During these months of negotiations, al-Libi had been in charge of carrying out the talks with al-Zarqawi and his group on behalf of al-Qa‘ida. Yet, al-Libi still had to report and answer to his two bosses, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Given that Bin Ladin was particularly difficult to contact at this time, al-Libi turned to al-Zawahiri for guidance during the process, even as he chose to ignore some of al-Zawahiri’s concerns, including the latter’s disapproval of al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda. However, the Libyan would eventually brief Bin Ladin about all the details of the negotiation, including the correspondence with al-Zarqawi’s group, in a message written a day after the merger was proclaimed.

Al-Libi’s letter to Bin Ladin, the most detailed account of the negotiation process that we have, was discussed in the first installment of this series. What remains to be addressed here is the subsequent reactions of the top two al-Qa‘ida leaders, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, to the merger. Once again, the Abbottabad files offer insights. On October 20, 2004, al-Zawahiri penned a missive to Bin Ladin—saved as “Risala li-l-Hizbar” (Letter to the Lion) in Bin Ladin’s archives—in which he provided his account of the merger and outlined the internal divisions al-Qa‘ida was facing as it came to terms with al-Zarqawi. Nearly two months later, on December 9, 2004, Bin Ladin responded to al-Libi’s and al-Zawahiri’s letters in a message to which he attached several other documents.

Al-Qa‘ida’s Internal Squabbles

In his message to Bin Ladin, Abu al-Faraj al-Libi was clearly concerned by the upcoming dispatch of al-Qa‘ida’s senior military leader, ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, to al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. Al-Libi portrayed al-Iraqi as a divisive figure at the heart of “the problems” al-Qa‘ida was going through at the time, noting that some within the Waziristan-based jihadi milieu pointed to al-Iraqi to justify not allying with Bin Ladin’s men. According to al-Libi, these internal tensions had “significantly decreased” with the Egyptian Khalid al-Habib taking over al-Qa‘ida’s military affairs portfolio from al-Iraqi and the popular field commander Abu al-Layth al-Libi joining forces with the organization in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Al-Zawahiri’s October 2004 letter to Bin Ladin substantiates al-Libi’s account about the organization’s internal squabbles, admitting that “some problems” were persisting within its senior ranks, including with al-Iraqi. “The affairs of ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi] have been in a state of struggle, as he has admitted to me”, al-Zawahiri writes, pointing to the “problems” and “conflict” between the Iraqi and Shaykh Sa‘id al-Misri (“al-Qari”), a founding member of al-Qa‘ida who would later become its general manager. “Each of them is complaining to me, but I am far away and all I can do is send letters at infrequent intervals”, al-Zawahiri laments. As is apparent from the letter, al-Iraqi was also quarreling with Hamza al-Jawfi, a senior Egyptian explosives trainer and weapons supplier whose strained relations with al-Iraqi had led him to stop working with al-Qa‘ida. Al-Jawfi, al-Zawahiri explained, “claimed that the problem was with ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi] and that he was waiting for his departure” before going back to the fold. With al-Iraqi’s demotion, al-Jawfi expressed “his commitment” to resuming his cooperation with al-Qa‘ida.

For al-Zawahiri, however, it was al-Libi, not al-Iraqi, who was the primary troublemaker in al-Qa‘ida’s hierarchy. “Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi] has been reckless and has exposed himself to hazards repeatedly”, al-Zawahiri wrote to Bin Ladin, adding that al-Libi had “caused a large problem with his continued absence that is nearly constant” as the Libyan “moves about frequently”. Over the past year, al-Libi had been mainly based in Abbottabad inside Pakistan while al-Iraqi and the bulk of al-Qa‘ida’s leaders operated from South Waziristan in Pakistan’s tribal areas. “I emphasized to Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi] that he must stick close to the location of ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi]”, al-Zawahiri stated, “because his leaving is dangerous and could lead to numerous problems”. Yet, “neither giving advice nor giving direct orders has diverted him from his path”, he complained. The Libyan’s “continued absence” ended up leaving “affairs and responsibilities unclear” and “things proceeding in an undisciplined manner” inside al-Qa’ida, notably causing the “conflict” between al-Iraqi and Shaykh Sa‘id. “I have exhausted all avenues with Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi]”, al-Zawahiri lamented, urging Bin Ladin to “issue a clear order to him [i.e., al-Libi] that he keep to a reliable location, such as the locations of ‘Abd al-Hadi, and leave the cities”, as staying inside urban Pakistani areas was deemed too dangerous.

Mindful of his lieutenants’ grievances, Bin Ladin authored a seven-page document saved as “al-Shura” (Consultation), which he attached to his December 2004 letter. An updated version of a missive written “a long time ago”, the “al-Shura” document aimed at resolving al-Qa‘ida’s internal turmoil by charting a framework regulating command-and-control and duties within the organization. In setting all this out, Bin Ladin firmly stood by his decision to appoint al-Libi as al-Qa‘ida’s “general manager” and reaffirmed his confidence in his young Libyan commander. “I consider you apt to manage the work under these circumstances”, Bin Ladin assured al-Libi, adding that the latter should not be “embarrassed because of the other brothers who had previous experience in the jihad or are older than he is”. Well-aware of the criticism around al-Libi’s leadership, Bin Ladin wanted to make very clear to the “senior brothers” in the Af-Pak region that “the author of these lines [i.e., Bin Ladin] is the one who appointed Tawfiq [i.e., al-Libi] as the overall head for all the al-Qa‘ida brothers”, thereby making al-Libi “the most senior official in the [Af-Pak] area”.

On the other hand, Bin Ladin took al-Zawahiri’s admonishment of al-Libi’s operational security recklessness very seriously. Consequently, the leader of al-Qa‘ida, in one of the attachments to his main letter, directed al-Libi to undertake his activities “using letters and very few couriers” and to “refrain from moving around unless there is a dire need [to do so]”, underlining that this was “an obligatory order and is not subject to discussion”. Further, in his “al-Shura” document, Bin Ladin reminded his Libyan lieutenant that his critics were not nobodies, advising him to “always remember that the respected brothers whose names were mentioned have good past experiences in the jihad”. The al-Qa‘ida leader went on to praise al-Zawahiri as “the cream of the crop of what was left from the mujahidin during these past decades” and instructed al-Libi to “increase your consultation with him and take his opinion, in addition to the fact that he is the deputy of the overall emir”. As for the “virtuous” Shaykh Sa‘id, another player in the group’s discord, Bin Ladin suggested that, “if possible”, al-Libi should “make friends with him, without him trespassing your privileges”. In sum, Bin Ladin wanted al-Libi to play ball for the organization’s sake by getting along with the other leaders. At the same time, Bin Ladin instructed him, “go forward and do not look back and do not hesitate, even if some people would talk [negatively] about you”.

With regard to the contentious case of al al-Iraqi, Bin Ladin weighed in in favor of his detractors, headed by al-Libi, whose complaints had been voiced in the Libyan’s October 2004 letter. First, Bin Ladin validated al-Libi’s decision to demote al-Iraqi as al-Qa‘ida’s military leader. He initially considered replacing the Iraqi with Abu ‘Ubayda al-Misri, a veteran military figure who was then leading al-Qa‘ida’s operations in Kunar, as he was “proven [in our eyes]”, while Khalid al-Habib would become “a trainer or an administrator, assuring the preparations of the brothers”. Eventually though, “we learned you had appointed brother Khalid al-Habib [as] the military emir”, Bin Ladin wrote to al-Libi, essentially endorsing the Libyan’s choice by confirming al-Habib as the new military leader “for a period of a year from his being given the assignment”.

Also, Bin Ladin sided with al-Libi regarding al-Iraqi’s relocation to Iraq. As we saw in the first article in this series, the leader of al-Qa‘ida initially favored dispatching al-Iraqi to Iraq. Yet, he changed his mind after learning that this move was causing concerns and was opposed by numerous top al-Qa‘ida figures, including al-Libi and al-Habib. As a result, Bin Ladin recommended in his December 2004 letter that al-Iraqi “delay his travel at this stage”. Instead, the Iraqi commander should “be assigned the file of al-Tanbul [the short] if that is possible, or whatever you see fit”. “Al-Tanbul” possibly refers to al-Zarqawi, especially given that al-Iraqi continued to work as a liaison to al-Qa‘ida in Iraq after 2004 (more on this in the next installment in this series). 

The Al-Rabi‘a-Al-Zarqawi Nexus

Besides backing al-Libi on the al-Iraqi issue, Bin Ladin also rallied behind the Libyan’s proposal concerning al-Qa‘ida’s external operations. Earlier, al-Libi had recommended to Bin Ladin that the group “transfer the external work department to Iraq” by sending there Hamza al-Rabi‘a, the external wing’s head, or Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, al-Qa‘ida’s best bombmaker, “or both of them”. In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin sanctioned the “transfer” of al-Rabi‘a to Iraq. He noted that “it is fine for him to travel alone”, hence implying that he did not see the presence of al-Muhajir as necessary.

Bin Ladin further advised that before traveling al-Rabi‘a should first reach out to and coordinate with al-Zarqawi to obtain “reassurance regarding the security of the road” between Pakistan and Iraq. The leader of al-Qa‘ida also wanted al-Rabi‘a to explain to al-Zarqawi the purpose of the mission at hand, namely to “form an independent apparatus to carry out external operations” from Iraq so as to capitalize on the numerous foreign fighters there who could easily travel abroad to mount these attacks. Al-Rabi‘a was also told that before setting off he ought to brief al-Zarqawi on external operations by sending the latter a message “comprising [information on] our previous experiences in this work”, with a focus on the “conditions necessary to be met” for would-be operatives. In doing so, Bin Ladin reasoned, al-Rabi‘a would not be starting from scratch if he managed to get to Iraq as al-Zarqawi would already be working on global attacks; on the other hand, if al-Rabi‘a were unable to travel, then external plotting would still continue from Iraq.

Bin Ladin attached a document to his December 2004 letter specifying the joint mission on which al-Rabi‘a and al-Zarqawi ought to cooperate. In it, the leader of al-Qa‘ida stipulated that, among their top priorities, the two should focus on planning attacks in the U.S., especially in “the states which elected [George W.] Bush, starting with Florida and Ohio and Texas”. Indeed, Bin Ladin seemed inclined to spare the states that did not vote for Bush, stipulating that there should be “some kind of security [guarantee] for them” and that al-Qa’ida should “issue a special message clarifying their status”. This echoes the conclusion of a public video by Bin Ladin released earlier in October 2004 in which he stated that “every [American] state that doesn’t play with our security has automatically guaranteed its own security”.

Another Abbottabad file indicates that Bin Ladin’s instructions were then communicated to al-Zarqawi. In a draft of a statement entitled “The America Speech”, Bin Ladin refuted the notion that al-Qa‘ida’s international attacks had waned and gloated that the war in Iraq had even strengthened the organization’s “military wing responsible for operations against America”. To further his point, he announced that “we have asked our brother … Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to establish another wing there [i.e., in Iraq], for recruiting those energies qualified to operate against America and its allies”. He went on to threaten that “the best witness of the success of this wing will be the operations undertaken in the capitals of Europe”, mentioning the 7/7 London bombings as the wing’s latest success. Lastly, while Bin Ladin acknowledged that “no operations have occurred in America recently”, he claimed that it was not because of the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts but the “result of some mistakes committed by some of the brothers in Pakistan [who] were discovered by … the apostate Pervez [Musharraf]”. The al-Qa‘ida leader nonetheless warned the U.S.: “what will come to you all is the most bitter thing you will have tasted … And the results will come … when the preparations are completed”.

It is worth noting that Bin Ladin’s December 2004 letter, the attached document threatening the states that voted for Bush and “The America Speech” all corroborate claims by U.S. intelligence back in 2007 that the leader of al-Qa‘ida had asked al-Rabi‘a “to send Zarqawi a briefing on al Qaeda’s external operations, including information about operations against the American homeland”. The same intelligence sources reported that Bin Ladin had also “tasked [al-Zarqawi] with forming a cell to conduct terrorist attacks outside of Iraq” and that he had “emphasized that America should be Zarqawi’s number one priority in terms of foreign attacks”. It is most likely that al-Libi was the one who transmitted Bin Ladin’s directives to al-Zarqawi, as the Libyan is reported to have called on al-Zarqawi “to target U.S. interests outside of Iraq”. The same U.S. intelligence sources added that al-Zarqawi had “welcomed this direction and claimed he had already come up with some good proposals”.

On January 19, 2006, al-Jazira broadcasted a new audio statement from Bin Ladin, who had not been heard in the media for a year. Entitled “A Message to the American People: The Way to End the War”, this message was a heavily edited version of “The America Speech” in which the leader of al-Qa‘ida was far less candid about his group’s planning for international attacks. The public address made no mention of the “external wing” or the nexus with al-Zarqawi in Iraq and instead remarked that “Iraq has become a point of attraction and recruitment for qualified forces”. Bin Ladin also chose not to evoke the “mistakes … of the brothers in Pakistan” to explain al-Qa‘ida’s failure to strike inside the U.S., rephrasing the passage as follows: “As for the delay in the occurrence of similar operations in America, it is not because of the impossibility of penetrating your security arrangements, but rather, operations are in preparation and you shall see them on your own soil when they are completed”. Finally, Bin Ladin did not issue threats against Europe, contenting himself to celebrate the achievements of “the mujahidin … as evidenced by what you have seen in terms of bombings in the capitals of the most important European States”, referring to the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005.

Al-Zawahiri’s “Glad Tidings”

In his October 2004 letter, al-Zawahiri recounted to Bin Ladin that two days earlier, he had heard “the glad tidings” in the media: al-Zarqawi had declared his allegiance to Bin Ladin and “urged the umma to unite against the Crusaders and the Jews”. The news had been reported by newspapers such as al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Hayat, al-Quds and Radio America (in Pashto) but was “completely ignored” by the BBC, despite the latter “filling its bulletins with a lot of rubbish!!”, al-Zawahiri fumed.

Al-Zawahiri went on to narrate the negotiation process between al-Qa‘ida and al-Zarqawi’s group, citing details that largely match those of al-Libi’s version. Before the merger, al-Zawahiri wrote, al-Libi had “sent [me] a message about the conditions of Iraq”. The main points of this message were that the “mujahidin” were thriving as they “controlled large areas” of Iraq, were well-resourced and had “hundreds” of recruits coming “from the neighboring countries”; that they were “about to form a unified group” that would include “most of those working on behalf of the jihad”; that they were planning “large-scale operations in neighboring countries”; that they had begun targeting the Shi‘a only after the Badr Corps started attacking “the Sunnis and their scholars”; and that after they had asked to swear allegiance to Bin Ladin, al-Libi told them to go ahead with the oath of allegiance, saying he would reach out to al-Zawahiri “to speed up the matter”. Al-Libi then “requested the approval of Abu Fatima [i.e., al-Zawahiri] with brief directives”, which would be followed by more detailed guidance at a later time.

It is worth noting here that al-Zawahiri’s letter helps to clarify al-Zarqawi’s rationale for joining al-Qa’ida, something which was missing in al-Libi’s letter. In discussing al-Zarqawi’s eagerness to pledge allegiance, al-Zawahiri specified that the Jordanian’s group initially showed “some hesitancy as concerns [Bin Ladin’s] forbearing from fighting the client rulers” but that Bin Ladin’s most recent message had “reassured” them. Although not more explicit, this passage echoes the account of a member of al-Zarqawi’s group who related that al-Zarqawi used to see al-Qa‘ida as “soft” on “the apostate rulers – especially the Saudis – and their armies” and had thus refused to join al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, Bin Ladin “explicitly declared the obligation to fight [the Saudi regime] in some of his addresses” and “the obstacles preventing the unification … were thereby removed”. It thus appears that it was the post-911 takfiri friendly agenda embraced by al-Qa‘ida that “reassured” al-Zarqawi and prompted him to join forces with an organization he saw as previously not adhering to the “correct” methodology.

