Muslim.

Al-Jihad: This department is for soldiers who wants to attack the Disbelievers where they feel the most safest, in their own home country. Main task of this department is to gather weapons which is easily acquirable and can be used by the lone wolf during his operation. Grant the lone wolves 1 to 1 conversation in who to attack and how to go about it. What do expect during the operation and how to win against the fear. If possible, fund the operations and do our part so we can get a share of his or her blessed attack.

The Media: This is our biggest department, we have translators from the West to the East, willing to give their time to translate different works and try to spread the message of Hurras Al-Tawheed. Alhamdulillah, the magazine has become longer and more detailed, and increased in quality, due to so many contribution for its success. We appreciate any Believer who helps us, no matter how insignificant it seems, it is big in the movement of Jihad. All praise and glory is due to Allah alone.

Question: Also can you tell me more about yourself? I just know that you are the spokesperson of Hurras al-Tawheed and it appears that you are the ‘face’ of HAT publishing all its messages. Hence, it is relevant to know more about yourself.

Answer: We did not see it appropriate to talk about the spokesperson too freely as media attention is coming our way, and we do not want to put our brother in any position of harm, however here is an explanation of him:

Abu Yahya Al-Khurasani, is one of the co-founders of Hurras Al-Tawheed, he has been here since the beginning and was picked by the members to be the one to drive the group forward. We deemed him to be a good leader with great vision. If we have any disagreement with him, he is quick to listen and make our stands together stronger. 

Here are some of our members and what they think of Abu Yahya:

Abu Ibrahim:

I have known Abu Yahya for more than a year now and i have come to like his maturity, leadership skills, and character as a whole. I think he would be best suitable for the spokesperson role because of these reasons

Abu Abdullah:

Abu Yahya is the most fit to be the spokesman from us due to his experience and great managing skills. He has faith in his choices and is well respected, Allahuma Barik. He obeys the orders of the emir and doesn’t go against him unless it’s advice. He knows who he is addressing and how to address them. His hate and anger doesn’t overcome him, which is essential when being a spokesman.

Abu Luqman:

Abu Yahya is a brother I deem to be the best person in the position of spokesman, he is a brother who thinks deeply before speaking. He is a person I have much trust in due to his skill and experience. Allahuma barik. He knows when and how to speak, and doesn’t allow emotions to have an impact on him when speaking. I believe these are important qualities a spokesperson needs, and therefore believe he is best fit for the position of spokesman.

Question: I came to know of Hurras al-Tawheed because of the magazine ‘O Mujahideen in the West’. What can you tell me about the magazine?

A: The magazine “O Mujahideen in the West” is an effort from Hurras Al-Tawheed to make the Muslims in the West to understand that they have been fooled about Islam and they want to white-wash Islam, to be make Islam more inclined and tolerant towards modern filth, such as feminism, liberalism, pro-sodomy etc. To quote from the Qur’an and Sunnah and show them the statements of our great scholars and what they think we should do in our time and situation. The war around the world, which as instigated by the Disbelievers, and how to solve this by using the sword and do not neglect the duty of Jihad. 

We chose English as our main language, as it is the most widely spoken around the world, especially the lingua franca of the West. Many thing Jihad is an exclusive club for the Arab speakers, this is wrong, by reading our magazine, you will be quick to realize that there is so much a “english-speaker” can do, or any other language. A sword has one function, and no language barrier will stop you from using it.

Question: For me the striking part about the magazine and HAT’s general statements are the explicit calls for action in the West. You write that you “want to open the doors to hijrah and Jihad” for people in the West. Is such operations the primary objective of the group?

A: The main work of Hurras Al-Tawheed is to facilitate Jihad and HIjrah. The most neglected duties of the Ummah. It could be that the Believer feel agitated about the war crimes of the West and wish to do an operation here, or feel the urgency to return home to the land of Jihad and help the groups there to fight against the apostates and disbelievers. These are the main objectives of the group Alhamdulillah. 

Question: Operations in the West have since 2015 mainly been associated with the Islamic State and in recent years, very few attacks have occurred, and only a handful can be associated with al-Qaida. Is it your objective to promote new attacks carried out by supporters of al-Qaida?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed has not made the magazine exclusive to Al-Qaeda supporters, it is for every Muslim who resides in Western countries to do an attack. May it be Tandhim Dawlah or Tandhim Al-Qaeda. We want to be among those who try to revive the movement of Jihad in the West, if blood is what we have to pay, so be it. Lone wolves does not need any association with a group to earn his place in Jannah. So let any of the two groups spread terror, and use our magazine if needed. 

And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged.

[sūrat l-anfāl (The Spoils of War) Verse: 60]

Question: At some point you write that HAT is based in the West as well. What can you say about this?

A: With this we mean that we have not taken our leap and made an official base, but we are residing in different Western countries, physical support is needed, we will try to provide one. We are entirely online, if Allah will that our Hijrah department continues to send Muhajireen, we will take talk to our contacts and let them know that we wish to take the next step, however this is all in the Hands of Allah. Success does not come without Sabr, we have given it before and we can continue give Sabr by the permissions of Allah.

Question: Another interesting point is a thing mentioned in issue 3 of the magazine. You write that you “have understood that the youth are used to short and quick information” making you follow the mantra ‘Quick – Simple – True’. This is the reason why the magazine was initially short and absent of long articles. In your view, what does this say about the youth nowadays and also the new generation of Jihadis?

A: Initially the magazines were and we were going to keep it short. Just show how to make different bombs and let the reader use the magazine as a recipe book. We were criticized due to it and we did not care about the blame of the blamers, however, many Believers looked forward to the magazine and said that they wait eagerly for the next issue. Many said that they were re-living the experience of “inspire” magazine from Al-Malahim. We saw how important another “inspire” magazine was needed in the West and English speakers so we decided to put more effort into the magazine, hence why the quality of the magazine increased by the grace of Allah alone. We try to make them easy to read and try to not bore the reader with too much of the same content. We try to make this magazine more engaging, by introducing “Sawt Al-Muwahid”, so the any Muslim can try to tell their own story. 

We had no plan on being the new Inspire magazine, however we are happy that we got many readers from Inspire magazine who shares them around. Our team finds joy in reading the great feedback from the Believers who enjoys reading our work. This motivates us even further to make more and more content for them to enjoy. 

Question: The latest issue (issue 6) is 44 pages and issue 5 was 16 pages. Why this change and is this an indication that HAT is growing bigger with more capacity to produce its media publications?

A: As mentioned previously, our media team is growing by the grace of Allah, and this has made it more viable for us to produce more and satisfy the demand.

Question: In the magazine (issue 4) you also write that HAT is not an al-Qaida magazine and that the group is not against the Islamic State. But HAT is present on the al-Qaida Rocket.Chat server and promotes historic al-Qaida leaders. How should this be understood?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed has not given any official pledge of allegiance to any group, we want the Muslim in the West to forget this Fitnah which came from Sham. We do not see the need for a lone wolf to worry what group to affiliate himself with, rather we want him to fully dedicate his or her life to Allah and do an operation for the sake of the entire Ummah, not for a group. So we will help the lone wolf no matter what his affiliation with is, unless we disagree with the operation.

If an operation does not bring a lot of benefit, we will guide the lone wolf Mujahid and tell him to pursue other missions, if he does not take our advice, we will take our distance from him or her, and we try to free ourselves from the crimes for those who fight for the sake of their own desires.

Question: Relating to the questions above, you write about the fitna between al-Qaida and the Islamic State that split the Jihadi movement. These tensions are still vividly present in much of the Muslim world where these groups are active, but you write that this Ramadan should be used as an opportunity to “unite and forgive” among Jihadis in the West. Can you say more about this project and how you see the milieu in the West develop in the future?

A: As for the groups in the East, there have been multiple times to settle the dispute between the groups but sadly it usually ends with bloodshed. For the believers in the West, constantly hearing these two groups fighting each other while they could have entirely focused the invaders, brings sadness to the Ummah. So for the Believers in the West, what we can do is try to sow the seed of unity in them, so the animosity between these groups decreases and eventually with the help from Allah,  in the future, the youth of these groups will eventually seek unity rather than disunity. We have been criticized by side of Dawlah and the side of Al-Qaeda. We understand that this is not easy to achieve, and many have cursed and insulted us by trying. 

what good idea comes without consequences of dogs barking? We do this for the sake of Allah, if this brings no benefit to the movement of Jihad, than we ask Allah to make us understand, and make us move to other important issues. For now, Hurras Al-Tawheed wants the supporters to not bring any harm to each other in the West, all the focus should be at the Disbelieving criminals.

Question: Are you attempting to forge a middle group similar to the efforts of sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi?

A: Shaykhuna Abu Muhammed Al-Maqdisi, May Allah grant him and his family the best in this world and the next. We Hurras Al-Tawheed has high respect for our shaykh who has exhausted his tongue in trying to guide the Mujahideen around the world. As mentioned previously, making such “middle group” is not easy and it will need a lot of sacrifice. As we know that there was an effort made to settle the dispute among Dawlah in 2014 and sadly those who tried to settle the dispute where executed. May Allah grant them martyrdom, Amin.

Question: In issue 5 you focus on killing prison guards. How come you see this as particularly important?

A: By Attacking the guards, and focusing our fire at the prison guards, it will make the Disbelievers more wary in imprisoning Muslims, and will waste more money to upgrade their security. There are many guards who abuse the Believers in prisons, and we do not want these Criminals to live life without justice. Many prisons around the world are torturing innocent people, especially scholars. We Hurras Al-Tawheed want to make it easy for the lone wolves, and give them a legitimate target, which is attacking prisons at the best of their ability. Killing guards on their way home, or on their way to work. Weaken their mentality and grant anxiety to the guards and make them rethink before abusing another Muslim. 

Incite the believer to do more “prison break” operations, such as the operation to save Shaykh Khalid Batarfi (May Allah preserve him).

The reason why these scholars are in jail is because the government knows that if the youth listens to them, their reign will collapse and justice will prevail. So targeting prisons and guards around the world. As long as 1 Muslim is inside that prison, we hope that a lone wolf will pick his weapon and seek revenge for that single Believer. These operations are not exclusive to the West, rather we want Saudia to be the most prepared for these attacks. The scholars told the apostate government to not ally with the Invaders, the leaders of Saudia does what it does the best, bowing down to other than Allah, and the scholars were taken to jail and tortured, where they are still inside and suffering. 

Question: In addition to HAT, you established the media wing al-Bidayah. Does this imply that HAT is evolving more into a group of mujahideen with a separate institution dedicated to media as one part of HAT activities? (…) Announcement came on 13 March, but now two months later, no videos have been issued. Why is that? What kind of videos can be expected?

A: In the intial message, Abu Yahya made the message really clear that Al-Bidayah will take its leap into videomaking, however it will take time. How long? Allah knows best. Jihad will last until the Day of Judgement, so there is no need for hastiness. Whatever Allah has willed, will happen. I am not allowed to give further details of Al-Bidayah.

Question: Most recently you started collaborating with TTP’s Umar Media. Is this because HAT sees itself as the global Jihadist movement or because there is a special relation with the group in Pakistan?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed wants to use all of our resources to help the Mujahideen around the world. We know that Urdu translators are needed, and we had no issues in helping our brothers in Umar Media in translating some of their messages. This does not mean we have given our pledge of allegiance, however it means that any group who wants our help, we will be willing to give our time and effort to help them in whatever task they ask of us. Alhamdulillah, by the grace of Allah, we have established contacts in different parts of the world, however I was told to refrain to mention anything until official messages had been made.

We ask Allah to deliver our message and make it easily understood by the masses. O Allah bring victory to Islam and the Believers!

On October 17, 2004, al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, the precursor organization to the Islamic State, issued a statement announcing with much fanfare that its leader Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi had pledged “allegiance” (bay‘a) on behalf of his group “to the mujahid Shaykh Usama bin Ladin, to listen and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity”. The communiqué specified that for eight months there had been “communications between Shaykh Abu Mus‘ab […] and the brothers in al-Qa‘ida and views were exchanged [between the two parties]”. The result was the creation of “al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Two Rivers”, better known as al-Qa‘ida in Iraq.

More than seventeen years later, much of the story behind these eight months of talks remains unknown. To date, the most widely known primary source on the topic has been a seventeen-page letter from al-Zarqawi to Usama bin Ladin and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. Intercepted by the U.S. in January 2004, the text is a blueprint for insurgency in which the Jordanian outlines his vision for jihad in Iraq and proposes to join al-Qa‘ida if its leaders agree to his strategy. While important for understanding the beginning of the process, this letter is just one piece of a much larger correspondence in which a merger was discussed both between al-Qa‘ida Central and its counterpart in Iraq and among the al-Qa‘ida senior leadership. The question remains as to how the two groups eventually agreed to join forces.

