As promised, I’ve pulled together some quotes from Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad so we can discuss their merits rather than my summaries of them.

Most of the stuff I disagree with in the book is on pages 126-133 (where your quote came from). It’s not a lot, but it’s the core of Sageman’s argument that AQ Central is not directing operations or groups outside of Af-Pak border area.

To begin, here is the position Sageman is against: “In mid-2007, several commentators on global Islamist terrorism argue that we are seeing a resurgence of al Qaeda Central. One went so far as to claim that ‘Al Qaeda is a more dangerous enemy today than it was ever before.'” (p.126)

Sageman then lays out his own thesis: “While I would reject the notion that al Qaeda is resurgent…I would agree that at this juncture al Qaeda leadership is regrouping and consolidating in Waziristan.” (p.127)

“Since 2004, al Qaeda seems to have been less active in Pakistan outside of Waziristan.” (p. 130-31)

“Al Qaeda Central is of course not dead, but it is still contained operationally. It puts out inspirational guidance on the Internet, but does not have the means to exert command and control over the al Qaeda social movement. The surviving leaders of al-Qaeda are undoubtedly still plotting to do harm to various countries in the world and have the expertise to do so, but they are hampered by the global security measures that have been put in place. They remain in hiding, but seem to have consolidated in Waziristan since the Pakistani military relaxed its efforts against them. So far al Qaeda Central has been confined to that area, but the increase in wannabes coming for training and its renewed ability to communicate with followers are disturbing developments. However, the long-term trend does not favor al Qaeda. The number of the trained global Islamist terrorists continues to dwindle along the Afghan-Pakistani border, and there is no sign that they are being replenished with competent new recruits.”

As for the AQ affiliates, you’ve already cited the relevant quote about al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Regarding the al-Qaeda affiliate in Algeria, Sageman writes, “In terms of the new al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, little ‘al Qaedas’ have sprung up everywhere in the world. They are just al Qaeda in name, trying to acquire the reputation of al Qaeda by using its name.” (p.129) Later in the same paragraph, he says, “It is unlikely that al Qaeda Central will be able to dictate anything to these groups.” (p.130)

You say that “Sageman, at least in my reading, is more than a little equivocal regarding AQ Central’s ability to exercise something like command and control outside of it’s immediate surroundings.” Where is the equivocation?

The passage you quoted says that even though attempts have been made to combine AQI and AQ Central, AQI remains independent of AQ Central. This is incorrect, but fits with Sageman’s larger argument that AQ Central does not have operational pull outside Afghanistan-Pakistan.

You make a good point about being fair to Sageman. I’ll find the relevant quotes tomorrow so I don’t continue to beat the stuffing out of strawmen.

Nowhere does Sageman cite AQI as an example of leaderless jihad.

Sageman, at least in my reading, is more than a little equivocal regarding AQ Central’s ability to exercise something like command and control outside of it’s immediate surroundings.

I would caution against making a strawman of Sageman, or trying to ascribe to him categorical opinions. I believe some have done this, and it weakens their own, often strong, case.

The Islamic State of Iraq, AQI’s umbrella organization, has put itself forward as the legitimate government of Iraq. Its head, Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, is spoken of as a caliph in waiting. That doesn’t mean the ISI is viable in the longterm, but it has controlled small areas from time to time.

The reason the ISI and AQI are having such problems today is precisely because they stopped attacking Americans and started attacking fellow insurgents and recalcitrant Sunnis.

As for the Shia, the idea is that ISI members should only kill those who collaborate. Of course, that eventually ends up including any Shia who don’t want to be ruled by the ISI.

In Afghanistan, by contrast, the government-in-exile (a tendentious but possibly legitimate title for the Taliban) exists and, by existing, present a possible , alternative future for the country, even for those with little imagination.

Is there any sort of “political” leadership of AQI? Do the Egyptian or al-Souri represent an actual potential future “President?” I suppose their political platform would be pretty simple… shari’a, but have they said if they have any plans for the Shi’a?

Sageman argues in Leaderless Jihad that AQ Central is not calling the shots outside of Afghanistan/Pakistan. The fact that Masri, the head of AQI, has made three trips to consult with AQ Central in Waziristan poses considerable problems for Sageman’s thesis.