Based on his understanding of Bin Ladin’s policy, al-Zawahiri sent a response to al-Libi urging al-Zarqawi’s group to “prepare immediately to announce the bay‘a”. He added that the oath “should not be in the name of a person”, namely al-Zarqawi, but rather on behalf “of the collectivity of the mujahidin in Iraq”. Al-Zawahiri’s message also addressed the scope of jihad for al-Zarqawi’s group: the Jordanian’s men should “stop working against the Shi‘a” and “postpone activity against the client rulers at the present time, so that their efforts are not scattered across two fronts given that we are now in the stage of mobilizing the umma for jihad”. Nonetheless, he added, “confronting the client rulers will eventually come, God willing, and victory will not be achieved without it”. As mentioned earlier, al-Libi withheld some of these instructions from al-Zarqawi’s group. While al-Libi notified Bin Ladin about this, none of the files I’ve reviewed indicates that al-Zawahiri was informed about this.

Bin Ladin’s Guidelines

In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin rejoiced over the news of al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a, saying that it pleased him greatly and describing it as “great and promising”. The leader of al-Qa‘ida urged al-Zawahiri and al-Libi to “pay close attention to this event” as it was “a major step toward unifying the efforts of the mujahidin … not only in Iraq, but in the whole region”. In view of the fact that unity among Muslims is “one of the most obligatory of legal duties”, Bin Ladin wanted his two lieutenants “to ask the brother Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to urge the other mujahid groups in Iraq and its environs to unite their efforts with him”, adding that al-Zawahiri and Abu al-Layth al-Libi should issue public messages calling for unity among the elements of the Iraqi insurgency. Bin Ladin also suggested publicizing the additions to al-Zarqawi’s group, even the “small” ones, as doing so would “raise the morale of Muslims and increase their interest and support for the mujahidin”. Bin Ladin commented on the rest of the Iraqi insurgency by stating that the Islamic Party and Ansar al-Sunna “should be encouraged and supported” in their operations.

As explained in the first installment in this series, al-Zarqawi and al-Libi wanted Bin Ladin to deliver a public pronouncement endorsing the Jordanian’s group, inciting the militants in Iraq and the Levant to rally behind it and “encourag[ing] the youth there” as they were in the midst of heavy military pressure from the U.S. in Fallujah. Following al-Libi’s and al-Zarqawi’s advice, Bin Ladin recorded an audio addressed to “the Muslim brothers in Iraq in particular and the umma in general” in which he lauded “the free people in the land of al-Anbar, particularly the residents of the heroic city of al-Fallujah” who were giving “an example of steadfastness for others in the face of U.S. barbarism”.

More importantly, the statement formally sanctioned the bay‘a of “the dignified brother” al-Zarqawi and his group. “We, in the al-Qa‘ida organization, warmly welcome their union with us”, Bin Ladin said, emphasizing that “this is a great step toward rendering successful the efforts of the mujahidin to establish [an Islamic state]”. He further stressed that “it should be known that the mujahid brother Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi is the emir of al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Two Rivers [i.e., al-Qa‘ida in Iraq]” and that “the brothers in the group there should heed his orders and obey him”. Bin Ladin also encouraged others in the jihadi landscape in Iraq to come together under al-Zarqawi’s leadership, stating that “the mujahid groups [there] ought to coordinate amongst themselves in order to unite their ranks under one banner”.

Bin Ladin’s audio advocated broad mobilization for fighting in Iraq and elsewhere in the Islamic world where “the Crusader-Zionist coalition” was seeking to subjugate the umma, including Afghanistan and Palestine. “The most important and serious issue today,” he explained, “is this Third World War”. In these circumstances, jihad was an “individual duty” (fard ‘ayn) on every member of the Muslim umma, who “are required to devote of their resources, sons and wealth what is sufficient for fighting the unbelievers and driving them out of their lands”. Adopting a more takfiri rhetoric more in tune with al-Zarqawi’s thinking, Bin Ladin also touched on “a number of the most important and serious legal judgments” concerning those who refrain from supporting this jihad. The first pertained to “those who support the unbelievers against the Muslims”. According to Bin Ladin, “giving support to America or [Ayad] Allawi’s apostate government … in any way whatsoever … is greater unbelief that expels one from the community”. This included “the owners of companies and the workers who transport fuel, ammunition, food supplies and any other needs”. All these “have apostatized from the religion and it is necessary to fight them”. In the same vein, he stated that “those Iraqis … who belong to Allawi’s apostate government, such as members of the Army, the security agencies and the National Guard … their blood is licit”. The second issue was about “participation in the upcoming elections” in Iraq. Given that the Iraqi constitution was “a constitution of unbelief” and that the elections “will be held upon America’s orders”, Bin Ladin maintained that “if anyone participates in [these elections] knowingly and willingly, he will have rejected God”.

In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin had advised that al-Zarqawi’s men “focus [their] operations against the Americans, their allies and the apostate government of Allawi”, arguing that “undoubtedly, they have the right to defend themselves and their brothers against any force wanting to harm them”. Similarly, the audio praised al-Zarqawi’s jihad in Iraq, highlighting the “daring operations against the Americans and Allawi’s apostate government”. Yet, the leader of al-Qa‘ida also argued that the “mujahidin” should “beware the shedding of innocent blood, except for what the law permits, such as in the case of people being used as shields (tatarrus), without going to excess”, a likely reference to the numerous Iraqi civilians killed in jihadi bombings in Iraq. In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin also recommended that al-Zarqawi’s group “avoid opening fronts that could be delayed”, which is almost certainly a reference to delaying an all-out war against the Shi‘a in Iraq.

Epilogue

In addition to the one on Iraq, Bin Ladin would record an additional audio statement in late 2004 focusing on the Arabian Peninsula. These two files as well as the other documents cited in this article, including Bin Ladin’s operational security directives to al-Libi, were all supposed to be sent together as a response to al-Libi’s and al-Zawahiri’s messages from October 2004. But as another document from the Abbottabad files suggests, Bin Ladin’s effort to reach out to his two deputies failed, at least initially.

This document is a letter addressed to al-Libi (“Wakil Sahib”) signed by a certain “Jaragh al-Din”. Clues from this missive and from al-Libi’s October 2004 letter to Bin Ladin indicate that Jaragh al-Din was part of Bin Ladin’s inner circle, living with or in close proximity to the leader of al-Qa‘ida in Haripur and transmitting the latter’s messages to his aides. In his October 2004 letter, al-Libi asked Bin Ladin “to permit brother Ahmad … to meet with us” so that “we can introduce him to at least one or two new brothers … so that you might benefit from us regarding sending communications”. Al-Libi also told Bin Ladin that “we can take advantage of the meeting to teach the brother some of the new means of encryption that we have”. In his letter to al-Libi, Jaragh al-Din wrote: “as for your request to meet with me, I would love to see you … but the Professor [i.e., Bin Ladin] would like us to arrange the meeting at a later time and also would like the study of encryption … to take place via correspondence”. These excerpts show that Jaragh al-Din and Ahmad were one and the same and that he was part of Bin Ladin’s courier network. Given his profile, it is possible that “Ahmad” is just short for the infamous Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who would end up being killed along with “the Professor” during the Abbottabad raid.

In any event, Jaragh al-Din’s letter to al-Libi reveals that the files Bin Ladin produced in late 2004, from the “al-Shura” document to the audio statements on Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, “were lost with Salih”. Together with a certain “Hassan”, Salih was one of “the two current lines” in al-Qa‘ida’s courier network on the receiving end of the correspondence from Bin Ladin at the time. Although the circumstances of the losses were not explained, in his letter to Bin Ladin al-Libi had warned that “the two current lines” were “overstretched” and “not safe on account of the extent of the demand on them” inside the organization.

Eventually though, Bin Ladin’s files reached their intended recipients. In his December 2004 letter, he notified al-Libi that he wanted the audio about the Arabian Peninsula to be released first, either on December 14 or 15, as there was an unspecified “interest related to this date”. If that was not possible, he continued, then the Iraq audio should be released before the Arabian Peninsula speech. Jaragh al-Din instructed al-Libi to “find a secure path” for “the two audio messages” to be released on “the internet” as “we do not think they will be published in their entirety in the media”. He asked the Libyan to “give a copy of them to al-Zarqawi’s representative if he visits you” so that the “important legal judgments” contained in these “messages” could be disseminated in Iraq.

On December 16, Bin Ladin’s Arabian Peninsula audio address was released on jihadi forums, the same day that anti-monarchy protests were planned in Riyadh and Jeddah at the initiative of the Saudi Islamist Sa‘d al-Faqih. Eleven days later, on December 27, the Iraq audio was released.

Reflections

When al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a to Bin Ladin was announced on October 17, 2004, the communiqué noted that “our most generous brothers in al-Qa‘ida came to understand the strategy of [our group], and their hearts warmed to its methodology”. Here, al-Zarqawi was signaling that, while nominally under Bin Ladin’s leadership, it was his “strategy” and “methodology” that Bin Ladin was agreeing to sign up for, and not the other way around.

The Abbottabad files studied in this series lend credence to the communiqué’s claim. As noted earlier, al-Zarqawi’s willingness to come under Bin Ladin’s leadership appears to have been facilitated, at least in part, by the more avowedly anti-regime stance adopted by al-Qa‘ida in the wake of 9/11. Indeed, it was only when al-Qa‘ida moved away from its “attack the West only” program to include a local component closer to al-Zarqawi’s line of thinking that he agreed to join forces. He likely reasoned that if he were to subordinate himself to al-Qa‘ida, he would not be encumbered by what was before 9/11 al-Qa‘ida’s exclusive focus on the far enemy.

Besides the positive signals in the form of Bin Ladin’s more takfiri statements, al-Zarqawi must have felt even more vindicated when, behind the scenes, al-Libi commended his strategy in Iraq, telling the Jordanian’s envoy that “what al-Zarqawi is doing, i.e., striking the Americans in Iraq and all the apostates who help them” while using “the Iraqi theater to make preparations for neighboring countries in terms of training and arrangements”, was “absolutely correct”. After the meeting where al-Zarqawi’s emissary outlined his group’s vision for Iraq and the region to al-Libi, the latter sent a message to his counterpart in Iraq announcing that al-Zawahiri had accepted the bay‘a and asking al-Zarqawi to present the bay‘a in public.

With all this in mind, it is easy to see why al-Zarqawi would think he had succeeded in bringing al-Qa‘ida on board with his strategic vision. However, the Abbottabad files also show that, despite the positive signals, al-Qa‘ida’s top leaders were not in full agreement with the Jordanian when his bay‘a was first accepted by al-Libi. Bin Ladin was originally keen on keeping al-Zarqawi in check by dispatching a senior figure, al-Iraqi, to Iraq in order to uphold al-Qa‘ida’s true agenda there, namely “the escalation in the resistance to the occupying forces” and “the prevention of the opening of other secondary fronts, such as [against] the Shi’ites”. Al-Zawahiri, for his part, wanted al-Zarqawi’s group to “stop working against the Shi‘a” and to “postpone activity against the client rulers”, which was to form a later stage of jihad. Likewise, al-Libi had notified al-Zarqawi’s emissary that Bin Ladin considered jihad against the Arab regimes “an advanced stage” and that the current priority was “the stage of fighting the greater unbelief (the Americans)”.The Libyan also appeared concerned by the mass-casualty attacks against Iraq’s Shi‘a community.

Nevertheless, al-Qa‘ida—or al-Qa‘ida central, as it would soon come to be known—was in no position to strong-arm al-Zarqawi into following its preferred path in Iraq. From the start, al-Zarqawi had made clear that it was up to al-Qa‘ida to embrace his program, telling Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri that “if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your readied soldiers, working under your banner”. In the aftermath of the first battle of Fallujah, the Jordanian had the upper hand in the negotiation as he had become the leading figure in the most important battleground for jihad. By contrast, letters from al-Libi and al-Zawahiri highlight that al-Qa‘ida was then enduring intense military and security pressure in Pakistan as well as internal rifts. The level of strain was such that the planning of external operations had “practically halted” and Bin Ladin had to write a guidance document (the “al-Shura” letter) focused entirely on bringing harmony to the ranks. In this precarious context, the prospect of a merger with al-Zarqawi appeared particularly attractive to al-Qa‘ida, which viewed Iraq as a new El Dorado which could reverse the organization’s fortunes, especially in terms of planning international attacks.

Hence, the concerns of al-Qa‘ida’s leadership, and its divergences, were transmitted in attenuated form or even hidden from al-Zarqawi altogether. The one “warning” to al-Zarqawi against “excess” contained in Bin Ladin’s audio about Iraq was only briefly expressed and came very late in what was otherwise a speech endorsing the Jordanian’s actions. Bin Ladin was not much more assertive in private. He eventually gave up on trying to rein in al-Zarqawi, instructing al-Iraqi to “delay” his journey to Iraq and, instead of confronting the Shi‘a elephant in the room head-on, merely shared his view in his letter to al-Libi and al-Zawahiri that al-Zarqawi’s group should “avoid opening fronts that could be delayed”. Even then, he made sure to qualify his subtle criticism with the expression “the witness sees what the absent one does not see”, in deference to al-Zarqawi and his team. It is telling that while Bin Ladin devoted an entire missive to resolving al-Qa‘ida’s internal disputes (the “al-Shura” letter), his strategic instructions to al-Qa‘ida in Iraq were limited to a six-line paragraph shorter than the one discussing wedding arrangements for his son Khalid”. This somewhat lax approach on the part of Bin Ladin would later be confirmed by al-Zawahiri, who stated in 2006 that while Bin Ladin had instructed the “brothers in Iraq” to “focus their efforts on the Americans and neutralize the rest of the powers as best as they could”, he had still given “them some freedom of movement, telling them that the witness sees what the absent one does not see.”

With regard to al-Zawahiri, although he was the bluntest in criticizing al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda internally, his disapproval was purposely concealed from the Jordanian by al-Qa‘ida’s general manager, al-Libi. From the Abbottabad files, the Libyan emerges as the most driven and ambitious of al-Qa‘ida’s top officials in brokering a deal in Iraq, as illustrated by his Iraq-focused October 2004 letter that provided detailed guidance on the topic. Bin Ladin’s and al-Zawahiri’s messages on the matter were rather laconic by contrast. It can be argued that al-Libi’s influence in forging the merger was more significant than either of his two bosses’. Besides his role in brokering the deal with al-Zarqawi’s group, he was also instrumental in convincing Bin Ladin to “delay” the dispatch of al-Iraqi, who was supposed to maintain al-Qa‘ida’s interests in Iraq. Furthermore, determined as he was to expedite the negotiation process and remove any remaining impediments, al-Libi, of his own initiative, accepted al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a on behalf of his bosses even as he withheld some of al-Zawahiri’s opinions from al-Zarqawi.

Although al-Libi’s resourcefulness likely facilitated the positive outcome of the negotiation, it also put al-Qa‘ida central in a precarious position in its relationship with its brand new subsidiary and helped to sow the seeds of the coming discord between the two sides. A union had been proclaimed, but strategic divergences had not been fully resolved—let alone conveyed to Zarqawi’s side. Before the announcement of the bay‘a, al-Libi had asked al-Zarqawi for a “detailed report on your situation”, which al-Libi intended to send to his bosses so that they could make well-informed decisions regarding the course of the Iraqi jihad. The files I have archived do not tell if this “report” was ever sent. In any case, the unresolved issues hidden by al-Libi and ignored by Bin Ladin would remain, proving an enduring source of tension as illustrated by al-Qa‘ida’s endless attempts over the years to “rectify” the policies of its affiliate behind the scenes.

Ultimately, al-Qa‘ida came to fully grasp the negative impact of the leeway granted to its Iraqi subsidiary from the outset. At least al-Zawahiri did. In a letter written to Bin Ladin in January 2011, the Egyptian was still arguing over issues that had been preoccupying him ever since the merger, including attacks against Iraq’s Shi‘a and “opening new fronts, whether inside or outside Iraq”. Another issue was the arrival of a new leader named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose presence was further eroding the already strained relations between al-Qa‘ida central and the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qa‘ida in Iraq’s latest incarnation. Particularly vocal in his opposition to the Islamic State’s conduct, al-Zawahiri urged Bin Ladin to restrain al-Baghdadi’s men by sending them a message detailing the policies to follow in Iraq. In the past, al-Qa‘ida’s top leadership had postured diplomatically when questioning the actions of its troublesome affiliate, stating, in the case of Bin Ladin, “the witness sees what the absent one does not see,” and, in the case of al-Zawahiri, “I see the picture from afar, and … you see what we do not see”. Now, the same al-Zawahiri was telling Bin Ladin that “I hope that you do not conclude your message with sayings like … ‘the witness sees what the absent one does not see’, as these sayings nullify every directive preceding them”. As the coming divorce between the two groups later showed, al-Zawahiri’s plea for a more assertive approach was too little, too late—if it ever stood a chance in the first place.