Over the past two years, I have been digging into the materials recovered from Bin Ladin’s compound in Abbottabad and came across a number of documents which add significant new pieces to the puzzle. One document proved particularly illuminating. Written by a certain “Wakil Khan”, it is a five-page Arabic letter dated October 18, 2004 in which the author essentially updates Bin Ladin on al-Qa‘ida’s latest developments worldwide to keep his leader in the picture and seek his guidance on key issues. While a good portion of the document deals with the group’s various fortunes in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the most pressing matter to Khan was clearly the Iraqi battlefield, which he described as “ablaze”.

This post focuses on the Iraqi angle of the letter. As will be seen, the letter provides the most detailed first-hand account of the negotiations between al-Qa‘ida Central and al-Zarqawi’s group leading to their union. It also presents new information on some of the lesser known players who were active in these talks between al-Qa‘ida in Pakistan and al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. In addition to the letter by Wakil Khan, the post draws on some additional Abbottabad letters cited here for the first time, including ones by Bin Ladin and al-Zarqawi, further helping to chronicle this milestone in the history of the global jihadi movement.

Wakil and ‘Abdallah Khan

If the name Wakil Khan sounds unfamiliar, it is because it is just one of the multiple aliases of Abu al-Faraj al-Libi. This Tripoli-born al-Qa‘ida veteran joined the organization after he was trained at its al-Faruq camp in Khost in early 1990. A member of al-Qa‘ida’s military committee, al-Libi emerged as a major figure in the group’s training efforts in Afghanistan during the 1990s, serving as an instructor for future cadres and operatives, from Fadil Harun to some of the 9/11 hijackers, and running the group’s training camps and guesthouses.

After the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, al-Libi resettled in Pakistan along with another central player in the Khurasan-Iraq nexus, namely ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, whom al-Libi refers to as “‘Abdallah Khan” in his letter. A former Iraqi army officer, al-Iraqi fought in the ranks of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s before participating in the training of Tajik volunteers in Khost, alongside al-Libi and others. After Bin Ladin’s return to Afghanistan in 1996, he joined up with the Saudi and became al-Qa‘ida’s frontline commander in Afghanistan and a member of its Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council).

In Pakistan, according to another Abbottabad document written on November 19, 2002, al-Libi initially acted as al-Iraqi’s deputy. By the time he composed his letter to Bin Ladin, however, the Libyan had been promoted, according to the U.S., to the position of al-Qa‘ida Central’s “general manager subordinate only to Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri”. Meanwhile, al-Iraqi continued to play a leading role in the organization’s military efforts in Afghanistan.

Besides their portfolios in Khurasan, the two also managed al-Qa‘ida’s “Iraq file” and were instrumental in cementing ties with al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. For example, it was al-Iraqi who dispatched Hassan Ghul—a prominent Pakistani facilitator formerly affiliated with the Khaldan camp in Khost—as al-Qa‘ida’s emissary to al-Zarqawi. Ghul served in this role until his capture in Iraqi Kurdistan on January 23, 2004; with him was found the seventeen-page letter from al-Zarqawi to Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Around this time, al-Iraqi considered traveling to Iraq himself but al-Zarqawi rejected the idea.

Al-Iraqi’s involvement in al-Qa‘ida’s Iraq dossier would eventually lead to his capture. In June 2006, Bin Ladin instructed him to go to Iraq but al-Iraqi was arrested in Gaziantep, Turkey, on October 16, 2006, in an episode well-documented by Brian Fishman. 

One of the things that the Abbottabad files reveal is that his 2006 failed attempt was not the first time al-Iraqi was supposed to travel to Iraq. A letter from Bin Ladin to al-Libi  indicates that as early as June-August 2004, al-Iraqi was preparing his departure for Iraq from Pakistan’s Tribal Areas. “We are eager for him to depart as quickly and safely as possible”, says the leader of al-Qa‘ida, who also advises that once in Iraq al-Iraqi should primarily focus on bolstering jihad against the U.S.-led coalition while “[preventing] the opening of other secondary fronts, such as [against] the Shi’ites”.

If Bin Ladin was enthusiastic about al-Iraqi heading to Iraq, al-Libi’s letter to Bin Ladin (the one he signs as “Wakil Khan”) shows that this sentiment was far from being shared by everyone inside al-Qa‘ida. According to al-Libi, the plan sparked opposition from “many of the brothers” within the group’s senior cadre, including the two Egyptian commanders Khalid al-Habib and Abu al-Hasan al-Misri. At the time, al-Habib headed al-Qa‘ida’s military operations in Afghanistan—a portfolio he had recently inherited from al-Iraqi—while al-Misri was in charge of the Zabul and Kandahar areas. The brothers, according to al-Libi, worried that al-Iraqi’s arrival might cause troubles in Iraq, citing his problematic “way of dealing” with others. Al-Libi himself refers to the difficulty that al-Iraqi has with taking orders (“he is not easily led”), and later in the letter he mentions “problems” with al-Iraqi’s leadership in Afghanistan, noting that these “problems (…) have significantly decreased” since al-Habib took over for him. 

If al-Iraqi went to Iraq, it was not clear to al-Libi what status he would enjoy once there. Would he serve as al-Zarqawi’s amir? Would he be al-Zarqawi’s “subordinate” (tabi’)? Or would he work independently? Considering all three options to be bad, the Libyan and his inner circle suggested to Bin Ladin that he dispatch al-Iraqi as an “adviser” (mustashar) to al-Zarqawi. Given the sensitivity of the issue, al-Libi urged Bin Ladin to personally weigh in and “to define the mission and role of [al-Iraqi] and to set forth regulations for him and a clear plan for his departure”, especially since contacting al-Iraqi would be more difficult once he is on his way out of Pakistan.

News from Iraq

Al-Libi’s concerns about al-Iraqi’s upcoming journey were not the only reason he wrote his missive. The Libyan also needed to brief Bin Ladin on his meeting with Abu Ja‘far al-Iraqi, a senior facilitator who, like Hassan Ghul, used to be affiliated with the Khaldan camp and worked closely with its leading figures Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. At the time of his meeting with al-Libi, Abu Ja‘far was acting as al-Zarqawi’s representative to al-Qa‘ida in Khurasan. Following the central organization’s request “to learn about what is happening [in Iraq], and thereby to be able to arrange the work of the brother ‘Abdallah [‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi]”, Abu Ja‘far went and saw al-Libi to discuss the “reality of the situation there.”.

Speaking to al-Libi on al-Zarqawi’s behalf, Abu Ja‘far portrayed al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad as the undisputed leading militant group in the field, claiming that “90% of the jihadi operations that are carried out there are arranged by brother [Abu] Mus‘ab” and his allies. “All the major operations and most of the small operations” are attributable to al-Zarqawi, he noted, including the attack on the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, the double suicide bombings against a Polish military camp in al-Hillah on February 18, 2004, and the suicide boat attacks against the Basra oil terminal on April 24, 2004. He added that “most of the mujahid groups there have joined Abu Mus‘ab”, that these newcomers were bound by “a legal oath to wage jihad”, and that the number of these groups was increasing. “During the meeting I counted with [Abu Ja‘far] the number of members of the groups, which reached thousands, not including the supporters from other countries, and these figures are not exhaustive”, wrote al-Libi.

The Iraqi theater was also promising owing to the ease of access for volunteers from neighboring Arab countries. “The roads are open from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan”, Abu Ja‘far explained, and large numbers of foreign volunteers were pouring in, so many “that the brothers were beginning to stop their influx” and send some back to their home countries.

The leading status of al-Zarqawi’s group was illustrated by the territorial control that it enjoyed in Iraq’s Sunni areas. Abu Ja‘far told al-Libi that they had “complete control” over Fallujah, Samarra, Baqubah and large parts of Ramadi. In Fallujah, where al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad had established its headquarters, the jihadis enjoyed such power that they were the ones patrolling the city at night, allowing Iraqi police officers and soldiers to patrol during the day though these were accompanied by “the mujahidin”.

There was also “no shortage of weapons and ammunition”, as “more than 80% of the Iraqi army’s weapons and ammunition had fallen into the hands of the brothers”, according to Abu Ja‘far. He further claimed that they were in heated competition with the U.S. to buy the explosives and weapons being sold in the markets. As for financing, Abu Ja‘far indicated that the group was able to raise funds internally from the “war booty” acquired during operations and that it still hadn’t used its hostages to obtain ransom payments despite the amount offered by its enemies, including during the detention of the U.S. national Nicholas Berg who was beheaded by al-Zarqawi in the spring of 2004.

The broader insurgency in Iraq was also a topic of discussion between al-Libi and Abu Ja‘far. Among those discussed was Ansar al-Sunna, a Kurdish-dominated jihadi group cooperating with al-Zarqawi’s group and linked to al-Qa‘ida Central. According to al-Libi, “their work appears to be very limited” and “they are unwilling to operate in their areas (Kurdistan)”. This had led many of their members to defect to al-Zarqawi.

The discussion also revolved around non-jihadi elements of the Iraqi insurgency. Regarding the Islamic Army, a Sunni Islamist armed faction, al-Libi was told that it was made up of “unidentified Iraqi brothers” who were not veterans of known jihadi fronts, but that they were “good brothers” and there was “good cooperation” between them and al-Zarqawi’s group. As for the Islamic Party, another Sunni Iraqi armed group, al-Libi was not enthusiastic, saying that “their position is known to you” and adding that some of their members had begun to carry out small operations. 

External Operations

In light of these promising reports from al-Zarqawi’s group, al-Libi was keen on capitalizing on the Iraqi jihad to further al-Qa‘ida’s global ambitions. In the letter he envisages, together with the colleagues he has consulted, relocating the Pakistan-based external operations wing to Iraq, suggesting that “one of the brothers with experience in [the field of] special activity” (i.e. terrorist attacks) redeploy there. Two Egyptian veterans of the first Afghan jihad are mentioned as the top candidates for the job: Hamza al-Al-Rabi‘a and Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir. A former bodyguard of al-Zawahiri’s, al-Al-Rabi‘a began his career in the Egyptian al-Jihad Group, whose security committee he headed, before joining al-Qa‘ida and running its external operations branch. As for al-Muhajir, he was al-Qa‘ida’s top bombmaker for its attacks in Khurasan and overseas, including the 1998 East Africa bombings, which earned him the nickname “the martyrdom operations engineer”.

To justify this risky shift, al-Libi underlines the difficulties faced by al-Qa‘ida in Pakistan as a result of the growing security pressure on its members in the country. Over the past months, a series of raids against al-Qa‘ida’s infrastructure in Karachi, Lahore and Quetta had battered the network Al-Rabi‘a and al-Libi relied on to facilitate and direct international attacks. Among the losses was Naeem Noor Khan (“Talha”), a Pakistani computer engineer involved in al-Qa‘ida’s plotting in the U.K. As a result of this crackdown, “most of the members of [Al-Rabi‘a’s] group were caught”, laments al-Libi.

In the process, the organization also lost “some important documents”, al-Libi says, referring in particular to the raid against al-Qa‘ida’s “documents office” (maktab al-watha’iq) in Punjab’s city of Gujarat on July 24, 2004. The raid had led to the arrest of Ahmad Khalfan Ghailani (“Haytham”), a senior member of the office from Tanzania involved in the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, and Abu Tariq al-Pakistani, an al-Qa‘ida trainer. While al-Al-Rabi‘a himself narrowly evaded arrest during the Gujarat raid, “the work of our brother Al-Rabi‘a was severely affected” and “his work has practically halted”, assesses al-Libi.  

By contrast, the Iraqi front presented a new opportunity for al-Qa‘ida to revitalize its transnational attacks. In the eyes of al-Libi and his aides, moving there would enable the external operations department to tap into a massive influx of foreign fighters from diverse backgrounds, train new recruits who could then be deployed in future missions, and more generally develop capacity and experience. Iraq also had the advantage of being easily accessible, unlike Pakistan, where “simply renting a home or bringing in a brother from abroad” could cost as much as carrying out an entire operation. “Unless matters speed up or you agree to relocate the activity to Iraq”, al-Libi says to Bin Ladin, then al-Qa‘ida’s capacity to plan attacks overseas will remain limited.  

Targeting the Near Enemy

During their meeting, al-Libi and Abu Ja‘far also addressed the contentious issue of targeting priorities, i.e., whether to attack the far enemy (the U.S. and the West) or the near enemy (apostate governments and their allies). Al-Libi relates that Abu Ja‘far asked him about “some of the issues pertaining to fighting the apostates”, noting that al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad had been making preparations for neighbouring countries, including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Besides transporting and storing weapons, these preparations included training large numbers of recruits and sending them back to their countries “in anticipation of the collapses and changes that may occur in the region when the Americans leave”.