On October 17, 2004, al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, the precursor organization to the Islamic State, issued a statement announcing with much fanfare that its leader Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi had pledged “allegiance” (bay‘a) on behalf of his group “to the mujahid Shaykh Usama bin Ladin, to listen and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity”. The communiqué specified that for eight months there had been “communications between Shaykh Abu Mus‘ab […] and the brothers in al-Qa‘ida and views were exchanged [between the two parties]”. The result was the creation of “al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Two Rivers”, better known as al-Qa‘ida in Iraq.

More than seventeen years later, much of the story behind these eight months of talks remains unknown. To date, the most widely known primary source on the topic has been a seventeen-page letter from al-Zarqawi to Usama bin Ladin and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. Intercepted by the U.S. in January 2004, the text is a blueprint for insurgency in which the Jordanian outlines his vision for jihad in Iraq and proposes to join al-Qa‘ida if its leaders agree to his strategy. While important for understanding the beginning of the process, this letter is just one piece of a much larger correspondence in which a merger was discussed both between al-Qa‘ida Central and its counterpart in Iraq and among the al-Qa‘ida senior leadership. The question remains as to how the two groups eventually agreed to join forces.

Over the past two years, I have been digging into the materials recovered from Bin Ladin’s compound in Abbottabad and came across a number of documents which add significant new pieces to the puzzle. One document proved particularly illuminating. Written by a certain “Wakil Khan”, it is a five-page Arabic letter dated October 18, 2004 in which the author essentially updates Bin Ladin on al-Qa‘ida’s latest developments worldwide to keep his leader in the picture and seek his guidance on key issues. While a good portion of the document deals with the group’s various fortunes in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the most pressing matter to Khan was clearly the Iraqi battlefield, which he described as “ablaze”.

This post focuses on the Iraqi angle of the letter. As will be seen, the letter provides the most detailed first-hand account of the negotiations between al-Qa‘ida Central and al-Zarqawi’s group leading to their union. It also presents new information on some of the lesser known players who were active in these talks between al-Qa‘ida in Pakistan and al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. In addition to the letter by Wakil Khan, the post draws on some additional Abbottabad letters cited here for the first time, including ones by Bin Ladin and al-Zarqawi, further helping to chronicle this milestone in the history of the global jihadi movement.

Wakil and ‘Abdallah Khan

If the name Wakil Khan sounds unfamiliar, it is because it is just one of the multiple aliases of Abu al-Faraj al-Libi. This Tripoli-born al-Qa‘ida veteran joined the organization after he was trained at its al-Faruq camp in Khost in early 1990. A member of al-Qa‘ida’s military committee, al-Libi emerged as a major figure in the group’s training efforts in Afghanistan during the 1990s, serving as an instructor for future cadres and operatives, from Fadil Harun to some of the 9/11 hijackers, and running the group’s training camps and guesthouses.

After the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, al-Libi resettled in Pakistan along with another central player in the Khurasan-Iraq nexus, namely ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, whom al-Libi refers to as “‘Abdallah Khan” in his letter. A former Iraqi army officer, al-Iraqi fought in the ranks of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s before participating in the training of Tajik volunteers in Khost, alongside al-Libi and others. After Bin Ladin’s return to Afghanistan in 1996, he joined up with the Saudi and became al-Qa‘ida’s frontline commander in Afghanistan and a member of its Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council).

In Pakistan, according to another Abbottabad document written on November 19, 2002, al-Libi initially acted as al-Iraqi’s deputy. By the time he composed his letter to Bin Ladin, however, the Libyan had been promoted, according to the U.S., to the position of al-Qa‘ida Central’s “general manager subordinate only to Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri”. Meanwhile, al-Iraqi continued to play a leading role in the organization’s military efforts in Afghanistan.

Besides their portfolios in Khurasan, the two also managed al-Qa‘ida’s “Iraq file” and were instrumental in cementing ties with al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. For example, it was al-Iraqi who dispatched Hassan Ghul—a prominent Pakistani facilitator formerly affiliated with the Khaldan camp in Khost—as al-Qa‘ida’s emissary to al-Zarqawi. Ghul served in this role until his capture in Iraqi Kurdistan on January 23, 2004; with him was found the seventeen-page letter from al-Zarqawi to Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Around this time, al-Iraqi considered traveling to Iraq himself but al-Zarqawi rejected the idea.

Al-Iraqi’s involvement in al-Qa‘ida’s Iraq dossier would eventually lead to his capture. In June 2006, Bin Ladin instructed him to go to Iraq but al-Iraqi was arrested in Gaziantep, Turkey, on October 16, 2006, in an episode well-documented by Brian Fishman. 

One of the things that the Abbottabad files reveal is that his 2006 failed attempt was not the first time al-Iraqi was supposed to travel to Iraq. A letter from Bin Ladin to al-Libi  indicates that as early as June-August 2004, al-Iraqi was preparing his departure for Iraq from Pakistan’s Tribal Areas. “We are eager for him to depart as quickly and safely as possible”, says the leader of al-Qa‘ida, who also advises that once in Iraq al-Iraqi should primarily focus on bolstering jihad against the U.S.-led coalition while “[preventing] the opening of other secondary fronts, such as [against] the Shi’ites”.

If Bin Ladin was enthusiastic about al-Iraqi heading to Iraq, al-Libi’s letter to Bin Ladin (the one he signs as “Wakil Khan”) shows that this sentiment was far from being shared by everyone inside al-Qa‘ida. According to al-Libi, the plan sparked opposition from “many of the brothers” within the group’s senior cadre, including the two Egyptian commanders Khalid al-Habib and Abu al-Hasan al-Misri. At the time, al-Habib headed al-Qa‘ida’s military operations in Afghanistan—a portfolio he had recently inherited from al-Iraqi—while al-Misri was in charge of the Zabul and Kandahar areas. The brothers, according to al-Libi, worried that al-Iraqi’s arrival might cause troubles in Iraq, citing his problematic “way of dealing” with others. Al-Libi himself refers to the difficulty that al-Iraqi has with taking orders (“he is not easily led”), and later in the letter he mentions “problems” with al-Iraqi’s leadership in Afghanistan, noting that these “problems (…) have significantly decreased” since al-Habib took over for him. 

If al-Iraqi went to Iraq, it was not clear to al-Libi what status he would enjoy once there. Would he serve as al-Zarqawi’s amir? Would he be al-Zarqawi’s “subordinate” (tabi’)? Or would he work independently? Considering all three options to be bad, the Libyan and his inner circle suggested to Bin Ladin that he dispatch al-Iraqi as an “adviser” (mustashar) to al-Zarqawi. Given the sensitivity of the issue, al-Libi urged Bin Ladin to personally weigh in and “to define the mission and role of [al-Iraqi] and to set forth regulations for him and a clear plan for his departure”, especially since contacting al-Iraqi would be more difficult once he is on his way out of Pakistan.

News from Iraq

Al-Libi’s concerns about al-Iraqi’s upcoming journey were not the only reason he wrote his missive. The Libyan also needed to brief Bin Ladin on his meeting with Abu Ja‘far al-Iraqi, a senior facilitator who, like Hassan Ghul, used to be affiliated with the Khaldan camp and worked closely with its leading figures Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. At the time of his meeting with al-Libi, Abu Ja‘far was acting as al-Zarqawi’s representative to al-Qa‘ida in Khurasan. Following the central organization’s request “to learn about what is happening [in Iraq], and thereby to be able to arrange the work of the brother ‘Abdallah [‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi]”, Abu Ja‘far went and saw al-Libi to discuss the “reality of the situation there.”.

Speaking to al-Libi on al-Zarqawi’s behalf, Abu Ja‘far portrayed al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad as the undisputed leading militant group in the field, claiming that “90% of the jihadi operations that are carried out there are arranged by brother [Abu] Mus‘ab” and his allies. “All the major operations and most of the small operations” are attributable to al-Zarqawi, he noted, including the attack on the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, the double suicide bombings against a Polish military camp in al-Hillah on February 18, 2004, and the suicide boat attacks against the Basra oil terminal on April 24, 2004. He added that “most of the mujahid groups there have joined Abu Mus‘ab”, that these newcomers were bound by “a legal oath to wage jihad”, and that the number of these groups was increasing. “During the meeting I counted with [Abu Ja‘far] the number of members of the groups, which reached thousands, not including the supporters from other countries, and these figures are not exhaustive”, wrote al-Libi.

The Iraqi theater was also promising owing to the ease of access for volunteers from neighboring Arab countries. “The roads are open from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan”, Abu Ja‘far explained, and large numbers of foreign volunteers were pouring in, so many “that the brothers were beginning to stop their influx” and send some back to their home countries.

The leading status of al-Zarqawi’s group was illustrated by the territorial control that it enjoyed in Iraq’s Sunni areas. Abu Ja‘far told al-Libi that they had “complete control” over Fallujah, Samarra, Baqubah and large parts of Ramadi. In Fallujah, where al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad had established its headquarters, the jihadis enjoyed such power that they were the ones patrolling the city at night, allowing Iraqi police officers and soldiers to patrol during the day though these were accompanied by “the mujahidin”.

There was also “no shortage of weapons and ammunition”, as “more than 80% of the Iraqi army’s weapons and ammunition had fallen into the hands of the brothers”, according to Abu Ja‘far. He further claimed that they were in heated competition with the U.S. to buy the explosives and weapons being sold in the markets. As for financing, Abu Ja‘far indicated that the group was able to raise funds internally from the “war booty” acquired during operations and that it still hadn’t used its hostages to obtain ransom payments despite the amount offered by its enemies, including during the detention of the U.S. national Nicholas Berg who was beheaded by al-Zarqawi in the spring of 2004.

The broader insurgency in Iraq was also a topic of discussion between al-Libi and Abu Ja‘far. Among those discussed was Ansar al-Sunna, a Kurdish-dominated jihadi group cooperating with al-Zarqawi’s group and linked to al-Qa‘ida Central. According to al-Libi, “their work appears to be very limited” and “they are unwilling to operate in their areas (Kurdistan)”. This had led many of their members to defect to al-Zarqawi.

The discussion also revolved around non-jihadi elements of the Iraqi insurgency. Regarding the Islamic Army, a Sunni Islamist armed faction, al-Libi was told that it was made up of “unidentified Iraqi brothers” who were not veterans of known jihadi fronts, but that they were “good brothers” and there was “good cooperation” between them and al-Zarqawi’s group. As for the Islamic Party, another Sunni Iraqi armed group, al-Libi was not enthusiastic, saying that “their position is known to you” and adding that some of their members had begun to carry out small operations. 

External Operations

In light of these promising reports from al-Zarqawi’s group, al-Libi was keen on capitalizing on the Iraqi jihad to further al-Qa‘ida’s global ambitions. In the letter he envisages, together with the colleagues he has consulted, relocating the Pakistan-based external operations wing to Iraq, suggesting that “one of the brothers with experience in [the field of] special activity” (i.e. terrorist attacks) redeploy there. Two Egyptian veterans of the first Afghan jihad are mentioned as the top candidates for the job: Hamza al-Al-Rabi‘a and Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir. A former bodyguard of al-Zawahiri’s, al-Al-Rabi‘a began his career in the Egyptian al-Jihad Group, whose security committee he headed, before joining al-Qa‘ida and running its external operations branch. As for al-Muhajir, he was al-Qa‘ida’s top bombmaker for its attacks in Khurasan and overseas, including the 1998 East Africa bombings, which earned him the nickname “the martyrdom operations engineer”.

To justify this risky shift, al-Libi underlines the difficulties faced by al-Qa‘ida in Pakistan as a result of the growing security pressure on its members in the country. Over the past months, a series of raids against al-Qa‘ida’s infrastructure in Karachi, Lahore and Quetta had battered the network Al-Rabi‘a and al-Libi relied on to facilitate and direct international attacks. Among the losses was Naeem Noor Khan (“Talha”), a Pakistani computer engineer involved in al-Qa‘ida’s plotting in the U.K. As a result of this crackdown, “most of the members of [Al-Rabi‘a’s] group were caught”, laments al-Libi.

In the process, the organization also lost “some important documents”, al-Libi says, referring in particular to the raid against al-Qa‘ida’s “documents office” (maktab al-watha’iq) in Punjab’s city of Gujarat on July 24, 2004. The raid had led to the arrest of Ahmad Khalfan Ghailani (“Haytham”), a senior member of the office from Tanzania involved in the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, and Abu Tariq al-Pakistani, an al-Qa‘ida trainer. While al-Al-Rabi‘a himself narrowly evaded arrest during the Gujarat raid, “the work of our brother Al-Rabi‘a was severely affected” and “his work has practically halted”, assesses al-Libi.  

By contrast, the Iraqi front presented a new opportunity for al-Qa‘ida to revitalize its transnational attacks. In the eyes of al-Libi and his aides, moving there would enable the external operations department to tap into a massive influx of foreign fighters from diverse backgrounds, train new recruits who could then be deployed in future missions, and more generally develop capacity and experience. Iraq also had the advantage of being easily accessible, unlike Pakistan, where “simply renting a home or bringing in a brother from abroad” could cost as much as carrying out an entire operation. “Unless matters speed up or you agree to relocate the activity to Iraq”, al-Libi says to Bin Ladin, then al-Qa‘ida’s capacity to plan attacks overseas will remain limited.  

Targeting the Near Enemy

During their meeting, al-Libi and Abu Ja‘far also addressed the contentious issue of targeting priorities, i.e., whether to attack the far enemy (the U.S. and the West) or the near enemy (apostate governments and their allies). Al-Libi relates that Abu Ja‘far asked him about “some of the issues pertaining to fighting the apostates”, noting that al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad had been making preparations for neighbouring countries, including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Besides transporting and storing weapons, these preparations included training large numbers of recruits and sending them back to their countries “in anticipation of the collapses and changes that may occur in the region when the Americans leave”.

Al-Libi answered that it was his understanding that while Bin Ladin “did not oppose fighting the apostates” he viewed it as “an advanced stage” of jihad, believing that “the current stage is the stage of fighting the greater unbelief (the Americans) and that this is the key to our struggle”. Nonetheless, al-Libi had positive feedback for Abu Ja‘far, maintaining that he agreed with al-Zarqawi’s strategy. “What al-Zarqawi is doing”, al-Libi told Abu Ja‘far, namely “striking the Americans in Iraq and all the apostates who help them”, and using “the Iraqi theater to make preparations for neighboring countries in terms of training and arrangements”, is “absolutely correct”.

While al-Zarqawi at least consulted with al-Qa‘ida regarding his plans for the broader region, he appeared more uncompromising when it came to his stance on Iraq’s Shi’a, whom his group had been attacking in hopes of igniting a sectarian civil war. In his letter, al-Libi recounts that he asked Abu Ja‘far specifically about the operations against the Shi‘a, notably in Karbala and Najaf, and that the Iraqi did not shy away from claiming responsibility for “almost all of them”. The justification for this campaign of violence, according to Abu Ja‘far, was the Shi‘a machinations in the post-war political void. In Abu Ja‘far’s words, the Shi‘a had established the Badr Corps which went to Baghdad and took control of Sunni mosques. They had also arrested Sunni religious figures and attacked Sunni men and women. The Sunnis lived in a “state of fear” of the Shi‘a, al-Libi was told, and this was not to mention that they were “the nucleus of the police and army” formed by the “nations of unbelief”. Because of all this, the Sunnis deemed it necessary to “restrain” the Shi‘a, and the situation has since “significantly changed and the Shi‘a have begun to reckon with the mujahidin”.

After his discussion with Abu Ja‘far, al-Libi sent the minutes of the meeting to al-Zawahiri. While the Egyptian responded similarly to al-Libi as regards “the apostates” (meaning neighboring countries), he told the Libyan that he was opposed to “opening a front” against the Shi’a in Iraq—a stance similar to Bin Ladin’s. Given the sensitivity of the issue, however, al-Libi explains to Bin Laden that he refrained from sharing this response of al-Zawahiri’s with al-Zarqawi’s team. This decision was made in consultation with, among others, Hamzah al-Al-Rabi‘a and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi, al-Zawahiri’s son-in-law and head of al-Qa‘ida’s al-Sahab Media Foundation. Al-Libi’s view was that it was best to keep al-Zawahiri’s opinion from al-Zarqawi for the time being, given that Zawahiri’s “decision” on the Shi‘a would “clash with the reality there as far as the brothers are concerned”. The Libyan likely reasoned that al-Zawahiri’s instructions would put them between a rock and a hard place, and that in any event it was not necessary to relay them at this point since, as he believed, once the bay‘a process was finalized then such an order would be binding on al-Zarqawi’s group. Since al-Zawahiri’s views were based on al-Libi’s briefing, the Libyan decided to ask al-Zarqawi for a “detailed report” on this issue which would then be sent to Bin Ladin or al-Zawahiri so that they could make a more informed decision which would not “put the brothers in an uncomfortable position with the first order coming from our side”. 

In a subsequent Abbottabad document, almost certainly a letter from al-Zarqawi to al-Libi, the anonymous author explains how important it was for him that al-Qa‘ida understand and support his action in Iraq. “Our strategy here differs from any other location”, he writes, adding that “for this reason, we sent [Abu] Ja‘far to you all to express this”. Part of Abu Ja’far’s mission was thus to dispel any concerns that al-Qa‘ida might have regarding al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, most importantly regarding the Shi‘a issue, such that “everything would be clear” and there would be no impediment to a merger. Cognisant of al-Qa‘ida’s lingering misgivings about his takfiri-leaning methodology, al-Zarqawi was worried that if there were “some opinions that oppose the nature of our work here, then undoubtedly this would lead to disturbance and conflict that we are in no need of during this trying time”. The fact that al-Zawahiri did have concerns with his strategy was deliberately withheld from al-Zarqawi by al-Libi.

Joining al-Qa‘ida

When he dispatched his representative Abu Ja’far to meet with al-Libi, al-Zarqawi entrusted Abu Ja‘far not only with conveying the “reality of the situation” in Iraq to al-Qa‘ida Central but also, more importantly, with offering his allegiance (bay‘a) to Bin Ladin on his behalf. Abu Ja’far informed al-Libi that al-Zarqawi was waiting for Bin Ladin’s approval before announcing the good news. In his letter, al-Libi provides Bin Ladin with a detailed picture of how the merger process was finalized, attaching the latest correspondence— written in code words—between himself and al-Zarqawi’s group that paved the way for the latter’s bay’a declaration on October 17, 2004. 

As recounted to Bin Ladin, al-Libi told Abu Ja‘far that as far as he was concerned, “the subject of the bay‘a, God willing, has been completed”, and the only issue requiring consultation with al-Qa‘ida’s senior leadership related to the framing of the announcement. After the meeting, al-Libi discussed the matter with al-Zawahiri, who gave his blessing to the union but added a caveat: the announcement should not be made in al-Zarqawi’s name alone but rather on behalf of  “the collectivity of the mujahidin in Iraq”. Al-Libi and his entourage, including Hamza al-Al-Rabi‘a and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi, disapproved of al-Zawahiri’s idea. In his letter, the Libyan explains to Bin Ladin that given that al-Zarqawi could not claim authority over those outside his own group, any statement on behalf of “the mujahidin in Iraq”, as if representing the entire insurgency, could create a backlash and weaken the initiative. These concerns may have been driven by what al-Libi knew of al-Zarqawi’s limited reach within the local militant environment. An “Iraqi leadership” was nowhere to be found in the Jordanian’s group, and veteran Iraqi jihadis had turned their back on the fight.

After these consultations with al-Zawahiri and other close companions, al-Libi sent a message to al-Zarqawi’s group to inform them about the al-Qa‘ida leadership’s final deliberations. “The companion of the father [al-Zawahiri] tells Ahmad [al-Zarqawi] to put his trust in Allah and announce what has taken place. And he suggests that the announcement be made in the name of your group [al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad].” In addition to giving al-Zarqawi the go-ahead, al-Libi informed him that al-Qa‘ida needed “a more detailed report concerning your conditions in order to put our brothers here in the picture and enable them to consult with you on some of the issues”, alluding to the divergences between al-Qa‘ida and al-Zarqawi on the Shi’a in Iraq.

Al-Zarqawi replied to al-Libi in a six-line message in which he said: “We are gladdened by your response and pleased by your message, and God willing we will announce publicly in the next 48 hours that we are children of the father [Bin Ladin] and a branch of the root [al-Qa‘ida] as you suggested, provided that the new name becomes ‘Kata’ib al-Tawhid’ instead of ‘Jama’at al-Tawhid’”. Al-Libi recounts to Bin Ladin that after receiving this message “we were awaiting the announcement” when he received another message from al-Zarqawi—which is not attached—saying that his group wanted “full incorporation” such that it would retitle itself and “claim operations in the name of al-Qa‘ida and under such-and-such a battalion or battalions”. Al-Libi replied that this was “exactly what we sought” and that al-Zarqawi’s group should claim operations in “the well-known company name [al-Qa‘ida] and under the name of a battalion or battalions belonging to our well-known company name”, insisting that the merger be proclaimed “in the name of your company, not just its director”.

In his last (oral) message sent to al-Libi before the merger, al-Zarqawi asked the Libyan to push for an official release from al-Qa‘ida in which the organization would bless the initiative and advise other militants in Iraq and the Levant to join and support it. The Jordanian wanted this statement to be delivered by Bin Ladin personally.

In his letter, al-Libi suggests that Bin Ladin do something along the lines of what al-Zarqawi requested. Given the hardships facing the brothers in Fallujah, he explains, Bin Ladin should make a statement that would “encourage the youth there” and urge Muslims in Iraq and the Levant to join al-Qa‘ida’s new franchise. According to al-Libi, this would also be an opportunity for Bin Ladin to officially sign off on the joining of al-Zarqawi’s group with al-Qa‘ida. Given the weight his words carry, Bin Ladin’s “blessing” would “strengthen [al-Zarqawi’s] position”.

Bin Ladin Out of the Loop?

Judging from the Abbottabad files, it appears that the leader of al-Qa‘ida was virtually left out of the talks between his organization and al-Zarqawi’s group.

First, it is worth highlighting that al-Libi composed the letter to bring Bin Ladin up to date about the negotiation process after the merger had taken place. The announcement by al-Zarqawi’s group had been made on October 17, 2004, the day before al-Libi was writing. The timeline of events discussed is also telling. While al-Libi does not date his meeting with Abu Ja‘far, he tells Bin Ladin that the number of al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad’s members provided by the Iraqi was from “four months ago”, i.e. June, and he notifies his leader about the death or capture of operatives that occured between May and July. This is probably the same “mid-2004 meeting” mentioned by Abu Ja‘far during his detention—he was arrested in Iraq in 2005—when he related that al-Libi had “requested al-Zarqawi [to] provide Chinese anti-aircraft missiles for al-Qa‘ida’s use against helicopters and other military aircraft in Afghanistan”. All of this suggests that the Libyan had not written to Bin Ladin in months.

That there had been a lengthy breakdown in communication between the two is further confirmed by al-Libi in his letter when he relates that, after his final correspondence with al-Zarqawi right before the merger, he received a message that ‘Abd al-Khaliq—the “go-between with Bin Ladin since mid-2003” according to al-Libi in his interrogation—was looking for him (i.e., al-Libi). “I was very happy and praised Allah for providing this opportunity to apprise you of this issue with you”, he writes, suggesting that he had not been able to do so previously. 

The significance of this breakdown lies in the nature of al-Libi’s duties. Given that the Libyan was the gatekeeper connecting Bin Ladin to the rest of the organization, any communication disruption between the two meant that the leader of al-Qa‘ida had very few options left to be kept informed or to send instructions in a timely manner. At this time, contacting Bin Ladin was not easy, even for someone as senior as al-Libi. The latter acknowledges as much in his letter, noting in response to al-Zarqawi’s request that Bin Ladin personally sanction the merger, “Of course, the brothers there [in Iraq] are not aware of how long our correspondence with you takes”.

With the amir of al-Qa‘ida being unable to oversee the merger process, it seems that the task befell his deputy. Indeed, it was al-Zawahiri, not Bin Ladin, whom al-Libi first updated and consulted with on the negotiations after his meeting with Abu Ja’far. It was also al-Zawahiri who greenlit the union and provided the final directives to the Jordanian’s group before the announcement. In al-Zarqawi’s letter mentioned above, he tellingly refers to the the issue of “the elder brother’s [Bin Ladin’s] delay in knowing about what happened between us”, adding that it is no worry “so long as the doctor [al-Zawahiri] is in the picture”. Delegating authority to the Egyptian presumably allowed al-Qa‘ida to speed up the decision-making process, as al-Zawahiri and al-Libi were both reported to be based in Bajaur, in Pakistan’s tribal areas, while Bin Ladin was hiding in Haripur.

There were other communications shortcomings plaguing al-Qa‘ida Central as well, as is shown in the opening of al-Libi’s first attachment where he apologizes to al-Zarqawi’s group for “the delay in responding due to circumstances that recently affected us here”. This difficulty was most likely related to al-Libi’s own predicament at the time: by 2004, he had become one of Pakistan’s most wanted fugitives, having escaped several raids on his hideouts in Abbottabad where he had been living since mid-2003. This had prompted him to go underground and relocate to Bajaur in mid-2004. 

Conclusion

Taken together, the Abbottabad files studied in this article offer a rich and seminal layer to the history of the al-Qa‘ida-al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad relationship. Until now, only some of the early stages of the negotiations between the two had been examined. As was known before, the al-Qa‘ida commander ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, from his base in Shkai, South Waziristan, was communicating with al-Zarqawi’s group throughout 2003, discussing personnel and technology transfer between Pakistan and Iraq. But contacts were cut off when al-Iraqi’s envoy Hassan Ghul, carrying al-Zarqawi’s proposal to al-Qa‘ida’s leadership, was arrested in January 2004 on his way back to Waziristan.

Thanks to the Abbottabad files, we now have a better view of what happened next and a fuller understanding of the players involved and the negotiation-related command-and-control dynamics inside al-Qa‘ida. As we saw, Bin Ladin remained largely absent during the process and likely heard of its successful outcome in the media. To be sure, the Saudi appeared very much eager to get closer to al-Zarqawi. In his June-August 2004 letter, he told al-Libi, in a likely reference to al-Zarqawi: “We emphasize the necessity of working with al-Tanbul [the short] and providing him with everything he needs”. But it was al-Zawahiri who actually oversaw the negotiation and was entrusted with executive decision making, a prominent role he would keep playing in relation to Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa and Somalia.  

The Abbottabad files also reveal that, beyond Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, al-Qa‘ida’s “general manager” Abu al-Faraj al-Libi was the one micromanaging the negotiation. Unlike the other players involved, al-Libi had direct access to al-Zarqawi’s group, meeting with the Jordanian’s emissary and sending messages to Iraq. Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri thus relied on him to be  updated and to convey their directives to al-Zarqawi. We also learn from the Abbottabad files that al-Libi involved a small cadre of senior aides in these talks. While these names—Hamza al-Al-Rabi‘a, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi, Khalid al-Habib, Abu al-Hasan al-Misri, Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir—were already known, this is the first time that they are shown to have been associated with the negotiations with al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. Together, these figures represented an informal council advising the process, including al-Libi’s critical decision to hold back al-Zawahiri’s stance on the Shi’a to al-Zarqawi.

The Abbottabad files further illustrate how the difficult security environment faced by al-Qa‘ida in Pakistan pushed the organization to eye Iraq as an alternative terrain for its operations, as exemplified by its willingness to dispatch key figures such as al-Rabi‘a to hatch external attacks from there. The files also underline how Islamabad’s 2004 crackdown hampered the negotiation process by disrupting the organization’s communications channels and prompting al-Libi to go deeper into hiding. This might largely explain why, if al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a was accepted by al-Libi around June, it took four additional months for the union to be announced publicly. Finally, the files indicate that, even when the “good news” was announced to the world in October, the process was not finished, as unresolved issues remained between the two parties. Indeed, al-Libi had taken the initiative to conceal al-Zawahiri’s disapproval of al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda from al-Zarqawi’s team. At this time, he was then still waiting for the Jordanian’s “detailed report” so that Bin Ladin or al-Zawahiri could make a final decision on the issue. This highlights how eager to compromise al-Qa‘ida—or at least al-Libi and his informal council of advisers—appeared to be during the negotiations, as it chose to sweep its differences with al-Zarqawi under the rug to speed up the merger process, thinking that these issues could be resolved later.

I am not convinced of these conclusions, primarily because the basis presented for them—a 96-page biography of Anbari written by his now-deceased son and published in July by Islamic State dissidents—does not bear them out. This biography is an important source for the history of the Islamic State, and Hassan is right to draw our attention to it. It details the hugely important role played by Anbari as a jihadi actor since the early 2000s, and particularly following his release from prison in 2012 when he became one of the Islamic State’s senior leaders. Yet the document says little about Zarqawi, and nothing about Anbari’s influence on him.

In January 2004, when Zarqawi wrote his famous missive to Osama bin Laden outlining a strategy for attacking the Shi‘a in Iraq, it would appear from the document that he had met Anbari once, in Baghdad in 2002.* Hassan writes that Zarqawi’s “idea for targeting the Shiites probably came from native Iraqis like Anbari,” which could be true. But the biography does not tell us this; nor does it suggest that one of these Iraqis was “possibly even Anbari himself.” It does not impute ideological influence to Anbari over Zarqawi at all. It is not clear how close the two were before Anbari became Zarqawi’s deputy in late 2004 (or perhaps slightly thereafter). Apart from their one meeting in 2002—and the fact that Anbari unwittingly produced gun silencers for Zarqawi’s group before the U.S. invasion—what contact they may have had before this time is not discussed. When they did forge a partnership, Zarqawi was the senior partner. Anbari had been second-in-command of an insurgent group in northern Iraq called Ansar al-Sunna. The biography relates that Anbari wanted to join forces with Zarqawi and his group, which had been retitled al-Qaida in Iraq after Zarqawi pledged fealty to Bin Laden in October 2004. Anbari failed to strike a unity agreement, ultimately leaving Ansar al-Sunna to become Zarqawi’s subordinate.

In 2005, according to the biography, Anbari was imprisoned at Abu Ghraib for six months. Upon his release, he went on a mission for Zarqawi to Waziristan to meet with the al-Qaida leadership. Following this, in January 2006, he became head of a consortium of jihadi groups, including al-Qaida in Iraq, called the Mujahidin Shura Council. This leadership is significant as the council would gradually morph into the Islamic State of Iraq, which was declared in October 2006. The biography attributes the idea for the council mainly to Anbari. However, a June 2006 death notice for Zarqawi by al-Qaida in Iraq credits the Jordanian with “the beneficial influence on establishing this council to become the first stone of the Islamic state that will be erected, God willing, in the land of the two rivers.” And an August 2016 issue of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter asserts that leadership of the council was to be rotational. In any event, neither Zarqawi nor Anbari was present at the creation. The former had been killed in June, the latter arrested in April. Anbari would remain in prison until 2012, his role during this period confined to indoctrinating his fellow inmates.

Significantly, the biography points to a shared ideological link between the two men. Anbari’s ideological formation was complete only after 9/11, when he read the works of Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The last of these was Zarqawi’s teacher and longtime prison companion. It would appear, then, that Zarqawi and Anbari were influenced by the same strain of Jihadi Salafi thought emanating from the pens of a number of radical clerics in the Middle East. But Zarqawi was influenced by it first. Both men would take a more extreme—more violent and sectarian—approach to this ideology than al-Maqdisi himself, and Iraqis were likely critical to shaping it. To be sure, Zarqawi was not acting alone, and many lesser-known jihadis from Iraq, such as Anbari, occupied key positions alongside him. Another was Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi, who served on al-Qaida in Iraq’s Shari‘a Council. I agree that “it is too simplistic to say that ISIS was Zarqawi’s brainchild.” But it is a stretch to infer, from the evidence at hand, that Anbari’s role was the more foundational.