Al-Libi answered that it was his understanding that while Bin Ladin “did not oppose fighting the apostates” he viewed it as “an advanced stage” of jihad, believing that “the current stage is the stage of fighting the greater unbelief (the Americans) and that this is the key to our struggle”. Nonetheless, al-Libi had positive feedback for Abu Ja‘far, maintaining that he agreed with al-Zarqawi’s strategy. “What al-Zarqawi is doing”, al-Libi told Abu Ja‘far, namely “striking the Americans in Iraq and all the apostates who help them”, and using “the Iraqi theater to make preparations for neighboring countries in terms of training and arrangements”, is “absolutely correct”.

While al-Zarqawi at least consulted with al-Qa‘ida regarding his plans for the broader region, he appeared more uncompromising when it came to his stance on Iraq’s Shi’a, whom his group had been attacking in hopes of igniting a sectarian civil war. In his letter, al-Libi recounts that he asked Abu Ja‘far specifically about the operations against the Shi‘a, notably in Karbala and Najaf, and that the Iraqi did not shy away from claiming responsibility for “almost all of them”. The justification for this campaign of violence, according to Abu Ja‘far, was the Shi‘a machinations in the post-war political void. In Abu Ja‘far’s words, the Shi‘a had established the Badr Corps which went to Baghdad and took control of Sunni mosques. They had also arrested Sunni religious figures and attacked Sunni men and women. The Sunnis lived in a “state of fear” of the Shi‘a, al-Libi was told, and this was not to mention that they were “the nucleus of the police and army” formed by the “nations of unbelief”. Because of all this, the Sunnis deemed it necessary to “restrain” the Shi‘a, and the situation has since “significantly changed and the Shi‘a have begun to reckon with the mujahidin”.

After his discussion with Abu Ja‘far, al-Libi sent the minutes of the meeting to al-Zawahiri. While the Egyptian responded similarly to al-Libi as regards “the apostates” (meaning neighboring countries), he told the Libyan that he was opposed to “opening a front” against the Shi’a in Iraq—a stance similar to Bin Ladin’s. Given the sensitivity of the issue, however, al-Libi explains to Bin Laden that he refrained from sharing this response of al-Zawahiri’s with al-Zarqawi’s team. This decision was made in consultation with, among others, Hamzah al-Al-Rabi‘a and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi, al-Zawahiri’s son-in-law and head of al-Qa‘ida’s al-Sahab Media Foundation. Al-Libi’s view was that it was best to keep al-Zawahiri’s opinion from al-Zarqawi for the time being, given that Zawahiri’s “decision” on the Shi‘a would “clash with the reality there as far as the brothers are concerned”. The Libyan likely reasoned that al-Zawahiri’s instructions would put them between a rock and a hard place, and that in any event it was not necessary to relay them at this point since, as he believed, once the bay‘a process was finalized then such an order would be binding on al-Zarqawi’s group. Since al-Zawahiri’s views were based on al-Libi’s briefing, the Libyan decided to ask al-Zarqawi for a “detailed report” on this issue which would then be sent to Bin Ladin or al-Zawahiri so that they could make a more informed decision which would not “put the brothers in an uncomfortable position with the first order coming from our side”. 

In a subsequent Abbottabad document, almost certainly a letter from al-Zarqawi to al-Libi, the anonymous author explains how important it was for him that al-Qa‘ida understand and support his action in Iraq. “Our strategy here differs from any other location”, he writes, adding that “for this reason, we sent [Abu] Ja‘far to you all to express this”. Part of Abu Ja’far’s mission was thus to dispel any concerns that al-Qa‘ida might have regarding al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, most importantly regarding the Shi‘a issue, such that “everything would be clear” and there would be no impediment to a merger. Cognisant of al-Qa‘ida’s lingering misgivings about his takfiri-leaning methodology, al-Zarqawi was worried that if there were “some opinions that oppose the nature of our work here, then undoubtedly this would lead to disturbance and conflict that we are in no need of during this trying time”. The fact that al-Zawahiri did have concerns with his strategy was deliberately withheld from al-Zarqawi by al-Libi.

Joining al-Qa‘ida

When he dispatched his representative Abu Ja’far to meet with al-Libi, al-Zarqawi entrusted Abu Ja‘far not only with conveying the “reality of the situation” in Iraq to al-Qa‘ida Central but also, more importantly, with offering his allegiance (bay‘a) to Bin Ladin on his behalf. Abu Ja’far informed al-Libi that al-Zarqawi was waiting for Bin Ladin’s approval before announcing the good news. In his letter, al-Libi provides Bin Ladin with a detailed picture of how the merger process was finalized, attaching the latest correspondence— written in code words—between himself and al-Zarqawi’s group that paved the way for the latter’s bay’a declaration on October 17, 2004. 

As recounted to Bin Ladin, al-Libi told Abu Ja‘far that as far as he was concerned, “the subject of the bay‘a, God willing, has been completed”, and the only issue requiring consultation with al-Qa‘ida’s senior leadership related to the framing of the announcement. After the meeting, al-Libi discussed the matter with al-Zawahiri, who gave his blessing to the union but added a caveat: the announcement should not be made in al-Zarqawi’s name alone but rather on behalf of  “the collectivity of the mujahidin in Iraq”. Al-Libi and his entourage, including Hamza al-Al-Rabi‘a and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi, disapproved of al-Zawahiri’s idea. In his letter, the Libyan explains to Bin Ladin that given that al-Zarqawi could not claim authority over those outside his own group, any statement on behalf of “the mujahidin in Iraq”, as if representing the entire insurgency, could create a backlash and weaken the initiative. These concerns may have been driven by what al-Libi knew of al-Zarqawi’s limited reach within the local militant environment. An “Iraqi leadership” was nowhere to be found in the Jordanian’s group, and veteran Iraqi jihadis had turned their back on the fight.

After these consultations with al-Zawahiri and other close companions, al-Libi sent a message to al-Zarqawi’s group to inform them about the al-Qa‘ida leadership’s final deliberations. “The companion of the father [al-Zawahiri] tells Ahmad [al-Zarqawi] to put his trust in Allah and announce what has taken place. And he suggests that the announcement be made in the name of your group [al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad].” In addition to giving al-Zarqawi the go-ahead, al-Libi informed him that al-Qa‘ida needed “a more detailed report concerning your conditions in order to put our brothers here in the picture and enable them to consult with you on some of the issues”, alluding to the divergences between al-Qa‘ida and al-Zarqawi on the Shi’a in Iraq.

Al-Zarqawi replied to al-Libi in a six-line message in which he said: “We are gladdened by your response and pleased by your message, and God willing we will announce publicly in the next 48 hours that we are children of the father [Bin Ladin] and a branch of the root [al-Qa‘ida] as you suggested, provided that the new name becomes ‘Kata’ib al-Tawhid’ instead of ‘Jama’at al-Tawhid’”. Al-Libi recounts to Bin Ladin that after receiving this message “we were awaiting the announcement” when he received another message from al-Zarqawi—which is not attached—saying that his group wanted “full incorporation” such that it would retitle itself and “claim operations in the name of al-Qa‘ida and under such-and-such a battalion or battalions”. Al-Libi replied that this was “exactly what we sought” and that al-Zarqawi’s group should claim operations in “the well-known company name [al-Qa‘ida] and under the name of a battalion or battalions belonging to our well-known company name”, insisting that the merger be proclaimed “in the name of your company, not just its director”.

In his last (oral) message sent to al-Libi before the merger, al-Zarqawi asked the Libyan to push for an official release from al-Qa‘ida in which the organization would bless the initiative and advise other militants in Iraq and the Levant to join and support it. The Jordanian wanted this statement to be delivered by Bin Ladin personally.

In his letter, al-Libi suggests that Bin Ladin do something along the lines of what al-Zarqawi requested. Given the hardships facing the brothers in Fallujah, he explains, Bin Ladin should make a statement that would “encourage the youth there” and urge Muslims in Iraq and the Levant to join al-Qa‘ida’s new franchise. According to al-Libi, this would also be an opportunity for Bin Ladin to officially sign off on the joining of al-Zarqawi’s group with al-Qa‘ida. Given the weight his words carry, Bin Ladin’s “blessing” would “strengthen [al-Zarqawi’s] position”.

Bin Ladin Out of the Loop?

Judging from the Abbottabad files, it appears that the leader of al-Qa‘ida was virtually left out of the talks between his organization and al-Zarqawi’s group.

First, it is worth highlighting that al-Libi composed the letter to bring Bin Ladin up to date about the negotiation process after the merger had taken place. The announcement by al-Zarqawi’s group had been made on October 17, 2004, the day before al-Libi was writing. The timeline of events discussed is also telling. While al-Libi does not date his meeting with Abu Ja‘far, he tells Bin Ladin that the number of al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad’s members provided by the Iraqi was from “four months ago”, i.e. June, and he notifies his leader about the death or capture of operatives that occured between May and July. This is probably the same “mid-2004 meeting” mentioned by Abu Ja‘far during his detention—he was arrested in Iraq in 2005—when he related that al-Libi had “requested al-Zarqawi [to] provide Chinese anti-aircraft missiles for al-Qa‘ida’s use against helicopters and other military aircraft in Afghanistan”. All of this suggests that the Libyan had not written to Bin Ladin in months.

That there had been a lengthy breakdown in communication between the two is further confirmed by al-Libi in his letter when he relates that, after his final correspondence with al-Zarqawi right before the merger, he received a message that ‘Abd al-Khaliq—the “go-between with Bin Ladin since mid-2003” according to al-Libi in his interrogation—was looking for him (i.e., al-Libi). “I was very happy and praised Allah for providing this opportunity to apprise you of this issue with you”, he writes, suggesting that he had not been able to do so previously. 

The significance of this breakdown lies in the nature of al-Libi’s duties. Given that the Libyan was the gatekeeper connecting Bin Ladin to the rest of the organization, any communication disruption between the two meant that the leader of al-Qa‘ida had very few options left to be kept informed or to send instructions in a timely manner. At this time, contacting Bin Ladin was not easy, even for someone as senior as al-Libi. The latter acknowledges as much in his letter, noting in response to al-Zarqawi’s request that Bin Ladin personally sanction the merger, “Of course, the brothers there [in Iraq] are not aware of how long our correspondence with you takes”.

With the amir of al-Qa‘ida being unable to oversee the merger process, it seems that the task befell his deputy. Indeed, it was al-Zawahiri, not Bin Ladin, whom al-Libi first updated and consulted with on the negotiations after his meeting with Abu Ja’far. It was also al-Zawahiri who greenlit the union and provided the final directives to the Jordanian’s group before the announcement. In al-Zarqawi’s letter mentioned above, he tellingly refers to the the issue of “the elder brother’s [Bin Ladin’s] delay in knowing about what happened between us”, adding that it is no worry “so long as the doctor [al-Zawahiri] is in the picture”. Delegating authority to the Egyptian presumably allowed al-Qa‘ida to speed up the decision-making process, as al-Zawahiri and al-Libi were both reported to be based in Bajaur, in Pakistan’s tribal areas, while Bin Ladin was hiding in Haripur.

There were other communications shortcomings plaguing al-Qa‘ida Central as well, as is shown in the opening of al-Libi’s first attachment where he apologizes to al-Zarqawi’s group for “the delay in responding due to circumstances that recently affected us here”. This difficulty was most likely related to al-Libi’s own predicament at the time: by 2004, he had become one of Pakistan’s most wanted fugitives, having escaped several raids on his hideouts in Abbottabad where he had been living since mid-2003. This had prompted him to go underground and relocate to Bajaur in mid-2004. 

Conclusion

Taken together, the Abbottabad files studied in this article offer a rich and seminal layer to the history of the al-Qa‘ida-al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad relationship. Until now, only some of the early stages of the negotiations between the two had been examined. As was known before, the al-Qa‘ida commander ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, from his base in Shkai, South Waziristan, was communicating with al-Zarqawi’s group throughout 2003, discussing personnel and technology transfer between Pakistan and Iraq. But contacts were cut off when al-Iraqi’s envoy Hassan Ghul, carrying al-Zarqawi’s proposal to al-Qa‘ida’s leadership, was arrested in January 2004 on his way back to Waziristan.

Thanks to the Abbottabad files, we now have a better view of what happened next and a fuller understanding of the players involved and the negotiation-related command-and-control dynamics inside al-Qa‘ida. As we saw, Bin Ladin remained largely absent during the process and likely heard of its successful outcome in the media. To be sure, the Saudi appeared very much eager to get closer to al-Zarqawi. In his June-August 2004 letter, he told al-Libi, in a likely reference to al-Zarqawi: “We emphasize the necessity of working with al-Tanbul [the short] and providing him with everything he needs”. But it was al-Zawahiri who actually oversaw the negotiation and was entrusted with executive decision making, a prominent role he would keep playing in relation to Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa and Somalia.  