Furthermore, the biography does not challenge the view that it was Zarqawi who introduced the extreme violence that would become the Islamic State’s hallmark. By all accounts, Zarqawi’s influence in this regard was the Egyptian scholar Abu ‘Abdallah al-Muhajir, with whom he affiliated in Afghanistan. As Brian Fishman writes in his book The Master Plan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory, “[I]t was Abu Abdallah who defined Zarqawi—and the Islamic State’s—embrace of sectarianism, brutality, and suicide tactics that have come to define Zarqawism’s adherents.” The first book published by the Islamic State’s printing press in 2014 was Abu ‘Abdallah al-Muhajir’s Issues in the Jurisprudence of Jihad, known commonly—and aptly—as The Jurisprudence of Blood. As Charlie Winter and Abdullah K. Al-Saud have pointed out, the book opens with a quote by Zarqawi acknowledging al-Muhajir’s role in convincing him of the validity of suicide operations.

It is worth recalling here just how celebrated Zarqawi is in the Islamic State, both as a religious thinker and as a dynamic leader. Far from being the semi-literate thug he is sometimes made out to be, Zarqawi spoke impeccable classical Arabic as evidenced by the dozens of hours of recorded speeches and lectures he left behind—nearly 700 pages in transcription. These are frequently quoted by the group. For instance, an Islamic State video filmed in Syria in 2015 shows a man telling the people of Saudi Arabia:

O people of the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, listen to just three lectures by the mujahid shaykh, the heroic leader, “the commander of the martyrdom-seekers,” Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, may God have mercy on him, who ignited volcanoes in the face of the Rejectionists [i.e., the Shi‘a], who was martyred approximately ten years ago. Listen to these three lectures, titled “Has Word of the Rejectionists Reached You?” They shall bring every devoted Muslim to have as one of his greatest hopes and highest objectives the killing of the Rejectionists in particular among the enemies of God.

His legacy is also commonly invoked by the leaders of the Islamic State. In April 2013, for example, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq to Syria, recasting it as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, he reaffirmed his commitment to the “path” laid down by Zarqawi. “May Shaykh Zarqawi be delighted in his resting place,” he said, “for the path that he tread, whose waymarks he established and guided toward, those who came after him followed it. And we, God willing, are following it as well.” In the absence of further evidence, the path belongs to Zarqawi above all.

* Correction, December 9, 2018: An earlier version of this post stated that Zarqawi‘s letter was written in February 2004, which is the date noted in Zarqawi‘s collected works (p. 58.) In fact, the undated letter was discovered in mid-January 2004, so it cannot have been written later than then. It may also be worth noting Jean-Pierre Milelli‘s speculation (Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, p. 249) that the real author of this letter was Abu Anas al-Shami, Zarqawi‘s principal Shari‘a adviser in Iraq before his death in September 2004. Al-Shami is the author of a book condemning the Shi‘a.

Originally from Ramallah, Abu al-Qassam grew up in Zarqa, just north of Jordan’s capital Amman. It was here, in one of the city’s mosques – most likely al-Hussein bin Ali Mosque – that he one day as a young man met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who eventually would become the founder of al-Qaida in Iraq, the Islamic State’s predecessor. The two would go on to become close, even family.

He was born as Khalid Mustafa Khalifa al-Aruri in 1967, but it was as Abu al-Qassam or Abu Ashraf that he eventually became known in Jihadi circles. Little is known about his early years and the information available is conflicting. One story is that he worked for a Saudi organization, the IIRO, in 1991 before returning to Zarqa a year later. Perhaps it was then that he stumbled upon al-Zarqawi, one year his senior and who was back from Afghanistan after his first battlefield experience. Another account is that he in fact joined al-Zarqawi in Afghanistan. In any case, from 1993 the two were inseparable.

Like al-Zarqawi, Abu al-Qassam was imprisoned in Jordan on 29 March 1994 until March 1999 (another account is that Abu al-Qassam was released early as there was not enough evidence against him) in the ‘Bay‘at al-Imam’ case, referring to the group al-Zarqawi had established upon his return together with his mentor Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. As soon as they were released, however, it was not long before the two young Jordanians left for Afghanistan for a second time.

Zarqawi’s companion, deputy and brother-in-law

Upon arrival in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi was approached by the senior al-Qaida member Saif al-Adl, who saw a great potential in the Jordanian. Al-Adl immediately wanted to start cooperation with al-Zarqawi, through logistical assistance and funding, but al-Zarqawi needed time to think it over. He had to consult with Abu al-Qassam. Some days later, Abu al-Qassam and Abdul Hadi Daghlas, Zarqawi’s other close companion, gave their blessing to Saif al-Adl’s proposal and from then on al-Qaida started to finance and support al-Zarqawi’s camp in Herat in western Afghanistan.

It was in Afghanistan at the camp in Herat that Abu al-Qassam married al-Zarqawi’s sister and assisted his emir in establishing a small Jihadi community, a mini society, that would lay the foundation for what is today known as the Islamic State. Abu al-Qassam not only acted as al-Zarqawi’s deputy but was also a commander at the camp. The two were so close that al-Maqdisi allegedly described Abu al-Qassam as al-Zarqawi’s shadow – everywhere he went, Abu al-Qassam went too.

The strikes against the US on 9/11 would eventually change that, however. In the aftermath of the attack, al-Zarqawi and his entourage were forced to flee in November 2001 as it became impossible to remain at the camp after the US invasion. But first the Jordanians had to go on a strenuous three-day trip to Kandahar to attend a meeting of high-ranking Jihadis that nearly cost their lives as the Americans bombed the building where the meeting was taking place. After intense battle in Kandahar and later in Tora Bora, al-Zarqawi’s group was forced to leave for Iran and it is likely that Abu al-Qassam was part of the group traveling to Iran at this point.

Whether Abu al-Qassam stayed on in Iran or followed al-Zarqawi to Iraqi Kurdistan in 2002 remains unknown, but it has been reported that he served as al-Zarqawi’s key liaison with Ansar al-Islam, the al-Qaida-affiliated group in Kurdistan that assisted with the relocation of al-Zarqawi’s group to Iraq. This work, however, probably took place in Iran and not in Kurdistan. Reportedly, Abu al-Qassam participated in an important meeting with people close to Mullah Krekar in August 2003 in Tehran, where it was agreed to set up training camps in Kurdistan. Interestingly, a Moroccan investigation into the March 2003 bombings in Casablanca claimed that Abu al-Qassam had helped finance the attack, thus indicating a role in the Iraq-based group’s external operations as well.

As is now well-known, the Iranian authorities were rather accommodating of Jihadi activities in their country and this was also the case with al-Zarqawi’s group, but for some reason this would suddenly change. Iranian police entered several hotels in Tehran, where al-Zarqawi’s people were known to reside, and it is likely that Abu al-Qassam was arrested as part of this crack down.

In Iranian prison, or house arrest, Abu al-Qassam would meet several familiar faces, among them Saif al-Adl, who had been responsible for the liaison between al-Qaida and al-Zarqawi’s group in Afghanistan. Several other senior al-Qaida figures and members of Usama bin Laden’s family were also in Iranian captivity.

Relocating to Syria

Abu al-Qassam spent approximately 12 years in prison before being released in March 2015 as part of a prisoner exchange deal. Besides Abu al-Qassam, four senior al-Qaida members were released, namely Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Saif al-Adl and Sari Shihab. Initially there was doubt over the location of the five senior figures and even over how engaged they remained after so many years in prison. Al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006, while Abu al-Qassam was imprisoned, only raised questions regarding his dedication to Jihad. On several occasions, it was reported that the released al-Qaida senior members had relocated to Syria at the directive of Ayman al-Zawahiri to support Jabhat al-Nusra and the so-called Khorasan group. We now know that these reports were only partly true.

The first rumours surrounding Abu al-Qassam emerged in September 2015, saying that he had been chosen to lead a new al-Qaida group in Iraq (see here and here). This, however, was not correct and it is unlikely that Abu al-Qassam stayed long in Iraq if at all. Instead, we know that Abu al-Qassam relocated to northern Syria, but when exactly is unclear. A Jabhat al-Nusra supporter disclosed in September 2015 that a senior member released from Iranian house arrest had arrived in Syria on the orders to al-Zawahiri, but whether it was Abu al-Qassam or Abu al-Khayr is still a mystery.

Abu al-Qassam’s first appearance in Syria was reported in December 2015. This was at the same time as high-ranking Jabhat al-Nusra leaders Sami al-Uraydi and Iyad al-Tubaysi (aka Abu Julaybib) relocated from southern Syria to the north, possibly to meet up with Abu al-Qassam. According to al-Maqdisi, Abu al-Qassam joined the Coordination Committee in Syria (lajnat al-mutaba’a fi-l-Sham), which allegedly was responsible for the link between al-Qaida and its Syrian affiliate, although not under direct supervision of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

It would take some time before Abu al-Qassam himself would confirm his presence in Syria, but that he did in early 2017 in an eulogy for Abu al-Khayr, al-Qaida’s deputy and his longtime friend from their time in Iran. In his statement, Abu al-Qassam praises his fallen friend, extends his blessings to al-Zawahiri and promises to work to keep the Syrian Jihad on the right path.

Abu al-Qassam is arguably a man of action rather than of writing. His closeness to Zarqawi could testify to that, but we can also take Abu al-Qassam at his word. He begins several of his writings by saying that he is not at ease with a pen in his hand and unlike many of his Jihadi colleagues not a fan of writing on the internet. That said, since the beginning of 2017 – and corresponding with Abu al-Khayr’s death – Abu al-Qassam has become increasingly active.

In May, in a brief analysis of the situation in Syria authored together with his friend Sami al-Uraydi (who posts Abu al-Qassam’s statements on his Telegram channel), Abu al-Qassam outlined the role of Iran, Russia and Turkey in Syria, noting that Turkey is broadening its influence in Idlib and that the mujahideen needs to adapt to the situation. The best way of fighting the enemy, he claimed, is to initiate a guerilla war, which he defines as the next stage (al-marhala al-muqbila) in the struggle. Uraydi, also a Jordanian, added that the Jihadis in Syria are critically affected by the ongoing confusion, referring to the Jihadi infighting and the split with al-Qaida, and emphasizes that this has to be resolved immediately.

The following month, Abu al-Qassam was forced to his keyboard once again. The war of words between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fath al-Sham, and his good friend and senior ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi were threatening the bond with al-Qaida sympathizers in Syria. Abu al-Qassam’s intervention, in which he argued that problems should be solved and not allowed to escalate and that al-Maqdisi should be respected despite one’s disagreement with him, was – as he promised Abu al-Khayr – an effort to safeguard al-Qaida’s Jihadi project in Syria.

Loyalty to al-Qaida

In early 2014, Abu al-Qassam was still imprisoned in Iran and could only witness the split between al-Qaida and the Islamic State and the ensuing fragmentation within the Jihadi environment from a distance. Ever since the rupture, the Islamic State has emphasized its ‘lineage’ from al-Zarqawi as a way to capitalize on his authority and legacy. According to the Islamic State itself, it is different from al-Qaida as it continued in the footsteps of its founder al-Zarqawi (and Usama bin Laden) while al-Qaida deviated after al-Zawahiri assumed control. Thus the Islamic State, and not al-Qaida, is the Zarqawist side in the intra-Jihadi civil war.

Is it surprising, then, that al-Zarqawi’s most loyal remaining companion chose to ally himself with al-Qaida and not the Islamic State after his release from prison? Initially it could be questioned whether Abu al-Qassam was still devoted to Jihad, and if so what group he remained loyal. This is no longer the case, however, as his recent involvement in the debate over the split between al-Qaida and its Syrian affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham attests.

Both Abu al-Qassam’s own testimony and that of Sami al-Uraydi give the impression that he is indeed an active player on the Jihadi scene and that this loyalty is unequivocally with al-Qaida and Ayman al-Zawahiri. In his statement, Abu al-Qassam explains how he initially sanctioned Jabhat al-Nusra’s desire to split from al-Qaida, but later reversed after he became familiar with the position of two of al-Zawahiri’s deputies (Abu Muhammad al-Masri and Saif al-Adl). As is now well-known, Jabhat al-Nusra went ahead and separated from al-Qaida against the will of the group’s senior leaders. The testimonies provide valuable insights into the dealings with such issues within Jihadi groups and not least the role played by Abu al-Qassam, who participated in several of the meetings that were held prior to the decision.

Of course, Abu al-Qassam’s closeness to al-Zarqawi and his later opposition to the Islamic State are not unique. Other people, such as Abu Julaybib, spent time in al-Zarqawi’s Herat camp and married one of al-Zarqawi’s sisters before eventually siding with Jabhat al-Nusra in its contest with the Islamic State. But the fact that Abu al-Qassam was Zarqawi’s very close friend and deputy, and now ranks as a senior al-Qaida member, can only be seen as a victory for al-Qaida.

While Abu al-Qassam’s exact role has not been revealed, it appears likely that he will try act as a unifying actor between the conflicting parties in the future. One recent example of such a role is his support to the scholarly peace initiative that was presented in late October, though so far this has produced no results.

Tore tweets at @torerhamming

While it is too early to determine who will eventually call the shots, a telling audio message recently released by Abu Dujana al-Basha, a high-ranking al-Qa`ida leader, hints at where the organization currently stands on a rapprochement with the Islamic State.

Who is Abu Dujana al-Basha?

Owing to the demise of the historical leadership of al-Qa`ida over the past ten years, the organization has witnessed the rise of more recently arrived, yet seasoned figures in its top hierarchy. Among these has been Abu Dujana al-Basha, also known as Abu Dujana al-Misri, one of the most senior al-Qa`ida leaders today. Named as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in mid-January 2009, al-Basha has nevertheless a long history in jihadi militancy.

Born Muhammad bin Mahmud al-Bahtiti in al-Sharqiyya, Egypt, al-Basha initially belonged to the cluster of cadres around Ayman al-Zawahiri in the Egyptian Islamic al-Jihad group (EIJ). During the first half of the 1980s, he traveled to the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. Al-Basha operated with Jalaluddin Haqqani’s mujahidin in southeastern Afghanistan, though his dogmatism led to strained relations with his local counterparts. Part of his activity entailed giving religiously-oriented lessons to trainees. For example, Fadil Harun relates that when he attended al-Qa`ida’s al-Faruq camp in Khost, Afghanistan, he was lectured by al-Basha on “the history of the Prophet Muhammad” and the early Islamic battles.

However, it appears that al-Basha was mainly involved in military action and training. During combat in Gardez, Afghanistan, Harun remembers, he and “Shaykh Abu Dujana al-Misri” closely worked together in the monitoring of the enemy lines near the city. This lends credence to the U.S. authorities’ claim that al-Basha penned “a book on security that was used as a template for al Qaida’s surveillance operations”. Also, al-Basha played a substantial role in the “Tajikistan Project” headed by Abu al-Walid al-Misri at al-Faruq, which consisted of training members of the Tajik Islamist party al-Nahda. Despite the EIJ refusing to participate in these efforts, al-Basha became one its “stars”, in Abu al-Walid’s words, as both an instructor and military commander. It was at that time that Abu Dujana came to be known as “al-Basha” (the Pasha), a rank given to him by his comrades as a private joke.

In the first half of the 1990s, al-Basha relocated to Sudan along with the EIJ. Based on Harun’s memoirs, al-Basha settled in Khartum together with other fellow Arab-Afghans, including al-Qa`ida members such as Sayf al-`Adl, the organization’s then head of security. Al-Basha seems to have operated in the Sudanese capital until at least late 1997. Indeed, when al-Gama`a al-Islamiyya attacked tourists in Luxor in November 1997, Khartum-based jihadis debated the lawfulness of this operation and, Harun contends, al-Basha was “strongly opposed” to it. Yet, it should be noted that al-Basha is said to have been involved in the Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995.

After his Sudanese interlude, al-Basha moved to Afghanistan, joining the few remaining personnel in al-Zawahiri’s group. Evoking the EIJ’s staff in Afghanistan, the Jordanian militant Shadi `Abdallah described al-Basha as one of its main figures, adding that he wore a prosthesis after he had a foot amputated. Around 1999-2000, al-Basha cemented his ties with al-Zawahiri by becoming his son-in-law, having married Umayma, the daughter al-Zawahiri had with `Azza bin Nuwayr (Umm Muhammad), his first wife. Though depicted as a “trusted aide to [al-Zawahiri]”, it is noticeable that al-Basha differed from his amir’s plan to align EIJ’s national-revolutionary agenda with al-Qa`ida’s global ambitions. According to `Abdallah, al-Basha was part of the EIJ’s faction which broke away from al-Zawahiri when the latter formally joined al-Qa`ida in mid-2001. This means that al-Basha only rallied to Usama bin Ladin’s group during the post-2001 period.

In the aftermath of the Taliban downfall in late 2001, al-Basha is reported to have acted as the caretaker of al-Zawahiri’s family and settled with it in Iran, before being arrested by Iranian authorities in 2003. Over the past few years, al-Basha began surfacing publicly by authoring a number of audio messages and writings via major jihadi media outlets, mostly al-Qa`ida’s. His work comprises theologically-oriented releases such as his paper “The Institution of Shari`a is a Shari`a Obligation and a Realistic Necessity” for al-Qa`ida’s magazine Tala`i’ Khurasan or his “Summary of Sahih al-Bukhari” published by the organization’s media department al-Sahab in September 2013. As to topical issues, al-Basha wrote down some interesting “Reflections on the Term al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya” in 2012 and also discussed the crackdown against the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in December 2013.

Amending the Path of Jihad in Syria

Abu Dujana al-Basha is said to have anticipated the onset of the Syrian conflict. Indeed, when recalling discussions on the “Arab Spring” in al-Qa`ida, `Azzam al-Amriki (Adam Gadahn), a major al-Sahab’s figure, claims that al-Basha portended that Syria would follow the Libyan uprising. “I recall that I was with one of the noble brothers, Shaykh Abu Dujana al-Basha”, al-Amriki recounts, “and [he] predicted […] without hesitation that the next stop for the revolutionary express would be Syria”.

If al-Basha had been hopeful for the future of the jihadist project in Syria, his hope gave way to uneasiness in the light of the infighting among militant groups in Syria. This was first reflected by his “’Message from the Opening of Khurasan to the Opening of al-Sham” which he penned in January 2014. Unsurprisingly, his missive conveys an aspect of “love and support” for the Syria-based fighters. For instance, al-Basha opens his missive by emphatically stating that “it would be not exaggerated to say that we feel that our bodies and hearts here in Khurasan hang with you in the Levant”.

Of greater importance it his advice (nasiha) for the Levantine militant spectrum aimed at preventing further dissensions. The Egyptian jihadi veteran emphasizes the concept of “jama`a” (group) and the danger of internal division, using Qur`anic verses and hadiths to support his argument. Acting as one unified body, al-Basha explains, is not only mandatory from an Islamic perspective but would also allow the mujahidin to achieve victory, no matter the hardships. Al-Basha thus bemoans the Syrian strife and urges his mujahidin brethren to uphold the sanctity of the Muslim blood, further outlining the dire consequences of those transgressing this ruling.

On September 26, 2014, al-Basha released “This Is our Message”, focusing yet again on the militant Syrian arena. In it, the Egyptian outlines the plight that has befallen the umma, with “the nations of disbelief and parties of apostasy […] inflicting its population with humiliation”. Faced with such circumstances, al-Basha continues, the only course of action to “cure the disease” lies in taking arms against the “oppressors”, be they from the “crusaders” or the “Nusayris”. He goes on to call to “the rejection of false gods, and disassociation from polytheism” and “the judgment of the Sharia”. Al-Basha warns that, unless this individual duty is performed, “[the umma] will be overcome by weakness [and] humiliation”.

Of greater importance in the message is al-Basha’s concerns regarding the threat of what he terms as “people of excess” (ahl al-ghuluw). The al-Qa`ida leader charges them with having “declared the worshipers as disbelievers …and undermined the jihad and distorted the message of the mujahidin”. Although the Islamic State is never mentioned, it is clear that the “extremists” al-Basha refers to pertain to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s loyalists. Among the most explicit references is al-Basha’s rant against “the caliphate on the path of deviation and lies and violations of treaties and breaking of pledges”. Similarly, al-Basha admonishes this “deviant” caliphate “built on oppression, takfir, killing the people of tawhid and splitting the rows of the mujahidin”. Finally, al-Basha  highlights the continuity in al-Qaida’s philosophy, declaring that “your mujahidin brothers in Khurasan … have not changed nor turned” despite “the injustice of slander, fabrications, distortions and lies”. This line reads as a response to the allegations spread by the the pro-Islamic State’s camp that the current leadership of al-Qa`ida no longer acts upon Bin Ladin’s program.

With the spread of the Islamic State’s virulent ideology and the broader discord in Syria, al-Basha considers that the Levantine cause has deviated from its “righteous path”, tarnishing the image of the global jihad movement. As a consequence, he offers guidance to “rescue the boat of jihad in Syria”. He notably exhorts militants groups “to strive to rectify what has been corrupted” and “to repel every form of perversion”. He also calls on the “people of knowledge and expertise”, namely veterans with a long jihadi experience, to “clarify to the umma and to the mujahidin the correct way […] in the various issues of disputes”. Conversely, he warns his audience against the “greatly ignorant” behind the “increase in issuance of verdicts [declaring] the Muslims as unbelievers, rather the best of the mujahidin”. This likely alludes to the pro-Islamic State ideologues often decried by al-Qa`ida’s supporters as lacking experience and religious knowledge.

Bad Timing?

Though the schism between al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State is nothing new, Abu Dujana al-Basha’s latest release is still worthwhile noting if properly contextualized.

Among all al-Qa`ida’s statements addressing ISIS in 2014, only two really stand out in terms of open hostility towards ISIS’s conduct. These two were both related to the assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri in February 2014. The first was in late March when `Azzam al-Amriki blamed al-Suri’s murder on ISIS, which he accused of “excess” (ghuluw) and “extremism” (tashaddud). The second quickly followed with Ayman al-Zawahiri drawing a parallel between the Khawarij who had stabbed `Ali and their “grand-children … in the Levant” responsible for al-Suri’s demise, a veiled reference to ISIS. While this period has witnessed the publication of other critical statements, overall, it was al-Suri’s murder which elicited the organization’s most corrosive comments against ISIS.

The caliphate’s foundation in late June 2014 saw a reorientation in al-Qa`ida’s media strategy, with a less straightforward approach to this new challenge. Instead of bluntly rejecting the Islamic State’s unilateralism, al-Zawahiri’s outfit chose to confront its powerful rival more obliquely. As a result, al-Qa`ida stressed its continuing loyalty to the Taliban leader Mullah `Umar, hence notifying Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that, despite his caliphal pretension, he would not hold sway over his elders in jihad. This message was passed through both new materials, like al-Qa`ida’s newsletter al-Nafir and old archives, like a 2001 speech by Bin Ladin explaining the nature of his oath to Mullah `Umar.

With that in mind, al-Basha’s latest speech deserves attention. It is the first al-Qa`ida message to rebuff the Islamic State’s caliphate since its founding. Al-Qa`ida had not even responded to Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s message in May taunting Ayman al-Zawahiri. On that note, it is most likely that al-Basha was alluding to this when he stated that the “Shaykh [Ayman al-Zawahiri] had ordered his brothers to remain silent and to not respond over his honour”. Al-Basha’s audio message is arguably one of the most aggressive that al-Qa`ida has released in its conflict with the Islamic State, in line with the two above-mentioned statements eulogizing Abu Khalid al-Suri.

The rationale for releasing al-Basha’s tape is worthwhile discussing. Judging by al-Basha’s words, there might have been a sense of growing frustration among al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership, unsatisfied with al-Zawahiri’s directive to stay quiet. Besides, this sentiment has been echoed in the broader militant milieu, including by al-Qa`ida’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. In late August, the latter’s former general shar`i (legal) official, Abu Mariyya al-Qahtani, authored an open letter to al-Zawahiri complaining about al-Qa`ida’s lack of a clear position against Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s bold move. This long silence, in al-Qahtani’s view, has bolstered the Islamic State while it perpetuated its “injustice and crimes” in Syria. Perhaps al-Basha was referring to these objections when, while explaining the reason for this silence, he mentioned “those who love us have blamed us by them thinking that we have betrayed our Shaykh [al-Zawahiri]”.

Still, one would wonder why al-Zawahiri eventually allowed one of his top aides to speak out against al-Baghdadi’s caliphate now. Indeed, the release occurred while the U.S.-led military coalition began its airstrikes against the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and Iraq. While the Western-backed offensive did not resolve the core factors driving the strife in the region, it at least prompted a vast array of condemnations from militant groups operating in the region and beyond, including al-Qa`ida affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. In this perspective, al-Qa`ida may have been preoccupied by its competition with the Islamic State for leadership of the global jihad.

In any case, the audio message fueled hostility between the proponents and opponents of al-Qa`ida. The well-known English-speaking Islamic State’s sympathizer Shami Witness, for instance, scolded al-Basha’s speech as “the worst [al-Qa`ida] message till date”, ending his comment by the following: “May Allaah give these partisan tandhim [organization] scum what they deserve”. It is clear that the issue was not only related to al-Basha’s strongly-worded tone, but also because his speech was released in a time of increasing adversity. As Shami Witness rhetorically asked, “So al Qaeda chooses NOW to continue with its BS partisan politics […]?” Pro-al-Qa`ida’s supporters tried to downplay this criticism notably by remarking that Abu Muhammad al-Adnani had attacked al-Qa`ida “while [the group has] been bombed by the US and much larger coalition then now since 2001!!”

Whether Abu Dujana al-Basha’s audio message marks the beginning of a prolonged media campaign by al-Qa`ida aimed at countering the Islamic State’s influence remains to be seen. More certain is that by coming out yet again against Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s caliphate, al-Qa`ida has signified that unity in the jihadist ranks would not come at any price, even in the face of an international military campaign. Unless the Islamic State reforms its stringent policies and returns to the fold, al-Qa`ida implies, any talk of reconciliation would equate to a chimera. This latest rant serves also as a reminder of how deeply entrenched the rupture with its former Iraqi affiliate is among al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership.

Since the start of the ISIS in April of this year, much support for this state and al-Baghadi has been expressed among jihadis across the world. Not everybody seems to be convinced, however, and apparently some still see the need to criticise al-Baghdadi as a proper leader of the ISIS. For this reason, Abu Hummam Bakr b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Athari, one of the scholars who used to be on the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (and in theory still is) but now just publishes random articles every now and then, has written a tract in which he makes the case for swearing fealty to al-Baghdadi. As such, it gives interesting insight into the question of leadership of an Islamic state.

The man

Al-Athari starts his case by singing the praises of al-Baghdadi’s background. First of all, he writes, Abu Bakr al-Qurashi al-Husayni al-Baghdadi is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Although this does not guarantee in any way that jihadis will like you – just think of the Jordanian and Moroccan royal families, who also claim to descend from Muhammad – it does give honorary status to al-Baghadi, which al-Athari stresses by citing hadiths in which the Prophet’s family is lauded.

Apart from al-Baghdadi’s family background, he is also a scholar of Islam according to al-Athari, having obtained an MA-degree in Qur’anic studies and a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and having written a book on tawhid (the unity of God). This comination of Islamic knowledge and Prophetic descent makes him a special man indeed, al-Athari claims.

The mujahid

Al-Baghdadi’s qualities cannot just be found in his person, but also in his activities as a jihad fighter. He has taught at several mosques in Iraq, where he also served as an imam and preacher, al-Athari states, and he has led several jihadi groups. He is also a member of the Majlis al-Shura (consultation council) of the mujahidun and heads the shari’a and judicial councils of the Islamic State in Iraq.

Besides mentioning the many jobs al-Baghdadi has, al-Athari stresses that his leadership of ISIS was achieved through the pledge of fealty by the state’s Majlis al-Shura and the scholars in it, who agreed that al-Baghdadi should succeed the previous two leaders, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, to become the new amir.

In his various capacities, al-Baghdadi has actively resisted the American invasion of his country “against his religion and his honour” and was instrumental in setting up and organising the Islamic State of Iraq, which was ruled on the basis of the Qur’an and the Sunna, al-Athari claims.

Throughout the period that preceded his leadership, al-Athari states, al-Baghdadi tried hard to listen to people, both young and old, in order to make Islamic rule pleasant for them. As such, he met with tribal representatives, jihadi groups and militias and called on all of them to pledge fealty to his predecessor.

The amir

Despite the man’s alleged abundant qualities, al-Athari dedicates several pages to “proving” that al-Baghdadi is indeed suitable for the job of amir. He lists ten conditions for leadership: the amir should be male, free, an adult, sound of mind, just, courageous, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad’s Quraysh tribe, knowledgeable and suitable to lead the umma and serve its interests. Suffice to say, al-Athari believes that al-Baghdadi fits all the criteria.

Al-Athari then asks whether someone can actually be a good amir if not all Muslims have pledged fealty to him. He answers in the negative, stating that only the scholars responsible for this, the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd, need to swear their loyalty to him and even they needn’t necessarily all agree on this. The idea that all members of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd should give their pledge of fealty (bay’a) to the amir is a Mu’tazilite idea, al-Athari claims, and the notion of popular support is derived from the concept of democracy. It will come as no surprise that al-Athari rejects both.

The fact that scholars from areas conquered by the ISIS may not necessarily endorse al-Baghdadi’s rule is no problem, al-Athari writes. These areas were not ruled by the shari’a, so the fact that al-Baghdadi’s state controls them now is great in and of itself, but even if these areas had been under shari’a rule, the consensus of the scholars is that the new ruler should be obeyed. The idea that al-Baghdadi is unknown to people and that this may hamper his ability to rule is false, al-Athari states, since he is not unknown at all. Even if this were the case, however, this would pose no problem to his leadership because individual people obviously do not have to know the leader personally to follow his rule.

Al-Baghdadi’s incomplete rule over Iraq and his lack of agreement with scholars in Syria about ISIS do not impede his leadership abilities either, according to al-Athari. The Prophet Muhammad did not rule everywhere on the Arabian Peninsula either and his leadership was certainly not in doubt. As for the scholars in Syria, al-Athari claims that the amir does not necessarily have to consult them to be allowed to incorporate this area into his state.

The caliph?

Al-Baghdadi’s descent of the Prophet Muhammad, his scholarly credentials and his actions as a mujahid who clearly builds his activities on the consensus of scholars and tries to work with others are the reasons why al-Athari believes he is such a great leader. He refutes all arguments that one may have against al-Baghdadi’s leadership and calls on Muslims in both Iraq and Syria to follow his lead and unite. In fact, al-Athari states that “we ask God that the time will come in which we will see our shaykh sitting on the thrown of the caliph”.

Much of this praise seems rooted in the idea that is also found in the work of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the Shari’a Council he started – of which, as mentioned, al-Athari is nominally still a member – namely that jihad should be legitimate, effective and fruitful. In other words, it should consist of exactly the type of scholarly sanctioned, thoroughly considered and widely consolidated actions that al-Baghdadi apparently engages in. Al-Baghdadi seems to combine the qualities of a thinker with those of a fighter and, in a nutshell, therefore seems to be precisely the type of “philosopher jihadi”, to use Nelly Lahoud’s phrase, that scholars like al-Maqdisi and al-Athari are searching for.

An article recently released by EA Worldview claims to refute the widespread belief that Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) is an al-Qaeda affiliate; rather, it is a “local faction” in the Syrian insurgency that respects al-Qaeda but maintains its autonomy. According to EA Worldview, when JN’s leader, al-Golani, recently renewed his oath of allegiance (bay`a) to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on April 10^th, it was merely a formal nod of respect without significance for command and control.