The Abbottabad files also reveal that, beyond Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, al-Qa‘ida’s “general manager” Abu al-Faraj al-Libi was the one micromanaging the negotiation. Unlike the other players involved, al-Libi had direct access to al-Zarqawi’s group, meeting with the Jordanian’s emissary and sending messages to Iraq. Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri thus relied on him to be  updated and to convey their directives to al-Zarqawi. We also learn from the Abbottabad files that al-Libi involved a small cadre of senior aides in these talks. While these names—Hamza al-Al-Rabi‘a, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi, Khalid al-Habib, Abu al-Hasan al-Misri, Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir—were already known, this is the first time that they are shown to have been associated with the negotiations with al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. Together, these figures represented an informal council advising the process, including al-Libi’s critical decision to hold back al-Zawahiri’s stance on the Shi’a to al-Zarqawi.

The Abbottabad files further illustrate how the difficult security environment faced by al-Qa‘ida in Pakistan pushed the organization to eye Iraq as an alternative terrain for its operations, as exemplified by its willingness to dispatch key figures such as al-Rabi‘a to hatch external attacks from there. The files also underline how Islamabad’s 2004 crackdown hampered the negotiation process by disrupting the organization’s communications channels and prompting al-Libi to go deeper into hiding. This might largely explain why, if al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a was accepted by al-Libi around June, it took four additional months for the union to be announced publicly. Finally, the files indicate that, even when the “good news” was announced to the world in October, the process was not finished, as unresolved issues remained between the two parties. Indeed, al-Libi had taken the initiative to conceal al-Zawahiri’s disapproval of al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda from al-Zarqawi’s team. At this time, he was then still waiting for the Jordanian’s “detailed report” so that Bin Ladin or al-Zawahiri could make a final decision on the issue. This highlights how eager to compromise al-Qa‘ida—or at least al-Libi and his informal council of advisers—appeared to be during the negotiations, as it chose to sweep its differences with al-Zarqawi under the rug to speed up the merger process, thinking that these issues could be resolved later.

Jihadist messaging regarding the pandemic has not been uniform, however, as the following survey of the different groups’ propaganda will show.^[1] The main difference is seen between those groups focused more on stopping the spread (e.g., the Taliban, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) and those focused more on exploiting the pandemic to stoke violence and amplify their message (e.g., the Islamic State, al-Qaida). All of these groups, however, have benefited from one of the main effects of the pandemic, which is the considerable increase in time spent on the internet and social media as people were forced to isolate themselves at home. To that extent, the pandemic has created fertile ground for jihadist propaganda and proselytising campaigns.

The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)

Among the first groups to speak publicly on the issue of Covid-19 was the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uyghur jihadist organisation with links to al-Qaida.^[2] In a video published in February 2020 on the Islam Awazi media channel, titled “The Perspective of the Mujahedeen Regarding the Corona Outbreak in China,” the TIP states that the outbreak in China is a “punishment from Allah” for the Chinese oppression of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang: “They destroyed mosques and turned them into  places of dancing, vice and insolence, they trampled on the Koran and burned them, transgressed honour and raped women […] God’s vengeance came against these criminals and sent them the deadly coronavirus […] the whole world knows that what happened in China, is simply part of God’s punishment.” In the video, the group gives an overview of the pandemic and rebukes the Chinese state for allowing the consumption of “meat forbidden by the Quran.” The TIP video ends with the spokesman’s hopeful statement that the pandemic will lead to the destruction of the atheistic Chinese state.

The Islamic State

The Islamic State has addressed the issue of Covid-19 in several statements, not explicitly naming the Coronavirus or the term Covid but rather speaking about pandemics in general.

The first statement, an infographic titled “Sharia Guidance for Managing Pandemics,” was published in the second week of March 2020 in issue 225 of the weekly newsletter al-Naba’. The infographic cites various hadith to emphasize hygiene and other precautionary measures regarding contagious diseases. The advice for militants includes instructions to “cover your mouth when yawning and sneezing” and to “wash your hands.” The infographic also warns healthy militants not to go to countries affected by the pandemic and those who are sick not to travel. At the same time, it reminds the militants that the pandemic is ultimately under the control of God, stating that “it is necessary to believe that diseases are not infectious on their own but are by Allah’s command and decree,” and it further emphasizes the necessity of “relying upon God and seeking refuge in him to be spared from disease.” Soon after, during the same month, the Islamic State published a 2-minute-and-13-second video reiterating the same guidance as the infographic. In both the infographic and the video, the lettering and banners are either purple or green, purple indicating a hadith of the Prophet and green indicating advice of a hygienic nature.

The Islamic State would return to the subject of the pandemic in issue 226 of the al-Naba’ newsletter, which was published on March 19, 2020. The issue included a lengthy editorial on the spread of the contagion showing how the organisation was seeking to exploit the pandemic in service of its strategy. The editorial makes a number of points about the nature and implications of the pandemic and how the mujahideen ought to go about exploiting it:

• The pandemic is an example of Allah’s torment, which strikes especially at idolatrous nations and unbelievers.
• The Crusader (i.e., Western) nations are concerned about the current and potential consequences for the economy, including the prices of goods and services.
• The Crusaders face pressure on their military deployments abroad at a time when they have been trying to bring their troops home. There is also the fear that with the pandemic come terrorist attacks in their own countries.
• The Crusaders hope that the mujahideen will not carry out attacks even as they feign ignorance of their own crimes against Muslims; the latter should feel no sympathy for unbelievers and apostates but should seize the opportunity to free Muslim prisoners from the prison camps in which they suffer terribly.
• Muslims should also remember that obedience to Allah allays His torment and wrath, so performing jihad and striking enemies is the best way to protect oneself from the pandemic.

The following week, the Islamic State’s propaganda again took up the matter of Covid-19, this time with a twist. In the editorial of al-Naba’ issue 227, the group talked almost exclusively about the United States, casting doubt on the United States’ ability to deal with global events, to contain the pandemic, and otherwise to anticipate risks and protect itself. Also in February, the English-language magazine The Voice of Hind, associated with the Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Hind, or Hind Province, devoted a page to the pandemic. The brief editorial, titled “Verily, it is a Punishment sent by Allah on whom he wished, and Allah made it Mercy for the believers,” echoes many of the Islamic State’s earlier points, including the idea that the pandemic has had a disproportionate impact on non-Muslim countries and the importance of seizing the opportunity to attack enemies. “The ever-increasing rate of COVID-19 that we are witnessing,” reads the editorial,

is a torment for the disbelievers and has brought the glad tidings for the believers. O Muwahideen, prepare with whatever you have and Rise up! and make it worse for the Kuffar […] Allah has made this disease a source of chaos among the nations of disbelief, and so their military and police have been deployed in their streets and alleys making them an easy target. So use this opportunity to strike them with a sword or a knife or just a rope to stop their breathing, fill the streets with their blood.

For the Islamic State, then, Covid-19 was at this stage a welcome development since it was seen as mainly affecting unbelieving nations and possibly providing additional incentive to wage jihad. There was some concern about the spread of the virus among Muslims, as the first Islamic State publications on the subject stressed mitigating measures drawn from prophetic guidance. But for the most part the group’s tone was one of optimism and schadenfreude.

In the same period, several unofficial pro-Islamic State media channels published posters and messages on various platforms recalling and reiterating the information previously spread by the organisation on its official channels, including the theme of divine punishment of the unbelievers and the idea of the virus as being the will of Allah. Among the most active of these channels were “Coronavirus: A Soldier of Allah” and “GreenBirds” on the Rocket.Chat platform.

The Taliban

The Taliban’s approach to the pandemic has been quite different from the Islamic State’s, the group’s leadership being concerned above all with stopping the spread of the contagion in Afghanistan, particularly in government prisons where thousands of Taliban militants were being held. In a statement issued on 3 March 2020, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid expressed dismay at the rapid spread of the virus, stating that the blame for infections and deaths “will be the responsibility of the Kabul government and its foreign supporters.” The group has since repeatedly issued security guidelines to counter the spread of the virus and has asked all Afghans returning to the country from abroad to have themselves tested.

On March 18, 2020, the Taliban’s official website, “Voice of Jihad,” published a “Statement concerning the fight against coronavirus” in which the group mixed religious observations about the nature of the virus with practical recommendations about how to fight it and protect people from it. “The Coronavirus is a disease ordered by Almighty Allah because of disobedience and sins of mankind or other reasons,” the statement read. “According to the directives of the scholars, people should recite effective prayers frequently and increase the reading of the Holy Quran, give alms and charity and turn to Allah in repentance for their past sins. […] In addition, safety guidelines issued by health organisations, doctors and other health experts should be adhered to and all safety precautions should be followed to the best of their ability.” Since the end of March 2020, the Taliban have refrained from offering such religious assessments of the pandemic, rather issuing rules and regulations to help counteract it.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani Taliban, or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which presents itself as a subsidiary of the Afghan Taliban, has promoted the theory that the Jews and their allies were secretly behind the pandemic. The eighth issue of the Urdu-language magazine Mujalla Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, published in December 2020, includes an article by mufti Abu Misbah titled “The Coronavirus and the Background Realities,” in which “the Jews and their puppets” are blamed for releasing the coronavirus in order to harm Muslims. According to this conspiracy theory, the virus was developed in the 1960s by a Scottish virologist, and afterwards “the COVID-19 virus was kept in a safe place and properly concealed so that it could be used as an atomic bomb, especially against Muslims.” It was released as part of “the work of those dreaming of establishing […] a Jewish superpower government.”

Al-Qaida

As for al-Qaida, which, like the TTP, bills itself as a jihadist entity subordinate to the Afghan Taliban, the group’s propaganda has focused on several themes, from the importance of hygiene and cleanliness to the idea of the pandemic as being the just rewards of the unbelievers.

The first remarks by al-Qaida on the subject, published in March 2020, took the form of a six-page statement by al-Qaida Central’s al-Sahab Media titled “The Way Forward: A Word of Advice on the Coronavirus Pandemic.” In the statement, both the Islamic world and humanity at large are described as having invited the pandemic by means of their wicked behavior. “It must be said,” the statement reads, “that the arrival of this pandemic to the Muslim world is only a consequence of our own sins and our distance from the Divine methodology.” Several pages later it affirms that “this pandemic is a punishment from the Lord of the Worlds for the injustice and oppression committed against Muslims specifically and mankind generally.” The statement also takes the opportunity to invite Westerners to embrace Islam in light of the evident failure of their societies to stop the pandemic, a failure that is attributed to “your usury-based economy.” As the pandemic has revealed, “Your governments and armies are helpless, utterly confused in the face of this weak creature. Allah (swt), the Creator, has revealed the fragility and vulnerability of your material strength.” From there the al-Qaida statement turns to the issue of hygiene, noting how “Islam places great emphasis on the principles of prevention to protect against all forms of disease. This is implemented through a system of personal hygiene that takes the form of a regular routine that is repeated several times throughout the day.” The statement concludes on an optimistic note, addressing the Crusaders, Zionists, and apostates by saying, “The fear and panic that has befallen you bodes well for us, and we ask Allah to hasten your fate.”

Subsequent statements by al-Qaida and affiliated groups have tended to focus on the devastating effects of the pandemic on the West and the opportunities created for terrorist attacks. In April 2021, al-Qaida Central’s flagship magazine, One Ummah, devoted an issue to the subject of “America Burns.” The opening article exulted in the economic, political, and social hardships facing the United States due to Covid-19, noting that the number of deaths in America from the pandemic has crossed the half million mark. Joe Biden is quoted calling the distribution of the vaccine under the Trump administration “a catastrophic failure.” Several months later, in August 2021, Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of the Sahelian al-Qaida affiliate Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin, appeared in a video that touched on the pandemic and its effects on the United States. In the video, Ag Ghali states that “what is happening to its [France’s] master, America, scourged by the Corona plague era […] this is because of their continuous attrition for their war on jihad.”

The previous year, in November 2020, the pro-al-Qaida media group al-Malahem Cyber Army published the first issue of its new Wolves of Manhattan Magazine, calling for attacks to exploit the complex security situation created by the pandemic. Lone attackers were encouraged to disguise themselves with masks (so as not to be identified) and to kill and injure enemies by poisoning the stocks of face masks. The following year, in August 2021, al-Malahem Cyber Army again sought to promote attacks in the new Covid environment, publishing a statement on anti-lockdown demonstrations in the West. The demonstrations, according to the statement, were a “golden opportunity” for the Muslims to attack “the enemies of God,” particularly the police. Those unable to kill a policeman, it added, can at least destroy their vehicles.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaida’s affiliate in Somalia, has issued statements both exulting in the damage done by the pandemic to the West and providing guidance on how militants and those under al-Shabaab’s authority can protect themselves. In May 2020, the group announced the creation of a special committee of doctors, scientists, and local officials to manage the response to Covid-19 in the territories under its control. In March 2021, al-Shabaab warned in a statement against the Astrazeneca vaccine, the vaccine that was being distributed by “the apostate Somali regime.” The warning came not because of anti-vax sentiment but rather because of the alleged “ineffectiveness and adverse side effects” that had led a number of European countries to suspend the administration of the vaccine. “Do not allow your children and family members to be used as guinea pigs in the race to develop a potent vaccine for the coronavirus pandemic,” the statement advised, suggesting instead that Muslims “adhere to the medications prescribed in the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him), such as black seed and honey […] Until a safe and effective vaccination becomes available, the Office of Politics and Wilaayaat urges the Muslims of Somalia to repent and supplicate to Allaah in order to alleviate their suffering and uplift them from the disease.”