EA Worldview’s interpretation of Golani’s oath of allegiance is wrong & here’s why:

Late on 8 April, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader al-Baghdadi issued a statement in which he essentially claimed to subsume JN within his group’s existing Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, the AQI front group) structure, thereby forming the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fil-Iraq wal-Sham). In so doing, Baghdadi confirmed suspicions first formally raised by the US State Department in December 2012 when it claimed JN was actually AQI, and therefore an international terrorist organisation. In his statement, Baghdadi set forth a JN history that explicitly depicted JN as his creation. Baghdadi claimed that he personally “deputised” Golani – then a Syrian AQI commander active in Iraq – and “pushed” him along with several other AQI fighters to Syria. Baghdadi also claimed that “we laid plans for them and drew up for them the policy of work” and also provided them with financial and other strategic assistance. If Baghdadi’s history is right, his assertion that JN is part of an expanded ISI structure is a natural next step in the group’s evolution.

JN’s leader Golani didn’t perceive things in quite the same way. His statement, released a little over 24 hours later, not only expressed surprise at Baghdadi’s claim to have subsumed JN under his overall command, but clearly described a series of events where he – not Baghdadi – was the brains and engine behind JN’s formation: “[Baghdadi had agreed] to a project that we proposed to him.” Although Golani openly acknowledged his previous role in AQI and adopted the reverential title of “Sheikh” when referring to Baghdadi, he explicitly asserted that “the banner of the [Nusra] Front will stay as it is.” Golani then renewed his pledge of bay’a – an Islamic oath of allegiance – to Zawahiri and swore to listen to and obey all his orders no matter the circumstances. Golani closed his statement by assuring the Syrian people that “what you saw from JN in its defence of your religion, blood, and honour, and its good manners to you – the fighting faction will not change.”

There are several things to take away from this to-and-fro between Baghdadi and Golani:

• JN leader Golani renewed his pledge of bay’a to AQ leader Zawahiri.
  • The renewal indicates that he had previously pledged bay’a to Zawahiri as a member of AQI. In other words, JN was already AQ before the April statements from Baghdadi and Golani.
  • The swearing of bay’a to Zawahiri itself is as clear an indication of a group’s loyalty to AQ as you’re ever going to get.

• Golani wants JN to be recognized as an independent AQ affiliate and not a subsidiary of AQI or its front group, the Islamic State of Iraq. It also indicates an element of competition between Golani and Baghdadi to assume responsibility for JN’s comparative success in Syria.
  • This does not mean JN is an autonomous actor in Syria detached from AQ leadership in Af-Pak.

• It is extremely unlikely that JN’s original creation in Syria by senior members of AQI could have occurred without Zawahiri’s knowledge and permission. In fact, the first statement in which Zawahiri explicitly covered developments in the Syrian revolution came on 27^th July 2011 – the month when JN was actually created (although it formally announced its emergence in January 2012, several 2013 interviews with JN commanders indicate the group was created in July).
  • This suggests the continued leading role of the AQ’s Af-Pak-based senior leadership in directing core AQ policies and strategies in Syria and across the world.

• By stressing his intention to continue operations in Syria under the JN name and with the same “policies”, Golani is attempting to prevent the deleterious impact an affiliation with AQI might have on his group’s reputation amongst Syria’s civilian population (resulting from AQI’s history of brutality and subjugation of Iraq’s civilian population).
  • This does not mean he is separating himself from central AQ’s leadership command & orders.

In short: JN was AQ all along; it grew specifically out of AQI; has adopted a notably different strategy in terms of operating amongst the people; and seeks a place as a Syria-based separate AQ affiliate group.

Although Golani is adamant that JN is a locally-focused insurgent group, his oath of allegiance to Zawahiri means the group shares al-Qaeda’s vision of the global jihad, which extends far beyond the Syrian theatre. Golani’s emphasis on the local jihad should therefore be interpreted as an attempt to win over the Syrian public and not as evidence that the group has no aspirations beyond Syria’s borders. Similar strategies have been adopted by other local AQ affiliates around the world, most notably by Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen. So long as JN portrays itself as a group derived from local recruits fighting for local issues and devoted to a national cause, it may be able to sustain its largely positive reputation within the wider Syrian opposition movement. Much will depend on the nature of instruction the group receives from Zawahiri.

In many respects, Golani’s subtly terse reply to Baghdadi has at least temporarily saved his group’s operational reputation within the “Syrian” insurgency. JN has so far escaped any direct condemnation from the other insurgent groups, which is a testament to Golani’s ability to portray the group as a servant of the Syrian revolution and not the tool of AQ’s transnational agenda.

Since 10 April, the senior leaderships of both AQI and JN have failed to issue a single statement through any official media outlet. While it’s impossible to definitively attribute this anomaly to anything in particular, the most likely explanation is that Zawahiri has been faced with the tough diplomatic challenge of reasserting authority over both AQI and JN and fixing any damaged relations between Baghdadi and Golani. AQ has traditionally prided itself on political unanimity within its command and control structures. A critical reason for swearing bay’a is that it should – in theory – ensure that affiliate groups follow orders from the top. Clearly, Baghdadi spoke too soon, and the resulting very public disagreement has raised questions over Zawahiri’s ability to manage the AQ “organisation.”

Both groups are clearly still active though. AQI attacks continue in Baghdad and elsewhere. In Syria, several local and independent jihadi units have pledged allegiance to JN and reports of JN operations have continued to filter through unofficial channels and other groups’ Syrian sources. Yesterday morning morning, the Salafi militia Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya claimed responsibility for a joint ambush with JN of a military convoy in Khan al-Sheikh outside Damascus. Whatever Zawahiri eventually decides, al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria will persist in one form or another.

A week later, on February 9, the same member to initiate the thread condensed these contributions into a single strategic document, intended to represent the forum membership’s thinking as a whole. The author identified the document as sensitive and not to be shared except via email with jihadis lacking access to Shumukh. (The Shumukh forum, which has direct ties to al-Qaeda, is password-protected and does not readily register new users.) In the spirit of transparency, I have taken the liberty of translating the document in its entirety (see below).

In all likelihood, Shumuk’s so-called “comprehensive strategy” for Syria has less value for jihadis on the battlefield as actionable strategy than it does for researchers as a window into how important jihadi thinkers are processing the unending Syrian civil war. In this regard, the document is particularly revealing in two respects.

First, contrary to the triumphalist tone of much Syrian jihadi media, the Shumukh members are not upbeat in their description of ongoing and anticipated events. For the present, there is hope mixed with desperation and fear; for the future, a strong sense that the jihadis will suffer strangulation from all sides. In their worldview, some form of Western intervention to stymie jihadi success is all but assured; the West, with its Israeli and Iranian allies, will seal Syria’s borders and proceed to eliminate the jihadi threat, carving up Syria and elevating the “Islamists” to power.

Second, Shumukh’s recommendations presuppose a very long war in Syria. These include such things as rapidly increasing the number of recruits before the borders are sealed, making sure to take control of the regime’s heavy and unconventional weapons, establishing a unified media organization for more effective propaganda, and refraining, at all costs, from allying with “Islamists” such as the Muslim Brotherhood, no matter how attractive this might seem.

Read in full, Shumukh’s “comprehensive strategy” for Syria presents an unmistakably grim prognostication for jihadism’s future in Syria—indeed a grim prognostication for Syria’s future in general. It is an attempt to think realistically about the challenges to true jihadi success in Syria in the coming months and years.

Translation of Shumukh al-Islam’s “comprehensive strategy” for Syria:

As you know, brothers, the intention of this thread is to bring together the greatest possible number of strategic ideas and proposals from which our mujahidin brothers and their supporters, especially those on the fighting front in Syria and its surrounding areas, may benefit. We would like here for our forums, in addition to their traditional role of support, publication, mobilization, and exhortation, to be centers for research and sophisticated studies that issue reports and advisory recommendations by which we may progress, by firm and well-studied steps on our path toward the virtuous caliphate, and arrive by God’s help and support at the desired objective in the quickest time possible and at the lowest possible cost. This is just as our enemies have centers for research and advisory studies, directed by contemptuous experts and thinkers, constantly issuing recommendations and reports which their countries’ governments act upon.

Here we will combine what we managed to summarize of previous and other entries, reducing them to a number of important and all-inclusive strategic points. These will give us, and our brothers in Syria and its environs, a clear picture of what our enemies are planning for us and what we must do to resist them, nay what we must do to take charge of our present and future activities and to compel our enemies to respond to what we—not they—are planning.

First, there are two points which constitute red lines and on which there can be no debate with anyone, whether in Syria or elsewhere. The first is ruling on the basis of the Islamic Shari‘ah, that is, striving to establish an Islamic state that rules according to the book of God and the normative practice of His Prophet, peace and prayers be upon him, in accordance with the understanding of the pious forefathers of this [Islamic] community and the interpretation of their pious successors. The second is non-recognition of any Sykes-Picot boundaries between our Islamic countries, near or distant, except insofar as Islamic activity may require harmless formalities, like the requirements of travel and logistical cooperation, on account of what this serves us in gathering soldiers and support and the like.

In light of the foregoing points, here we will set down certain recommendations, as well as [describe] certain events anticipated—by God’s will—to transpire.

Events anticipated and ongoing:

First, most of our thinkers expect the struggle in Syria to endure for a long time, and it is necessary therefore to make the needed provisions for this.

Second, there is currently an ongoing race, and there will be Crusader-Israeli-Iranian efforts, to wrest control of or destroy the chemical weapons facilities within Syria before they come under the control of those whom this criminal alliance believes are a danger to it: namely, the jihadis or Hezbollah[i] from the perspective of the Jews and the Crusaders, and the jihadis from the perspective of the Iranian Zoroastrians and the Crusaders.[ii]

Third, a Crusader power will, inevitably, arrive on Syrian territory, using multiple pretexts such as “preserving peace” or “protecting the Jews” or “protecting the poor and innocent Alawite community!!!!”

Fourth, there will be efforts to partition Syrian territory—or partition will be imposed upon it—with a view to protecting the Alawite sect so that the latter may serve as a Crusader-Jewish-Zoroastrian nail in the throat of the Sunnis in greater Syria. This is an outcome which must be guarded against no matter how many Islamists engage in the conspiracy, either as clients cognizant of the conspiracy, or as fools ignorant of it.

Fifth, the revolution and the mujahidin are currently being besieged in an effort to prevent their acquiring arms, while at the same time military, logistical, and financial support are being provided to the Alawite regime. There are, of course, a number of reasons for this, all of them being interests of the alliance mentioned above:

• prolonging the war until the desired arrangement of cards and puppets can emerge;
• bleeding the financial reserves of the regime and sucking dry everything in this foolish Alawite’s possession;
• transforming those financial reserves into arms and weapons stocks for the regime, that it might use them against its people in bombarding and destroying them, or that they might fall as booty into the hands of the revolution’s fighting units;
• exploiting the revolutionaries’ seizure of the regime’s weapons in order to destroy what remains of it [the regime].

With time, everyone will be exhausted, all weapons in Syria will be destroyed, and all signs of civilization will be obliterated and cast back to what existed before the Stone Age. Thus will the path be paved for direct and indirect military intervention in Syria, and for redrawing the map in accordance with the wishes of the Zionist-Crusader-Zoroastrian alliance.

Sixth, different forms of intervention will multiply in Syria, which will become filled with contradictory ideas leading to major disagreements among opposition forces, as well as among the independent fighting units of foreign origin fighting on the battlefield in league with these forces.

Seventh, and with the transformation of the revolution’s course into an “Islamist” one, “drawing on the support of God and intending to establish His rule on the ground,” it is the “secular Islamists” who will be brought to power, power being their main objective. In this they will be encouraged by the forces of the international conspiracy, but on the condition that they [the Islamists] oppose with all their might this jihadi Islamic tide aspiring to the virtuous caliphate. What will happen, in other words, is that pseudo-Muslims will be attacking Muslims, thus sparing the infidel powers the evil of fighting themselves. Of course, this group (i.e., the secularist pseudo-Muslims) is that which will be provisioned with weapons from now on, so that instead of against the Alawites they [the weapons] may be used against the [conspiracy’s] real enemy, which is those who wish to implement the rule of the Islamic Shari‘ah.

Eighth, after the exhaustion or downfall of the regime, the Zionist-Crusader-Zoroastrian alliance and its allies in Syria will, if possible, reorient its compass in a new direction, sealing off all borders to forestall an influx of jihadi recruits and any kind of logistical support for them. This will be with a view to besieging them [the jihadis] and beginning a confrontation with those of them present inside the country.

Ninth, the shared interests [in besieging the jihadis] mentioned in point eight will expand to encompass the Brotherhood government in Turkey, the client Son of the Crusaders in Jordan and his Brotherhood friends, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Safavid government in Iraq, the hypocrite government in the Hijaz, the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, and others who are clearly with them.

Tenth, in sum, perhaps it will be that our brothers in Syria are exposed to extraordinary pressure, assault, forced retreat, ignominy, and many, many other things. But all of this, God permitting, will be of a piece with the greatness of the trial and the test, and the greatness of the responsibility assumed for pushing the community of one and a half billion Muslims toward salvation. And few are those, unfortunately, deserving of such credit.

As for the recommendations that are advised:

First, patience…and more patience, and trust in God alone in all things, and dependence upon Him, be He praised and exalted. For He is the Bringer of success and the All-Knowing about His servants.

Second, keeping in our eyes the principal objective at all times no matter what the challenges. This is: the annihilation of the Alawites, then the establishment of God’s law in the land of Syria—in preparation for erecting the larger virtuous caliphate on all of the earth—and removing all obstacles standing in the way.

Third, making the necessary provisions and taking the necessary measures for what will follow the fall or toppling of the regime. In fact, these are of greater concern to us than the ongoing war, be one a mujahid inside Syria or a supporter somewhere around the world.

Fourth, collecting the greatest possible amount of heavy and unconventional weapons and guarding them in full security, as there will be great need for them in the future.

Fifth, increasing recruitment [of mujahidin] extensively and securely—securely meaning the possibility of recruiting large fighting units for service with Jabhat al-Nusrah while instructing individuals in the correct [Islamic] creed and path, periodically polishing them [in this way], and selecting those whose credibility has been established for dependable battalions…and things such as this—as well as establishing links and alliances, insofar as these do not contravene God’s law, with the many influential forces in Syria, such as other Islamic organizations, tribal shaykhs, and others.

Sixth, working to increase greatly the inflow of recruits to Syria, both because of what need the brothers have there and because the openness of these borders will not persist; rather the borders will soon be closed. But this inflow need not require emptying other [jihad] fronts of the fighters and young men who are needed there; rather [the latter should spare only] what they have above and beyond their local need and in proportion to the need of our brothers in Syria if it be greater.

Seventh, all forces of Ansar al-Shari‘ah throughout the world (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and even in Europe) must take concerted action in two ways:

• First, work to increase the number of lectures and activities relating to preaching, consciousness raising, and communications—with regard to the media, there is today a concerted media war against the brothers in Syria and especially from the channel “al-Jazeera,” for recently this lying channel has attributed all the various operations and activities in Syria to the “Free Syrian Army”; this is a criminal and programmatic effort to brainwash the viewers and render the past and future of the revolution empty of any activity or space for Islamic fighters—and work to inform the Islamic community of the truth of the struggle [in Syria], of its nature as global and not merely limited to Syria, or as merely opposing oppressive regimes, but rather as opposing the murderous Alawites, those of the Zoroastrians standing in the background holding imperial Persian dreams, and a Crusader-Jewish alliance that provides unlimited support to anyone wishing to destroy the community of Islam.
• Second, work to gather contributions and support for our brothers in Syria and ensure that they reach them, as well as working via the proper mechanism to sustain necessary recruitment activity and engaging in demonstrations highlighting the extent of the interconnectedness of our interests around the world. For we are a single community, not divided by geographical or other boundaries. All must know that the issue of Syria is a pivotal issue for us, and that no participant in a conspiracy against the brothers there will ever be spared, no matter how far away he may be.