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

Like al-Shabaab, the Syrian jihadist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which was once affiliated with al-Qaida but has since become independent and now holds territory in north-west Syria, has been focused on preventing the spread of Covid-19 in its propaganda. While boasting in one statement that the virus has killed some of those who have “killed and shed the blood of the Muslims all over the world,” most of HTS’s attention has been devoted to emphasizing anti-Covid measures. In one poster released by HTS’s media outlet, al-Ebaa, Syrians in HTS-controlled territory are instructed to wear masks, wash their hands, and refrain from touching their faces, among other measures.

Conclusion

Jihadist organisations have devoted a great deal of attention to the Covid-19 pandemic in their propaganda. For the most part, however, this has had little favourable impact on the operations of jihadist groups. Jihadist activity has not significantly declined in the era of Covid-19, but neither has it increased dramatically either. The most that can be said is probably that increased time spent on the internet and social media has been conducive to greater radicalisation and recruitment. Jihadist organisations have sought to use the pandemic as an opportunity to strengthen themselves but do not seem to have achieved the desired result. Strategically, perhaps, only the Taliban and HTS have been able to exploit the pandemic operationally, providing governance services, medical aid, and infrastructure improvements in the territories they control, thus improving their credibility and popularity and demonstrating that they are more capable and prepared to meet the challenges of Covid-19 than the governments in Kabul and Damascus. In this way, jihadist organisations have sought to present themselves as a viable alternative to established governments, again showing that their aims are not limited to perpetrating violence alone.

[1] The images and statements included in the analysis were retrieved directly by the author while monitoring jihadist media channels. Where possible, links to sources are provided for researchers who wish to view or further investigate the material.

[2] The TIP has mainly been operating in Syria in recent years. See more at https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/07/analysis-the-turkistan-islamic-partys-jihad-in-syria.php.The Syrian branch of the TIP has collaborated with HTS and Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. In recent months there seems to be a split within the Syrian branch of the TIP (due to the choice of a part of the militants and leaders to participate in the fight of HTS against the other jihadist groups operating in the Syrian theatre). Many leaders and militants who disagree with the line adopted by HTS seem intent on moving towards the TIP strongholds in Afghanistan.

In light of the Frontline interview, the authors decided to interview a prominent jihadi source who actively monitors the ongoing conflict between HTS and Hurras al-Din (HaD), the new Syrian al-Qaida affiliate in Syria, and the state of al-Qaida and the Salafi-Jihadi movement globally. The source, who goes by the name Muzamjir al-Sham, is known for revealing, via his Twitter account, detailed information about the inner workings of the various jihadi groups in Syria. While his identity remains unknown, his Twitter page describes him as “a shami voice from within the jihadi current.” According to Aaron Zelin, he is believed to have once belonged to Ahrar al-Sham, a Syrian Islamist militant group.

The interview, which was conducted remotely between 11 and 18 June 2021, covered a number of topics, ranging from whether the jihadi groups opposed to HTS can form a united front (Q1) and whether al-Jolani will tolerate foreign jihadis in his territory (Q4) to the possibility of a reconciliation between al-Qaida and HTS (Q6) and the current state of HaD (Q7). Muzamjir al-Sham further discussed the state of the al-Qaida leadership and its control of its affiliates (Q10-12), as well as Ayman al-Zawahiri’s oath of allegiance, or bay‘a, to the Taliban (Q8-9). Finally, he touched on the differences between al-Qaida and the Islamic State (Q13-14) and the capabilities of these groups to conduct international terrorist operations (Q16-17).

Perhaps the most remarkable detail to emerge from the interview is the assertion that the leader of the Taliban, Hibatullah Akhundzadeh, refused to accept al-Zawahiri’s bay‘a, meaning that the leader of al-Qaida’s pledge of allegiance to the Taliban was rejected. While the source did not substantiate his claim (and has not responded to further queries regarding the matter), it is a potentially significant revelation if proven true. As of now, no other jihadi source has corroborated the assertion, and the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaida is widely seen as strong and enduring. Muzamjir al-Sham appears to disagree, arguing that there will be little al-Qaida activity in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

It is also interesting to note that, according to this source, al-Qaida made the unofficial decision to dissolve HaD and to operate in smaller cells in Syria, thereby avoiding a fratricidal confrontation with HTS. This would seem to confirm the weakened state of al-Qaida in Syria as reported by the United Nations Security Council sanctions monitoring team for al-Qaida and the Islamic State.[2] The source indicates that this decision came from Sayf al-‘Adl, the Egyptian al-Qaida leader in Iran who appears to manage and communicate with al-Qaida central and the al-Qaida affiliates. Given al-Zawahiri’s rumored ill-health, al-‘Adl’s current role is significant as it could undermine the idea of a power vacuum in the event of a leadership transition.

The source was skeptical of the rumors that al-Zawahiri had died, suggesting rather that he could be merely ill. On 10 September 2021, an 852-page book by al-Zawahiri was published by al-Qaida central, and the introduction is dated 21 April 2021. Presumably, therefore, the al-Qaida leader is alive—or least he was until that date—though the text does not reveal anything about his health. The rumors about his death or serious illness could be exploited in an instrumental way by the organization to create confusion around its real condition, allowing al-Qaida to continue to work under the radar.

Jihadi organizations remain a threat not to be underestimated. Al-Qaida’s strategy of keeping a low profile has facilitated its reorganization, allowing it to build ties with other jihadi groups, tribes, clans, and minorities. The Islamic State was too quickly declared defeated; it was also forming new alliances and planning new strategies. In Muzamjir al-Sham’s words, “fighting and struggle are a lung with which Salafi-Jihadism breathes, as it thrives in such circumstances.” Cutting off the air will require specifically tailored policies for each local condition.

Q1: After the separation of the Islamic State from al-Qaida, and the subsequent separation of al-Jolani from al-Qaida, al-Qaida’s position in Syria has become very precarious. HaD found itself fighting alone on multiple fronts, squeezed between the Asad regime, the international coalition, and al-Jolani’s HTS. HTS has imprisoned several members of the al-Qaida shura council and several HaD leaders, transforming Idlib into a new Guantanamo. In your opinion, what are the chances that al-Qaida and HaD will be able to form a united front with the other Salafi-Jihadi factions of Idlib, such as Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Tawhid, Ahrar al-Sham, Jundullah, and al-Ghuraba, against HTS?

There will be no united front between al-Qaida and the rest of the Salafi-Jihadi factions in Syria for several reasons.

First, some of these factions have been won over by al-Jolani by his providing some support to them, and thus he neutralized them from the conflict with al-Qaida. Ansar al-Tawhid is an example.

Second, there are some Salafi-Jihadi factions that do not agree with al-Qaida in terms of ideology and consider it deviant. This is the case with Jundullah, which is close in ideology to ISIS.

Third, entering into a front or union with al-Qaida means entering into a comprehensive war with HTS, and this is something the results of which these factions are currently not able to bear.

I expect the formation of something that looks like an alliance, not a merger or a single front. I mean an alliance that looks like a joint operations room, similar to the previously formed Wa-Harrid  al-Mu’minin room[3] that HTS was able to dismantle.

This is a step [the formation of an alliance or united front] that cannot take place right now for several other reasons. The position of al-Qaida and the factions that could ally with it is very weak because of arrests and security operations against them and because of a lack of funding.

However, I believe that the regime’s assault on Idlib will strengthen the position of al-Qaida and the factions that could ally with it, as these factions thrive in chaos.

Q2: Is Ahrar al-Sham still close to al-Qaida and HaD?

Al-Zawahiri sent a letter to Ahrar al-Sham calling for the unification of all factions in Syria. But the factions fell into heresy or deviation.

They are no longer close to al-Qaida, especially after the murder of its first leaders.

Q3: Going back in time to the early quarrel between al-Qaida and ISIS, the Khurasan cell [i.e., a group of senior al-Qaida members who travelled from Iran to Syria in 2013 involved in the reconciliation process between al-Qaida and ISIS] and many of its prominent members from Iran were very critical of the way al-Jolani ran the al-Qaida branch in Syria. It seems that al-Jolani may have facilitated or helped in the killing of a number of members of the Khurasan cell in Aleppo and Idlib, before separating from al-Qaida in 2016. Given the high rank of the members of the Khurasan cell, one would think that it would have been very difficult to betray them without consequences. Does anyone suspect al-Jolani?

The Khurasan cell was not satisfied with al-Jolani’s management of al-Qaida in Syria. Al-Jolani is in origin a son of the Iraqi school [of jihadism], and al-Qaida did not know him or anything about him. Neither did al-Qaida know anything about al-Baghdadi’s policy and management of the [Islamic] State group. Its relationship to the Iraq branch was only superficial. Thus when al-Qaida got the opportunity to get to know al-Jolani and the Iraqi school closely, it did not like any of it. What they were being told was one thing, and what they saw was something else.

Al-Jolani is unknown to the leadership of al-Qaida, unlike the Khurasan cell or members of al-Qaida’s shura council who came to Syria, and unlike Abu al-Hammam [al-Suri], the current leader of HaD, who was a leader in the al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. So all of them are known to al-Qaida, while al-Jolani was completely unknown and his bay‘a to al-Qaida occurred suddenly and without complete coordination.

As for how they [the Khurasan cell’s members] were killed, some were killed in coalition strikes, while others were killed by improvised explosive devices. Others were deliberately pushed into battles with the [Asad] regime and were killed.

Even those who were killed in the coalition strikes, I think that they were betrayed from within by HTS, because some of the leaders were liquidated while walking on the road without using any machinery or electronic device. Some of them, such as Abu Firas [al-Suri], were targeted minutes after meeting with al-Jolani and his leaders.

Q4: According to some sources, HTS specifically targeted foreign fighter groups in Idlib, most notably Omar Omsen of al-Ghuraba [Omar Diaby, the leader of the French foreign fighters]. What is the current status of Salafi-Jihadi groups made up of foreigners in Idlib? Do you think they will have to leave Syria and move to other theaters?

Yes, al-Jolani is pushing them to leave Syria by putting great pressure on them: arresting and kidnapping them, preventing them from fighting, and preventing them from working to earn money.

Al-Jolani is pushing them to leave for two reasons: (1) foreign agreements with some countries; (2) the presence of these emigrants hinders his project in Idlib, and therefore it is necessary to get rid of them.

Indeed, the condition of the [foreign] jihadi groups is very bad. They are completely surrounded and prevented from working or raising funds, and they are being arrested, pursued, and severely restricted. They have become just scattered cells.

Q5: Moving away from the Syrian theater, many analysts and researchers claim that there is no longer an al-Qaida group in Iraq. Is this true? Is Ansar al-Islam[4] still operating in Kurdish areas? Are they still connected to al-Qaida? Are there any brigades or battalions linked to al-Qaida in Iraq?

There are no groups connected to Iraq except for ISIS and Ansar al-Islam. Ansar al-Islam is a very old group with popular support and roots in the areas of Kurdistan, so it is difficult to completely eradicate. However, most of its members are now working in Syria, being in contact with their cells in Iraqi Kurdistan. In Syria they are operating in the western areas of Idlib.

Q6: It is quite clear that reconciliation between al-Qaida and HTS is currently impossible, at least as long as al-Jolani remains HTS’s leader. Do you think that al-Qaida’s opposition to HTS is limited to al-Jolani and his entourage (such as controversial members like Abu Ahmad Hadd, Abu Muhjen al-Hasakawi, Abu Hafs Binnish), or does it also extend to the model of the Salvation Government? If al-Jolani weren’t the leader of HTS, do you think that HaD and other Salafi-Jihadi factions in Idlib would be ready to hold peace talks, similar to what is happening in Afghanistan with the Taliban or what has been proposed by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) in Mali in the past? Will HaD be willing to join the Salvation Government or a similar authority?

No, this is almost impossible. I mean the possibility of reconciliation between HTS and al-Qaida in the event of al-Jolani’s death. This is for a simple reason: when al-Jolani defected from al-Qaida, the entire current that adopted his position left with him. Meanwhile, the other group opposed to al-Jolani’s line and his orientation formed al-Qaida with its new name, Hurras al-Din.

The issue, then, is not about people only; it is about difference in ideology, thought, and methodology. Even if al-Jolani were killed, all the leaders of HTS today are people who have completely severed their ties with al-Qaida.

As for the HaD’s willingness to join a government or authority, this is also entirely out of the question. HaD does have permission from al-Zawahiri to merge with [other] factions, but only after consulting with and obtaining permission from the al-Qaida leadership. However, al-Qaida does not want to repeat the al-Jolani scenario.

Q7: And do you think that HaD will be able to resist in such a hostile environment? Or will it be disbanded?

HaD has already been dissolved, though it was an unofficial decision. It now takes the form of small cells only.

Al-Qaida’s policy was to avoid confrontation with al-Jolani, directing many of its members to remain within the ranks of HTS—a kind of flexibility for absorbing al-Jolani’s attacks.

Q8: And do you think that HaD could eventually migrate from Syria to other areas, such as Afghanistan? What is HaD’s view on what is happening there?

Both HTS and HaD glorify what the Taliban are doing in Afghanistan, and they sing the praises of their victories. HTS thinks that they are the Syrian Taliban, while HaD thinks that the Taliban are the same Taliban of yesterday that embraced al-Qaida.

However, the emir of the Taliban recently rejected the bay‘a of al-Qaida. Therefore, there will not be significant al-Qaida activity in the areas of the Taliban. It is completely unlikely that fighters will leave the base in Syria for Afghanistan, with the possible exception of the fighters of the Turkistan Islamic Party [TIP, a Uyghur jihadi group].

Q9: What do you mean that the Taliban rejected al-Zawahiri’sbay‘a? Did Akhundzada explicitly say he rejected al-Zawahiri’s bay‘a? We only know that Suhail Shaheen recently said that there is no allegiance between al-Qaida and the Taliban[5]. Can you explain to us what you mean?

The emir of the Taliban rejected al-Zawahiri’s bay‘a to him.

Q10: I see. Back to HaD. Is al-Qaida central controlling these new cells? Because many researchers and analysts claim that al-Qaida does not have control over its affiliates, and therefore that they operate independently from the central leadership. Do you agree?

Yes, that is correct. Al-Qaida now operates in a decentralized manner. Al-Qaida central is disconnected from the branches and does not interfere much in their policies or operations. Thus most of the branches operate without referring to al-Qaida central.

As for the Syrian branch, it is still linked to al-Qaida central through Sayf al-‘Adl, who is in Iran and is the supervisor of the Syrian branch. However, the contact with him is weak as well.

Q11: During the last several months, several intelligence services and researchers have reported that al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri could be seriously ill or even dead. There are also rumors that his possible successors could be Sayf al-‘Adl and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi. What is your opinion?

Recently, al-Zawahiri appeared in an audio recording after the news reports speaking of his death. Al-Qaida also released a statement regarding the recent events in Gaza.[6] Therefore, I don’t think he has died. It is possible he is just ill.

Regarding his possible successor, there is a document by some al-Qaida leaders from a number of branches entrusting the leadership to a number of persons. I have it, though I cannot remember where it is right now. Perhaps I can find it for you.

In light of the killing of Abu al-Khayr [al-Masri] and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Sayf al-‘Adl is certainly the most likely successor. However, some branches do not support this.

Q12: And apart from Sayf al-‘Adl, is there any other senior member of the Hittin Shura[7] who is still connected with Syria?

Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri[8] is still based in Syria.

Q13: For many years, both official and unofficial Islamic State propaganda accused al-Qaida of having a too populist, sort of wait-and-see strategy, of not applying the Sharia, and of betraying the Salafi-Jihadi ideology. What is your opinion on this?

Indeed, al-Qaida does not agree with ISIS on many matters. Al-Qaida is more populist because of the ideological revisions that took place among the al-Qaida leaders—I mean here the Egyptian leaders. And al-Qaida was influenced by the ideas of Abu Yahya [al-Libi] and Atiyatullah [al-Libi].[9]

Therefore al-Qaida appears to be more realist as it takes into account some aspects of society. However, the difference between them is not huge as regards the issue of applying the Sharia. Jabhat al-Nusra was also close to ISIS when it came to implementing the Sharia in the liberated areas, where it established the role of the judiciary and carried out some of the canonical punishments. But it did not follow ISIS’s policy of giving media coverage to them.

Q14: You say that the difference between al-Qaida and ISIS on the matter of Sharia rulings is not that huge. However, the Islamic State has repeatedly published magazines and videos in which they declare al-Qaida and its leader to be apostates for their operational choices, such as their alliance with the Taliban. What do you think?

ISIS’s relationship with al-Qaida has passed through three stages:

[First,] a stage in which there was a kind of agreement. This was the stage that preceded the establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra and the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. Al-Qaida continued to recognize the [Islamic] State of Iraq as its branch in Iraq, and ISIS continued to regard al-Qaida with a kind of appreciation, despite the reports that reached al-Qaida concerning violations and abuses committed by the [Islamic] State of Iraq.

As for the second stage, this is the stage of discord. It began with al-Jolani’s announcement of his bay‘a to al-Qaida and opposition to al-Baghdadi, and al-Qaida’s judgment in support of al-Jolani. Here ISIS began to view al-Qaida as a competitor, given that it had encouraged al-Jolani to defect from the [Islamic] State, and accusations began to be hurled between the two sides.

The third stage began after the killing of Abu Khalid al-Suri, the leader in Ahrar al-Sham who was the person appointed by al-Qaida central as arbiter between al-Baghdadi and al-Jolani. This stage came after the fighting between ISIS and the rest of the Syrian factions, including Jabhat al-Nusra, and here the dispute reached the point of accusing ISIS of being on the path of the Kharijites, while ISIS accused al-Qaida in Syria of showing loyalty to apostates and allying with them, and thus of having apostatized as well. Then all of al-Qaida was accused of apostasy.

As for the Taliban, they have been apostate for ISIS for a long time, even before the dispute with al-Qaida … But these matters were not leaked to the media.

Q15: Today, many Salafi-Jihadi groups, including al-Qaida, are still engaged on several fronts, fighting a number of different actors. However, in some areas, some groups appear to be inclined towards abandoning the armed struggle and concluding peace agreements with the governments they are fighting. Do you think such a strategic choice could be a valuable option for Salafi-Jihadi groups, or do you think that there can be no peace deal between them and their opponents?

There are several interrelated factors regarding this issue.

First, fighting and struggle are a lung with which Salafi-Jihadism breathes, as it thrives in such circumstances.

Second, there are many elements that used to be part of jihadi factions that made [reconciliation] agreements.

Third, it seems that after years of conflict Salafi-Jihadism has lost much of its momentum and strength, especially with the disintegration of Ahrar al-Sham, the decline of ISIS, and the cutting of ties between Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaida.

Fourth, there is no doubt that ending a conflict in an unjust manner and without equitable solutions will generate a backlash among many factions and elements that do not belong to Salafi-Jihadi groups. Thus, the slogans raised by Salafi-Jihadism to the effect that it is necessary to continue the struggle will appear as truthful slogans and will attract more elements to them from beyond Salafi-Jihadism. Thus Asad’s success in regaining control of the country and resolving the conflict in his favor, or imposing unfair solutions, will strengthen the Salafi-Jihadi narrative and position.

Q16: Do you think that al-Qaida and ISIS are still capable of waging a global armed struggle against the far enemy? Or will they decide to exclusively concentrate their attacks on the near enemy?

I believe that ISIS is still capable of launching external attacks despite its weak state at the present time. ISIS has gone through similar stages previously and it was eventually able to reassemble its ranks and restore its activity, and this is what it is doing now in Syria, Iraq, and Africa.

As for al-Qaida, external operations are limited to the Yemen branch only, and to a lesser extent to the North African branch. As for the Syrian branch, it is forbidden from launching any external attacks, and it is in a very weak state now.

Q17: So, you say that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and maybe al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) are still capable of conducting external attacks, as they are allowed to do so. But as you may be aware, many scholars and politicians claim that al-Qaida no longer has the strength to carry out attacks in the West. What is your opinion? Does al-Qaida still have the capability to attack the West?

I think that al-Qaida is still capable of launching small attacks in Europe, such as stabbings or tramplings. As for major operations, I do not think that it is capable of that at the present time.

[1] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/abu-mohammad-al-jolani/.

[2] https://undocs.org/S/2021/68.

[3] The operations room referred to by the interviewee is the “Rouse the Believers Operations Room,” a coalition of Salafist-Jihadi groups that rose up in northwest Syria during the Syrian civil war. The coalition included Hurras al-Din, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Ansar al-Islam, and Ansar al-Tawhid. On 12 June 2020, the member groups of the “Rouse the Believers Operations Room” (excluding Ansar al-Tawhid), along with two other Salafi-Jihadi groups (the al-Muqatileen al-Ansar Brigade and the al-Jihad Coordination Group) led by former HTS commanders, reorganized into a new operations room called “So Be Steadfast,” which was quickly routed by HTS.

[4] Ansar al-Islam is a historic Salafi-Jihadi group originally based in Iraqi Kurdistan. In 2014, it shifted its operations to Syria. In February 2015, it announced the creation of a branch in the north-western Syrian province of Idlib that has been mainly active in the northern area of Latakia. It cooperates with HaD in their fight against the Syrian regime and Russian troops.

[5] See Nihad Jariri’s interview with Suhail Shaheen https://mobile.twitter.com/NihadJariri/status/1391155623534989314

[6] The video referenced here is from 12 March 2021, “The Wound of the Rohingya is the Wound of the Islamic Nation”; see https://jihadology.net/2021/03/12/new-video-message-from-al-qaidahs-dr-ayman-al-%e1%ba%93awahiri-the-wound-of-the-rohingya-is-the-wound-of-the-islamic-nation/.

[7] The core leadership of al-Qaida.

[8] Abu ‘Abd al-Karim al-Masri is a veteran member of al-Qaida and a senior leader of HaD. In 2018, al-Masri, was a member of HaD’s shura council, the group’s senior decision-making body, and served as a mediator between it and Jabhat al-Nusra.

[9] Abu Yahya al-Libi was a prominent al-Qaida leader who rose to become al-Qaida’s second in command. He was killed in a drone strike in 2012 in Mir Ali, Pakistan. Atiyatullah al-Libi was a senior member of al-Qaida who worked as general manager for the organization. He was killed in a drone strike in 2011 in North Waziristan, Pakistan.

The recent hostilities between Hamas and Israel have brought the controversy over Hamas back to the fore, shedding new light on the jihadi movement’s ideological fault lines. The first division is that between al-Qaida and the Islamic State, and as one would expect it is the Islamic State that takes the harder line against Hamas. There is another fault line, however, that runs between two ideological camps on the pro-al-Qaida side of the jihadi movement. It is here, as will be seen, where the most intense debate has taken place. One of the camps has not shied away from criticizing al-Qaida itself.

Al-Qaida vs. the Islamic State

Shortly after the conflict between Israel and Hamas began on May 10, when Hamas fired more than 150 rockets into Israel and Israel responded with airstrikes, most jihadi groups, including the various branches of al-Qaida, issued statements of solidarity with the Palestinians. The statements also decried the perceived Israeli aggression on the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, where clashes had been taking place between worshippers and Israeli security forces since May 7. Al-Qaida central, through its al-Sahab media outlet, issued three such statements between mid-May and early June.

The first statement appeared on May 11 in the form of an issue of al-Qaida’s occasional newsletter, al-Nafir. Titled “Al-Aqsa in the Care of the Descendants of al-Bara’ ibn Malik,” it appears to have been written before the air war began as its focus is the Palestinian demonstrations around the al-Aqsa mosque. Al-Qaida here likens the fearlessness of the demonstrators to that of the Prophet’s companion al-Bara’ ibn Malik, who was launched into a walled area of thousands of apostates in the so-called “wars of apostasy” in early Islam. The issue also quoted at length from a March 2002 speech by Osama bin Ladin in which he inveighs against normalization with the Jewish state and encourages Muslims to kill Americans and Jews by any means possible.

Several days later, on May 17, came a more controversial statement from al-Qaida’s “general leadership,” titled “Statement of Love, Honor, and Support for Our People in Palestine.” The purpose of the statement was to salute the “mujahidin” in Gaza and their launching of “jihadi missiles toward the Zionists.” The statement never mentions Hamas, but it does mourn the death of one of its military commanders. Toward the end, the al-Qaida leadership offers its condolences (or congratulations) to the Palestinians on “your pious martyrs, foremost among them the heroic leader Basim ‘Isa Abu ‘Imad.” Basim ‘Isa, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza on May 12, was a top military commander of the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s armed wing. As noted by the analyst Wassim Nasr on Twitter, the praise for Basim ‘Isa here was in keeping with a preexisting al-Qaida policy to distinguish between the political and military wings of Hamas. That policy was elucidated over a decade ago by the al-Qaida commander Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (d. 2010) after he made the mistake of saying in an interview that “we and Hamas share the same thinking and the same methodology.” Following criticism of his remark, Abu al-Yazid issued a clarification acknowledging that he had misspoken and explaining that the approach of the al-Qaida leadership is to distinguish between Hamas as a political organization, which had committed terrible methodological errors such as embracing democracy, and the righteous mujahideen fighting under Hamas’s banner (i.e., the al-Qassam Brigades, or at least some of them).