Eighth, the military and civilian units of global jihad supporters in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine must be fully prepared for mobilization if that is required. What this means is that there first be peaceful activities, as we have indicated [in point seven], but that they be accompanied by the threat of plunging the entire region into a vast war if our brothers in Syria are besieged or conspired against whether [by elements] from beyond Syria or by the brothers of the revolution itself. The interests of anyone participating in such a conspiracy would be targeted. Fingers should be on the trigger. Indeed, this point is most important for establishing a balance of fear that allows the brothers in Syria the support necessary to be able to concentrate on their activities within the country.

In this vein, the brothers from the Islamic State of Iraq, may god strengthen them, who are the true strategic depth for the brothers in Syria, must work to prevent the Safavids from having any presence on the eastern Syrian border. They must ensure sustained logistical support and prevent the Safavids from partaking in any effort to besiege the brothers in Syria in the future, as well as stop overland support and other things that would diminish pressure on the Alawites in the west of Syria.

Ninth, the fighting units of Jabhat al-Nusrah, may God grant them victory, and their allies should turn their fire and missiles in the direction of Alawite cities with great intensity. For such will work to upset their security and encourage them to flee, particularly those possessing wealth, thus leading to the collapse of the regime’s bases of support. The latter consist of the finances provided by Alawite businessmen, and which is necessary for funding the different groups of the shabiha.

Tenth, the fighting units of Jabhat al-Nusrah and their allies should work to establish a broad and unified shura council and to create an executive committee for carrying out the work of governance, in order to fill the void and manage people’s affairs in the areas under our control. In this way services and other forms of aid may be rendered, people may be educated and enlightened about the creed and Islam, and they may be informed about the international conspiracy against them.

Eleventh, establishing an office or large media organization that would work around the clock for Jabhat al-Nusrah and the fighting units in Syria allied with it, providing the people with the necessary facts. For the media in this generation are equivalent to half the army, and sometimes international wars are led by means of the media alone. This [proposed] office can produce local broadcasts, ensuring that these reach every home in Syria and thus allowing the true, undistorted voice of the mujahidin access to the ears of the people.

Twelfth, it is incumbent upon all preachers and religious scholars to bear their legal responsibilities to guide and enlighten the [Islamic] community. For your brothers in Syria, in the coming days, will be in the utmost need of what you can do [for them].

Thirteenth, establishing a professional intelligence apparatus to carry out special operations: that is, to clean up anything dirtying the path to the creation of an Islamic state.

Fourteenth, urging our brothers in Jabhat al-Nusrah to seize control of geographically strategic areas; also urging them to seize barracks containing heavy weaponry so as to increase the conventional weapons stocks that will be of the greatest importance in the future.

[Finally,] a notice: Personally, I do not at the present time advise striking what is referred to as “Israel.” Doing so would widen the circle of enemies and [war] fronts around our brothers while they are in an inflexible state of full exertion. [I would only advise it] in the event [“Israel”] immediately join the battles alongside the Alawites against the mujahidin, or if we were responding to Israeli tests of our determination, which they will carry out once the mujahidin have or are nearing complete control of Syria.

This is what was possible for us to bring together of points and recommendations. We ask God Almighty to grant us success by means of them, to grant our brothers in Syria success by means of them, to grant them victory, and to establish for them the virtuous caliphate, by the permission of Him—be He exalted.

Since last May the context of this dispute has changed significantly. Abu Basir has abandoned his London refuge, where he had lived for more than a decade, for the battlefields of northern Syria. Meanwhile, Jabhat al-Nusrah no longer enjoys a monopoly on Syrian Islamic militancy, as a large number of groups has emerged fighting under an “Islamic banner.”

Yet the war of words between the two jihadi ideologues has intensified over the past months, becoming the most significant bout of intellectual jihadi infighting since the 2005 quarrel between Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi. The tension in jihadi media has been palpable. Two days ago, al-Bunyan al-Marsus, a jihadi outfit promoting unity among Syrian Islamists, issued a plea for reconciliation between the two shaykhs. As the following explains, this is not likely to ease tensions. The intellectual divide separating these opponents is vast, and the battle lines have been boldly drawn—with possible implications for the unfolding Syrian jihad.

Dramatis personæ

Little is known about Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti besides his presumed Mauritanian nationality. His anonymity, however, has not hindered his rising stature, which derives from affiliation with the website Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. This is the site founded by the now jailed Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi of Jordan. In 2009 al-Maqdisi organized a Shari‘ah Council of some dozen like-minded scholars to handle queries on his website, among whom was al-Shinqiti. For the past several months, al-Shinqiti has been the Council’s sole acting representative. The Minbar also publishes his many books and essays, all written within the last few years.

A great deal more is known about the 53-year-old Abu Basir al-Tartusi (real name, ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Mustafa Halimah), who fled his native Syria in 1980 after fighting against the previous Asad regime. Abu Basir made a name for himself in the 1990s in Jordan with books calling for jihad against the impious rulers of the Arab world. Around the millennium he took refuge in London and started a website hosting his books and commentaries. (For more information, see here and here.)

Abu Basir has long posed as an internal critic of the jihadi movement. For example, he categorically opposes suicide (or martyrdom) operations on theological and strategic grounds and holds that non-Muslims in Western and Muslim countries are entitled to protection from attack. He accordingly denounced the 2005 London bombings as “disgraceful.” He has argued, in a pragmatic vein, that jihad focus on the near enemy—as opposed to the far enemy strategy of al-Qaeda—and eschew needless violence.

When protests against the Asad regime broke out in March 2011 Abu Basir started a Facebook page called “The Islamic Opposition to the Syrian Regime,” urging jihad against the government, and in May 2012 he arrived in Syria himself. Although he is often pictured armed, he defines his role in the Syrian jihad as “simply a servant and an adviser to all the heroic rebels.” He has been seen among various rebel groups with Islamic names (see here and here, for example), but certainly not with the al-Qaeda group Jabhat al-Nusrah.

Al-Shinqiti attacks

Despite his contrarian stances, Abu Basir has long been a welcome member of the jihadi community. Even al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri underscored his “respect and appreciation” for Abu Basir’s “support for jihad and the mujahidin.” Al-Shinqiti, however, has made it his personal objective to write Abu Basir completely out of the jihadi fold.

The Mauritanian fired his opening salvo in May 2012 with the publication of “The Disgusting Deviations of the Critic of Ansar al-Shari‘ah: A Refutation of Shaykh Abu Basir.” (For further coverage of this, see here.) This monograph, a line-by-line critique of Abu Basir’s letter to the Yemeni AQAP-linked group Ansar al-Shari‘ah criticizing it for unnecessary violence in post-revolutionary Yemen, accused Abu Basir of obstructing jihad on the pretext of offering advice. Whereas the Syrian believed it wrong to target Yemeni soldiers following the deposition of the Yemeni president, the Mauritanian held that jihad ought to continue. Al-Shinqiti called one of Abu Basir’s arguments “the ugliest thing I have ever heard in my life in terms of obstruction.” Revolution, he claimed, had become for Abu Basir “an end in itself,” more important than implementation of the shari‘ah.

The following day al-Shinqiti attacked again, this time in a fatwa castigating Abu Basir for his stances toward the FSA and Jabhat al-Nusrah. (For more on this, see here and here). These remarks were indicative of a “large methodological shortcoming.”

In September 2012 al-Shinqiti released yet two more monographs chiding Abu Basir—and this time also his followers—in equally harsh terms. The first of these, called “The Enlightenment of Some Warnings in the Book Jihad and Shari‘ah Politics,” attacked Abu Basir’s forenamed book that called on jihadi groups to reform and reassess their strategies. The second, called “The Illumination of the Truth of Abu Basir’s Method,” comprised fourteen enumerated points of criticism and an extended plea to his followers to desist from supporting him.

Continuing his line of criticism, al-Shinqiti writes in these monographs that the chief aim of Abu Basir’s “advice” literature is to put out the fires of jihadis’ passion and instill in them fear of activity. “He considers himself a theoretician of jihad, and yet at the same time he supports not one action of the mujahidin’s actions.” Some of his fatwas, al Shinqiti believes, even played a role in decreasing the number of jihadi attacks in the United States and Europe. ‘Abd al-Bari ‘Atwan, the editor of the London-based daily al-Quds al-‘Arabi, he says, is a bigger supporter of al-Qaeda than Abu Basir.

Addressing himself to the Syrian’s supporters, al-Shinqiti says that it is time they recognize that their shaykh has defected from “the jihadi methodology,” much like other erstwhile jihadis, including Salman al-‘Awdah, have before him. “Know,” he continues, “that Abu Basir’s dispute with the mujahidin is not a dispute over one or two issues but rather one between two methodologies (manhajayn).” Therefore his opinions and judgments are to be read with great caution.

Abu Basir fires back

Abu Basir has issued two responses to al-Shinqiti, the first in November 2012 and the second in early January of this year. They are both short—about two to three pages each—in comparison with the Mauritanian’s more than 100 pages, and betray a certain reluctance. Abu Basir states that while he preferred to stay silent on the matter of al-Shinqiti’s accusations, he finally relented in view of the many solicitations for a response. But for all his reluctance, he does not mince words.

Al-Shinqiti, says Abu Basir, is a delusional “extremist” and “khariji” whose critiques amount to implicit takfir (excommunication). “He sees no farther than his nose” and writes as if he held “the keys to paradise in his hand.” In his lying screeds, “he interprets your advice to some of the mujahidin brothers as if it were an expression of enmity toward God, his Prophet, and the believers.” And he piles up scriptural evidence like firewood. Abu Basir states that while he, Abu Basir, is busy supporting jihad against the Asad regime, al-Shinqiti spends his time drumming up opposition not to Asad but to Abu Basir.

Al-Shinqiti ought not to be praised as brave and bold, Abu Basir warns, for he is in fact a coward, “too scared even to identify himself.” This “unknown jurist of his age,” he says mockingly, does not even deserve a proper refutation. Those who truly deserve one are “the brothers in charge of Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. How do they allow such dishonesty, extremism, and vileness to be published on their site?” (Ironically, the site also hosts a large number of Abu Basir’s writings.)

Most important for this discussion is that Abu Basir finds al-Shinqiti a serious threat to opposition unity in Syria. He is worried by the spreading influence there of his “takfiri words,” for certain Syrians are paying them notice. The result, he claims, is that some in the Syrian opposition are preparing for a confrontation with their fellow Muslims on the pretext of fighting the FSA.

Reconciliation?

Clearly the temperature of this exchange does not bode well for any hoped-for reconciliation between the two shaykhs. It may even portend confrontation between two kinds of Syrian jihadi groups somewhere down the road: those concerned with immediately seizing power and establishing God’s law by whatever means necessary, and those more willing to cooperate with the less Islamist elements of the opposition.

Recently, Abu Basir endorsed a new conglomerate of Islamic militant units called the Syrian Islamic Front, which represents—at least probably to his mind—the latter kind of group. The group’s charter mentions “gradualism” with respect to political objectives and “coexistence” with Syrian minorities. While Abu Basir criticized some parts of the charter, these were mere quibbles which the group kindly noted and brought to the attention of its leadership.

Abu Basir remains critical of Jabhat al-Nusrah, which he did not defend after its designation by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization. He did recently affirm his “affection for all the mujahidin” in Syria notwithstanding “reservations about some of their strategies and policies.” But the very next day he criticized Jabhat al-Nusrah for its excessive secrecy.

One might anticipate that this rather intellectual dispute between Abu Basir and al-Shinqiti will have practical implications for the ongoing Syrian jihad. It may be some time before the full extent of these implications is borne out—or perhaps the mujahidin will allow all this to pass over their heads. But it is clear from Abu Basir’s writing that he, at least, sees confrontation between Syrian jihadis as a looming threat and possibility.

While several publications have tried to show us the man behind the myth, it would be even better if we could get a glimpse of what al-Zarqawi thought in his pre-Iraq years. Well, the time has come. About a week ago, a jihadi website posted a notebook allegedly used by al-Zarqawi while imprisoned in Jordan in the 1990s. The link on the website (the eleventh title from the top) is called Safahat min Daftar al-Shaykh Abi Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (Pages from Shaykh Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s Notebook) and leads to an .exe file that actually allows you to flick through the man’s writings.

Some Jihadica readers may remember that Will McCants discussed this document two years ago (on 22 June 2008 to be exact). At the time, however, only a few pages were available and the links to the rest of the document didn’t work (or at least don’t work anymore). Some readers may also be familiar with the Jordanian journalist Fu’ad Husayn and his book Al-Zarqawi: Al-Jil al-Thani li-l-Qa’ida (Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of al-Qa’ida, available in English here), which also only showed a few of the notebook’s pages on pp. 21-23. Now, however, the full 77-page document is available in its original form, including even the blank pages.

Authenticity and timing

The document seems to be authentic. As Will noted at the time, the notebook is dedicated to several people, including Umm Qudama and Abu Qudama, who are respectively al-Zarqawi’s sister and brother-in-law, and al-Zarqawi was indeed in prison in 1998, when the document is said to have been written. This information could, of course, easily have been known by others but there is a third reason to believe this document is indeed the real deal. As mentioned, Will discussed some of these pages before when they appeared on a jihadi forum and so did the book by Fu’ad Husayn, who told me he had received the notes directly from al-Zarqawi’s family. Now that they appear on another jihadi website, it seems unlikely that three different sources keep recycling different pages of a notebook that was never written by al-Zarqawi, although one cannot be entirely sure of course.

As to why this document was posted now, one can only guess. The notebook wasn’t written or discovered recently and, considering al-Zarqawi has been dead for four years, nothing of interest seems to have happened to him that caused the document’s publication. Moreover, if it was posted on the website to commemorate some kind of anniversary (his death, his birth, his release from prison etc.), it would presumably have been announced with quite a bit of fanfare but it wasn’t. The most likely reason it was posted a week ago is that the website it appeared on, tawhed.ws, has posted several collections of jihadi writings as e-books over the past few weeks. These include Ayman al-Zawahiri’s writings, for example, but also those of Mustafa Abu l-Yazid. The posting of al-Zarqawi’s notebook may thus be part of a general effort by the people behind the website to release collections of writings, even of those that have been in their possession for a long time.

Religious texts

In any case, and as Will noted at the time, this is a great source for academics studying the backgrounds and inner workings of terrorists. Although this blog post is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the content, we can surely take a quick glance. The document is filled with religious texts that deal with various topics. There is Qur’anic exegesis, for example on p. 8, where al-Zarqawi cites the explanation of the verse “and be not as those who say, ‘We hear,’ and they hear not” (Q. 8: 21) by the mediaeval exegete al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), and on p. 20, by Ibn Kathir (1300-1373). It also contains several texts apparently copied from books by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350), for example on pp. 9-11 and 15-16. Although Ibn al-Qayyim is generally a favourite among radical Muslims for his uncompromising and strict views on various issues – like his teacher Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) – the fact that he was persecuted and imprisoned because of his ideas may also have inspired al-Zarqawi.

Dedication

While the notebook does not have a single topic or message, most of the texts mentioned seem somehow related to what I would call “dedication” to the cause. The passage explained by al-Qurtubi mentioned above seems to serve as a reminder to stay pious and focused, for example. Al-Zarqawi also discusses jihad (p. 12) and cites a hadith (tradition on the life of Muhammad) about not having to fear if one trusts in God (p. 13). He continues by mentioning the various types of consolation to the believers (p. 15). Al-Zarqawi sometimes also writes short pieces that he seems to have made up himself. One of them (p. 25) mentions the close connection one should maintain with God, while one should break with the tawaghit (idols, used here probably to refer to “un-Islamic” rulers). The rest of the notebook is similarly filled with poems, religious texts and exhortations to remain patient and to keep one’s faith.

What all this adds up to is a collection of short pieces that seems to portray a man dedicated to his faith who uses religious texts to get him through the tough times he is facing. Considering the fact that he was in prison when he wrote this and would go on to become one of the world’s best-known jihadis, this makes a lot of sense, of course. I will leave it to others to decipher all of the notebook, which contains a lot of blank pages after p. 34 but also shows some nice drawings (for example on pp. 70-71). It should be clear, however, that any scholar seriously dealing with al-Zarqawi cannot afford to ignore this source.