The third al-Qaida statement appeared on June 2, two weeks after a ceasefire was reached between the warring parties on May 21. Once again taking the form of an issue of al-Qaida’s al-Nafir newsletter, the statement hailed Hamas’s “sword of Jerusalem” campaign as a great victory that should be seized on “to revive the duty of jihad” in the youth of the Muslim umma. The model of initiating battles to defend mosques under siege from unbelievers and apostates was one to be followed across the Islamic world. The statement went on to praise “the mujahidin in Gaza” and in particular “their heroic leader Muhammad al-Dayf,” the supreme military commander of the al-Qassam Brigades. The singling out of al-Dayf further exemplified the al-Qaida leadership’s fondness for Hamas’s military wing to the exclusion of its political wing.

Taken together, the three statements show al-Qaida posturing as the ally of the al-Qassam Brigades and trying to portray the hostilities with the Jewish state as part of al-Qaida’s larger war with the Americans, the Zionists, and the “client” Arab regimes. Nowhere in these statements is there any hint of criticism of Hamas as a political organization, unless that is to be read in the omission of Hamas’s name. In the past al-Qaida has issued harsh condemnations of the Hamas political leadership, but here no such thing is to be found.

The Islamic State could not have responded more differently to the war between Hamas and Israel. After more than a week of silence on the matter, the official line came in the editorial of the May 20 issue of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter, al-Naba’. Titled “The Road to Jerusalem,” the editorial condemned Hamas (never mentioned by name) as a proxy of Shiite Iran and as part of its axis of “resistance.” Hamas’s warfare was not to be considered jihad as it served the interests of the Iranians and their plot for regional domination. “The difference between jihad and resistance is as the difference between truth and falsehood,” the editorial read. “Whoso allies with those who curse the Prophet’s wives [i.e., the Shia] will never liberate Jerusalem … and whoso differentiates between the Rejectionists [i.e., the Shia] and the Jews will never liberate Jerusalem … Indeed, we consider the mujahid who lies in wait for the Rejectionists in Iraq to be closer to Jerusalem than those who show loyalty to the Rejectionists and burnish their image.” The editorial went on to claim that all of the Islamic State’s battles “east and west are in fact steps in the direction of Jerusalem, Mecca, al-Andalus, Baghdad, Damascus, and all other captured Muslim lands.” In other words, it is the Islamic State, and not Hamas, that holds the promise of liberating Jerusalem.

Perhaps the most notable line in the editorial was a remark toward the end rejecting the idea of Palestinian exceptionalism. “The soldiers of the caliphate,” it stated, “have not exaggerated the issue of Palestine and have not made it an exception among the issues of the Muslims … They have not differentiated between the blood of their Muslim brethren in Palestine and the blood of their brethren in other lands.” This is a remarkable statement, and one that illustrates a stark difference between the Islamic State and al-Qaida regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike al-Qaida, the Islamic State is not interested in posing as the ally of whatever Sunni Muslim group is waging war against the Jewish state. For the Islamic State, any group that deviates from its methodology (manhaj) is simply not worthy of honor and support.

On June 21, the Islamic State’s official spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, delivered an audio address that echoed much of the sentiment of the editorial. Al-Qurashi ridiculed the idea that Hamas could ever bring victory to Palestine and urged the Palestinians not to be deceived by the rockets launched by Hamas “in service of their Iranian masters.” Hamas was hypocritical for condemning the Gulf states’ normalization with Israel when it had normalized relations with “Zoroastrian, Safavid Iran.” As in the editorial, the idea here is that it is folly to differentiate between the Jews and the Shia.

Al-Maqdisi vs. Abu Qatada

Among jihadis opposed to the Islamic State and generally aligned with al-Qaida, a divide has emerged in recent years between two competing ideological camps—namely, those who side with the more hardline ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and those who ally with the relatively more moderate Abu Qatada al-Filastini. Both men, who are Palestinian-Jordanians, have active social media presences and devoted followings. Much of their disagreement has revolved around the issue of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, which al-Maqdisi has condemned and Abu Qatada praised. The matter of Hamas has proven equally controversial.

The war of words over Hamas, which played out on the messaging app Telegram, began on May 13 when al-Maqdisi responded to a comment by the jihadi scholar Na’il ibn Ghazi Musran, who is aligned with Abu Qatada. Musran had written that Gaza was “the standard of distinction between faith and unbelief, and the line separating monotheism (tawhid) in its entirety from apostasy in its entirety.” The author was referring to the different reactions in the Arab world to the Gaza conflict, his point being that those unsupportive of the Palestinian belligerents were in “the camp of apostasy” and those supportive were in “the camp of truth.” In his response, al-Maqdisi ridiculed the idea that “Gaza is the standard,” as the ongoing battle was not one between tawhid and unbelief. He cited what he saw as the outright apostasy of some Palestinian youth and their adherence to pagan nationalism. Addressing the people of Palestine, he wrote: “Do not expect victory from God so long as you are silent about the reviling and cursing of God around you.”

Later that day, Abu Qatada authored a brief response in which he objected to such casual dismissal of unspecified Palestinian youth as apostates. “It is incumbent upon us,” he wrote, “to treat the Muslim youth, even if they are people of sin, as belonging to us. We should understand them as belonging to us and being of us, for the call to expel them from the umma means making them the soldiers of Satan, and making them against us and against Islam. This is a profound error.” Abu Qatada did not believe that Hamas’s efforts would achieve “complete victory and the elimination of the Jewish state,” but nonetheless “these winds of faith in Palestine,” he said, referring to Hamas’s military operations, keep “the spirit of jihad” alive and renew faith in “the necessity of waging jihad against the unbelievers and the apostates.” And likewise, “they teach us to keep in check our quarrels with the Muslim sinner, the Muslim innovator, and the Muslim who errs.”

If Abu Qatada’s view was that the Gaza conflict ought to teach jihadis to be more tolerant and openminded, al-Maqdisi’s view was the opposite. In a post published on May 14, al-Maqdisi accused a certain unnamed shaykh (ba‘d al-shuyukh) of “exploiting these events to spread error and confusion.” “What is necessary,” he retorted, “is that these occasions and battles and wars be exploited to teach people their tawhid and their true religion, not to dilute it, change it, and distort it with false conceptions.” The problem with “making Gaza and Palestine the measure of unbelief and faith,” he reiterated, was that it overlooked the transgressions of the those purporting to wage jihad. “It is impossible for victory to come,” he declared, “from the exaltation of the Rejectionists of Iran and its affiliated parties that attack the honor of the Prophet’s wives, pronounce takfir on the Companions, and kill the Sunnis in Iraq and al-Sham.” In a subsequent post published the next day, al-Maqdisi clarified that while he supports the military efforts of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad against the Jews, he nonetheless does not consider them “jihad in the path of God”; for the path of these groups is not “tawhid and dissociation from all forms of polytheism and idolatry,” but rather “exalting and burnishing of the image of Rejectionist Iran.”

Al-Maqdisi vs. al-Qaida (and Abu Qatada)

The war of words between al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada went on hiatus for about two weeks. It resumed on June 1 when al-Maqdisi authored a post condemning al-Qaida’s statement mourning the death of the Hamas military commander Basim ‘Isa. In the post, titled “Questions Posed to the Brothers at al-Sahab,” al-Maqdisi presented his criticism in the form of questionings attributed to others. “Many mujahid brothers, shaykhs, and preachers were displeased,” he wrote, “by the al-Sahab statement’s exaltation of the al-Qassam leader who was killed in the recent war in Gaza, and they wondered astonishedly: ‘Are our brothers not aware of the deviation of Hamas and its leadership from the path of tawhid in favor of the path of democracy, and their alignment with Hizb al-Lat [i.e., Hizbullah] and Bashar [al-Asad] and Iran?’” Al-Maqdisi continued in this way, referring to the “surprises, shocks, and perturbations” that have succeeded one after the other since the mourning of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi by some of the al-Qaida leadership. “Has the methodology (manhaj) changed?” he asked. “Or have the ranks of al-Qaida been penetrated by those who pay no heed to the purity of the manhaj? … It is presumed that al-Qaida continues to condemn the advocates of democratic Islamism and to dissociate from their manhaj, so how can it mourn their dead when they died on behalf of democracy? And how can it exalt their military leaders who in turn exalt Iran and Bashar and choose the path of democracy?” Al-Maqdisi was putting it out there that a lot of supporters of al-Qaida, himself included, were aghast at such praise for Hamas, even if the praise was restricted to Hamas’s military wing.

The following day, Abu Qatada responded to al-Maqdisi with a brief post implicitly rebuking him for suggesting that Hamas’s war dead were not martyrs (al-Maqdisi had pondered how al-Qaida could “mourn their dead when they died on behalf of democracy?”). Hamas was far from perfect, Abu Qatada explained, yet it nonetheless deserved praise for having “returned the Islamic identity” to the Palestinian cause that had been dominated by leftist and secularist parties. For this reason, he said, and because the secularist alternative is far worse, the critics of Hamas have generally been restrained in their criticism. The right way to deal with them, he declared, was to seek their improvement (ta‘dil) and not their destruction (tadmir). “Their dead are martyrs and their legal status is Islam,” he concluded. “Patience concerning their errors, together with the proffering of advice, is the right-guided sunni way.”

Al-Maqdisi’s response, which appeared the next day, was to insist that “whoso is killed in the path of democracy, and in support of a group that refrains from implementing the Sharia and chooses democracy, is not a martyr; rather he is a corpse (fatis), bother some though it will.” In the same post, al-Maqdisi launched into a comparison of Hamas and the Islamic State, both of which, as he explains, have killed their opponents and exposed their civilian populations to bombardment. Though al-Maqdisi has long been a critic of the Islamic State, here he suggests that the caliphate is superior to Hamas in that it has implemented the Sharia as opposed to democracy and does not show loyalty to idolatrous tyrants (tawaghit). Why then, he asks, addressing Abu Qatada (though not by name), is it your view that we must approach the Islamic State as something to be destroyed (tadmir) but Hamas as something to be improved (ta‘dil)? Al-Maqdisi’s point here was not that the Islamic State is improvable while Hamas is not. His point, rather, was that if the Islamic State is irredeemable then Hamas is doubly so, since Hamas is worse than the Islamic State in certain ways.

This time Abu Qatada did not respond. Al-Maqdisi would follow up to reaffirm that “whoso dies in the path of democracy is a corpse, not a martyr,” and later he would author a long post quoting some of Abu Qatada’s older works that were highly critical of Hamas and its ilk. The most recent post by Abu Qatada regarding Hamas was actually a statement condemning the group for allying with Iran and its Shiite proxies, and particularly the Houthis whom a Hamas representative had recently honored with a medal. Yet even here it was clear that Abu Qatada considered Hamas a Muslim group; the criticism was harsh but still intended as constructive.

Whither al-Maqdisi and al-Qaida?

As noted above, the jihadi reactions to last month’s Israel-Hamas war point to two fault lines in the Sunni jihadi movement: one between the Islamic State and al-Qaida, and one in the pro-al-Qaida side of the movement between the followers of al-Maqdisi and the followers of Abu Qatada. Al-Qaida, as I have written before, almost certainly would like to hold on to both ideological camps, but increasingly it is alienating al-Maqdisi and his followers. The change in approach appears to be by design. With the Islamic State representing the more extreme and intolerant version of Jihadi Salafism, al-Qaida is intent on presenting itself as the movement’s more moderate face. To that end, it has taken a softer line on mainstream Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and played down the emphasis on ideological exclusivism promoted by al-Maqdisi and his camp.

Al-Qaida has long wavered between a more pan-Islamist and a more Salafi (i.e., doctrinally exclusivist) tendency, and today the pan-Islamist tendency has the edge. Al-Maqdisi has taken note of this development, hence his questioning whether al-Qaida has “changed its methodology.” For the supporters of the Islamic State, the answer to this question is obvious and al-Maqdisi knows it. As one Islamic State supporter recently wrote, addressing al-Maqdisi, “Yes, it has changed, and you have ceased to have any value to them and they no longer pay any heed to what you say. Soon they may issue a statement in which, implicitly or explicitly, they dissociate from you and your extremism.” The writer was probably overstating the divergence between al-Maqdisi and al-Qaida; neither is eager for a divorce. But if al-Maqdisi continues to express outrage at what he see as the accumulating deviations of al-Qaida, then a breakup of sorts may well be inevitable.

The Wound of the Rohingya

The new video, released on March 12, 2021 and titled “The Rohingya Are the Wound of the Entire Umma,” is peculiar in several respects. First, though it is advertised as a video address by al-Zawahiri, he is not in fact the main speaker. That role is played by an unidentified narrator, who introduces the subject (the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar and the world’s failure to do something about it) and provides the vast majority of the commentary. Al-Zawahiri’s voice can be heard (he does not actually appear in the video) on just six occasions, in snippets ranging from eleven seconds to a minute and a half. In total, he speaks for just three minutes and forty-five seconds in the nearly 22-minute video. While news coverages clippings take up a lot of this time, and that is normal in these sorts of videos, it is not normal for al-Zawahiri to play second fiddle to another speaker.

Al-Zawahiri, it seems, did at some point record an address on the subject of the Rohingya genocide. But the impression given by the video is that this was recorded so long ago that it needed trimming and repackaging in order not to seem dated and timeworn. In one of the six snippets, al-Zawahiri speaks of “the democratic government of Myanmar,” indicating that his recorded words are not recent. The narrator, by contrast, refers to “the military coup in Myanmar,” showing that at least he is up to date on current affairs. Al-Zawahiri’s words are indeed so general that they could have been recorded as long ago as 2017. Nothing in his three minutes and forty-five seconds offers anything remotely approaching proof of life.

In his last video, al-Zawahiri also did not refer to recent events. Released on September 11, 2020, this was a most unusual video for al-Qaida to put out on the anniversary of 9/11. Billed as the first installment of a series titled “Deal of the Century or Centuries of Campaigns?” its general subject is the Trump administration’s policies regarding Israel. At the beginning of the video, al-Zawahiri describes some of the Trump administration’s recent moves, such as relocating the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, as part of “the long-running struggle between the Muslims and the Crusaders.” Yet the bulk of his address takes the form of an extended refutation of an al-Jazeera documentary from July 2019 that asserted links between al-Qaida and Bahraini intelligence. Al-Zawahiri made no reference to anything more recent than that.

Another peculiarity of the Rohingya video, as pointed out by Wassim Nasr, is the omission of the phrase “may God preserve him” from its usual place after al-Zawahiri’s name, both in the announcement for the video and in the video itself. In jihadi media products, the words “may God preserve him” usually follow the name of a speaker/author who is alive, whereas the words “may God have mercy on him” usually follow the name of a speaker/author who is dead. The absence of either of these expressions here is striking, particularly in the context of rumors of al-Zawahiri’s death. The phraseology was also missing from al-Zawahiri’s “Deal of the Century” video. By contrast, “may God preserve him” followed al-Zawahiri’s name is his video from May 2020, as it did in nearly all of his videos from 2019. While occasionally al-Qaida has neglected to include the phrase in videos of al-Zawahiri in the past, to do so twice in a row under the current circumstances is to give the impression that he very well could be dead.

Jihadi reactions

Following the release of the video, supporters of the Islamic State trolled supporters of al-Qaida on Telegram, sometimes using the hashtag @where_is_al-Zawahiri (#أين_الظواهري). Sawt al-Zarqawi, a prominent commentator, urged those in the Islamic State camp to use the hashtag and to give the “apostate” al-Qaida lovers hell in retaliation for how they responded to the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019. “Flog them and gloat over them,” he wrote, “as those accursed ones did before when they rejoiced and exulted in the martyrdom of Shaykh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, may God accept him … today the shoe is on the other foot.”

Another prominent supporter of the Islamic State, known as Baha’, called the video a failed attempt “to prove that al-Zawahiri is alive.” While the video was presented as being a new address by al-Zawahiri, he wrote, it obviously was not, and “even the supporters of al-Qaida recognized this time that it is an old production.” More discouraging for them still, he continued, was the absence of the phrase “may God preserve him,” an omission that “invites speculation.” In another post, Baha’ wrote that the video, rather than reassuring al-Qaida supporters about their emir’s status, instead had the effect of “fueling speculation about al-Zawahiri’s fate and the fate of al-Qaida in its entirety.”

Baha’s own take is that al-Zawahiri is long dead and that al-Qaida, for whatever reason, is trying to cover it up: “All of this muddling … confirms that which is already established, which is that al-Zawahiri died a long time ago. Foolish al-Qaida’s current efforts are akin to trying to cover up the sun with a sieve.” But al-Qaida may not be ready, he added, to announce the death of its leader. Alluding to the two-year period from 2014 to 2015 when al-Qaida urged its members to give bay‘a, or allegiance, to Taliban leader Mullah Omar as their supreme authority even though he had been dead since 2013, Baha’ quipped that “giving bay‘a to the dead is a registered al-Qaida trademark.”

The online supporters of al-Qaida, as Baha’ correctly noted, made no effort to convince themselves that al-Zawahiri’s video was new and that it furnished proof of life. To the contrary, some of them began to entertain the possibility that al-Zawahiri had died. In a post released the day after the video, Jallad al-Murji’a, one of the more outspoken pro-al-Qaida commentators on Telegram, praised al-Zawahiri as one of the giants of the jihadi movement while minimizing the significance of his possible death. Jihad is not about any particular leader or organization, he reminded his readers, and all of us, including al-Zawahiri, will one day die. “There will come a day when [al-Zawahiri] dies,” Jallad al-Murji’a wrote, “whether that is today or tomorrow, for death will afflict all of us.” In that event, al-Qaida “may pass through stages of weakness,” but in one form or another it will endure. This is because al-Qaida “is more than just an armed group; rather, it is an idea and methodology and creed that will not expire with the death of its adherents.” None of this, he said, was to affirm or deny the rumors of al-Zawahiri’s death, only to remind everyone that his death will eventually come and that the jihad will continue.

A similar sentiment was expressed by another pro-al-Qaida personality, Warith al-Qassam, who in a post informed al-Qaida’s unbelieving adversaries that the organization does not  fight on behalf of any particular individual. “If for the sake of argument we accept your claims that the jihad will end with the death of our shaykh,” he wrote, “then the jihad would have ended more than fifteen years ago with the death of the Imam Abu ‘Abdallah [i.e., Osama bin Ladin].”

These kinds of statements  do not constitute acknowledgment of al-Zawahiri’s death, but they do show that al-Qaida supporters are beginning at least to take seriously the idea that their leader has passed.

The Problem of succession

The possibility of al-Zawahiri’s death raises the question of who will succeed him. The process of choosing a successor could be a difficult one.

Several years ago, al-Qaida put in place a succession plan providing for an orderly transition, but it may be of little help today. The plan was detailed in a set of documents leaked by the Syrian-based jihadi al-Zubayr al-Ghazzi in the course of the dispute between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the group of al-Qaida loyalists in Syria. The documents, from 2014, are the handwritten statements of six high-ranking members of al-Qaida pledging to honor the succession plan. The line of succession to al-Zawahiri is described as follows: First, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, then Abu Muhammad al-Masri, then Sayf al-‘Adl, then Nasir al-Wuhayshi, and then another person to be chosen by al-Qaida’s shura council. Out of the four men named here, three are now dead: Nasir al-Wuhayshi was killed in a drone strike in Yemen in 2015, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was killed by the same means in Syria in 2017, and Abu Muhammad al-Masri was gunned down in Iran (most likely by Israeli agents) in 2020. That leaves Sayf al-‘Adl as the only surviving candidate, but his elevation could be complicated by the fact that he is living in Iran.

The six documents detailing the succession plan clearly state that for a candidate to be given bay‘a as emir he must be present in Khurasan (i.e., the Afghanistan-Pakistan region) or in one of al-Qaida’s branches. That would seem to rule out anyone living in Iran, including al-‘Adl, who is forbidden from leaving the country in accordance with the terms of a 2015 prisoner exchange deal. However, the deal with Iran was reached after these succession documents were written, leaving open the possibility that the restriction on his candidacy no longer applies. While the prisoner exchange deal forbade al-‘Adl from leaving Iran, it also enabled him to live a more normal life and to operate more freely. Thus he may feel perfectly comfortable claiming the mantle of al-Qaida’s global leadership. Even so, it would be problematic for ‘Adl to assume the emirship while still living in Iran, a country routinely described by al-Zawahiri as an enemy state and seen as such by the vast majority of al-Qaida’s supporters. Such a situation would almost certainly alienate al-Qaida’s support base of hardline Jihadi Salafis and possibly some of its commanders. So if al-‘Adl were indeed to succeed al-Zawahiri, he would be wise to do so discreetly—and to try to leave Iran for another safe location as soon as possible.

If al-‘Adl is disqualified, however, on the basis of his location, then perhaps the decision on a successor would fall to al-Qaida’s shura council. In that case the picture becomes more obscure. One possible candidate in this scenario is ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, al-Zawahiri’s Moroccan-born son-in-law who is in charge of al-Qaida’s main media platform, al-Sahab. But he too, according to the U.S. State Department, is based in Iran. Incidentally, al-Maghrebi is the author of one of the six pledges outlining the 2014 succession plan. Two of the other authors of these pledges, Abu Ziyad al-‘Iraqi and Abu Dujana al-Basha, are no longer alive. Perhaps one of the other three authors (Abu Hammam al-Sa‘idi, Salih ibn Sa‘id al-Ghamidi, and Abu ‘Amr al-Masri) is a possible candidate, but there seems to be no publicly available information about who or where they are.

Another complicating factor in the succession process is the Taliban’s ongoing negotations with the Afghan government and its hopes for a complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, as is well known, has long enjoyed a close relationship with the Taliban and even presents itself as ultimately subservient to the Taliban leader. Yet in seeking to get the United States to agree to a military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban has sought to minimize the relationship with al-Qaida, going so far as to deny that any al-Qaida members are present in Afghanistan. That is of course false (in summer 2020 CENTCOM commander Kenneth McKenzie located al-Zawahiri in eastern Afghanistan, and in fall of last year Afghan special forces eliminated al-Qaida’s media chief in Ghazni Province), but the Taliban’s interest in making it seem that al-Qaida is of little significance could have an effect on succession.

The Taliban appears to have asked the al-Qaida central leadership to keep a low profile while it negotiates a U.S. exit. Hardly any al-Qaida videos have been released since the signing of the Doha accord in February 2020. So if al-Zawahiri were to have died, and especially if he died while living in Afghanistan, the Taliban might request that al-Qaida not announce it—and thus delay announcing a successor. That delay could grow into a long one, as the Biden administration may never agree to a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Three distinct possibilities

While al-Zawahiri’s death is not confirmed, all signs seem to be pointing in that direction. Even al-Qaida itself, by leaving out the words “may God preserve him” from its latest video, seems to be signaling that he could be dead. The first and most likely possibility, then, is that al-Zawahiri has died but that al-Qaida does not yet wish to confirm it, either because it is playing for time as it manages a succession or because the Taliban has asked it not to, or both—or perhaps for some other reason.

Yet if this is the case, the question remains why al-Qaida would put out the Rohingya video in the first place. What possible benefit is there in fueling speculation that al-Zawahiri is dead? Is the purpose to send a message to al-Qaida’s global membership that a transition may be underway? Perhaps that is so, but another explanation is also possible.

The second possibility is that al- Zawahiri is not dead but that al-Qaida wants us to think that he might be. In other words, al-Qaida is deliberately fostering ambiguity for some strategic purpose, perhaps because al-Qaida (in cooperation with the Taliban) wants to broadcast to the United States and the international community that al-Qaida is weak and fragile—and thus not worth sticking around in Afghanistan for. That, however, may be a bit too conspiratorial to countenance. As the saying goes, never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity or incompetence.

That leads to the third possibility, which is that the al-Qaida leaders responsible for the group’s media production simply do not know if al-Zawahiri is dead or not. They have heard the rumors of his death but are just as in the dark as the rest of us. If this were true, it would account for the withholding of “may God preserve him” or “may God have mercy on him” from after al-Zawahiri’s name, but it would not account for the decision to release the video in the first place.

Whatever the case may be, al-Qaida’s supporters cannot be feeling very good about their organization right now. What is going on at the top of al-Qaida is not entirely clear, but it appears to be a symptom of a deeper dysfunction and existential crisis afflicting the group. Several of al-Qaida’s local affiliates are doing quite well today, but as a centralized organization al-Qaida has the look of a group in disarray. Over the past decade it has lost control of its affiliates in Iraq and Syria. It has lost numerous leaders in decapitation strikes or assassinations, and those who have survived appear powerless and constrained. Sayf al-‘Adl, the presumptive successor to al-Zawahiri, lives in a country that al-Qaida claims to be at war with. Other al-Qaida leaders live under the authority of a group, the Taliban, that seems interested in reigning it in (at least temporarily). Meanwhile, al-Qaida’s principal stated objective remains attacking the United States, though it has not succeeded in doing so on a large scale since 9/11. And while it is generally thought of as a Jihadi Salafi group, al-Qaida occasionally makes overtures to the Muslim Brotherhood, as it did in this most recent video. In short, there is a lot of dissonance here. Whether al-Zawahiri is dead or alive, al-Qaida has a lot of problems it needs to sort out. Any successor might find the challenge insurmountable.